Jack Devine on the Afghan War’s Financial Disaster (Podcast)

roles within the intelligence world. Um. Really quite quite an astonishing career. His new book is all about Russia's aggression against the West, not in the Cold War era but today, and it's quite fascinating and very revealing, in particular how the Russians have so skillfully used social media to foment unrest and anger and essentially turn Americans against each other. They're not the only reason why the country is having issues, but they are clearly pouring fuel on the fire. It's

quite fascinating. Really, a person with an endless amount of of inside and knowledge from a unique position with no further ado. My conversation with the CIA's Jack Divine, this is Mesters in Business with very Renaults on Bloomberg Radio. This week, I have an extra special guest. His name is Jack Divine. He is a thirty two year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency, where he has served as

Acting Director and Associate Director of Operations. He was the Chief of the Latin American Division and head of Counternarcotic Center, where he was awarded the CIA's Meritorious Officer Award and Distinguished Intelligence Medal. He has written a number of books on the intelligence fields, his most recent Spymaster's Prism, the

Fight against Russian Aggression. He was chief of the Afghan Task Force and in seven helped drive the Stinger anti aircraft program UH, the handheld missile that took out Russian helicopters and really changed the course of the war, sending the Russians fleeing from Afghanistan. It couldn't be more timely given our recent withdrawal. Jack Divine, Welcome back to Bloomberg Break. So let's start a little bit with your background, and but I guess I really have to lead with Afghanistan.

Tell us a little bit about your perspective as to what's going on in that nation and where the United States went wrong other than the fact that we were there for two full decades. Well, I think it all starts. It's like many things. How do you get into something in the first place off and determines how you get how do you get out years later? So I think

we all were quite shaking, and that's an understatement. By the attack against the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon and uh Alkida attacked, and this country, our beloved country. Everybody wanted to get the people responsible immediately and go get in Latin. And we knew he was in uh he was in Afghanistan, so naturally there was

a program. The US government immediately decided we're going to go get them, and within hours the c I had a team on the on the ground already had on the ground, but a team coming in to work with some of the Mujadine leaders that in the Northern Alliance, which I had worked with years earlier, and the Special Forces were coming in right behind them. They would have been there at the same time, as I understand that the paperwork got tied up, but the Special Forces wanted

to be there and they did a magnificent job. And uh actually you know, eleven took place, but you know we we the government fell, the Taliban government fell. People forgot this in November and in November seven, so you know that early covert action program now bombing. The very first thing was bombing in October. And the reason I mentioned this is, you know, we basically had them brought down. Um and are overt military arrived a night the nineteenth

of October. The government fell, you know, a few days later. So did we really need an army? As a question, I wrote an op ed piece that's still floating around today in July of the C I a solution, which is, let's not put it. We're not We're not going to win with the army on the ground. We should be working to get ben Latin and then where our interests apply, we're covertly. So I think the big judgment call was that we needed to put our army on the ground.

Once we made that decision, then your next there's no question that we could drive them off the field, and we did. The question is how do you get out? And you know, the thought that we would be there twenty years later was probably not on anybody's mind. So UM, fast forward, we get up the hundred sousand troops too in the Obama administration. Then you know it started to bring it down, and you know there's a big argument, big argument today issued that it's not a big argument.

I think the bast majority if people down the States think it is time to leave. But I think what we were looking at isn't so much that we were leaving the last few days. I think they really criticism. Criticism is on how did we manage you know, the exit and could have been avoided. I think we're a tremendous number of progressional inquiries and so on about this, and this will be a lingering issue. So I don't think it's about this was the time to get out.

I mean I've been saying this for a long time. It's you know, how do you get out? And being careful not to get into things where we put troops on the ground, because that is a longer commitment. And I'm an advocate for using covert and my whole career was devoted to covert action. I am a believer that even with troops on the ground, if we would have remained focused on Afghanistan and come up with a plan to do we have to do and then get out

of that country. It could have been a much cheaper, shorter, more effective war. How accurate is it to say that the adventure in Iraq, and I use those words purposefully, a war of choice that had nothing to do with on eleven that distracted us from the task at hand in Afghanistan is part of the factors that led to this snaffoo that we see currently going on today. I think historians, when they go back, because you need to

get away from it, everyone's committed. They had a role, so they're defending their roles and that's but I think when history looks back, we're gonna have a hard time explaining exactly why we went into a rock because they didn't have weapons of fast destruction right um, and there was nothing Even if they had them, there was nothing indicating that it was going to be used against the

United States. And the proof of the Puddy became they didn't happen, so they certainly weren't wasn't an eminent threat. So I think there were a lot of us at that time that scratched our head about why we're going to rocket? Rocket is nothing new without Kaida, so you know, and this is I'm not a Johnny come late on this. I was stumped at the time. Um, and I go into that both of my books that you know. I think it was one of the great errors in our

our foreign policy and youth of our tremendous force. I mean so, um, you know, we spent a lot of time and money and most importantly our precious military personnel. So I think it was a great distraction. We missed the main point, which was go getting bed I was or another rockted where I was very critical of our government for not getting him. We took years to find him. He was in Pakistan. So invading Afghanistan, uh, you know, when the guy was in Pakistan is uh. You know,

we again restorans and book back and scratched their head. However, I was for going after him and going into Afghanistan. But as I said covertly, but the Iraq War is one thing that I've learned over the years in the CIA, were all consuming that there was. Once you decide you're going to commit to a war, almost all your other activities, and particularly in a NaSTA security arena, are all driven

by that war. You stopped looking at less about Russia and less about China though, it's it becomes all consuming all of your personnel. They're hired against that mission. So it all there's you know, institutions. It is the wars. You know, when they drag on, they have tremendous change, has tremendous change about your natural security structure, and there's a long tail to it paying for it that it was trillions of dollars are gonna be paid for by

our grandkids. So you know, I think history is gonna be really hard on decision to go in and to have stayed as long as we did. And you know, there was universal support, so there's no wing to you can blame it on. We probably gets the Democrats. The President and I had to brief exchange. I mean, you know, there weren't a lot of people shouting about going into a rock at the time, and I just found it really um umbfound me that we we went in No. Eleven.

