Interview With Richard Haass: Masters in Business (Audio)

for the past fourteen years. I thought it would be a great idea to get Dr hass in because, more than any time in the past, I don't know how many years UH, international events are driving UH not only the debate, but but the headlines and policies that we see everywhere, whether it's the Brexit vote in the UK, whether it's things like Middle East issues and isis UH and and the Iran nuclear deal, what's happening in China with the South China, see what's happening in Russia. Even

even normalizing relations with Cuba are are significant events. And these are all outside of the US borders. I can't ever recall a time in recent history where overseas events have been more significant, more important to both the global economy and to international relations. I think you'll find Professor hass or Doctor hass Uh. He has taught at the Kennedy school. Uh, quite fascinating. He is about as knowledgeable a person as you'll ever hear. He began in Democratic

Senator Claiborne Pell's office. He also served in both Bush White Houses. He's nonpartisan. Uh. He he very much has a fairly moderate and centrist view. He's he's an extremely rational and logical guy. And and a lot of what he says, uh, and a lot of the discussion that took place today, uh, really very much is just if you were to stop and and do a d historical dive into each of these subjects, they would inform your perspective and very much drive your decision making in a

certain direction. Uh. That is consistent on both a cultural, diplomatic, and global basis. I found his conversation to be completely refreshing, uh and quite fascinating. For those of you who are aware of what goes on the world, you know what an expert hass is. And for those of you who are not very well informed about the state of the global affairs, this is going to be a crash course in international relations. I found it to be an absolutely

brilliant and fascinating conversation. So, with no further ado, my conversation with Dr Richard Hass. This is Masters in Business with Barry Ridholes on Bloomberg Radio. My special guest today is Richard Hass. He is the President of the Council of Foreign Relations, a position he has held for the past fourteen years. UH fascinating career in government as a legislative aid in the Senate in the Department of Defense.

In the State Department, he was awarded the Presidential Citizens Medal for his contributions during the US Operation Desert Shield. In one. He has been a special advisor to both President George H. W. Bush Uh in the National Security Council, as well as President George W. Bush in the Department of State, where he served as principal advisor to Secretary of State Colin Powell. Richard Hass, Welcome to Blomberg. I left out half of your CV. It's it's way too long.

You are the author or editor of a dozen books. Perhaps the one I'm our our listeners might be most familiar with is the Reluctant Share of the United States after the Cold War, and you have a new book coming out in January. World in Disarray, American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order. I am confident that a lot of the questions and topics we discussed today are covered in the book. But but let's jump right into your early career. So you leave was it Oxford?

Did I get that right? Yes? You leave Oxford with a masters and a PhD and pretty much start as a Senatorial aid. Is that right? That was your first first job, and then you end up in the State Department and the Department of Defense. How did all that come about? Well after Oxford? Actually, during Oxford, I spent a year splitting between my masters and my doctorate, working in the Senate as an aid on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to Senator Claiborne Pell, who was a Democrat

from Rhode Island. I really just wanted some experience. I'd been an academic and wanted to see how the sausage was made, and I got the chance. After that, I then spent a couple of years working at a think tank in London, the place called the Institute for Strategic Studies, essentially doing a post doc. And then after some conference, I spoke at a few people who are working at the Pentagon said hey, would you come and work with us at the Department of Defense. So I said, great,

and so I went and worked at the Pentagon. It was a fantastic opportunity because about less than six months after I got there, in seventy nine, you had two big historical events. You had the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and you had the revolution in Iran. And I was assigned with a very small group of people to plan for what would the United States do in that part of the world, because we had very few capabilities, very

few plans. And suddenly I was thrown at this in part because I had written my doctoral dissertation on this part of the world, on the Middle East, on the Middle East, on the Persian Gulf. What what was the name of your doctoral dissertation? Filling the Vacuum? And it was essentially the American reactions what was called the British East of Suez withdrawal, meaning the meaning for for listeners who may not be historians of that part of the world.

