Iraq and Lebanon – Revolt Against Sectarianism?

Well, good evening and welcome to the Middle East centre in Oxford. My name is Eugene Rogan and I'm the director of the Middle East Centre. And it's my great pleasure to welcome you to the second of our webinars around the theme of the Arab uprisings one decade on.

This week, we'll be examining the ongoing process of challenging and contesting government and its accountability in two cases where popular demonstrations seem to be motivated as much by a challenge to the sectarian order as it is to mismanagement or bad government. We'll be looking at Lebanon and Iraq. And it's my great pleasure to be welcoming back to the Middle East centre. Two old friends from Beirut. We'll be welcoming. Maha Yahya.

Maha is the director of the Malcolm H. Curr Centre, the Carnegie Institute in Beirut, where she has been working on the whole host of political issues spanning the political violence. Identity politics, pluralism, development and social justice. She's the author of a number of works, but one really stands out in her list, which is The Summer of our Discontent Sex and Citizen in Lebanon and Iraq, which was published in June of twenty seventeen. Very much anticipating tonight's discussion.

Speaking on Iraq, we'll be welcoming Maysoon Pachachi, who is a London based filmmaker of Iraqi origin who was educated in Iraq, the UK and the USA. She studied filmmaking at the London Film School where she took her masters. And since 1994, she's been an independent documentary filmmaker. She's just completed a fiction feature film called Our River Our Sky. In Arabic, the title is Kushima Macu. Which was shot in Iraq in twenty nineteen.

And even before the film was shot, it was a PRISE winner. It had taken the IWC. Gulf Filmmaker Award for the script for the film at the Dubai International Film Festival in December of 2012. So we're very excited to see our river, our sky in the cinemas soon. But tonight, we're delighted to be welcoming my soon to hear her firsthand experience of the thinking between the different regions of Iraq in the months leading up to the outbreak of the protest movements there.

But to get us started tonight, I would like to begin by inviting mahouts. Hutson's starts with her reflections on Lebanon long overdue. Good evening, everyone. And Eugene, thank you for having me on this panel with my son in particular. It's great to see you first. Going to virtually. And it's great to join this discussion tonight. I will start with a few comments on Lebanon and then maybe later we can get into the parallels between Lebanon and Iraq.

Lebanon, as you all know, is going through a perfect or received a perfect storm of crises. It is facing an economic meltdown, political deadlock and now a health crisis. Four out of the five key pillars of the country are collapsing.

First, the Politiken, if you want, or the social contract that has ruled the country since independence, and then more particularly after the end of the civil war in the 1990s, is under tremendous strain and is being questioned by the populace, but still by the leadership. The merchant public model, a economic model that relied on banking and services, as you know, the economic model for Lebanon is now collapsing and there is a search for a new economic model for country, for the country.

It is one that relies on imports. The country imports close to 80 percent of what it consumes. The third pillar is its middle class. The country has always prided itself on a well-educated, very sophisticated middle class of doctors, engineers, you name it. It's basically innovative and an entrepreneurial class with the economic crisis that began last year in October.

Twenty nineteen. And as most of you know, the protests started in Lebanon, ostensibly because of the what's app is supposed levy on what's out there will go to other things, six cents per month to the telephone bill and all [INAUDIBLE] broke loose. And I think people's sense of time was enough is enough. I mean, you're looking for ways to raise money from a population that's already exhausted and impoverished.

With the political protests came the economic crisis, which had been brewing for a very long time today. Just to give a couple of figures, the currency has lost close to 70 or 80 percent of its value. The inflation is at one hundred, one hundred and fifty percent. I can't recall the price of basic goods has is skyrocketing. It's triple or quadruple and even more. And therefore, things like rice and flour.

Basically, the country really is has become unaffordable in the process with the loss of the value of the currency. The middle class, which I come back to now, have lost their pensions. They've lost their faith savings and they've lost the value of their actual, you know, incomes right now.

So just to give a sense, a university, an assistant professor at the American University in Beirut used to make sixty six thousand dollars per year and now makes around 800 dollars per month in the equivalent of Lebanese lira. And this also trickles down to the security sector pension years.

I mean, I was talking to a judge who was probably one of the most decent judges in this country, spent his lifetime in service of this country, and now he's talking about literally living hand to mouth because their pension is gone and his savings are locked up in the banks. He can't access them because of capital controls, because, I mean, I won't get into the details of on the economic front. But we can have this in the Q&A session. So the middle class is disappearing.

Hundreds of Lebanese, particularly the young and the talented doctors, are leaving by the drawers. Their health infrastructure actually is in severe crisis, which is a real problem when we're also having to deal with a pandemic. Today, the country is under a 24 hour curfew. People are meant to stay at home. And yet, for the last three days, there have been significant protests in Tripoli, Lebanon's second largest city. And we can talk about the roots of that protest again in the Q&A.

