¶ Intro / Opening
Bloomberg Audio Studios, podcasts, radio news.
¶ Ackman's Fund Launch and Initial Struggles
I'm trying to buy a house.
Yeah, it's the nesting instinct.
Things in Hoboken, New Jersey. They just get wet because the city is below sea level. I'm exaggerating, but only slightly. And you know, mold is a problem, and remediation of mold is a problem, and it's like, what are we going to do? I don't know, meate that mold, I know, and that's gonna cost money. And this whole thing, it's gonna cost money in time. Why does anyone own a house?
I asked myself that question every day. Yeah, but I want to on an apartment, but I don't own a house. Every mediate mold check for raid On.
Yeah, we checked for Raidon too. There's no freight on oh Neat Yeah. Yeah, that's cool.
The whole thing.
This is a place that we live in for like five to seven years. Okay, in five to seven years, I'm going to try to sell this bag of snakes. Yeah, same way it was sold to Mate. But at least, you know, I'm with my good friend Matt Levine and there's microphones in front of us.
Yeah, I have no bags of snakes to sell you. Hello, and welcome to the money Stuff Podcast. Youreicly podcast. Are we talking about stuff without it? To Bunny the money?
Funny funny Bunny stuff.
Funny money, money stuff. And I write the Matt Levine column.
This is very silly. I'm I'm just Katie Greifeld. I'm a reporter for Bloomberg News and an anchor for Bloomberg Television.
To the snakes. Ye Bill Ackman, founder of Pershing Square, the lads fund management firm closed un fund management firm, also has been talking for like two years about taking
a big new closed end fund public. It's called the Pershing Square USA or ps US, and I feel like this time too years ago, it was going to be a twenty five billion dollar clothes und fund, and it was going to trade it a premium, unlike most other clothes und funds, including notably like Ben's other clothes then fund for sure, And you really had to trade it a premion to like get a twenty five billion dollar IPO done, You really have to think that the thing
will trade up. No one did, so that IPO didn't happen, And he came back last month with like, what we're going to do is We're going to give you free shares of the management company person to square, the Hedgelinde management firm, and with those free shares, that'll be enough incentive for you to buy the clothes Unfund shares and then the whole thing will work. And it worked. Yeah, they went public dual ipo both ps the Hedgeho management company and PSUs the clothes Und Fund. They went public
this week. They started trading Wednesday. They raised five billion dollars for the clothes Und Fund, which you can now put to work investing in large cap public companies and uber credit.
Hues Hi. I have a few questions. I guess I just keep coming back to the point. I mean, you think about before we get to.
Too many questions. Yeah, yeah, talking about So they did go public PSUs so two o'clock on Thursday.
Yeah.
PSUs was trading at like forty three point fifty last night checked.
So sounds right.
Not a prem to net ascid value, no meaningful discount to net asset money.
It did close a bigger discount on once.
Yeah, it's up a bit today. Yeah, it closed down like sort of twenty percent. Yeah, from that asset It closed forty two ish and now it's at forty three and change. So you know, yeah, well below that ass that value.
I mean, it just seems extremely hard to defy the physics of closed un funds.
Sure, I agree, I should stress that spent years being like you know, in twenty twenty four, he wrote in a letter, it requires a significant leap of faith and ultimately careful analysis and judgment for investors to recognize that this closed end company will trade at a prim master the IPI, when very few in history have done so. Yeah, careful analysis, not careful enough. So yeah, so that traded down.
You know, the management company is trading it like twenty nine bucks a share, thirty bucks a share, which if you bought in the IPO, you got one share of piece of PSUs and one fifth of a share of Pershing Square. Right, so if you do the math, you got about like forty three bucks worth of the clothes on fund and about six bucks worth of the management company. So you lost a little bit of money as of now on the IPI. Yeah, it's down from the IPI price,
but it's not catastrophically done. Yeah up, No, normally IPOs.
Go up normally, I mean ideally, Yeah, to the closed end funds. He did say yesterday that there are hundreds of close und funds, but they are very different animals from what we are doing over time. We're going to compound the book value if we do anything like we've done in the past, at a high rate over time, and we're going to run it like a real company. I guess I just struggle to understand how this animal looks different than the other animals that are out there
when it comes to close un funds. His eyes, Yeah, true, true.