When the Brits were were occupying most of the Middle East, at a certain point, they pretty much drew random some people have called them random borders on their way out and and really left the political and diplomatic borders uh we see today to some degree as a cause of

some friction between some of these states. Well after World War One, which is what you're alluding to, there was the British and French ministers and their subordinates essentially did draw the map a lot of which is the contemporary Middle East. I was really focusing on the Persian Gulf and where the Brits stayed longer, and they left essentially

in the early late sixties early early seventies. But soon afterwards again you had these major tests with the twin crises of Afghanistan and Iran, and I was lucky enough or unlucky enough to be one of those who was

asked essentially to plan for it. So I had an amazing early experience in the depending on indeed what's now Central Command, the force which has fought several of the wars, including the Gulf War, the Rock arn All that I was involved in the creation of that force, So I know it was a little bit of being in the

right or wrong place at the right time. And then after that, after the Carter administration ended, I was put on the transition team for the State Department for the Reagan administration and went over to the Reagan State work. You started as a Democrat under sand lerpel you you are now in the Department Defense under Carter, and then you're part of the transition team for the Reagan White House. Right, And it wasn't that I was a political chameleon. I

was essentially a political at the time. I think I was probably a registered independent at the time. At some point I became a registered Republican. And even now I run a skip ahead of several decade. I run a nonpartisan institution. I don't feel particularly partisan in in my bones, and I'd like to think maybe it's naive that there's a place in American politics, say within the forty yard lines, where what you might create, where conservative or moderate Democrats

and moderate Republicans can find common cause. And if we can't we if we can't have that center, then I think we as a society are in serious trouble. The fascinating thing is I totally agree with you. I think the fascinating schism is that most of the public, or a lot of the public, lives in between the forty yard line, so to speak. But everyone in DC seems to be in their respective end zones. But there's a

reason for that. There's a principle that you see in the literature of political science called intensity, and the whole idea of intensity is what matters in American politics and early in democratic politics more broadly, is not absolute numbers, but it's the intensity with which political participan pence bring to the process, whether it's voting or money or time. So what this means of small numbers of people with great intensity could overwhelm large numbers of people who have

virtually no intensity. It's the reason, for example, of Americans may favor background checks, but the n r A wins the gun control debate. That's an intensity issue. I'm Barry Ridhults. You're listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio. My special guest today is Richard hass He is the President of the Council on Foreign Relations. Not too long ago we had the big UK vote to leave the EU. I think a lot of people were surprised by by

the outcome of that. So let's start out, and I know you are intensely familiar with the region because of all the work you've done in Northern Ireland. Let's let's start out very simply. Why was the Leave campaign victorious in part peak US. It was a referendum on the status quo, and people who were, for one reason or another unhappy or disaffected or angry or worried about the future vented and supported the LEA vote. A lot of them were not particularly well informed exactly what would be

the precise consequences. So I think it was something of a protest vote, and it was very hard for the remain camp to make a persuasive case. What were they were supposed to say? Well, things aren't perfect, but it's better to stay than it is to leave. That that's the case. That doesn't tend to get people out of their seats, much less to to to vote. So you had an anemic showing on the remain side, and you had an impassioned, if uninformed, uh turnout on the Leave side.

And the rest, as they say, is history. You know. In investing in the markets, um enthusiastic ignorance is not a good way to make money, but apparently in politics it's a successful strategy. Well, except there's an awful lot of voters remorse and a lot of people afterwards. I think, indeed, if the referendum were to be repeated, it would go

down in flames and if there is. There were some people who seemed genuinely surprised that this wasn't just a a pole, This was a policy vote with real consequences, and even though technically Parliament disposes, this was advisory. It's extremely difficult for British politicians to simply say never never mind. So so one way or another, bregsit in some form is likely to happened, I would say, and I'm prepared

now to be called an elitist. To me, it's a real sign that you want not to be deciding major, major matters of public policy through referendum. That's why the founders of the American political system created something called the Congress, created something called an executive. The whole idea was to have representative government rather than direct democracy. And I think what we've seen in Britain is a very expensive lesson of what happens if you have direct rather than representative democracy.

It's quite fascinating. Your background is such that you spend a lot of time negotiating and helping UH Northern Ireland UH broker a series of treaties with h the UK. Scotland recently voted to stay with the UK. UH part of the reason was the membership in EU. Is it possible that we're gonna see Scotland and Northern Ireland, both of whom were strong Remain supporters, say hey, you know, there's the benefits of being in the UK are less than being in the EU where we're gone from the

Brits and we're going to join the continent. Or is

that just wishful thinking. It's quite possible. What will depend What it will depend on more than anything, is if the British government goes ahead with Brexit, the new government under the new Prime Minister, Theresa May, and if depending on the terms there's there's Brexit and Brexit and this is this is totally uncharted waters, so we don't know what would be what will be the details potentially a new relationship between a post EU UK and in Europe.