I think you could have invaded anywhere and would have gotten support. And that's been some of the criticism of the Bush Cheney administration. But let me circle back to the point you just made about wars being all consuming and leading us to take our eye off of other balls. That are in the air. Clearly the focus has been on the Middle East for the past twenty years, since

certainly since nine eleven. But in Spymaster's Prison, the Fight against Russian Aggression, you make a very cogent case that Russia remains a dangerous adversary, that they weren't distracted by what was going on in the Middle East, and that they very capably built up assets against the United States, which which they have been deploying quite successfully without a

whole lot of counter from us. To tell us about the motivations that led you to write this new book, well, a couple of really key questions, and in your point that I mean a tackle, and I mean the first one is, you know, it's not that I'm you know, using Kentucky when they trying to figure out what happened in terms of our attention. I mean very clearly in our public records, the budget against you know, the Soviet Union, if you will, and supposed to Russia drive from you

in the full ward down to ten percent. Now they're building it back. And in the first book, Good Hunting, I mentioned sort of at the end, not mentioned I go into some lens that terrorism is going to be with us, and in fact, it's been with us since the beginning of time. But it spikes, and it's spiked the nine eleven and isis and we had to do what we had to do. But the real or bigger, arching, over arching, longer issues will be the return of competition

among nation states, and that's where we are. The dialogue is about China, Korea, Russia or on it. So that's where the new national security emphasis. Can't take your eye off of terrorism. But there was a clear trend, but

we were all in. I mean, when you put an army on the ground and you get up the hundred thousand troops and a hundred thousand contractors and billions of dollars, so much effort goes into that that there's the government isn't fungible in the sense that you know, you're gonna have to take people off of something to cover it and you have to hire new people. So I think we became, you know, we felt that the big, the big targets, we're not going to be the competitors that

there are today. China clearly has loomed large. That should not have been a surprise. But your point, which is a I think a really good one. Is we sort of behind neglective. I could use that old phrase about Russia. It was somehow it wasn't the Soviet Union, so and it wasn't didn't have the economy of China, has the economy of Spain or Italy. We should worry less about it. But no one stood back and said, well, who's actually working against us? In ourn A secured another who's actually

operating against us and particularly United States? And this is what drove me to the book, And that is when I saw the elections in UH was again flabbergast that not that the Russians were in collecting information and cyber I mean, that's been going on and will continue to go on and going on for as far as I can see. What they did it was really different, a size me change Grohich. I couldn't believe they did, which is they took the information and used it politically inside

the United States. And that is not what happened to Cold War. As I go into the book, there was we've fought each other all around the world, but we did not run big sophisticated covert action operations inside Russia after Stalin, and they weren't rather a few books on the screen. But this as a general principle understanding. They were not operating United States in our political system, So isn't so much that they were collecting the intelligence that

they were in there. And that's what drove me up the wall. I wanted to screen from the rooftops and pay attention. The Russians are deep into our cyber world, the new world of combat, and they're very effective. They've been doing this and they've had us. They've been penetrating us for longer than the Chinese. And we can get to that, but they're using it and we need to respond to that. So that is the you know, Clarine call if you will, from on the spy master's prison.

Let's talk a little bit about the competition between the United States and Russia. The US is an open society. We have a free press or robust constitution, a First Amendment that guarantees freedom of the press. Does this put us at a competitive disadvantage against those nations that would

take advantage of our freedoms and openness. It's a double edged sword, and I will take the open, free, democratic side of the sword in the sense that during the Cold War, you know, we talked about the spying business. Having that is our mantra brought many of the best agents to us. The best supporters the world to help us are allies to help us. Was that flag flying high? How would you like there's been a Russian kg VH I selling the economy in right? I mean, uh, your advantage.

It's a tough sell, right, We're talking a lot of people in business try and sell that, so it's a great advantage. However, there is the other side of the coin, which is if you want to we have a system that looks broken in some ways. On this next point, we need to get a consensus. And of teritarian governments, you don't need a consensus, right, you can move more quickly. The Chinese can move quickly. The Russians got the Iranians because they don't have to have with the Congress and solve.

But I want to stick with Congress despite my misgivings about some some parts of it. But my point is when you get into the cyber the cyber type of world, our openness provides a level of vulnerabilities that in warfare gives them an edgement um and and I should add just one point there not to get pustomisty. I think we're very powerful in our capabilities in the cyber war. The big issue is, because we're a democracy, going to your point, Barry, in order to use it against an adversary,

we need to get a consensus. We need to get tigress to improvement. The president can't do that unilaterally because it is action, it's covert action, and you'd have to get approval. So today's world, being a democracy, you have to go through that process and what you're looking at and before that and after that, they do not have the same compunction season straints, so they have an edge. But I still want to stick with our system because

at some point the system will come together. I know that seems Pollyannis in this moment, but we'll come together and we will get a consensus on what we need to do in the cyber warfare. But we don't have it now. And it is where did disadvantage in a weakness now? Which goes to your You're I think very perceptive question. Tell us about Moscow rules? What are they

and when did they start changing? So when I looked at the election as we were just talking to our election, and you know, I was hearing that the KGB was actually interfere in our political process I had. I was in denial at first that they can't do that, that's that's that's a politically stupid But now back and say, maybe it wasn't so stupid after all. In their part, the second part was that's not how we played the Cold War, didn't somebody briefed Putin Putin was actually in

the Cold War? It was you know, and Dresden, And we can talk about that at some point. What were the rules that you can't find them? It's like the Magna Carter, you know, it's a little hard to get your hands around the exact document. But there was an understanding that there are certain things that weren't going to happen. Where are we on the Cold War. We were not going to counterfeit each other's money. Why we would destroy the world economy, so we both had the capability to

do it. That never happened. We wouldn't um uh rough off each other's officers because we were fighting all around the world, and we would have no chaos in the