But it's it's part and parcel of the widespread grievances that Lebanese society is facing or is feeling for the fourth and fifth pillars. The fourth is freedoms, fundamental freedoms. This country has always prided itself on being the place where one can say what they want anytime, time they want. In the 50s and 60s and 70s, you know this, Eugene, it became the place where all the exiles from around the region, from their space. It is a hub for intellectual. Cultural and artistic activities.

See it. Music writers, journalists, everyone used to eat to be here after the end of the Civil War. It kinda started regaining some of this. But now, you know, that sense of freedom is being slowly conscripted. We're seeing increasing clampdown on social media and on press freedoms. The final pillar is the security. The Lebanese army and the internal security services. Now, on the one hand, they are facing the same kind of pressure on their incomes.

So we're starting to hear from members of the security services saying if I'm going to be earning the equivalent of 100 dollars a month for, you know, and I need to feed my family, why should I put myself on the line of fire? And yet, at the same time, the demand for the security services has ever been greater. We're seeing great. I mean, there were live bullets being shot, being used and rubber bullets in Tripoli last night and the night before.

Politicians are now calling for more and more security services for them to take over the streets, so to speak. Now, just before I stop, I just want to say a few words about who's really been protesting. The demands that we initiated in 2019 to bring down the regime were really an indictment of the catastrophic political and economic mismanagement of the country by its political class.

This is a political class that is composed mainly of four time militia leaders who came to power after the end of the civil war in 1990 and moved into state institutions and the process. They turned state institutions and to or they treated state institutions does a kind of for bounty. Now, the profound abuse of the political system by this leadership was significant.

I'll just quote one finger. The World Bank in 2016 estimates that nine percent of gross domestic product in Lebanon is lost to patronage politics. So the protest in itself began as a revolt against the system and the complete kind of collapse of trust in all institutions. And you see this and a lot of the polls that have happened, whether it's state institutions, political parties, the banking sector, professional associations, et cetera.

And then the sense, which was remarkable, that we started to see it in 2019 and October 20, 19 of the US versus them where the US was no longer about sect, ethnicity, class or gender to address the topic of today, but rather it was about a corrupt political class versus the rest of the country.

And here I think there was this growing realisation or acceptance by a broad cross-section of the population that these sectarian politics in Lebanon, that there isn't a single community that has genuinely gained out of it, and that, in fact, it's the political class that has won at the expense of Lebanese citizens. But at the same time, this moment of national awakening was also about ending a lot of social norms in the country.

What we saw was an uprising against a factory worker system that maintains unequal relationships amongst citizens, particularly women. Lebanese women were really at the forefront of demonstrations. They continued to mobilise.

They were forming lines of defence between protesters and security services, organising events, trying to decrease sectarian tensions when they emerged between neighbourhoods, cetera, and they were demanding equal rights and the uplifting of the personal status laws of sectarian communities, a kind of overhaul of the system and the move to a more secular and more civic system.

But the protest movement was also about generations. A large number of high school and university students were participating in the protest. And we I mean, there were many interviews with them. And what's remarkable is to see these young men and women of this country talking about we don't care about losing a year from our education. We're actually fighting for our future. We don't want to leave. As many of you know, Lebanon has a history of emigration there.

MONTREUIL As we don't want to leave. We want to stay in Lebanon. We don't want to be forced to emigrate. We want to stay with our family and friends.

I think also this protest that we saw above, the systematic exclusion of the country's impoverished population, whether they lived in Lebanon's geographic bursaries or on the edges of major towns and cities, we saw populations really protesting their continued marginalisation from political and economic life in a country that has centralised everything historically in the capital, Beirut. Tripoli, for example, was dubbed the by bribe of the revolution because of.

The high participation rates and demonstrations and we can talk a bit more about Tripoli, as I said earlier in the Q&A. And why Tripoli is incredibly significant, not only October twenty nineteen, but today is also incredibly important. And finally, I think these protests were also about, you know, opposing this privileging of connexion of sect over merit. You have professionals and Express Scripts that were playing a key role in the protest.

They were funding. They were organising. They were doing everything they can to say we want a civic society. We do not want a privileged sect over marriage, connexion over marriage. And finally, two more quick points about this is there was also a rediscovery of the public, Qur'an and the sense of a reassertion of notions of the public good. Anyone who was here during that period will remember this amazing energy.

I mean, you go down to Martyrs Square, where the most of the protests were happening, and there'll be at least seven, eight, nine, 10 discussion groups happening around anything and everything you can think about.

And this was happening across the country, not just in Beirut. And for the first time in the country's history, we saw a sense of empowerment also amongst private sector companies who began to take staging demonstrations and saying we're not going to pay taxes because we'd rather divert this money to our employees.