But depending upon the details, it's quite possible that you'll have a second Scottish referendum and in this time, if there is one, it would pass because people would vote to stay in Europe. And I believe there's a decent chance you will have a so called border pole in Northern Ireland in which people would vote to to join Ireland so I think that Brexit one of the many reasons I opposed. It has the potential to lead to

the dissolution of the United Kingdom. And beyond that, it has the potential to tremendously increased centrifugal forces within Europe. And I just say, for those who aren't familiar with it, Europe is one of the great historic accomplishments of the last three quarters of a century. Twice in the twentieth century, Europe was the venue for great wars, for the two World Wars. The whole idea after World War Two is two so knit together, Europe and France and Germany in particular,

that war would become unthinkable. We ought not to take that for granted. And I'm worried if bregsit goes ahead, depending again on the details, it could have knock on effects throughout Europe. That that makes a lot of sense. So so, given negotiations um that you undertook in in Ireland's um, if you were advising either the Northern Irish or the Scots, what sort of And I don't want to use the term elite in a negative way. Instead of saying elite is um, let's let's say educated and

informed UH policy pronouncinations. What how would you advise them today given the most recent Well, I would I would wait and see what the details are whether bregsit goes forward. If so, what are the details? Assume it goes forward, So let me digress. Assume it goes forward. Are the Brits going to get a better deal with the EU or a worse deal when they're not part of it?

I'm not ducking the question, the honest answers. Nobody knows, because there's a debate with in Brussels whether to give them a better deal or not too because a lot of people in Brussels feared that to give the British a better deal would create a precedent and suddenly twenty seven other governments may want their own, their own better deal. So it has to be from a game theory perspective, it has to be a worse deal than they previously had. Well, it could be a deal that would require less of

them but would also give less less to them. And the real question is whether net net they would come off better. And I think if you're sitting in Northern Ireland or you're sitting in Scotland, you then have to make the calculation, are you better off in a post EU UK or you better off going out on on your own? And I think that will literally be the debate, certainly in Scotland and potentially in Belfast and beyond. So let's talk a little bit about um the stakes here.

You mentioned or I mentioned an uninformed electorate. How truly uninformed were the people who were casting votes there? Uh? Did they actually know they were voting for policy? Did they think this was a poll? There? There have been some suggestions that while the Remain camp was not as crystal squeaky clean and transparent as they should have been,

the Leave campaign was industrial level fabrication. How did that impact the actual I may steal that phrase, I like that industrial level there's a there's a I'll send you the link to the Scottish or Irish professor who who I'm paraphrasing him, But but that was that was his Two things. I think there's two things to say. One is that, or maybe even more than that, one is that there there were poles that came out beforehand which suggested that the factual basis, shall we say, was incomplete.

People just in many cases didn't quite understand what the relationship was between Britain and the EU and so far. Second of all, there was industrial misrepresentation of the facts about the flow of money, about consequences, about immigration issues. So now it's a little bit like the hangover what you have as a as a country that went out a bit on a political binge and now has to deal with the with the consequences. And again it reinforces my instincts that you don't want to decide major issues

in a democracy this way. So two other questions about Brexit that that I would be remiss if I didn't ask. Brexit seemed to be quite the surprise to too, not only the financial houses and and bookmakers, but lots of people. What other European surprises might be lurking out there. Well, it's not the first surprise we've had in Europe in the last two or three years. We had Russia and Ukraine,

which how we say, was an unfortunate surprise. We had the massive flow of immigrants from Syria and the Middle East to Europe. We then had terrorism. So this, in some ways, if you added up, is at least the fourth surprise in the last two to three years. And that and what's so surprising about this is that you're for decades was the part of the world with the fewest surprises. It seemed to be the most state and predictable. But I would think going forward you could uh. We

still don't know what's going to happen with Brexit. We don't know whether the countries may decide to do their own versions of of of of an exit. We could have problems once again in Greece on the financial side, or with some other country. In um, Italy and southern and in southern Europe. You know that from what it is um you do. Unfortunately, you can imagine without a hell of a lot of imagination, another terrorist problem in

any number of countries. There's uncertainty about Russian intentions, not only in eastern Ukraine, but with some of the other small states that that border it. So I had all this up, and again I'm struck by if we had had this conversation three years ago, we never would have talked about Europe Old Europe boring nothing going on there, And suddenly Europe is you sense it's in play. And one of the less since I draw from that is it's more difficult to have assumptions. Now it's more difficult

to have a sense of the givens. There's a sense of greater not just speed of change, but breadth of change. And I just went three years ago. I didn't have the imagination, I'll be honest with you, to see a lot, to see this coming. You know, I was just in Europe for a conference and I was astonished at how really soft the Greek economy is when you're on the street. And then in Italy, Southern Italy is is better than Greece. But Rome is like New York City. Rome is booming.