intelligence world. But there are a few exceptions on that, but by and large, um that was an understanding the others understanding was, you know, we can run operations around the world against each other, Afghanistan, Chili, Um, Egypt, wherever the crisis, whether Italy after the war, but we were not going to meddle in each in each country's programs. And I was in charge of it, as you know, for a period of time number two and then acting

for number one. It's number one, And you know, I would just tell you the idea of phone came up and said, look, let's run a cute operation in Russia's Look that's that's not how we played this game. And so uh, the Moscow rules, we need to get back to the table. And I'll tell it's not just the election. Election is just the manifestation of the problem, and that is,

how are we going to conduct cyber warfare? We can have treaties on missiles and boundaries and treaties on management of water and so on, but how do you manage cyber when it's invisible? So you have to have and that comes hard to a democratic system. In other words, we'd like things out in the open. We came very slowly the intelligence business. Through history. We we build up intelligence and back the way. So how are we going to deal with cyber and the truth of the matter

is in my estimation, and I hope it was. That was hopeful that I was hearing something and the first discussions with Prutinent they were going to defer, so the second level officials to sort of work out things. I was hoping, and I don't know that to be the case, that there'd be some understanding among the intelligence groups at a very high level. This is not a committee. This is really one or two people agreeing that we should we know what you're doing, you know what we're doing.

Let's understand each other. You either we're going to stay out of each other political system, and if they don't, then you get to the really hard But this is where we needed consensus in this country. How do we respond to that aggressive Russian aggression inside of our our political and economic system. So what is there obviously was a will full calculus made by Vladimir Putin to violate these rules. Did he just see us as sort of

distracted and vulnerable and thought, let me go mess with them? What? What? What's behind such a radical change in the relationship between two very powerful nations. I think it goes to the personality of and it goes to a strategic decision um on the personality. As I said, he was. He wanted to be a KGV officer at seventeen. They turned him down, but he actually got into KGB. You have to be you know, it was hard to get into the KGVS, just like it's very hard to get into c I A.

I'm an exception, but which set that aside. But so he would he knew what he wanted to be come he wanted to defend, you know, the system. He was a true believer. And they didn't send him to Paris, the wine and dyeing the French, or Washington and hang out in Georgetown that they sendim to Dresden. And Dresden is you know, the bleak, dark East Germany, the famous Marcus Wolf, the real Carla Uh of Lucy's books. I mean, he had more spies Marcus Wolfs than I think any

they should state had at the time. So he was in the dark side of the Cold War. And Uh when Sony Union fell, he was crushed his whole world. And I think he was committed and he remains it, and people need to understand he is committed to the reconstitution of the Great Russian not so much the Communist Party, but Russia being powerful and it's intelligence arms being powerful and guess what and adnemy be in the United States. And I have how hard time come to terms with it.

But when I look at the psychology, he grew up in a world where the number one enemy of the KGB was the the the US, and that's still there. He hasn't mind that we're in amplacable and of me and the truth of that his adversaries, like myself, I think we don't have a good relationship with Russia. There's a awful lot of similarhyberties with Russia, and uh, it's

it's role in Europe and we shouldn't be adversary. So it's on that psychological level, and then we can go into the whole psychology of Wood and if you like, I think he actually believes that we're an adversary in a way that I don't believe is the case. The second thing is they've developed a strategy, a military strategy, and it's uh attributed to one other generals more pronounced right, and he was the head of the armed forces, and

he latest said, well, that's not really his strategy. It's called a hybrid strategy means when you're facing adversaries, use military, economic, political, what cyber. In other words, they have made cyber part of their military strategy and the use of it and

the use of this information. Other words, what you saw in it the States, there is only the visible eventually saw a visible part of of of a military strategy, and that is you weaken your adversary or if you'd like something softer competitor, by getting into their system, into their cyber world and causing trouble and making them a weaker political force. And I think it was both politically, um, I mean not politically psychologically driven, but I think it

was part of their strategy. If there's an opportunity to weakness, they will And I refer to the dabbling in Venezuela. You know, they're trying to do what they didn't call war challenges everywhere. The one to keep your eye on today, not necessarily next year, but today is if you're looking at you know, you look at today, what was Russia's role with the Taliban? What are they going to be

doing and what what do they want done? And I absolutely time issue their objective in the caleban one was to make life visible for the US and to use whatever capabilities have had. And I think that story will will unfold. So we need to recognize, yes, China is that they you know, tremendous military force, but united about Russia is fighting about its wife. But it's actually punching is China isn't training, you know, really good vigorous training.

One of the things you mentioned in the book is that Putin is essentially the newest tsar in a long line of tzars. How did you come to that conclusion. Is it a function of his net worth, which I've seen all sorts of crazy numbers about, or just his consolidation of power and really being the Russian autocrat. I think first of all, you know, they counter intelligent people, and say, are you going to get excited if I

said this? But I think it's a very talented guy, really smart, cunning, so sense you know, he's this, this is a worthy adversary. So what happened? If you do he went into the KGB, the that's called Spymaster's prison.

You know, he's just he was a spy master. He ran spy you know, and there's a way of looking at the world and one of the one of the characteristics you strive where it's not that you're not emotionally a cold fish, but when you're thinking, you have to look at the realities of the situation and just whether you like them or not, you've got to deal with it. So I think he's a realist and what he's his objective is is to make it's a consolidate power. How

do you become strong? Powerful? And so maybe he didn't set out to be Thezar, but you know, he left it and he got involved with the politics, and Petersburg became the uh come on, something more elegant than diagnom. But he had a lot of interacting with the political process. But then he ended up being the head of their version, the FBI. People forget he was the head of the f SPEED. That's the FBI. What is that? That runs by his intelligence, hard edged information, tough guy. You don't

get there by accident, let me tell you. In Russia, so and then Uh he was the political process, put him around the Yeltsin circle, and people were forgotten. The oligarchs, the old timers thought well, let's bring putin and he's a he can be he can be the success of the Yelton because we can all manage him, we can all manage them. What they missed that they had someone of those places coming as they were, and quickly consolidated

his position. He's a real political animal, the first order, and and so little by little he consolidated his position. But he was a real operator, and I think we have to understand that and not underestimated. But we need to understand how he abuses. And it's not you know, the warm embrace. I looked in his eyes and me you know, I know it was called me the truth. I mean, this is this is this is about naive.

