Welcome to Midrats with sal from Commander Salamander and the Eagle One from Eagles Speak at Sea or Shore your home for a discussion of national security issues in all things maritime. And welcome board everybody, and glad to have you on board today for a mid Rat And because we're live, I always like to do my altar call. If you're with us, go ahead and scroll down to the bottom of the show page. That's where you will find a link to the chat room. We already got a few folks are ready to keep you
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one of those one of those things. This is going to be part of opening question to our guest that after a couple of decades of smallish wars in Southwest Asia and Central Asia, that some topics were in the back burner and some are hidden in the back closet that have come back to the front now that people are able to focus their attention elsewhere, and especially in the last year, one of the more technologically challenging and essential parts of modern warfare,
that's ground based, counter air and missile defense, has come back into people's attention, not just for what we've seen in the Russia Ukrainian War, but also a growing appreciation of what the People's Republic of China has built in the Western Pacific to cover what she considers her backyard and a lot of our bases and our habits and for many ways preconceptions on how we would operate there.
People are starting to realize that we are located in operating under the guns of a potential adversary, and people who look at both sides of the Eastern European and Eastern Asian landmasses, looking at the challenge from small lawn lower size unmanned combat vehicles to your standard issue ballistic missiles and hypersonics. And our guest today
discuss these and related challenges is Tom Carrocot. He's a senior fellow with the International Security Program and the director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Tom, it's great to have you on mid Rats. Welcome, mord Well, sal it's a pleasure to be with you. It's a beautiful, beautiful afternoon in Virginia, Smoke curling off the grill called whiskey in the glass. And I just have a question if if this is
an ultra call, am I supposed to testify? We shall witness and lay hands upon you as you proceed in your next sea All right, all right, let's go. Well, we got everything from Virginia to Florida, and Mark is holding down the North Carolina venue, so we've got got the Eastern
seaboard covered. And I appreciate you coming back on mid Rats for this topic because it's kind of like I mentioned in the intro that there were a lot of things that are an essential part of a major military power such as ourselves that for obvious reasons, for most of this century, where risk was accepted, attention was diverted, some things were large percentage were just playing decommissioned or
gotten rid of that. Now that people's minds and attentions have been able to focus elsewhere, there is a growing appreciation that while we were focused elsewhere, the rest of the world was not polite enough to wait for us to regain our attentions. And the events of the last year have given an opportunity for a lot of people. And you're one of them who has spent a lot of intellectual time and effort and work and understanding and looking at what is needed
in areas such as missile defense and counter air challenges. And you know, from from your perspective, you know, since twenty twenty two showed up, you know, fourteen fifteen months ago. What are a couple of the items that really has gotten your attention, Either things that you wouldn't expect would reach a level of that they have, or perhaps some things you thought would take place in this arena that had just not materialized. Yeah, well again,
so thanks for having me on um. I think that was a little bit like polite southern gentleman's way to ask, you know, what are the I
told you sos from the past year. And there are a few that's true, you know, it's it's not that there's a whole lot of surprises, but it is interesting, I would say, gratifying that some of these issues have come to the four and sort of the more popular consciousness over the past year as you as you rightly point out, and whether it's whether whether or formulating the problem from mud to space or formulating the problem from c foam to
space. Uh, you know that particular air and missile threat spectrum have become increasingly rich and diverse and uh and challenging. And what we see in Ukraine over the past the past year and change has just really brocrous. Not that
we didn't know it or that wasn't there. It's become again more they popularly accepted and appreciated on the UAV, the UAFS problem for instance, the lawyering munitions where the twenty five cent sat word for the problem, and then of course the cruise missiles and so you know, as I always like to say, or should as I have been saying for some time, probably tediously to some folk ars, it's not just about the road state ballistic missile anymore.