And I think that the final one and maybe the most important one that is relevant to this discussion today is that the protests also showed a real revolt against the sectarian leadership of the country, because what we saw was protests happening within communities. This is the first time where the protests were not just in Beirut, but were actually in towns and villages across the country. And members of various sectarian communities were protesting against their own leadership.

And this is also a Mindstorm, in a sense, for Lebanese internal politics. It's quite significant. Hence came the slogan Columbiana Galon. All of them means all of them are still craftier. And if for the Kewney. He's so much Malha that is just so much material for us to work with. And I think lots of points of comparison and contrast to be drawn in the case of Iraq. So could I invite my son to please now take the floor? Thank you, Jim.

Thank you. I'm going to read. I'm afraid I'm not as fluent. And just to say that I'm a filmmaker, I'm not an academic. I was actually not present at the protests that that kicked off in October 2019. I was in Iraq in 2019 shooting my film, but that was in the very beginning of the year. But I'm very much in touch with people who were there. The protests, which began in Iraq in October 2019, were not the first.

Between 2011 and 18, sporadic protests took place in various cities against unemployment, low wages, corruption and the lack of utilities like electricity and clean water. But 2092 protests were much bigger and much more inclusive, two events triggered the protests that began in Tahrir Square in Baghdad in October 2019. One month before 100 hundred university graduates had protested in front of the prime minister's office demanding jobs.

There was a major use of force against the protesters by the security services. And in response, protests around the country happened against the methods used to suppress the graduates demonstration, especially the violence against women. A little later, a respected Army officer, Abdulwahab Sayadi, who as head of Iraq counter-terrorism force, had led the fight against ISIS in Mosul, where he was a hero and where a statue of him was erected in the city by a grateful population.

This man was suddenly dismissed and transferred to a desk job in the defence ministry and his statue was taken down. According to many people, this decision was taken by the prime minister under pressure from Possum's Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. He was the real power in Iraq and Saturday had had a disagreement with him.

People were outraged by this for them. This was a symbol of how the country did not really belong to its people, but to foreign forces and to the corrupt, incompetent Iraqi political class and their militias. Protests erupted in Tahrir Square, in Baghdad and in other cities. And the slogan was read, what on? We want a homeland. The protesters wanted radical systemic change, a core demand was an end to the quota system. The mahasen on which the government was based.

This was set up by the US occupying power after the 2003 invasion to create proportional representation. But on an ethnic and sectarian basis. Protesters blame this system for causing divisions and entrenching an identity on a sectarian basis and racing a sense of national Iraqi identity. The protesters also blamed this policy for the division of causing a catastrophic, barbaric sectarian violence of 2006 and eight, which took so many lives.

It also meant that the political class acted in self-interest as defined by sex and ethnicity and not in the interests of the whole country. It enabled corruption and networks of patronage and cronyism amongst the political class and the militias who backed them. The scale of the corruption is unbelievable. And I have an anecdote to tell about this to do in Lebanon, while somewhere enriching themselves on a massive scale. The rest of the country was being impoverished.

As one activist said, we can no longer tolerate a system which allows political elites to treat our country's resources as spoils. One slogan was not she are not, certainly not Christian. We are one Iraq. This reflects an outright rejection of sectarianism, but it also expresses an aspiration. Other demands were to reform the party and electoral laws so that no party with a militia could run for office.

The other core demand was that no foreign power should be able to influence or intervene in Iraqi affairs. That has been the case since 2003 from various parties. And the nature of these protests was different from anything that had been seen in Iraq before. There was a core commitment to non-violence. There was a rejection of hierarchy. So when they were asked who the leaders were, the protesters would say there were no leaders and nor did they want any.

Of course, this was probably also to protect the people who might have been seen as leaders. Tahrir Square became a tent city where thousands flocked to join the protests in different parts of the city, but also from the rural areas. People of all ages, grandparents to primary school children brought by their teachers came. People brought food. They painted murals. They performed street theatre against the interference of foreign powers.

And they made memorials for the dead from the spent to your gas canisters. They took took drivers, became de facto ambulances, ferrying the wounded to hospital and returning with food. Lawyers came to give advice. Medical volunteers, often at risk of their own lives, came to treat the wounded. And everywhere there were discussions, a remarkable expression of unity and grassroots solidarity.

For the first time, people from poor areas like Sadr City met those from Monsoor, which is a comfortable middle class area in Baghdad. For the first time, they were speaking to each other. And, of course, across sectarian lines. The government reacted with force. Initially, it was snipers and the use of military grade tear gas canisters often being aimed at the heads of the protesters. Activists were kidnapped as they went home, either by security forces or the militias.

And some who had been targeted were assassinated, which even now after the protests have stopped. It's happening in cities like Basra, an armada probably as a warning to others. By the end, people were exhausted by the violence and possibly because there was not enough tangible progress. By the end, 700 people had been killed. Twenty five thousand had been wounded and 5000 left with permanent disabilities.