There's a line in the book that kind of cracked me up, not just that he's a spymaster president, but quote, there's no such thing as a former KGB agent. Explained that that's him. That's him. That's what he said. I didn't say that. I would say there's such thing as a former CIA guy. But that doesn't mean I'm the Taylor. It means that there's a mindset. And what Putin is saying to you is, don't be confused. I know how to run operations. I mean so and that at that

I was the head of all operations. So where there where there is I think a major fall. And the guy that I gave, you know what, I would you give the Alexander the grace or something. It might not have been a nice guy, but he knew how to organize. What I would say about was wrong with his ategy is it's the basic principle, which is where his enemies.

I mean, if he put all the political skills into becoming uh, joining the wet and becoming a real partner in the West, I think the Russian economy would be stronger there, more potential would be reached and the world be a better place. But I think he's decided he's going to play his hand and it's better for him to be the tough guy in charge of a smaller Russia,

a less dynamic economic Russia. But be in charge, and that when you open up to the West, and you open up to the democratic process is associated with it. He can't count on consolidating and holding on the power. So I think he's decided to play the shorthand, which would make him UH not Outsider the Great or Peter the Great right, so he he is a a tzar um, but on the on the on the smaller scale. I do think he's a truly a major advers in fact

we're confronting today. You know, leadership is a really important thing. But you know, she is not exactly a walk in the park either. I mean, you're not a tough guy or the Iranians or the North Koreans. And there was the president United States past and present. We are now terrorism was a highly decentralized problem. Right now, once the know that again, situation reaches a certain point of stability, which it will not nothing, not favorably for us, but

stability we will return to. One of the President's biggest challenges will be dealing with hard minded competitors who have nothing, have very little time for the democratic process as we understand it. And some of the last putent question for now, some of the estimates of his net worth, what he snuck out of the country and has hidden elsewhere, puts him amongst the wealthiest five or so people in the

world eight billion. Are these just sensational numbers with no basis in reality, or has he really moved a lot of Russia's wealth elsewhere as sort of his uh emergency life raft, or maybe it's his retirement planning well, I think one of the big problems with all autocratic leaders is, you know, you really don't get to enjoy a lot of your retirement money. Um. But I would say this, I don't know where he ranks in terms of the wealth of the top hundred people in the world, but

he is substantially wealthy. You know, you don't. I can't think of an example in history where you've held the type of power hell without a large aggrandizement of your fortune. He's certainly not working on what we would call gs pension in the United States, right, it's not the way, uh, the world worked for the best by knowledge? So then was this video wherever they got this video from my god? So I would say, uh, he has a masked of fortune.

That's not surprising and it's not unique in history with the people that hold that much power. And whether they can track it down with the penny, I'll leave other experts to go there, but I would say substantially wealthy and amongst one of the wealthiest men today. Quite interesting. Let's talk a little bit about the state of the agency and in particular cyber warfare, which seems to be everywhere from China to North Korea to Iran and especially UH in Russia. And let's start with what is the

Internet Research Agency? It sounds like a pretty benign title. I couldn't help but smile a little bit. The operational director of CIA Inspiring Group used to be called the director for plans something you see something like the Internet Research Agency, it has the same ring. It's a It is really an elite hacking group, and it's the centralization of their capabilities. It's a troll farm. I mean, they have the ability to go in and create personas and

they do a really good job of it. Uh. It is there platform, one of their principal platforms of executing their cyber program. And again the g r U and the SPR that's that's Military Intelligence TRU and the old KGB is now called the SVR. So this is really a platform that's used and it was used during the election. All the face fake identities and the operational activity that they were involved in emanated from from those intelligence agencies,

and the ira A played a part of them. So let's talk a little bit about the involvement generally in social media, but specifically in the election. What's the purpose of disinformation, what advantage accrues to the Russians. If the US is busy sniping at each other over Twitter and Facebook, well, I think the big advantage is I mean, I think it's a political advantage that which if you can make

people angry with each other in the United States. You know, there's a whole list of of organizations that they don't really care. Whether it's Proud Boys, are ah Q, I ON and U and Tea. They don't really care about the mission of them. And in some ways, I'm going to tell you, I don't think I'm not even sure how much they cared about Trump. The bigger objective was how you start up and make Americans unhappy among themselves.

I'm happy about the issues, you know, to make uh, any type of special interest group feel that they're being disadvantage. So it is really psyche warfare. Used to be called psychological warfare, and it's used in every body going back. I was just thinking that the Battle of Jerry. You mentioned that, right, you were out there and you blow the horns and make it sound like there's a thousand,

thousands of troops when there isn't. I mean, so people lying aligned themselves, uh and organized around this information for a worldward through the famous body that they was the bridge, put a note on it and floated the body to the Germans would find it and think we were coming in some place other than the Normandy, the Russians and Spymaster's prison, which I thought was particularly interesting. And we know about it because the guy that was involved in it.