And we've seen that in spades in terms of the UAV and the cruise missile activity of the past of the past year and change. And I will I will give the Biden administration credit in their missile defense review, like the previous missile defense review, highlighting the the extent of that threat spectrum, but the most recently, the most recent one and what was the end of October last
year, you know, included UAVs there for the first time. And uh, you know, UAVs really are kind of the to to expropriate a phrase, poor man's cruise missile and uh, and that's that is fundamentally part of the part of the problem that we have to contend with. We don't get to decide that, you know, we just want to do missile defense against certain things. We have to do air and muscile defense against the full spectrum of threats. We just we just uh acknowledged the fourtieth anniversary of of the
SBI speech last last the last week I think it was, uh. And so you know, a lot's changed since then, and this arrow u endo atmospheric part of the threat spectrum, I would say, is the brunt And so that's where from a policy, from a from a strategy, from a budget and programmatics point of view, that's where so much of the conversation is right now. Yeah. You you put out a piece called North America is
a Region two um. And one of the things that struck me about that was you you start out saying that there's a dichotomy and the way we've approached air and missile defense. Can you kind of elaborate on what that dichotomy is and what we should be doing to change change that. Yeah, so you're referencing a big report that the Missile Defense Project to See as asked, put out last summer. That was July of twenty twenty two. We worked closely
with Marad Northcom on that. It was specifically on the homeland cruise missile defense. Uh. And the reason we entitle it North America's origion two is that these kinds of threats have historically been kind of relegated to something we can we can worry about over there, but not over here. And you know, sort of the full threat spectrum that can be dialed up and down in any
region whatsoever is kind of point to that. So this is something that the head of Northcom, General Van Hurt, has been kind of halving the table about for some time, and by the ways, probably second only to him is a general bottom us of the excuse me the head of Transcom as well, you know, because one of the potential scenarios or images as it were, of why someone might might want to attact the United States homeland with something
like a Christmas usole and think of connersional crudinism is to impeed, retard, affect our ability with power projection with all of the forces that we have at any given time within KONAS. And so the North America's a region two thing is just sort of, you know, one of the handful of phrases that I like to use to kind of emphasize the commonality and really the ubiquity of
that air missile threat spectrum. You know, back in the well, let's just go back for a second to the Clinton administration, they actually amended the the ABM freety with this kind of distinction between theater ballistic missiles missile defenses and quote unquote national missiles, and they did so with the reference point that basically how fast the thing could go. But the theater national dichotomy on that has
kind of stuck. The Bush administration comes in, gets rid of the ab M three and actually renames one of our weapon systems just to make a point. They rename is a bad Ballisticness of Defense interceptor, just to make a point. They're changing it from the theater the theater and Anti air Defense two terminal, just to get rid of that. The problem is the dichotomy has persisted and the old theater of versus national thing has re emerged yet again as
the regional versus homeland dichotomy. And as they say, the threat gets the vote, the threat has voted, and we don't get to the side. Whether it's or whether it's Alaska or Harbor or frankly Guan, we don't get We're not the ones who gets to the side. What is the mix of air missile threats that the bad guys get to compose into a structured attack.
They get moved And that's kind of where the active, active air and news deplement comes in for the things that we can't move or hide and I will again refer back to Ukraine here that in the first week of the attack, the Russians actually did a pretty good job surprisingly according to some reports public reports of suppressing seventy some percent of fixed air defenses that the Ukrainians had. And they had a lot of that stuff in terms of the fixed stuff, about
seventy percent of it with suppress in the first week. But what what wasn't depressed it which is one of the facts, thats you why they've been able to move on is mobility or relocalability or deception or distribution of air defenses. And that's been a pretty interesting component. But for those things that you cannot move or hide, you're going to have to have a little bit more robust activit event and again Guam I mentioned a minute ago, that's really the centerpiece
of this whole discussion. And uh, certainly a heavily maritime aspect to that. Yeah, as as a former resident of Guam, it is not it's a small place, but it's not so small you can hide it. Um. I wanted I wanted to follow up what you said because one of the things in that report that I that I looked at was this was a figure four from the thing which is about the cruise that to North America from the
Arctic. And I had never I must confess, and I had never really thought until I read that piece that the Russians could could launch cruise missiles from inside Russia that would go across the pole and threaten a huge chunk of of the northern hemisp which we which we in the United States occupies. UM. It is do people have trouble grasping the ideas these these long range crew miss cruise missiles, which some of which can fly under the various radar uh areas
we have, are a threat and a huge threat. So I think what you're reverencing is an image that we put together for the report. All those images were produced in house. UM, an image that from a polar perspectives just what kind of standoff you could do for twenty five y filometer cruise missiles love an RTHERN warning system in the Arctic and be able to reach out for, if not all, at least most of knas. And I appreciate your calling out that. I think it's a cool one encourage for us to take