To finish, I'd just like to quote to you what my friend Knoff RC, who I think is joining us here from Baghdad, told me. She said the beginning of the protest is that there has been a development of political awareness, a commitment to a non-sectarian, non-violent movement for justice and equality. And even if the political class has not changed, the society has, in their sense of their own power what they feel entitled to and how they identify themselves.

Mike, thank you so much. And I take my hat off to both you and Maher for being able to address such a breadth of issues, driving these very different and yet comparable popular protest movements in Iraq and in Lebanon. I am going to want to yield the floor very quickly because I can see the questions are already beginning to come in from our audience,

which is over 130 strong, which is wonderful to see. But I think the point you made most to in about the way in which Iraqi protesters were saying in particular they didn't want any outside power to have any influence on their country's politics, was a message that was very much coded about Iran and the one country that seems to be a unifying thread between the sectarian dissonance in Lebanon and in Iraq.

Is the role that Iran is playing now, whether it's through the support that they give to Hezbollah in Lebanon or whether it's through the kind of intervention that cost them, Soleimani was, you know, protested against for doing. Could I ask you both to just give a little bit of thought to the role that Iran plays in destabilising the situation in both cases and what the way forward might be?

I wish I knew. Bahar. Well, I mean, when it comes to Lebanon, the support for Hezbollah is the obvious one. Hezbollah is a Lebanese political party, but it is one that is part of a larger regional axis that is involved in regional conflicts. I mean, it's it's an extension of Iran's policies in the region.

In that sense, it's interesting that I read just now, a few days ago, that they're now considering some sort of strategic agreement between the Republic of Iran itself and its seasoned allies, some sort of defence agreement where they agree to defend each other, which means it's going to put Lebanon even further into the orbit and to an external orbit issue like external to Lebanon.

At least the challenge is significant. I mean, Iran's destabilising and I don't want to get into Iran versus the Saudi Arabia or Iran versus the US. If I just want to zoom in just to respond to your question of Iran's particular activities in Iraq, where a lot of the protests were about Iran, Barbara and Basra and Karbala and places we never thought we would hear these words. Mean to hear Iran on, but it just displays the level.

It's not just about a rediscovery of Iraqi national identity, a sense of Iraqi and us, but it's also the sense that their country is being exploited for external purposes that someone else.

I mean, my sense from Iraq of Iraqi friends and colleagues and workshops support space and the sense that Iran acts towards Iraq in the same way that Syria used to act towards Lebanon, deciding making, you know, playing a big role in the internal politics, decision making, humiliating leaders, etc. Hezbollah is Iran's man in Lebanon, and they are at this point the kingmakers in many ways. Nothing will move the country if they don't agree to it.

And one of the issues today, as you may know, Lebanon is in a severe bottleneck. It's unable to politically where the government formation has been stalled for at least six, seven months now. We have a prime minister, caretaker prime minister and prime minister elect, and the government is not being formed. And part of the issue is and part of it is domestic politics. I won't get into the weeds here.

But part of it also is that whatever happens in Lebanon is going to be part of a regional discussion or international discussion between the Iranians and the United States of America. And as far as the U.S. is concerned, frankly, Lebanon is a footnote. It really is a footnote. And this broader regional deal that's going to be put on the table. And so for Lebanon, it's not a very comfortable position to be in. No, I think I think you've made a good point.

And if Lebanon's a footnote, you know, Iraq, because of America's historic involvement as an exclamation mark and the fear, I think that I've heard expressed and I feel myself is that the battle between the US and Iran is going to take place in Iraq. Iraqis themselves are pushing back. I mean, I I'm very struck by Saddam's statue coming down. Yeah. Or antagonism between Iraqi citizens and their neighbour, Iran. It's all sort of dynamism in Iran's position within Iraq.

Sometimes for better and sometimes for the worse as far as public opinion is concerned. But in public opinion, it's happening. But what's worrisome, for example, is that the rocket that was fired on Saudi Arabia a couple of days ago supposedly came from Iraq, not from Yemen this time. And this was Iraqi, you know, groups on the ground that claimed it.

So this attempt to drag Iraq again or for it to become the playing field for this regional and international tug of war becomes even more significant. And perhaps all the more reason for there to be detente between the United States, Iran, Iran and regional actors. It's very hard to see how in the current sanction regime the pressure is on Iran that one could hope to see moderation in Iran's positions in the countries like Iraq or Lebanon.

Well, we're part of the negotiating the arsenal of things that they will negotiate over. So whether it's sanctions, whether it's that's why I think the government's submission will continue to be stalled, because there's no reason for them to give anyone anything until they get something else for it. So the negotiations are happening outside of Lebanon, not in Lebanon at this point. I don't see an opening. And I think it's the same for Iraq.