His twitter, Yeah right, everyone who runs a clothes un fund would like to compound it. Yeah, at a high rate.
I'm sure that's what he would have wanted to do in Europe as well, where his clothing fund is trading at a discount.
And compose at a high rate. But yeah, like the actual investing tracker, it is good.
Yeah, Yeah, it just feels it feels yeah, it feels disconnected from the trading dynamics of the actual structure. The structure is interesting in that I really want him to launch an ETF. I know he's not going to launch an UTF the discount problem would be solved, but it feels like that's a detail for him since he wants the permanent capital.
It's not just that, like, yeah, like he wants it to be a company, like he wants it to be Berkshire halfway. Well, like if you can just be redeemed at any moment, and like you're dealing with Jane Street arbitrage, Like it's not the same thing. Yeah, he wants to have a permanent company with permanent capital where you can make permanent investments.
It's the Warren Buffett comparison that I also have a lot of questions about, because how does the Howard Hughes of it all fold into this?
I've never understood that. Yes, Howard Hughes is a real company, but he owns a big stake in it's the offered to acquire more of it, would like to control it and use it as a platform to make investments. And then severally there's a closing fund.
I don't know, So, yeah, how do those two co exist? Are you going to compete with yourself? I mean probably not, but it seems like you're trying to do the same thing through two different Yeah.
I'm sure he has a plan, but I don't know that it's that super well explained.
Yeah, Like why would I buy shares of Howard Hughes and support your vision there. If you're also doing it in the closed up fund.
It's probably a different vision, slightly different vision.
I want to know what it is.
¶ Public Hedge Fund IPO Dynamics
Yeah, I don't care. I'm going to say attitude, the grandiosity with which started and the sort of fizzle with which is sort of when public is a little disappointing, Like this is gonna be a twenty five billion dollar clothes in fund, the trades at a premium. Now it's a five billion dollar clothes in fund. The trades at are discounts. Like, okay, thing is the normal thing happened? Someone got really mad about this. This IPO sort of
took place in two phases. He rounded up a bunch of anchor investors, institutions and family offices in highlight while worth individuals who invested, who like committed their capital before the IPO. They sorted like an anchor to like do the IPI. They're like, we've already got like two point eight million dollars of capital spoken for, so the thing,
will you know, have enough money? Those people got a little bit extra in the IPO instead of getting one fifth of a share of Pershing square for every share of pieces they got, they got three tenths of a share, so they got an extra like fifty percent of the management company. And someone emailed me like a weeko being like, it's so unfair that like the favored fat cats get more than like the regular investors are buying the IPO.
Was like, look, like it's always true that. Yeah, venture capitalists who invest in the last round before an IPO get you know, a better deal than people invest in the IPO. That's not that weird, but it is kind of there. You're paying these people to anchor the deal and make sure it happens. But it is the case that like, as of like the prices right now, that people who invested before the IPO have made a little
bit of a profit on the deal. People invested in the IPO have lost a little bit of money in the deal. It's a little awkward. Yeah, word that, Like that's the dividing one, Like you split that perfectly where the favorite investors did well and the disabored investors did poorly.
Yeah, I do wonder we've talked about this before. I also wonder when it comes to the management company, like what is the motivation to go public. There's so few publicly listed hedge funds. Man Group is the one that springs to mind for me. I just wonder.
Why, Well, I feel like the number one reason is to get this close un fund one. Yeah right, Like as I've written a lot, like you just can't get the clothes on fund because it's well feasible.
But if you soon got to twenty twenty fours, like they weren't connected, they were going to be to separate. I know, but I feel like you're outside.
They were talking about doing an IPO. Yeah, yeah, no, I mean I think it's the same reason anyone takes any you know, financial services company public, which is if you think that the public market would pay a high value for your ownership and your company, Like yeah, why do I take some cash up? Like you know, it's like he's sort of not the main chief investment officer of the company anymore. Like there's you know, there's like a next generation coming up. It makes sense for him
to have a publicly list that's duck. So I don't know, for all I know they're going to do I'm and a you know, for all I know, the publicly list that's luck will be a currency beyond just the getting the closed end fund launched. It's also like they have sort of an interesting structure where like everyone's calls him a hedge fund manager, it's like sort of a hedge fund firm, but it's like a closed and fund management firm. I think they would argue they have more stable, recurring
revenue then a lot of hedge fund firms. They're not making most of their money on totally at risk performance fees, like they're The way it works is like the they get like a senior share and the performance fees goes to the shareholders, and then like the junior share goes to the employees, and so they are a little bit more of a like recurring revenue play. And so I think they think that's something that shareholders value and they can monetize.