a look at it. You're right, I've never seen that which a version of that image produced before, so we we put it out. But you know, cruise missiles really fit the description, or excuse me, fit the phrase the assistants sectory of defense. John Plumb, who has space and muscile defense and a bunch of other stuff in his portfolio, what he used the phrase weapons of choice in his testimony from May last year. And I really think that just nailed it on the head. And you don't have to take
my word for it. Look at the thousands that they have employed in the Ukraine conflict over the past what thirteen months and change. And in fact, my colleague in THESI Missile Events Project, Ian Williams, is about to put out at probably in the next week or so, specifically on the air and
Missile war PUTS. Missile war is the name of the report that we'll put out here soon, talking about thinking about understanding what has transpired and accomplished the role of air defenses and the degree to which the missile attacks have been successful or or not successful. But weapons of choice, and that's why it's you know, important to pay attention to them, and whether it be for Guam
quahum Land gua Guam quaw power projection or that matters. And oh, by the way, uh, what comes after Guam is things like the defense of Hawaii. And I know everybody likes to use the what about cyber pearl harbor or a space pearl harbor. Well, I'm just a kid from World taxes, and so I'm simplistic enough to worry about that pearl harbor pol harbor, which is to say, an air missile attack and other kinds of attack and
a little bit more unconventional kind of thing. And so that is in this in this environment with these weapons for choice, we got where about that aspect as well. So there's actually some two things for that in the PP twenty four budget requests. I think you're going to see more of that in the in the coming years. And I share you're concerning with some of the people
that they seem very fascinated with. I mean, they're important areas in cyber I think a lot of it just because it's something that is not kinetic and is sterile, and a lot of people have come from computers. But you know, building off the discussion of the Great Circle routes over the over the Arctic and what we've seen in the last year. One thing that keeps popping into the back of my head is a lot of our thoughts and conceptions about
ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. I think still has a hangover from the Cold War, where everybody thinks nuclear, everybody thinks, well, nobody will do that because that might trigger a nuclear war. I think that that steel has been broken in a few ways. One is the hundreds of short, intermediate, and medium range ballistic missiles the PRC has built, and also recent combat.
You know, going back to whether you're looking at twenty fourteen in Georgia or what's been going on for the last year here, that conventional ballistic and cruise missiles have been married with the modern secret heads and warheads using Independent of whether you can jam the GPS, there's a lot of really neat stuff behind the cipher door in the multi spectral environment that makes this old technology incredibly accurate.
And we we did some writing and some some talking last week about what really started in nineteen nineties but has really set root in the last couple of decades is our defense infas structure is incredibly not resilient. Whether you're looking everything
from propellant manufacturing to precursor chemicals. We have the spreadsheets and consolidations of gotten US to the point that we do have significant single points of failure here in conus that you can go through a variety of scenarios where an opponent five, ten, fifteen years down the road has a pretty good conventional intercontinental capability. And then when you look at the handful of interceptors we have in Alaska and
if you've got a nisia shift in Port, well good on you. But how much of a concern do you have that of a that being a legitimate concern, and be if so, how much of a conversation is that taking place to see what we need in five to ten to fifteen years to maybe have a more modern few of those threats. So you said a lot there, So I did that reaction? I don't know. That's don't know what good um couple reactions. One. I appreciate the emphasis on the non nuclear
version of this. This is basically my pet rock and my you know, favorite sort of theme that I've been propounding for close to a decade now, which is that so much of the one depends more airmus amount the conversation is stuck in something of the time work, and we're stuck in the kind of nineteen nineties, can't get out of the EBM treaty, rhetorical talking points of Oh my goodness, gracious, what did somebody, you know, duct tape
a couple of SCUD missiles together and put a nuke on the front of it? Um, wouldn't that be terrible sort of image of the problem. And you alluded in your comments there too. I called the sort of democratization the
globalization of the precision guide of munition. And so it's the formulation that I like to use is non nuclear strategic tank whereby an adversary or for that matter, US, but really adversaries following you might say the American way of war are looking for ways to operate and hold the United States at risk under the nuclear threshold, to do and to get away with the full the maximum effect without any radiation being released, as a very little radiation being released as a
work. And so you know, as I like to say, if Guam goes away, or if a half a dozen fights on Guam go away without any uranium and plutonium being energized, the effect is nevertheless similar. And so that's that is so much of the reason why for the things that we cannot move or hard, why we are forced into contending with the active ary muscile defense of things like like Guam. That is the signature, whether they whether it's kind of a bump or sticker or not, that is the signature.
Biden administration mustile defense program of about five billion dollars in this decade, and they are right to do that. And the only question is whether they're doing it at the speed of relevance and whether they're doing it to cover the entire threat spectrum in this as they as they call it, the Decisive decade.