It's part of the negotiating tactics that Iran will use to its benefits now that it's reopened a conversation with the United States. Well, at this point, I think I need to be handing over to the questions from our audience before we hand over to Michael Willa's, who's going to moderate the Q&A line. Let me just remind listeners who have joined us for tonight's webinar that you can ask your questions to our speakers through the Q&A bar on your ZEW function.

If you want to be anonymous, you can market as anonymous. If you put your name down next, your question that Michael's going to give you the satisfaction of hearing your name broadcast. So do please put your questions up now. And Michael, let me hand over to you for the Q&A. Thank you very much, Eugene. Our first question is directed specifically at Malchow on Lebanon. But I think it's relevant really to both countries. And you've touched on it already.

And it's a question that comes from Adam Lokke. And Adam's question is, to what extent can the Lebanese and Iraqi protest movements be called a nation building movement overturning the post civil war, civil conflict and sectarian confessional settlement? And is it comparable to the other revolutions against perceived corrupt and distant governments? For example, the nationis revolutions against Kremlin backed dictators in Eastern Europe.

So really, is there actually something identifiable as a nation building movement emerging in these protest movements in both countries? Both the Mehar and team-mates who may soon be on to start OK? I mean, in a way and Iraq, it is a kind of nation building exercise because actually everything was razed to the ground in 2003. Everything fell apart. The whole infrastructure of the country in the sense of the nation because of this incredible sectarian division that happened.

So in a sense, it's rebuilding something that is, you know, when they say we are all one Iraq, that's what the aspiration is to be achieved and to have a homeland and to have a country. To have a nation. So maybe. I think for Lebanon also, it is I don't know if it's a nation building exercise or more of recapturing the nation somehow. So the sense that, again, like Iraq, we are all Lebanese. Our sectarian identity doesn't matter. I mean, this sense was very genuine on the ground.

Now, how that will translate and I think this is where we need to distinguish between what's happening today across the region and what's happened in Eastern Europe, you know, decades ago. One is this is a very different context. We're at a moment where people have lost belief and political parties. The whole question of how you organise. How do you play politics? I mean, we're coming out of a period where politics was a dirty word for a long time.

And we're also coming out of period where across the region political parties were systematically demolished by those in government. So I think that it's a very different period in that sense. And this is partly reflected in the disarray we're seeing today or the diversity. I don't see that this diversity of the diversity of people and groups are part of these movements. We don't have, you know, a Vaclav Havel or, you know, a kind of a leader who was kind of leading the crowds down the street.

No, you have groups who are protesting how that will translate into a political movement that's able to transition Lebanon or Iraq into something else I think is a much bigger and a very different question. The last thing I would say in terms of context also is that the regional context of the democracy movements that emerged in Eastern Europe was very different. They had the Europe region that was completely supportive of these movements in this region.

And this part of the whole region was completely Amethi. These demonstrations look at 2011. I mean, Tunisia, Egypt. And immediately the counter-revolution kickstarted. The realisation was, oh, my God, this is a domino effect. And it's hitting all of us. So, I mean, actually, the actors in the region have played a very active role in undermining these protest movements across the board, including, I would say, Lebanon and Iraq. There is a question on Hezbollah here.

Hezbollah has played the role. Also, we saw the reaction at the beginning of the protest movement in 2019. Their reaction, you know, first saying it's OK, you you're right to protest. We understand you're upset, but you're not OK. Now, you can go home. We've heard you will try and do something about it. And then the next step was to say, you're all traitors and there's treason here and you're all children off and being paid by foreign embassies.

I mean, it was a crescendo of trying to discredit the the protests. And what was actually happening on the ground. Thank you very much. A couple of questions now on whether specific events changed the nature of the protests and their prospects. And the question for each of you, for Moha. Do you think if it had not been for the Cobh 19 pandemic, there would actually have been effective change by now?

And that comes from Isabel Miller. And our second question comes from the Rush Joshi, former student. Very good to see you with us. Very Ash. And this goes to May soon. And it is. Did the killing of Kassem's samani galvanise and incite sectarian sentiment or sharpen sectarian divides? Did it give the government to get out of jail free card and that it was deprived of having to take action against Iranian forces?

If you could both answer those things about how specific events may have changed the movement. Thank you. For Lebanon. Very quickly. Yes. Covered 90. Would we have seen change by now? I sincerely doubt it. You've got the political elite that's very deeply entrenched on the numbness. I mean, half the city was blown up on August 4th and they still haven't budged. So I'm not. Not to mention the thousands of deaths, etc.

So you have a very entrenched political elite. But what we have seen is a continuation of massive movements on the ground and that could have created additional pressure on this political elite to watch somehow. So, yes, it did change the trajectory, but not in the way of peace. I don't think it's taught them. I don't have a crystal ball, but I don't think it would if we would have seen a massive change by now. Yes, in terms of the killing of Sulaimani.