Eventually the fact was affected to the west. His name is Pittman KGB guy. And so in the sixties, like sixty four, all of the sudden there's a member of a young Young person college at the timement the they found the treasure trove of Nazi documents and Devil Lake and in and you found all these incriminating documents about the German citizens that worked with the Nazis, and you know, got into New York Times and it was a big story,

your story. The only problem with it was it was a KGB operation operation next to him, right, And what they did is they falsified the documents and as they said, himself was part of the team that you know, organized this, so it looked like it was a private sector discovery. So the purpose was to write Germans hate each other,

you know. So disinformation has always been a tool psychological warfare of the military, but also in the intelligence world, and you know, substituting Stalin's head and putting someone I mean, you know, it goes on and on. The difference today is when I was in the agency, you know, you don't have limited capabilities as they said. You know, you found the body during World War Two and you put a note on it. Right today, we live in a

whole new world social media. It's like it's almost like a nuclear weapon and its ability to generate tremendous force. So the ability to use disinformation, and as we all understood, the Russians have been into disinformation and never stopped and it's something that they do quite well actually, and in the modern days, I'm told that the personas they make look very legitimate. They really put time into it. So it's a new way of warfare. So there is a warfare,

there's warfare being taken taking place. And I would submit on the in Afghanistan today that Russia is using social media to create tensions and problems that are adverse to our our inter So this information is part of the big game, so to speak. So around the time of the election, we heard the name Cozy Bear, Who or what is Cozy Bear? Cozy Bear, Fancy Bear, U, Lady Bear. These are all operational names that you have been given

to t r U and SBR entities. Cozy Bear was actually discovered by Dutch intelligence and it was the Russians actually going into our system, and the Dutch alerted this to him. They were the first ones to discover Cozy Bear being designed to stir up trouble the United States during the election. Again almost like the operation I mentored Bittman is called Operation Neptune. So Cozy Bear is really

an operational name for an activity. And you know when you when you engaged in sort of meddling inside our country, they got the nickname Cozy there, right, So it's it's not it's the name of an activity rather than a specific group. And then what took place in why was it the g r U probing the US election system? I think they both are, you know, and uh, I

can't tell you whether it's a coordinated or not. There's probably a bit like our own intelligence world that you know a lot of things are coordinated, but some things aren't. But did Jerry you and this is true in our own system, you know, Big data and the ability to mass big data often requires a tremendous computer power. So in our world, you know, n s A has tremendous capabilities in the cyber world. And now we have a

military command called Cyber Command. And the reason is because it requires a tremendous amount of uh of uh firepower if you will, in the cyber world and personnel. So uh it's a consequence the military is better equipped to handle what I would call large um large cyber activities. And that's why we have a cyber command today. The CIA, and again this would be you know, my personal judgment, and and and the KGV sp R probably do more

surgical things. In other words, they're not trying to mass all the data and grind it down in supercomputers, but are looking at surgical things, targeted types of activities. So, but both of them are under flying under the same flag, which is it is too run operations that that weaken the political fabric of the United States. So let's talk about some of those operations that are attempts to weaken the social fabric. Here. I want there's a run of

things you've you've referenced. I want to ask you about you mentioned Q and on are the Russians stirring up trouble with that group? Well, I think there's a number of things that have emerged the book that I it's it's it's really what are the types of groups that they would be looking at Antipa right, uh? Doing on? Uh? They started in the vac the nation program putting out this information about the vaccination and then that vaccinations are

vaccinations were not not not good, not not effective? Right, so uh and then where were the Chinese doing about where did the where did the virus start? And so um, you know proud boys, uh, white supremacist right climate. I mean, they're taking issues and it's not as though, as I said, you don't want to overweight that they're working with the conservatives or the left or whatever. They are just taking advantages where a ce friction inside of our system and

try to agitate. So um, I think you know, the FBI, I would think would be immensely busy and trying to figure this out, as well as the n s A. And how deep are they now the end of the day, I don't think I think it's a nuisance at this point. I think the what we really need to be concerned. Is it a real potential if they decided up the anti I mean, how far could they push it? And second of all, we need to nip it in the butt. It's not exactly the but I think it's blooming, if

you will. But I think we need to have some understanding. This cannot be going checked where you know we have you picked whatever group. Now there's any group that has a voice that you know, and particularly conspiratorial mindset, And that is much larger than I anticipated, even though I came for the world of conspirators. Right, Maybe it's because I know too much that the conspiracies are harder to

bring about them, one would think. But there is a mindset in the United States, and I'm only now thinking of where where are the roots of this mindset? And it's a conspiratorial one. We become less less sanguine about our government and our institutions, and we're more susceptible we used to be. And I'm trying to figure what is changing.

And then I mean, it's kind of right before us. Right, it's the cyber world and social media in other words, today it is so much easier stir up trouble among among people and I think we have to realize that it's not a lot of this isn't just internal. Much of it is going to be taking advantages by all of our competitors how to make this week. And we have to be susceptible, I mean, we have to be perceptive about this, and we have to be able to address it with is doing it. And that's why I

think we need have really tough discussions. The Russians are the ones that are really doing it now. The Chinese looked at we know this from public intelligence reports have made public by the Intelligence Comminity, but decided not to In others they did one Trump is being too tough on them or whatever, but they decided that we can live with that, but we're not going to do with the Russians. But they looked at it, you know. But the Russians, they're gonna go, why why step back if

you're not being forced to step back? And they need to remember, right, start with the perius of power players. So a power player looks for vulnerabilities, pushes in it, and you won't. You don't back up unless its power. You're not going to jaw bone the prutinents of this world. The shades of this world with sweet words. You know that they if you accept that they're power players, they recognize power. We have to make sure we don't delude

their power. Or one of the things about democracy touched tho is really interesting and we don't think about it enough. Americans really restrainful. I know it doesn't feel like that today, but so that you know, we don't really use our force. The rest of the world looks at us and being much more, much stronger, and have a different view of us and our power. We tend not to use use our power as much as if our country were an authoritarian oriented case and didn't have to go before the public.

So the you know, we're not using our power by choice at this point, the counter cyber cyber warfare, and the question is when will we reach that consensus and the will of United people that we're not going to tolerate, you know, intrusions into our political process. So let me reference some of the things you you write about in

the book that was kind of fascinating. I didn't have any idea that the Russians were out buying Facebook accounts and Twitter accounts and other local accounts in order to use that as part of their agit prop. Uh that was that was really kind of shocking. Who are the useful idiots that are selling these things to the Russians because I have to imagine someone wants to buy your Facebook account. No good could ever come out of that.