So yes, I've been basically to anybody that will listen and to people that won't, talking about the non nuclear Strategic Attact problem and why I profoundly and emphatically prefer framing the threat problem in terms of a new missile age, which is to say, focusing on the deliver system, as opposed to a quote unquote new nuclear age, which is to say, focusing on one particular payload or effect that the spectrum can deliver that obscures it kind of dilutes the problem
too much, and we have to worry about the non nuclear strategic contact problem. And that is where the diversity, the diversity of the air missile thread spectrum is just so profound and so so present and concerning. And if you hadn't figured that out before the Ukraine conflict, you should have from the Gornal Caraboc, from the even the Uranian packs, you know, all this sort
of stuff. Whatever the range did in twenty nineteen. You know, the Russians and Chinese are people with borders of magnitude war and so that's that's what we have to That's why all this is uh is interesting and fascinating in a board. Yeah, I'm glad you mentioned the I call it no gomo and comp crumb. One of it is Karabakh because one of the some of your colleagues wrote a piece on it and they said, the primary lesson from the
air war in that area is the importance of full spectrum air defense. And I'm sitting there thinking, well, you know, full spectrum air defense covers a lot of ground, but we've watched UAVs in Ukraine carrying grenades and dropping them down the open hatches of tanks. Uh. You know, the the the amount of information that you try and cover with this missile and air defense stuff. I mean, it is, it is awesome, It's it's overwhelming
almost. But you know, if we didn't learn that lesson from watching other folks go through this stuff, what what would it take for us really to get serious about And I'm hoping that there are a lot of serious people out there taking it seriously now, but what would it really take for us to get totally serious about, you know, the full spector Mayer defense. Yeah, so, I think the bad guys have given us enough warnings an example,
at this point today, we ought to be taking it seriously. I think the Pentagon really is so at this point over the past year, we've now we're past the kind of early Indica indications in the warning. We're like to the you know, in your face stage of the problem. So I think you're referencing in terms of the report, you're probably referencing. The only write up of it that I know about is my colleague Sean Shaik, who
did a write up of the new Gorno Carebat conflict. This was a new years ago while it was going on, And uh, and you're right, Um, that was sort of that was our early that was sort of our Spanish Civil War kind of warning of what was to come and what is to
come. So so now we're kind of seeing it, I will say Thou in his opening remarks the ultracol Analogy, UM, I think noted the divestment that the Joint Force did about a decade ago of air defense problems because hey, the number one we were focused on VP two we had the birthright of air superiority that we could take to the bank. Uh see, there was a reset in Russian China. We're you know, our our sort of kind of friends. And also m B we D excuse me D where we have
the phenomenon that at the time was called sequestration. And so with the first three predicates, the twenty and twelve ish time frame included some making, some hard choices and divestments, and one of those was that the regular US Army divested of for instants m shore AD from its regular regular force. That is something that came one hundred and eighty degrees just five years later in twenty seventeen, with the army's new modernization priorities. But think about what happened between twenty
twelve and twenty seventeen. Charmian happened Chinese shenanigans in the you know, in their backyard, in lots of different ways. And so between twenty twelve and twenty seventeen, the Army went from divesting maneuver so rad short range of defense too, saying aramis defense is one of the top five modernization priorities for that
service. And of course the Army has some really important roles and missions for the Joint force overall, and they are dramatically, dramatically understaffed in terms of air defense, air defenders, and in terms of equipment for that number one cruise missile defense number two counter US And this is like the big thing kind of problem and other aspects of aramisis defense overall. And it don't take my
word for it. If you have any doubt about the US Army's and strength and capability of limitations on air and cruise missive defense, just listen to Frank Kendall, Secretary of the Air Force, who was constantly pointing that out. He's both right, and the Army is also right to say that they can't defend everything, and they can't defend every airbase. Give them the given the means that they have. It is such a dramatic mismatch on those things.