Yeah, I guess maybe another way to ask that question is why aren't there more public lists and hedge funds.
So a couple of answers. One is like, because a lot of hedge funds have bad income, like they're very volatile income, and so it is hard to sell that to the public. Approaching Square thinks that has built a better mouse trap where it has less volatile income, and so you know, because it runs like locked up you know in the Eastern capital with like very stable fees and you know, invest in large cap aquity, it's like a you know, it's a it's a fairly stable revenue stream.
That's one part of the answer. If you run a medium sized hedge fund and you like very volatile earnings, then it's harder to take that public. My theory is that the giant hedge fund firms don't go public because their hedge funds operate like investment banks. They offer their investors a return on equity rather than offering them like all of the upside and the you know, upside minus
twenty percent performance fees. Like they take whatever they want from the investors to pay their fees, and so there's not really like another layer of equity that you can put on that. I think that's not a very clear answer, but I think that's part of the answer. Like I think of the big multi strategy hedge funds as like this is a business, yeah, and the business has equity capital, and the equity capital comes from the LPs in the
hedge fund. And when you think of it like that, like you don't need another layer of equity capital for the management company, because the management company is just a way to pay the fees to the employees.
The good news is that we're going to be talking about the fee structure of multistraats. Oh yeah, we are later in this podcast. I just just want to point out one more thing. Bill Lackman, he said on Bloeber TV that he's been very constrained when it comes to tweeting. He did tweet on Thursday morning was that he bought in the open market both ps U s and p S. Yeah. I thought that was a.
Cool little established He thinks he should traded a premium.
Yeah, you have to invest in yourself, Matt, Bill Lackman Man not bird.
Did you talking about Bobby Jane and the fees?
¶ Multi-Strategy Fund Startup Difficulties
Yeah, I think that we were trying to be thematic.
Yeah, sure, So elsewhere in hedge funds, behund managers, edge trend managers who maybe you know, it's somewhat disappointing weeks.
Yeah.
Bobby Jane, the founder of.
Jane Global, which I don't think is going to go public anytime.
Soon, multi strategy hedge fund startup from the last couple of years. He is returning outside capital and going back to managing money exclusively from Millennium, which is the firm that he came from.
M He's going home, going home.
It's hard out there for.
A It really is strategy hedge on the startup. I think a lot of people read this news and at least my first thought was, if it's not Bobby Jane, who can crack into this into multistrats, That's what everyone said, right.
He was like high up in investing at Millennium and also was like sort of known as the guy who built a lot of millenniums like architecture and processes. Like he seemed like a guy who could run a firm rather than just be an investor at a firm. Yeah, and it didn't work, apparently, And I think the answer is, like,
it's just really hard. These are platforms that really require scale and have a lot of fixed costs, and it's just hard to get started and cover all those fixed costs as you're like wrapping up your strategies and as you're wrapping up your investor base. Yeah, and therefore it's hard to get new investors because early on you're not earning the return that they want, and so they're like, yeah, we'll wait until you get huge, and let's stick with the money and then till them.
Yeah, I mean it has about six billion dollars. Not enough, it's not enough. What is enough? Jane struck out on his own in twenty twenty four.
Yeah, so he's been independent for about two years and it's hard to get to scale.
Yeah, let's talk a little bit about how passed through fees factor into this, because multistraats are very expensive.