It is I don't know if it's a tourist town or what I mean. We know it's a tourist town. But when you look at Rome, it is a hopping city, a very very economically active city. Makes you makes me think twice about how Italy is broken into different halfs and and why part of it is doing so well and part of it isn't right. What you have in Europe then is increased inequality. You have high levels of

unemployment and underemployment. You have demographic distributions that aren't even in terms of wealth and unemployment, and you sense there's a lot of fault lines in Europe. Far right and far left policy parties both could come to the four year U asked before about surprises. That's another part of it. So Europe at one and the same time, there's elements

of boom and there's real elements of fragility. And as long as we're discussing Brexit, people have tried to draw parallels between the Brexit vote any either the Sanders or Trump candidacy. Um, do you see any parallels between the two, and is it possible in the United States we end up with a Brexit like surprise? The short answer is absolutely,

I see parallels. What you see on both sides of the Atlantic is widespread pushback, even rejection of important aspects of globalization, whether it's immigration or or free trade uh or or other issues. And I take the Brexit vote is something of a wake up calling shot across the bow. So much absolutely that we don't have a direct equivalent to Brexit. But again, what it shows me is that, for example, historical support for free trade agreements is just

not there. What you have right now sitting in the Congress, a major trade agreement, the t PP, the Trans Pacific Partnership, involves the United States and countries and I think it's eleven other countries make up around the world economy. Right now that trade agreement is parked, I'm not sure under what circumstances it could muster the necessary UH support. And what this tells me is that here's one of the basics free trade used to be bipartisan support Democrats, Republicans

and so forth. That at the moment you'd have to say not just a the juries out, but the forces are probably stronger against it than in favor of Well that that that's one of the American parallel els to bruit. I'm Barry Ridhults. You're listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio. My special guest today is Richard hass He is the President of the Council on Form Relations, where

he has served for the past fourteen years. Prior to that, he has an extensive resume both in the Department of State and the Department of Defense, as well as the White House in US Senate, and is the author of twelve books on foreign relations. Let's jump right into the conversation about trade and globalization. How important is globalization to the modern economy? And I include not just wealth creation, but but job creation. Well, the answer is it's it's central.

Think about it this way. We have what three million people in the United States. That's out of a world of roughly seven billion, that's four we're what twenty odd percent of the world's GDP. Another way of saying, a world g D palies outside the United States. So if we are going to sell a lot of what it is we we do has to be outside the borders of our our own country with just not a large

enough market to be self sufficient. So so given that perspective, and I know it's obvious to folks like you and me, why is there so much opposition to trade? One way to answer it is that trade on occasion does cost jobs, and whether it's cheaper labor elsewhere or people produce better products. In the area of cars was a reality for a long time, so trade displaces. What I think also happens, though, is that trade is blamed for things it gets scapegoaded.

So the biggest source of displacement in jobs of job elimination is not trade, it's technology. It's productivity increases, which, by the way, is scary for the future for things like robotics, three D printing, artificial intelligence. If anything, the potential for job displacement might accelerate. And I don't think we've begun to think that through as a society what we're going to do. But in the meantime, trade is

the scapegoat. There's inventing and just like we're talking about breaks it before that became a vote where people expressed a lot of their frustrations with the status quo. You don't get a chance to vote on globalization, but you do get a chance to vote on grade on trade. And I think what's happening is that trade is carrying a lot of weight that it really doesn't deserve, but people are turning towards it to to vent their frustrations.

If you really want to be scared about automation, there's a book out um, I think you know his name is Ford, called Rise of the Robots. The technology discussion is fascinating, the future impact of that technology. Technology. It's a little Malthusian for my taste. It's a little too end of world, um, but it there is no doubt that there are huge societal shifts coming due to technology. It's uneven certain types of jobs, certain sectors of the

economy are more vulnerable. I just don't think we've really begun the public conversation about how is it we better prepare workers to deal with some of the challenges. And that's everything from transition assistance financially, the education and retraining. And we just can't put a mote out there. We can't pull up the bridge. We've got to think about how is it we compete in this world? And the political conversation isn't close to the conversation we need to have.