So, uh, it's it's a problem that we've seen coming. This is back to the I told you solves is a probably we've seen coming for a long time. It's crept up keeps getting worse, and it's one of the reasons why I'm I'm gratified that the Army is prioritizing counter us and cruisin about to the extent that it is. I'm glad you brought up the the Iranian
incident because I'm learning to kind of wrap a question about it. I'll actually break my question into two so I don't think one of my soliloquies again. But one of the great things about spending a few years as an ADO officer, and you could probably do a show on this by itself, is the fact that a lot of our allies there are sense is not an Army job, it's an air Force job, and their their air base defense is pretty good as a result of it, because they're not begging their army tights to
take care of their airfields. And I had an interesting back and forth with an Army Field great officer right after the Iranian ballistic missile attack or rocket attack to paim on how you wanted to find it. I think missile attack sounds
sex here. But um, after a really snarky comment he made that I've heard since I was a JO that you know there are there are grown men and women who cry at service election when they find out that they're going air defense because they know they're not going to be promoted or have a very exciting career. But I asked him the obvious question, um, you know, where was our air defense? He said that we don't have enough, Like, well, what are they doing? This more important than defending our air
fields under an Iranian threat? And he went on at thirty minutes speech enraged that I won't go into it here, but you combine that with what we saw in both Afghanistan and Iraq as well, where something that everybody's favorite, RTT two in the Navy, our s was was brought ashore to give rocket and mortar defense to our air bases. And you combine that with what we're
seeing with the flying lawnmowers and everything else. Building on the comment you made about the army before, I know everybody wants money right now, and they seem to want to get involved in our land war in Asia for some reason. But is the concern being reflected in money and emphasis from the army to give an appropriate response to what is a pretty clear demand signal on real world combat operations that we're seeing right now. Again, sal you put a lot
on the table. I'll do my best to answer your um. Look, there was a Washington, DC based think tank I won't name who kind of listed up every military cemetery and a veterinary clinic the US military operates in the world to kind of puff up the number of Ford operating bases of the United States has um. You don't have to get to that level of what's just exaggeration. However, two conclude that there's a lot to defend. There's too
much to defend. And so the folks that rouse where were the where was the where was the c ram or where was the patriots to defend that base and Iraq when it was attacked? What the January twenty twenty or so.
You can't defend everything, You just can't. And in that Homeland Cruise Missile Defense report that I alluded to earlier, I'm pretty sure we said a version of the falling, which is the beginning of wisdom is to appreciate that you you can't defend everything, and that you shouldn't try now if you're if you're a chef, if you are a carrier group, for instance, that's the
level of risk you can't really take on the same way necessarily. But for air bases, for all those other stuff, there is a dramatic traumatic mismatch. I credit the US Army to answer your question directly, sow. I credit the US Army for increasing the four structures for especially what's called the trust some acronyms around here. I'm sorry, but if PICK, which is essentially kind of the cruise missile defend part of the Army's Area Musim Defense program,
and Patriot. They're moving from fifteen to sixteen battalions for Patriot, But fifteen or sixteen battalions and those batteries within them is still nothing, still nothing compared to the number of critical assets around the world we kind of like to defend. And so, with all respect and all appropriate concern for the American service members printed at that Iraqi Air Base in Iraq in twenty twenty twenty, that probably wasn't in the top of the list and things to defend and so it's
a challenge. The US Army is increasing via I think it's like seven thousand air defenders going into if Pick over the the coming couple of years. They're adding, as a said, an additional Patriot battalion, and Congress is sort of asking them, as in the past last nbaa hey, maybe we need to think about some more Patriot battalions. There's no there is I think this
is the case. There's there's no aspect of the joint force that has a higher operational or personnel tempo that's higher than the Patriot the Patriot Force, So lots and lots of demand signal for that stuff. And why is there the demand signal because of the threat Because and then you kind of move this over to something like law importantance, which is the perfect aaron missile defense problem.
And it's going to take some army stuff, army affectors, army elements, is going to take some Navy elements and NBA elements to get that right. And it's going to be important for this to be approached in an appropriate way, which is to say, joint way. And I recognize the Navy doesn't want a man ashore. I recognize if the army doesn't want a man,
you know, a version of ages Ashore on glam. But all the services have to recognize that there's benefits and there's a necessity for the active baron missile events of things like blom and everybody's gonna have to pull you up something because you know, we can't. It's not going to be a single service a single service solution. And I know the ship's don't like being tethered, for instance, for the ballistic missile event mission. They're also not going to like
being tethered for hypersonic queuing and warning. Nonetheless, the threat gets to vote. The threat has voted, and I'm gonna be a little I'm gonna be a skunk the garden party here, which is to say, the several services are going to have to contribute to this solution set because the threat is already in the way that has you it's not a piece of yours at the Hoover Institute on Deterrence, Air Defense and Munitions Production and the new missile age.
And you pose a couple of great questions in there that I think kind of feed into we can't defend everything. But yeah, I think you asked the question. Without a renewal of conventional munition stockpiles and the air defenses need to counter those of our adversaries, this posture would come increasingly under question. And
then the other question was can we produce enough munitions to cover ourselves? Would you say, here, the apostle of munitions production been built, a plant under secret defense or acquisition, who has emphasized a need to re orient toward mass munitions production to anyone who will listen. And you also point out that the just in time manufacturing we've adopted is a big part of the problem we
have. Uh, And I guess I think you also point out to the whoever the auditors are who come along and look at that too, Well, we've got too many tomahawks. I don't know if you can have too many tomahawks, but I guess somebody will complain about it no matter what you do. So, you know, let's talk a little bit about the production side of this. It is enough money can be thrown at this problem that we're going to work our way out. And do we have time to do that?