Yeah. I think that, like the intuition that people have about hedge funds doesn't apply to all these shots. Like Bill Ackman runs like an investment from right there. Yeah, he like takes your money and he invested in some stuff and he gives you the return minus his fees. It's not what Millennium or Jane Global do. What they do is they run some businesses. They have some desks that do some businesses. They do index arbitrage, they do
basis trades. They do like some stuff that generates high expected returns with like relatively low volatility, and they combine those things into a thing that has even lower volatility and they sell that to investors. They say, we're going to give you alpha we're gonna give you like very stable, medium sized returns. And when you do those businesses, there's a certain amount of capacity in those strategies, and if you have too much money for the capacity, then you
can't do it right. And so like these friends will sometimes return money because they don't have enough capacity to run the money that the investors will give them. But if too little capacity, then you can still do the trades. But you're paying a portfolio manager fifty million dollars a year to do the trades, and you're only making forty million dollars a year from the trades because you're not
putting enough money into them, right. So that's a lot of what's happening here is like the going rate for someone to sit in these seats and do these trades is fifty million dollars or something, and if you're not giving him enough capital, then he's only earning forty million dollars and you're not earning a return for your investors.
I think that's a lot of what happened here. Like they were earning returns running their strategies, but when you took out the amount they were their portfolio managers, it wasn't enough for the investors.
Yeah, it's a sad start sat right. Yeah.
The essential problem here is that hedgehund portfolio managers get paid a lot, which is, you know, a nice problem for them. Yeah, but it makes it hard to become an employer of hedge on portfolio managers.
I like how you compared it to tech startups in the newsletter that you wrote on this topic that you think about tech startups. Employees come in and they you know, are paid pennies, but they get a lot of stock and investors are content to wait out for their big payday.
Yeah. Everyone has Like investors in a startup company have a long term horizon where they're like, I know, I'm not going to get any return on my capital in the first year, but in ten years I'll get a lot.
I get a huge return on my capital, right, you know, if things go well and employees are kind of taking the same bargain at a multi strategy hedge fund, if you're like competing for the audience that is giving money to like Millennium and zero point seventy two and whatever, people are not like, oh yeah in ten years, all
ten X my money. Great. Those people are like, I want a very steady fifteen percent a year with no correlation to the market and no drawdowns, right, Like, those people are not the ideal investors in a startup that is not currently earning its cost of capital. And similarly,
like the employees. I don't know, man, I'm sure there are some, you know, portfolio managers at hedgehos who are like, I'll work for nothing in exchange for huge equity, right, I mean they are famous stories, right, like, yeah, Jeff Bezos left E Shaw to Campbell on himself. But you know a lot of them are like getting fifty million dollars a year over here. I'd rather keep getting fifty million dollars a year.
Yeah, I'm just I'm just doing the math, man, And doesn't it doesn't work out?
Right? Should we move on to another Yeah?
We have a lot to cover Front of.
The show hedgehow manager had a disappointing.
Week in actual Front of the show.
¶ BDC Tender Offer Investor Insights
Buzz once then came on the pod a few weeks ago to talk about how he was bidding to buy I don't know, five or ten percent of OBDC two, the Blue Owl Private Credit Fund Audacious he got less than one percent. I don't think he's that disappointed. I mean, as I said on the podcast, it was not zero percent trolling. Yeah, you got to he accomplished the trolling whether or not he bought any shares.
Yeah.
Also, he said on the podcast, like, if he had gotten filled, it would have been sort of scary for everyone, including him. It would have been like, oh wow, people are really panicking about these private credit funds. But the fact that he didn't get that many shares suggest that, like, yeah, everyone's fine, it's fine.
Yeah, it was an interesting experiment. He pulled it off, and we got in interesting read on how folks are actually feeling.
Yeah, it's very hard for me to know the psychology of investors in private credit non traded BDCs, And I want to emphasize that. I say that as an investor in a non traded BDC I own, as we'll talk about next week. I own a small amount of all non traded bdct this one. But who are these people like me? Some of them are people who are like, these credits are bad. I want my money back, and if the best I can do is bo As giving me sixty five cents on the dollar, I'll take it. Right.
A few of those people, right, you got some take up. A lot of them I think are like, I would like to not be involved in this conversation. I would like my money back at one hundred cents on the dollar, which all these funds offer, but with caps on how many withdraws you can and not how much they'll have at each quarter. And they're like putting in their requests to get back their money at one hundred cents on
the dollar. And if it's capped and they only get a portion of their money back a one hundred cents on the dollar, then they'll wait for next time.
Yeah.
What they won't do is sell to Boaz for sixty five cents on the dollar, because the whole point of this product is it doesn't go down.
Sixty five is less than one hundred.