They create their own personas. I mean, they actually create people that you think they that they actually exist, or as they create uh, fake identities and run them on Facebook and Twitter. Right, Remember they did that years ago. We had a spy in the Famous Spy. There was a movie with Tom Hanks a few years ago, um, and it was Rudolph Able, right. He came here under fourth documents and then they have the show the Americans. Right, this is all old Russia's stuff. But if he moved

to today, it's not one person. You're building identities, You're you're you're building social media identities that look real, you know. And so they had I have in front of me right now. But I think you know, two thousand, they had like twenty nine thousand Facebook spots that you get hit, you know, they had Twitter accounts. I mean, they were out there. I think the when I did the research on it, I think we I think from the low end Uh concluded that they had like twenty million hits,

twenty nine million hits. There was It wasn't trivial. That wasn't like one guy came in with a false document, right, this was we were out there. They were peddling among twenty nine million people. But I think if you look at them and the numbers and the aggregate, it it looks really big. But I think at the end of the day, the election was really the American people were voting on bigger issues in their mind, and the Russians firm working around the edges. But the potential is there.

And even if they only changed two thousand votes or made two thousand people, man, that's two thousand too many. Right, Well, let's look at let's look at Brexit, which was you know, pretty much a dead split down the middle with a slight advantage to the Brexiters. Were the Russians agitating for the UK against the EU and and did they have an impact there? Yeah, I honestly I don't know the answer. But you know, the Brits are in some way, I mean, our closest ally, I would say we have the Canadians

that are are close to us, Australians are the five eyes. Um. I think one of the problems for footing and that issue would be is it better for Russia UH to have the UK in or out of NATO? So would the conclusion be they be better out? Um, I'm not sure they'd make that call because it might mean closer alliance with the US. So I don't know whether they don't have any um, primary source research on that, but

it felt to them like it was advantageous. Then I would suspect that they you know, and as you were saying, you could work within the margins, but you have to make a decision and a lot of times even autocrats are stuck with you know, tell me how this plays out again, I mean, does it all worked or our favor? But to human beings and so they can make a snap decision. So I don't think Russia changed and had the impact of on on Breakfast. I mean, I think

it's like the American election. I think it is what it is, and I think it up for a lot of other over arching issues beyond what the Russians might be able to start up. Right, you mentioned in the book after the election, there were these not my president rallies, tell us who was behind those and who was agitating for those. So again, you have a lot of folks that in the world of social media, almost spontaneously, you don't know who starts the first the first tweet on it,

right or whatever. But I think once the Russians saw it, I think are are reporting would indicate that they saw that as an opportunity, so that that is that is one area where they were um developing Facebook points and agitating. So but where they be driving force. I won't give them that credit yet, right, all right, but they saw it and it was in their interest to have a segment of the population to feel that the presidented state is illegitimate members. Anytime you're an adversary and you can

play that card that weekends your adversary. So they surely were in into it where they braids behind it. Now, I think that was going to come. It did come with or without. But would they play in it short and as I said, you know, around the edges, it's you know, it's um you know, I'm not saying to

make a difference, but they were playing in it. I'm concerned that they're playing across the broad spectrum of things, and the potential if not checked, then they will create not my president right, how much money are they going to throw into In other words, it can become really quite disruptive. Now we could do the same thing inside Russia. I mean he needs to understand that. But I don't think he believes we're going to do it right. I

don't think he feels that. You know, we're responding, and I think the last thing our president said, uh was we're gonna respond in kind. What does that mean? Put are saying, well, okay, well, what what is that going to what's that going to look like? But I think that's why you have to have a private discussion between intelligence people saying let me tell you what it looks like. So, yeah, so you know we have to star otherwise we're have

you know, this is like a nircular weapon. You know, you have mutual destruction, right so at a certain point you don't do it right, you contain yourself and then we don't have that right now. Right now, the Russians field, you know, investing your system, You're not doing much in my system. I don't see any incentive to stop. I'm doing a lot of R and D right now. I'm testing.

I mean, I don't need to be so flipped about it, but you know, I'm testing this and seeing how we can do this and how we can work within the U S system. Right. But if let's say we really got to the mat and we were, you know, at each other's throat, I mean, we're looking at small potatoes compared to what they could do and what we could do. What do you think the reaction in Moscow was to the January six insurrection and that that took place earlier

this year. Were they surprised by that? Were they agitating by that? Or they're just very happy to sit back and say, hey, if you guys are gonna find amost yourselves, we could just you know, never get in the way of an enemy shooting themselves in the foot. I think it's the ladder which it happened so fast. It's the type of thing you can't prepare. But the other thing is, it's one thing that creative persona out there are about not my president, right, it's another one to deliberately be

involved in a violent act against the capital. Right, that's a bit too risky, I think for even Putin, who is not risk avert I think you don't want to be caught out on that one. That absolutely requires an American response. That's pretty dynamic. So I don't think they had to tank the chance to evaluated way it. You know, it just happened too fast. But if you're asking me, how do they feel about it? It It, Wow, that's when we didn't have to work on. But that really worked

out within our plan. It's now you know, we're now they're gonna have investigations that are going to turn on each other. So but we're looking at our own weaknesses and they're sitting there looking at them, and they're thinking about how do you left reach it? Remember, he studied, he's he was, he's a judo expert. I think he's a black belt design He under he understands how you use the other price and strength against him, right, and so so I think, you know these are judo place

m that's really interesting. So you one of the things you wrote in the book that I found kind of intriguing was as long as there's an autocratic government in Moscow, there will be people willing to spy for the West. That raises two questions, why does an autocratic government lead to that? And second, why do Americans and Westerners occasionally spy for Russia? You would think in in the battle of good versus evil. It maybe it's not crystal clear, but but it seems like they've been the bad guy

for a long time. Tell us a little bit about why people spy for us and why do people spy for them. There's a commonality on one level, and don't let me leave you without going there. But let me go to the first set of of issues on this.