Yeah? So here's another kind of I told you so, um, and I will. And it's fascinating that as as I like to say, Official Washington has over the past twelve months learned a new word. And that new word that they've learned is munitions. And now it's, you know, it's the new hotness to be talking about munitions production. And you just you can't swing a dead cat and two pont circles that, you know, talking to finding something tankled for talking about such a thing that wasn't true? What
year goes that just wasn't true? And everybody's kind of recognized this problem. And now we're moving from diagnosis to prognosis, and soon we'll get to the treatment stage. But that's kind of where we're right now. We're kind of in the prognosis stage. It is kind of like it oops, you know, we've really gone short on munitions production for so long. You had Brian McGrath on the show a couple of weeks ago, and he was he was
articulating a version of this formulation. Mark you referenced the too many tamahawks phrase. That's not my phrase, that's that's build a plant's phrase. Sometimes I call him the Apostle. Sometimes I think it's it's more appropriate to come in front of the John the baptist of this topic, which was he was he was warning about this before anybody else, and now everybody else has kind of
been catching up to him. The under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment twelve forty four of the National Defense Authorization Act, the converse put out late last year, had a multi year procurement provision from you know, most of the critical ammunitions that we might we might want to to produce in greater quantity. And
I give that Converse course a lot of credit for that. Think there's probably some more to be done there, but on this front, because we've kind of gone from a peacetime efficiency based model to kind of an oops, we've been neglectful in this realization, it's gonna it's gonna take a little while to ramp up. And I will say I think it was Foul a little bit ago who referenced the very impolite and sensitive observation that there are far too many
single points of Fairier on our production side. And I don't even like to talk about that because you don't want to help the bad guy to put together a target list. But it's it's a little scary way you think about it in terms of the in terms of the single points of failure for our munitions industrial base with large and that applies to both the strike side and the air in the sible defense side as well, So across the board, we got
to get the unit production cost down. But again my formulation is we've gotten to the prognosis stage and now we're we're going to move to the treatment stage, and you will the proof of the pudding is in the eating here and and so show me the money. And to their credit, I believe the Old is doing an okay job actually of saying, yeah, let's go quadruple or whatever our gimla's production. The challenge is the defense industrial base is not
a ferrari and it doesn't go from zero to six ft. It's it's more of a little you know, put put along to In terms of the workforce and in terms of the production lines and the facilitization, you've got to you know, build buildings and create and fill them with big complex machining tools to do certain things. And that takes time. And some of these are government owned, contractor operated et cetera, et cetera. That all takes time.
And so I am cautiously optimistic that we're moving out on the treatment stage in time, but I'm not. I'm not super edulent on the matter. And at the end of the day, that's got a new sport, because if we get to a problem and we haven't built up the industrial base, or Japan hasn't gotten this four hundred Tomahawks in time, et cetera, et cetera.
I hate to say that that's what we had new sports. That's one reason why you want a very, very strong and capable of conventional because you don't want decision makers to feel like that they're whether they're American or they're Russian, I guess that they're they're backed into the nuclear corner. Um. I wanted to touch on something. You know, I always have to make sure and fully advertise my biases. I love a few things better than the GAPPERD
thirty five millimeter anti aircraft system. That Flack Flack, Ryan Metal, Ryan Metal was that Flack is back, the death Flaq is back, and I think Ryan Metal last month, after getting tired of arguing with the squid like everybody does, they're gonna go ahead and produce. I saw some figure. I think it was three hundred and four hundred thousand rounds a thirty five millimeter, so they're getting good use out of the thirty or so that they've sent
to Ukraine. But I almost used as the picture and the pre show announcements something that caught my attention about this topic because everybody loves to talk about. On the American side, patriot, we have fad or whatever we're calling it this week up up in Alaska. We have a few of our Avengers, which is basically for a navy guys, it's eight stingers on the back of a Humby. But the Ukrainians have got to the point on the lower end
of the threat spectrum that they have. They've recreated something straight out of World War Two, because sometimes you have to. They've got spotlights, they've got quad twenty three millimeters and even fifty cows and dual amounts trying to find some way to address this lower end. The Iranian Shahi to find him pronounced it correctly, you know that threat. That's one thing that you were talking about. The Spanish Civil War that has tapped me on the shoulder a couple of
times. The Iranians warned everybody what they could do when they attacked the Saudi Oil oil refinery a couple of years ago, and they're they're learning some great
cought benefit analysis. Weaponeering there. And on that low end of the spectrum, have you seen any movement on the US side of the house to look at what we can do besides throwing multimillion dollars missiles at tens of thousands of dollars small end drones that could because wherever that's going to come, American forces are going to be targets of that threat the next time we go forward.