Yeah. There are a lot of people who sell stocks at below where they bought them because like stocks go up and down, right, this is not supposed to go up and down. Yeah, whatever the navy goes up and down, put mostly up. And if the market price of this thing is in some sense down thirty five percent from it's that acid value, people are not going to sell
that market price. So that's a lot of what's happening here is that these people kidding me are in these products for like stability, and if the market has just located, they're like, no, thank you, I don't want to play. And then some people are like not checking their mailbox.
Right. Yeah, it feels like quite an exercise in trying to herd cats without knowing.
I get him throw away all tender offer statements from Blue Out.
Yeah, some of them might be interesting. Maybe you would have liked to look.
At the time I open one, I'm like, it's relevant to.
My job, goodbye. Okay, So we don't know too much about the psychology. If you can draw the conclusion here.
Though, that people like outright panic.
Yeah, they weren't so desperate to get out of this.
If he had bought like ten percent of the fund it sixty five cents on the dollar, that would have been a strong suggestion that it was worth considerably less than sixty five cents on the dollar. Yes, and he would be taking a bath. Yeah. But herly it's like, yeah, that's interesting.
Well, I was to say in an interview with Bloomberg News. To Blue Owl's credit, they went around to calm nerves. We would have had more success if we offered for their larger BDC, but we had the offer ready before they offered to pay back investors, and we still wanted to go through with it. Obviously, we hope to buy more shares from them than we did. He's not out of this game, right Yeah.
OBC two is a weird one because like they are trying to wind it up at one hundred cents on the dollar. So like one reason for him to tender for it is it's a pretty short timeline to probably get all of all of your money back, right the other Blue Owl and also other firms like have a lot of private, non traded BDCs where people have asked for more than five percent of their money back, they've been capped at five percent. There's a line to get out.
And how long that problem will persist, nobody quite knows. And so he's going to tender for some other ones where maybe the timeline is a little bit more uncertain, maybe people will be more interested. I think he's going to tender for the one I own, and then that'd.
Be so fun you have to sell to him. I think it would be really good for the podcast. Make a good ye think of the content, Matt think of the content. If you want to talk about Avis suggests we do it now.
¶ Avis Short Squeeze Profit Maneuvers
That's interesting thing.
That's what we saved it for last A short squeeze, Yeah they did.
That's been going for like a month and like it peaked last week. This stock had gone from like one hundred dollars like a few weeks ago to seven closed over seven hundred dollars one day last week and then it deflated and it's back down until the one hundredths. And this week the company had an earnings call, which earnings always somewhat irrelevant to the situations, and stock was down a little. Their earnings are little disappointment.
It doesn't mean yeah, but at least the executives have to talk about what's going on going on, and what was.
Going on was crazy, which is that the night before the earnings announcement, so their short scureaze was like they had two hedgehuns that owned between actual stock positions and derotos, they owned more than one hundred percent of the stock. So a lot of people were short, and these two hedge funds, SRS and Pentwater were long more than one hundred percent of the stock. Put those things together, it just seems like there's gonna be a short squeeze, and
there seems to have been a short squaze. Those two Edgems SRS. Is kind of like the company, like they have a board seat, like they've been long term holders. They're associated with.
The company, right.
They have a lockup agreement. They have an agreement where they're like bound by the company's black eyed parents. Pentwater is just like a hedge fund. There's bought some stock as an investment and they got to like fifty percent of the stock with including Derovotos, and they sold a big chunk of stock at the peak of the short squaze last week for something like one point seventy five billion dollars of total proceeds and profits of possibly a billion,
huge profits. And when the short squeeze was happening, I remember people emailing me to be like, what is Petwater going to do about this? Because they're subject to short
swing profit rules. They own more than ten percent of the stock, and therefore, if they sell their stock within six months of buying it, which like they double their stake in like February March, if they sell their stock within six months of buying it, they have to pay back all of the profits to the company, which is just the weird rule of section sixteen of the US securities laws, and so like, they can't really profit from the short squeeze. That's what I thought, and whatever run
for that was naive. That was a little naive. So they announced that they've sold millions of shares, and those shares fall into two buckets. One bucket, they're like, yes, we are subject to short swing profit rules. We bought these shares and then we sold them within six months, so we have to give up all of our profits to the company. So we called the company and we're like,
here's your check. Here you go. The other bucket, they're like, no, no, the funds like Pentwater is, you know, it manages different funds, like theater funds, SMAs, like all sorts of like accounts, right, and it buys stock for all the different accounts, and the accounts are separate. And they're saying, well, you know, most of the shares that we sold in the last you know, last week were not sold by funds or accounts that bought within the last six months, So there's
no Section sixteen short swing profits for that. The first bucket, the one where they're giving up the profits is like ninety four thousand shares, and the second buckets like millions of shares. So they're like, we're almost all but we're giving the company a tip, you know, you know, fifty million bucks or whatever, maybe lass And so that's wild on a number of levels. One, it's like, oh, you can just get around short swing profit rolls that way.