I don't think it really I mean, there are people who are very linked to him who are in power and who are benefiting from, you know, being in power. And his being killed is a diminution of their power, is conceivably possibly diminishing their power. And so I don't think it really changed. It doesn't change anything in the squares, in the protests, except that there were people who came out against the US because Soleimani had been killed.

And so I don't think it was really has changed anything. I mean, I think they'll pick up where they left off, basically. That's interesting. Thank you very much. Again, the question, I think would be nice to have both of you on. So this comes from Catarina Delacourt up from the LSC. Thank you for joining us, Katharina. Good to see you. And the question she poses is this. Everybody dislikes the sectarian system, but there are no mechanisms in either Lebanon or Iraq.

Overcoming it in a way, the eggs have to be broken to make the omelette with the cost of doing so would be hard. Are there any practical steps can be taken in this direction of any institutions in which reform could be made more feasible? So really, is there really functional alternative to the sectarian system in the country, perhaps in Lebanon? Yes. I mean, in Lebanon, the type of agreement already foresaw the move towards a civic form of governance.

The idea was that there would be the formation of an upper Senate that would include members of the religious groups, representatives of the different religious groups in Lebanon. And where any decision, policy decision that is considered of strategic or of national implications with national implications would actually be discussed in this particular Senate.

There's actually also been discussions about including members of the diaspora, representatives of Lebanon's extensive diaspora in the Senate. And once that sentence is established, the idea was we will then move to parliamentary elections that would not be based on sectarian identity. And that's in time you would slowly move away from political appointments or appointments and the civil service based on sectarian identity.

The Lebanese constitution actually is very particular about this because it says that only seven one service civil servants should be considered based on the sectarian identity. And in practise, this is now at every single level. If you want to move a caretaker of a building from one building to another, it becomes part of the skipper or girl between the leadership. So the Lebanese governance system does have something forward in place should they choose to implement it.

They simply have chosen not to implement it. And so almost I mean, since since 1990 that this has been in place and they still haven't implemented it. Well, in Iraq, actually, some of the young people who were involved in protests in Tahrir Square and so forth. What they're trying to do is to set up parties that are first of all, you have to get rid of them houseless our system, occultation, the quota system.

But the set our parties that are not based on any kind of sectarian idea, but on policy when people vote for them, no vote for a policy, which is a policy which addresses the needs of the whole country. This is the idea that it should be secular and non-sectarian. Now what this is going to take a long time, but I think that that's the direction in which people are moving because the consequences of having a sectarian based government have been really catastrophic for the country.

I mean, the population is really traumatised. Everybody has lost people. So I think I think it's a possibility. Yeah, you probably do have to break a good number of eggs. But I think it's possible. Thank you. Another question for both of you, and this comes from Nadia Alali, thank you for joining us. Nadia Luddy asks, I would like to have both my heart and may soon about their view on the role of women and gender claims in the uprisings,

especially in relation to the challenging of sectarianism. The women element in the movements have presented a challenge in any way to sectarianism. Women were at the forefront. I mean, they were at the forefront at every single level. As I said, whether it was in terms of organising the protests, even now an infrastructure of support for communities that were affected, families that were affected by the explosion. The idea is that they've stepped in too many.

I mean, broad cross-section of women have stepped into public life. It's not about just doing the NGO thing anymore. It's actually recognising that this is all a seamless effort, whether it's protecting protesters from security sector violence or whether it's calling for equal citizenship, the right to pass on their citizenship to their children, pushing against violence, gender based violence and for LGBT rights, the sense that all of these are connected.

You can no longer separate these rights if we want to move to a more civic Lebanon as such. So I would say that what they really were at the forefront and continue to be at the forefront in every single level. That is quite amazing. I mean, the leadership that we've seen emerge amongst women is something. Hello, Nadya. It's nice that you're here. I would say something similar about Iraq, from what I know.

I know, for example, that it's at a certain point the Senate decided that it was shameful and sinful and so forth for women to come out and demonstrations with the men and the women were there in large, large numbers. They did it an enormous number of murals and were involved in theatre and all kinds of things. And they were there in big numbers. So he said he said that and that they should not march together and the women went bananas.

They they refused. They said we're not you know, we're not being threatened by this. And, you know, and there was threats, threats that they shouldn't be. And amongst the adherents to this address line, people did that, but they weren't really people who had been involved in the protests, as far as I know. But the people who were involved in the protests absolutely, categorically refused.

And there was a lot of talking about women's rights and around the, you know, personal status laws and so forth. And people who were involved also were people who were working against gender based violence as well. Like, no, if I quoted earlier. And also the other thing that some women said and meant that there was I mean, something that they didn't expect to be the case, that there was no harassment of women, no sexual harassment of women in Tahrir Square.