It's just clear to me that that's going to be an issue. But I don't see anything in our in our inventory they can address that very well. Uh. I would say yes, yes, um, and so much I would say of what the US Army is doing south of Patriot, uh, in terms of lower tier than Patriot is all about that stuff. Because you don't want to shoot a Patriot missile at a at a chief threat if you don't have to. It's been done, uh, Corey News reports it has
been done. U. Some of our partners, have allies have used a Patriot missiles some kind against the US, for instance. But you want to be able to have that layered defense and have cheaper and more any more numerous effectors to deal with the the more prolific and cheaper threat. So yea verily and so much of what instance, I would say, both in terms of the non kinetic, think laser, think hypower marc wave, think other forms
of directed energy, and also think electronic attack. And last a week ago we could go in two days, I had Admiral Hill from the Missile Plan's Agency over for a thing or an event, and we talked about the two between four and we talked about kind of the last forty years of missile events. And I asked him for his vision of the future, because you know, we're forty years in from Reagan's speech and all that jazz. And I said, okay, what's your vision going out and and and his response was
it wasn't the usual kind of naud in the direction of lasers. It was actually h e W, which is electronic attack. And so I think that there's there's other there's there's a there's a lot of interesting non kinetic things out there that can and should be pursued. It's not just about lasers that that are being that are being rightfully pursued and some of those have the light of
day and some of them some of them don't. But back to kind of connecting our conversation now foul in terms of basically the cost per killed, cost per shot, to the larger discussion of essentially the weapons of choice that are ato atmospheric of so many different kinds of whether it be a cruise MISSI or the Shahid. And by the way, some of those shahids are basically a poor man's cruise missiles, right um, And so it makes sense to go
after that. And so that's that's that's one reason why I think it's been useful and important. Uh, you know, think think about the think about the draw down the United States is given to Ukraine over the past sever years, past year, especially from stingers to uh nasans right nasans, the cruise mussile killer uh to ultimately up to the patriots system. And I will be
candid, I was very cautious. I know there was a lot of cheerleaders, and certainly in this in the subject area, it's all too dominated by cheerleaders. But I was very cautious about the the transfer of a even a single picture battery to Ukraine because those are extremely precious and scarce assets for the
US Army, the US Joint Force that we cannot unfortunately backfill fast. And I've already alluded to the operational and personal tempo that that those air defenders operate under, and by the way, that also translate to the modernization tempo of the Patriot Force. You start taking out a single battery that affects people adversely within the air defense aretelry, and that therefore effects They're ability to upgrade and all that sort of stuff so they can be better at what they do to
protect those air bases. So that's why the cheaper, cheaper effects are important on this point. Sow you highlighted the flat guns for instance there Beaverily. That's all for the good and they're being used to good effect. It's unfortunate that the foreign policies of several countries you noted the Swiss, I think in the German along the way, have gotten the way of that basically is well, we don't know how it's something going to come out, and we want
to be on Russia's good side to some extent economically when it does. It's also one of the reasons that iron don't has reportedly not been transferred even from the United States to Ukraine because of those foreign policy kind of consideration. So it's a hard problem we need, excuse me, the Ukrainians need and you can imagine that anybody's fighting a major power like Russure China would need tacity, cheap effectors, large numbers, kind of a layered defense for all this stuff.
And you can't patriot your way out of this problem. You need the cheaper stuff too. Yeah, speaking of cheaper stuff, one of the one of the other interesting things that loaned up for this discussion to day. We're looking at it what the hoodies hoofies wherever they are down in Yemen are doing with ballistic missiles and you ease you whatever they've got, uh you know they
they the the Saudis have have are fighting that proxy war with Iran. Maybe that's maybe the piece is going to break out now that China has intervened with both those countries. But I mean, that is a really interesting case study that I'm sure, I hope that we're paying a lot of attention to because they're the ones who engaged US Navy ships with the anti ship missiles. They're the ones who've attacked the Saudi refineries and cities and air fields and stuff.
It's uh, it should be a real study. Are are other than the people that c sis as anybody paying attention to that that uh uh stuff going on down there in the Arabian Peninsula. The Iranian threat you mean specifically, is that right? I'm sorry, the what the Iranians breaking? No, Look, I think that in some respects it's a little bit of a stocking horse for the larger threat problem. Um, yes, we are indeed tracking
if you've asked those those challenges. So what I would say is that the whether it be anti ship or whether it be drawn or whatever, I'm skeptical, I would say, I'm I am concerned about the kind of broke ering, the real broke rings going on obviously between the Chinese and the Sauadies, for instance, But I'm also skeptical that that kind of thing would will hold.