Two like how did that happen? Like how did some funds that they managed by the shares and other funds sold the shares. It seems a little bit mysterious. Presumably the funds that sold the shares were funds that had owned them for a long time. Maybe not, Maybe they were short selling. I don't know.
Will anyone go and try to figure that out?
O the company? Will?
Avis?
Will? Yeah? Because Avis, they said on their earnings call, you know, we got a call from Penwater saying like here's your you know, check for a little bit of money. And they're like, we're gonna look into anything we can do to recover for the shelters, because obviously they'd rather have a billion dollars than you know, a few million dollars.
That number is bigger than the other one.
This is just like a weird exogenous event that happened to Davis, and they're like probably a little bit unsettled by it. And if they could have a billion dollars, they'd that would make it better.
They have a little bit of money though, Yeah, they have some money.
Yeah right, I read it's like a nice windfall for them. If you'd asked me last week, and I feel like maybe you did. I feel like we talked about this, Like it's very hard for anyone to do anything about the short screenze. Right, Like Penwater, I had thought, can't sell because of Section sixteen year olds, and the company can't sell because one they were in an earnings blackout right, they really startings this week, so they can't like go
around selling stock the week before they release harntings. And two if you announce a sale, you might pop the bubble and then you won't actually sell it the high prices. But like somehow Pintwater founder around it, where both Pentwater got a lot of money and also the company got a little bit of money without actually selling.
Any stock, so they found a way around it.
But TBD, well, I certainly sold stock. Who gets that money between Pantwater and Avis is an interesting question Penwater will be bummed if they lose all of the money. But my impressure is they a pretty argument that they're fine and they get to keep the money they think they can keep. I also think there's some possibility of just like Pentwater and Eavis beying, like, we'll give you a little bit more than that ninety four thousand shares and we'll call it a day. No, no, because ninety
four thousand shares. Yeah, Like the profits on these shares sales are at least at least one hundred dollars and as much as like six hundred dollars a share, so you know, like it's it's millions and tens of millions of dollars, but it's not billion dollars.
So if they had increased her safe by slightly less, could they have just like if they had stayed at the nine percent that they were on December thirty first, twenty twenty five, would they.
Have a relevant number? Well, it's a fifty percent, it's not like a little bit less. They got to fifty percent, which would cause the short squeeze. They went from nine percent to fifty percent. People like, oh wow, between them Srs and Penal on more than one hundred percent of the stock. That's going to cause a short scraze. It causes a short squeze. The stock goes to seven hundred and they sell right, going from nine to nine and a half percent.
I wouldn't have done that, Yeah, But I'm just wondering would they have then been under the threshold where they could short sell without penalty or sell without penalty?
Sure, but who cares?
I care a little bit. You're saying the short sqeeze would have never happen.
Selling at seven hundred dollars and then dealing with lawyers afterwards is much much, much, much better than selling it one hundred dollars.
Yeah. I guess that's assuming that that is what caused the short squeeze, because there are stories like, you know, the short.
Squeeze was definitely like two hedge funds on one hundred and eight percent of the company. Yeah, these are things that happened due to like attention and the best psychology and things like that, and you know, it happens because like they bought so much of the company. Yeah, anyway, it's a great trade.
It is.
It's like it's baffling that I don't understand how they could have bought so much stock in one place and sold so much stock in another place, Like it's something as weird but great trade.
I wish I had tuned into that earnings call because we talk about body language all the time. I would have loved to.
Yes, I know, I've read the transfer to letters. Just you definitely like can imagine them like.
Tugging on their collar and dabbing at their brow. Good stuff.
And that was the Money Stuff Podcast.
I'm Matt Levine and I'm Katie Greifeld.
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