There wasn't. And you would have expected there to be, but there wasn't. Thank you very much. Question. Specifically on Lebanon, reports up by two audience members all combine asking very similar things. And welcome on Béatrice T.S.A. They're asking Mohie if you could a little bit more about the internal domestic regional dynamics in the protests, particularly the role of the protests in Tripoli, again, outside of Beirut.

Tripoli became much more important. Is there an importance of domestic dynamics going on in Lebanon we haven't seen before? Sorry, is it about you, said Rachel, or within within regional in terms of within Lebanon itself, the Tripoli performing a new role, a particular dynamic place as opposed to Beirut. Is there a sort of domestic within regional dynamic within Lebanon? Well, I mean, each each city.

And actually, if you go in on our website, we did a series on how the protests were being experienced from different cities, because each city does have its own dynamic. It has its own history. It has its own community history of protest, history of organisation cetera.

Tripoli was incredibly important because in twenty nineteen I mean, I remember telling people constantly, don't look at what's happening in Beirut, look at say that in Tripoli, because it was the first time that we were seeing these massive protests. Spain, the second and third largest cities in the country. Tripoli is significant because the popular narrative about Tripoli is one of radicalisation, Islamization, terrorism.

It's associated in a lot of people's minds, ways radical, you know, with social Islam and the fighting that came out in 2007, I believe, in the area. So there are lots of narratives. It's a society where there's a lot of poverty. And what happens in 2019 is actually capture for the suspension. The protests were almost like massive parties. People were reclaiming their city, but also making their voices heard and saying don't take us for granted anymore.

We're sick and tired of the way this country has been run and we want to reclaim our space back. Now, in terms of central dynamics, it's also reflected. I mean, Tripoli is predominantly Sunni. It reflected the discontent of the Sunni community with its own leadership in the city, has eight different members of parliament, former prime ministers, two former prime ministers. So the the protests were very much a reflection of this discontent.

And we could hear it in the protest. People saying, you know, you talked about you've been in power, but you've done nothing for the city. This is a city which has 50 percent poverty rates, which has very high levels of illiteracy, high levels of unemployment. There's been very little investment by the Lebanese state in the city. It's a very youthful population. It's a mixed city. It's a historic city. I mean, there are lots of things one can talk about. There is the dynamic there.

To the extent that it's had its own particular modes of organisation, but also something that we were seeing across the country at the same time. There's also a question, if I could just say very quickly on whether change will happen bottom up or top down. I think it's both way. It will happen both bottom up and top down. It's not going to be a one way street. There definitely has to be more organisation on the ground to present an alternative because they will not.

But without that. But also, there has to be external pressure on the leadership as well. Thank you very much. I'm tempted to sort of extend that question to May soon about the bottom up and top down change and also to add again, they may well be connected. The question is coming in from Morris Kerschbaum and Maurice is asking Maysoon how she sees the upcoming parliamentary elections laying out.

Will there be more protests, an intensifying of a situation or a political change action based on the protests? OK, well, organising from the bottom up, top down business, I think it's it's. Yes. I mean, there is there's a long way to go to organise from the bottom to have an actual programme, which isn't there yet. I think people are working on it. And, you know, as I said, some people are trying to sort of think about new parties.

And I think that that will come from the bottom. What kind of structure? But you know, the top down well, I don't know what is the top in Iraq. It's a bit difficult. A bit difficult to tell. The parliamentary elections. I think. Yes. I mean, these parties that are being put together will take part. I think the problem is that it actually if the whole Mahoso saw the whole quota structure is not abandoned.

It's a problem. I mean, there are also parties who are asking some of the people who are involved in the protests who have sort of come up, appear more more apparent to people. I mean, that they might be people who would become involved in politics. They've been invited to join some of the parties that already exist, which, you know, scares me, actually, quite frankly, because, one, people can be co-opted very easily.

And unless there's a systemic change, it's not going to mean very much in June when the elections happen. So I don't know quite what is happening on that score. If no if my friend is here, she would be a person who would be able to answer that question easily. So that's really all I can say. But yes, certainly I mean, I think the big effort is to at ground level, at grassroots level, to actually come up with a programme.

And what's something like the government that everybody seems to want looks like? Because at the moment we don't have it at all. No, thank you. Question this time again. Back to Maha for the money. Good to see you having you join us. Frank and Frank is asking really about the effect that the reconstruction programme as and when it starts in Syria will have on Lebanon, particular, of course, the invasion and the involvement of the Iranians and the Russians.

What sort of implications that might have for Lebanon? Well, it depends if it happens with the U.S. blessing or not, because if the Sezer act for any Lebanese, I mean that Lebanese companies weren't getting ready to partner with other companies and move in. But when this sees their act, that kind of put a damper on any initiatives in that direction.

So I think a lot of it will depend on what kind of a reconstruction programme is put in place, who's sponsoring it, and whether there's an international agreement to do so. If and when that happens and it is an internationally sanctions reconstruction programme, then, yes, it will create businesses for Lebanon, of course, being the country like next door. Tripoli is already ready to become a hub for things to be moving in and out of Syria.