And so before you get too excited about peace breaking out between the Saudis and the Iranians, there's a couple of thousand years of history there that will probably reassert itself before before too long. The very optimistic about the Abraham Accords kind of kind of thing Uh, there's a lot going on in that particular area of the world right now in terms of Israel and Saudi and Iran as you as you fish your note, but we have to I guess, I
guess, my my gut. There is whatever is going on politically, diplomatically and all this kind of stuff. We've got to be prepared for when it falls apart in a month, the months rough whenever it does. And so the problem hasn't really gone away. It's just it's just fuctering and blistering in a different way. We talked a fair bit about about missiles, we haven't
really talked much about the counter error problem. And you can put me in this category that when the Crucho Ukrainian War kicked off, you just look at a spreadsheet of the world's air forces and at least on paper, their capabilities, and the Russian Air Force on paper looked really, really good. But you know, here we are months later, and a lot of it may have been biased because we were used to pretty much owning the air a where
we had been the last few decades. You know, we had a little bit of a contested air environment in Iraq that the first time around when I was a jo was measured in a couple of days, and Dash two and
Dash three was measured in hours. But you know, here where are we find ourselves over a year and the Russian Air Force has either underperformed or people underestimated the ability of modern anti air systems to create a contested airspace such that do you see the future being more less like what we've seen since nineteen ninety one, but more like North Vietnam in the late sixties in early seventies, where you have to earn your access to airspace. It's still I still am
shocked the underperformance of the Russian Air Force. Interesting comments. There lot a lot in what you just said. There some smart people who I talk to will make the observation that what you described as the underperformance or maybe the absence of the Russian airporce you don't see carbon bombing, right, where's the bomber?
That right has to do with the reluctance of the Russian Air Force to fly not over Ukorean over their own Russian air defenses, which is to say, it's kind of the what we you know, we would call the iff problem. Um, they don't want to be shot down by their own air defence, and so there's some of that going on. It's a little surprising
they haven't figured that out more than they more than they have. But whether it's the strength of the Ukrainian or the the lack of disambiguation on the part of the Russian air defenses, like, there's clearly some some things going on there. So if they get past that, which is to say, if the Russians get past that, that may be the different cost for the for the Russian air force we were they to go that route. But if they were to get past there, that would be a big development and a big
problem obviously. And the you see these news reports for instance, about while the Russians distensibly you know, and being in really bad cruise missiles or stuff like that that they or may not even have a warhead on them. Is it to just soak up Ukrainian air defense capacity? Right back to you know, what is the Lensky number one ask, it's all the time. It's like air defen they need air defense if they run out, if they go Winchester to use that phrase on this stuff, then what you talk about,
will you allude to their foul becomes a much bigger problem. And so that's that's kind of the head nod to the act of air defense to the saliens of active air defense for Ukraine, because if they get to a point where they are ava schlips, then that is where you will see you the rushing air force. I believe reassert in a way that it surprisingly enough hasn't so far. Well, Tom, there we go to the top of the hour.
It's been a really fast hour and I did not finish all my questions, which which is which is good because we had some good conversation back and forth for the listeners. If they wanted to keep track of what you and CSIS are working on, where's a good place for them to look And are there some projects that you have in the oven right now that we should keep an eye open for over the next few weeks or months. Yeah, I appreciate that. Look just Google see as I ask in missile defense and you'll
find a pretty good smatter what we're doing. Um and in the next couple weeks and months you'll see a number of reports coming out from the team. I mentioned that Ukraine Aaron mussile War and Air Defense report that's coming out very soon, but also a count of us report that's being led by Sean Shake who authored the endogonal Carabac piece from a number of years ago. And then we've got a couple of other irons in the fire for budget analysis and for
space sensors for all this stuff. So lots of threats mud to space. We try to we do our best to cover them all. And look appreciate the time sal and Mark for being able to kind of come in and chat with you all about these problems. It's been great times, so much times. Thanks thanks again, Tom, Yeah, look forward to next time, all right, thank you everybody for joining us yep, and thank you everybody for join us for another edition of Midrat And until next time, I hope
everybody has a great Navy day. Cheers. Having a king like my lonely want to marry me and leave randomly for you being to blame lovely told me city holding you all the dame. It's a long way to It's a long way. It's a long way to God. I don't bye think I dealing well, listen atwell, it's a long long way to get an it. But my heart, my