And as I said at the very beginning, working from a democratic system, we had much more of a drawal to get people to want to work with us, not just Russians, every group, right, and it was it was not a hard sell because a lot of people were dissatisfied with their own country because it was a repressive One might repressive, have a repressive but when you have an autocratic government, you have people that are much more disadvantaged and have do not have a release for their descent.

The United States has lots of room for descent. You can say whatever you want, whatever you want, and you can go move on of another job and so on. So we have that that release and there are you know, percentage wide fewer people that our element. When Russia first started and the Communists started, right, there was an appeal people believed in communism. Right, we have a number of people both in the UK United States became spies, ideological spies,

not for money but for the cause. But by the time you got the Stalin I mean, and then World War two broke out and Hitler and uh and Stalin agreed on how to handle Poland, I mean that everybody was disillusioned. So it was really hard and illogically after the fifties to get people to really want to become a communist, so they had a rupper product. But then there's the world. So in the bigger sweep of things, I think democracies have a big, bigger opportunity and fewer

fewer posts that are spy candidates. But there are spy candidates, and I will get to that the right of the side. I think a lot of people just discrantled and they came and volunteered their service. So many of the KGB sources and Jerry sources and people like that Kane dots rather than as people finding finding them. But then what makes people spy gets to another level, so you have the overarching ideological, economic, political, but then you have why

as a person betrayed. And what's really interesting when you study the most famous spies, what I found is it's not about ideology. It's you take the famous American spy inside the CIA, Rick Games or Robert Hansen inside the FBI, and you look at their personalities and you find they share the same thing. They think they're really smart, smarter than everybody else. Sadly for them, they're not smarter than

anybody else. But they are all so lazy. So when you have you think you're really smart, you're lazy, and you work inside the US government, you end up getting promoted less frequently, right, And then when you get proto that's frequently if the system is against you, right, you're not recognized for the genius that you are. You're not appreciated, right, and you become alienated within your small world. So people often defect inside of that world that they're disgruntled about

the squeeze on their ego and their their recognition. And you know, you look at aims, and you look at hands and look at spies, they often have that in trade. So I wouldn't look for someone that's a gambler drinker. Yes, look for them, uh um, but look for the person and had a huge ego and it's delusional about themselves and are underperforming. That's where I would go hunting for spies. And they're in every society. Quite interesting. I wish we had time to get to China, but will have to

save that for the next time. I have to ask you before we get to our favorite questions. One last question. Another quote from the book, which is quote fundamentally the ultimate lesson to take away is this, never trust the Russians. Explain that I was going to name the at least the subtitle never Trust the Russians. So I had a

plaque in my office. I now have a dono my house of the shore, and it's a quote from the last democratic president in Afghanistan seven of you Economy talks to his son and this is the quote and it says, my son, my sn My last advice to you is never trust the Russian Now, that plaque was given to me by Charlie Wilson, you know Charlie Wilson Court, which is what Charlie's were. And I go into the bug.

It was actually the US government program, but the US government program doesn't make for movies, so I gotta look like Tom Hanks and like that, or Charlie Wilson didn't look like it. But my point is it had a sentimental because it was if you look at it from the eyes of the Afghanis. And I would say to them today, watch the Russians on your border today. But I don't mean it in the sure sense that never ever ever trust them. But in this day and age, I would say you need to pay more attention to

what they're they're up to. I honestly believe that some were out there there may be an opportunity to do business with them and they and I'm more I think the natural course of events would be to bring us together. But I think for for today, the manager is really

meant to say, hey, look, pay attention. The Russians are not benign and so you really can't trust um, you know, standing in front of the Helsinki and saying, you know, I mean the next KGB got there for I can tell you that no, we're not spying on you, and it's anoxy more and but so my point is, uh, this is a moment to remember who Russia is. So it's not communism. They're not coming to they'd be more threatening if they had an ideology. There is no ideology.

So let's jump to our speed round our favorite five questions. We ask all our guests, starting with tell us what you're streaming these days? Give us your favorite Netflix or Amazon Prime viewing material. You know it's interesting. Let me start with what I don't watch, which I think will surprise your audience. You know I don't watch in James Bond movies, right, don't watch most five movies. Uh. I used to resent them because I thought this isn't the

way it is that trivializes the business. And then I began to realize, sees, if everyone thinks I'm James Bond, they think I'm I'm lipping in. If you know what I look like, uh, Connor, you would know white. I'm more favorbly disposed to work those seve but I um to be interesting. I will look did look at a couple of the caras. The first ones were good, the slid came in from the gul But basically I really

go to another place. I look at Masterpiece theater. You know, I'll watch you know, the Crown or some things by Jane this and you say, well, that's kind of light stuff, but you know, it's such a relief and you get back to a world where people have manners and personal dignity and so on. So I find those tranquilizing in the most positive sense. So I'm I'm a big fan of the pps that I lived in Britain for for a substantial amount of time, and I grew to enjoy

that and so on. So that's where you'll find me on Prime and Netflix. Uh, most often on the podcast. I did an awful lot of podcasts during the promotion of the book, and I enjoyed doing by the way, UM,

but I'm not a follower of the particular podcast. I spend a lot of time going through what I would call the more traditional media outlets and uh, and I probably if I had more time, I should since should focus in on podcast I enjoyed several several of them, but UM, I tend not to be a podcast follower except my own. Tell us about some of your early mentors who helped shape your career in the world of intelligence.