Thank you. I've got a little bit of a question on Lebanon particularly. Several people have asked if you could say something, Maha, about the role of France, particularly in Makram, play a big role. What going to play a significant role in Lebanon or not? Well, they're trying. The problem is that they've got the carrots, but I don't think they have quite the stick. That the way they need to use and I'm not sure.

I mean, now they just his mackerels, President Krall's initiatives, he's taken a bit more life. Right now, there's more kind of support for it between the call that supposedly happened between him and President Biden. Actually, the call happened. But what was leaked is that he, you know, said we've support your initiative on Lebanon. Whether that's true or not, we don't know. But also, the Vatican, it seems, is pushing for something to break.

The political political stalemate in Lebanon will not break on its own. Still, it does need external political intervention, not military, political intervention and diplomatic intervention to try and break that political stalemate. It will need carrots and sticks. I'm fortunate to keep my counsel far, has had the carrots, but has not had the sticks to force them to move into some sort of an agreement.

This political leadership is refusing to recognise that the economic losses as a result of the country's economic collapse are of such magnitude that the country will have a lost decade at the very least. And even when they do recognise how significant the losses are, we're talking about 50 billion dollar hole in the central bank alone.

And what that is doing to the country, they're still refusing to accept that they need to share in these losses or that sharing these losses means that they're going to lose some of their influence in the pieces of the pie that they've carved for themselves within state institutions. So there needs to be an international push to get them to recognise this reform is inevitable.

And they are going to have to let go at some point sooner rather than later, we hope, before there's not much left of the country left. Thank you. One last brief question to both of you, and it's a question that came up in relation to Algeria last week and came up consistently during the protests across the region in 2011. And it's something I think both of you refer to is the lack of leadership in the protest movements and whether this actually gives its strength or weakness.

And are there any particular insights from the movements in Lebanon, the movement in Iraq? Or are we seeing a similar mixture where it actually weakens? I think initially, frankly, and then weakens it later on. So your thoughts on that particular experience will be very interesting. And that comes from Alexander Brendle Maha. I think that it's both a strength and a weakness. The strength is the kind of horizontal leadership allows many people to take ownership.

And this comes again, as I said earlier, at a time when people have lost faith in institutions and organisations and political parties. It also is a strength because it prevents the security services from going after the leaders of the protest movements or both whether to put them in jail or in some instances, they've been killed, as we know historically in this part of the world. So in that sense, it's a strength. The weakness is obviously when it comes to presenting an alternative.

We saw this in Iraq with sequins. We saw this in Algeria and we see this in Lebanon. We'll say, who's the alternative? What is the alternative? Then it becomes quite problematic. Let's talk to the leadership of this protest movement that becomes problematic because there is no one seeing the leadership. If you recall in January 25, when when the Egyptian uprising happened and there was a call, let's talk to representatives of this revolution.

A number of people went to speak to the authorities at the time. And they were you know, there were lots of questions around them with people on the street. Sinkholes said, you can represent us. Who are you to represent us? We have not elected you to this position. So I think it is a conundrum. What I'm seeing in Lebanon, and this would be my sense, is what I'm seeing in Lebanon is that there is a move to overcome this.

And it's an exciting time in the sense we're seeing different models of organisation happening. People are trying to be innovative in terms of how do you organise both horizontally and vertically at the same time? We're seeing opposition, kind of broad coalitions emerging as an opposition movement. What is the political elite in the country? So I think it's a wait and see and we have to give these things time to mature and emerge.

Yes. I mean, what I would really agree with that in terms of Iraq, I think there is a strength and not having leaders. If it's really pursued and you set up groups, participatory groups, rather than choosing one person to represent everybody, I mean, I think it's something that might be tried as opposed to just choosing a leader. As you say, leader can be picked off. And actually in Iraq leadership, people who are called leaders don't have a very good image.

I mean, through the years I've sat down and all the rest that have come and gone and the leaders that are there now, I think people are looking not only in our part of the world, but everywhere. I think people are looking for different sorts of organisation, not hierarchical, not patriarchal. So I don't know what form that will take. But I think there is a desire for that kind of thing for a leader in this leaderless leadership.

Well, on that note, Maysoon Pachachi, Mahayana, I have to thank you for having shared of the depth of your knowledge and experience and shedding so much clarity on issues of such complexity. It's really been a remarkable privilege to share this hour with you. I'd like to invite you all to join us next week when our colleague, a summit Azami. We'll be speaking with Shadi Hamid from Brookings. And with Nadia.

Oh, that from the University of Kansas. Where they going to be examining the role of religion in the Arab uprisings one decade on? But from all of us in Oxford, a good night. A good weekend. And thanks to our speakers. Goodbye. Thank you. Jean.