One of the great things about writing a book, and we could spend a lot of time on the advantage of writing a book and things that I did not think I would get out of it. One of one of those as a young person, you said, well, I made it by myself, right, That's how I got there. And then you go back, you write a book. He said, We'll wait a minute, start looking at your career and

at every step of the way. And this is a tribute to all of them, that I had a series of bosses one after the other, but actually put up with me so and mentored me and stopped me from stepping on on on my foot. If you're will and uh you know from my first chief and Chili and I can't be care with the names because some are not and some are. But at every step of the way, the agency seemed to reach out and pull me towards

something positive. And I think in retrospect, I ran the things like Chili and Afghanistan, so I was predisposed to sort of the action arm of it. So I I owe uh I easily. In the book, it's very clearly I described each of them is sort of putting a helping helping hand is the right word. I don't know how I would have gotten to survive my first assignment without bosses that were uh um, interested in being helpful. They called trade craft. The business is spying, and you

know it's the word craft is really interesting. It's like a journeyman, right, And the best of the best managers in CIA that I worked for looked at as a trade jack. We're going to show you. You know, you went through training, you jumped the planes, but we're going to show you how it really works. And I'm very grateful and I admired the generation of people that I worked for that, uh, we're true pat There was one

thing they all had in common. There were very diverse people, they were all true patriots and and at high integrity. I know that's a hard adjective for people to swallow and CIA, but you'd be amazed of the dichotomy between the integrity inside the institution and how it exercised power with approval of department adjusted. Quite quite interesting. Tell us about some of your favorite books and and what you're

reading recently. Well, I think the one I've been enjoying and I've been going through it slowly, and I actually think it's very apropos I got so much out of it. It's Ulysses S. Grant by run turn off. Now why is it important? You know, you look at the Civil War and everybody and Robert E. Lee, the great general, the you know, feather in his hat and all this, and you look at the scrumpy cigar ashes on his coat. Drank too much unussy, says Brand. But when I dug

into the book, there was something I didn't know. He was a quartermaster words. He knew how to make things move. When you look at the Civil War, so much of war fighting, and this comes to I want to come to Afghanistan. Logistics. I mean the real heroes of not Charlie Wilson, Jack Divide, uh well Bearden, but it's it's the logistics guy, people to make the mules get where they want to go and the guns where they are, helping the negotia. There's logistics and Afghanistan in many ways.

And when you go to the war, you know, yeah, you need a mccarthur here and there perhaps, but you really need the logistics guy. And unless he says, Brand was the logistics guy. And when you look at his formation, it tells you about value do things. So when I have time, I spent a lot of time reading newspapers and magazines, and because I'm required to stay up in the world, I tend to go to biographies and history

and I found a lot. You know, Doris Currency went on Tap that I read last year, which who thinks about Tap? And when you read it an amazing career. Not gonna be in president, but you know, proconsul and the Philippines and on the Supreme Court. I got halfway through one on Pulk and I started on McCulloch's Pioneers and who think who thought of Ohio was being a pioneer state and what it took Americans in the world they lived, and he would think it was it was

one of the formative aspects of our life. And then the one that I've enjoyed is a fun book, because I don't read a lot of fun books, and maybe I should someday. This is a great book that's going to make a movie out of it. It's just taking forever and it's poisoned about that really about the crew team that raced in the nineteen thirty six Olympics, the Nazi Germany and what it took to get there. The the lumberjacked out of Wisconsin going to that race, and

hinching out of victory. And it's also you can find it on on online that they look it up, safety read, look up nineteen thirty six Olympics rowing. I mean it's it's America at its best. So I enjoyed it was a good read. And uh, and I do tend to stick to biographies. Interesting. What sort of advice would you give to a recent college grad who was interested in a career in either government service or intelligence. The scenicna and this is you really want to be a you

really have the one to serve your country? And he said, well, that's the crssade, of course you do. Now you really have to say, is this you will you will not get through the door. It's the it's the glue that holds it together. The second thing I would say is, uh, you know, make sure your education is broad based. You know someone's gonna say, look, China is the place learn Chinese. Maybe maybe maybe it won't be, you know, maybe things

that happen here by the time you get ready. Um, the broad broad based and understanding the history of not in in this country of the world. I would invest. I would invest in that and not worry too much about the specialization and study and read, read the best books written on it, and servedly please include mind that's the first. I should have said, that's number one. But um no, I think it's having a world view. And as I said, I really wanted to serve your country

is critical. You want to make a dollar that may not be the best place interesting. And our final question, what do you know about the world of intelligence counterintelligence spycraft today that you wish you knew forty years or so ago when you were first getting started. Uh that's a profound, a profound question. I I would say that again from my perspective. Um, Graham, Cream write a book. You know the human factor and that what the essence of the human factor is the best laid plans of

mice and men. Right, whatever your plan, whatever you're doing, you gotta double your planning triple. You're planning because something is going to happen and you're not you're not ready for it. And uh, you know, if we we look at modern events in Central Asia, Uh, you know, uh, having the plumbing in planning. Uh, the importance of planning. The other thing that I would say, and I should have said this almost first, and I found the paucity

of it. I thought, at every level I went up, I would get to the level where there's strategic thinking right, and you keep looking for it. And then I found that most of most of the intelligence role, most of the world is is around tactical thinking, what are we going to do today? What are we doing tomorrow? And it's very hard to build into life and the strategic things. And of all places, uh, a retreatment head of the Plumber's union that was sixteen came to me and he said,

remember three things. Firm handshake, never have your picture taken with a drink in your hand. And spend the first five minutes before you get out of bed thinking about the bigger aspects of your life. And that's a good I mean from a blue collar guy. That's you know, high level thinking. And I would say for young people, make sure you put time in the strategic be thinking and not just how to get from me to be quite quite interesting. Jack Divine, thank you for being so

generous with your time. We have been speaking with long term CIA veteran Jack Divine, author most recently of The Spymaster's Prism, The Fight against Russian Aggression. If you enjoyed this conversation, Well, be sure and check out any of our prior three hundred and sixty seven conversations we've had before. You can find those at iTunes, Spotify, wherever you find your favorite podcasts. We love your comments, feedback and suggestions right to us at m IB podcast at Bloomberg dot net.

You can sign up for my daily reads at ritals dot com. Follow me on Twitter at rit Halts. I would be remiss if I forgot to mention our crack staff that helps put these conversations together each week. Tim Harrow is my audio engineer. A Tika val Bran is my project manager. My Kaelbatnick is my director of research. Paris Walter is my producer. I'm Barrier Bults. You've been listening to Passers of Business. I'm Bloomberg Ridd