So last year we saw a ton of news out about hacking of various institutions in the United States. Specifically, there's a building in China that's primarily filled with their Department of Defense and their intelligence community, and these folks are hacking US corporate sites, US military sites, and US government uh information. How has this gotten as out of control as it appears to be, Is there any chance that this has gotten better? Is going to get better?

And what sort of things might they have stolen from us? Well? In general, in the whole area of cyber the technology g is outpaced the rules. It's a little bit like the old Wild West, and there's no sheriff. A lot of people out there with guns and we're seeing it all over. So the U. S. China relationship is simply one part of a of a larger UH situation. Look, some forms of espionage and the rest we carry out, and it's carried out against us, and if we're not

protecting our data, shame on us. So the idea that the Office of Personnel Management got hacked, that was ther responsibility on our side. Now, the Chinese are doing more than espionage. They're also doing property theft and that is something that we have got to sanction them on if they won't stop. You're talking about patents and designs and I mean they they're some of their military aircraft and

other things. It's clear that that's not in house stuff absolutely, So again there's a difference between It seems to me what is espionage and we carry that out and this is just the newest domain of espionage and intellectual property theft which needs to be stopped, and the Chinese have agreed to stop it. The question is whether one they meant the agreement to whether they will then implement it.

So there's big there's big questions UH there, And this is you know, one of the six d things on the US Chinese agenda, and I think also in future trade agreements, this question of intellectual property protection is going to play a larger role. It needs to. I'm Barry Ridhults. You're listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio. My guest today is Richard hass He is President of the

Council on Foreign Relations. Let's jump right into some of the rest of the world and and how what we do here in the United States impacts our own ability to to influence events. The two thousand oh eight oh nine financial crisis, how did that impact the American ability to project power around the world. Well, it hurt us in lots of ways. It hurt us in terms of lost resources. We simply didn't have as much wealth to devote to what it is we do in the world.

It hurt us reputationally in many ways. Suddenly the does are to emulate the American model was, to put it gently, was not was not what it it was. And I just think more broadly, it made people uncomfortable with the world in which American leaders and officials were making decisions that had tremendous consequence for them, over which they had no influence, and No one likes to be in a situation where they feel vulnerable but unable to influence, and

that's what the rest of the world felt. So here we are. It's seven eight years later. The economy in the US has recovered substantially. The rest of the world. You know, someone had described us as the cleanest shirt in the hamper um. I kind of like that description. Given that recovery versus let's say, Japan and China and Europe, have we regained some of that influence and or or have we made a lasting um image problem that that's going to affect our ability to influence events. It's a

good question. The polls would suggest we've gained somewhat, but not that much because other areas have heard us. We heard over issues. Our reputation gets hurt over things like guns and violence uh in this country, or political dysfunction has subtracted from our reputation. What we did in Iraq and what we didn't do in Syria has has heard us. So I think while we've recovered somewhat economically over the last eight or so years, other aspects that affect the

way the rest of the world sees us. If it were shaff stock, we've lost value, so I want to come back to Iraq a little later. Let's let's let's go through some of the recent diplomatic um breakthroughs or or treaties that might impact us going forward. Uh. The Iran nuclear deal. I think people generally were confused by by that, or at least some people at first blush. It certainly looked like a positive. It kicked uh, the Iranian bomb ten years down the road. What's your take

on our new treaty with Iran? The joy Agreement, Uh, to me was in principle better than either living within Iran with nuclear weapons or going to war with Iran. But there are aspects of the treaty that that give me real pause. Uh. Not just a transfer of wealth, but the fact that after ten years they can do whatever they want when it comes to centrifugures. In fifteen years, they can accumulate as much enriched geranium as it is

they want. So, as you said, as you rightly said, it brought us time, but it didn't in any way solve the problem. And there's a lot of people who said, well, maybe in ten or fifteen years, or Ron will be a much more reasonable, moderate place. That's possible. I wouldn't

bet I wouldn't bet a lot on it. And so my concern is that in ten or fifteen years we're going to face in Iran without constraints potentially, and in the meantime, a lot of its neighbors, seeing this possibility, may decide to develop nuclear options of their own, if

you will to hedge. So as bad as the Middle East now is, and it's plenty bad by any and every measure, it's conceivable to see how you could have multiple moves towards what you might call a pre nuclear weapons status on the part of several of Iran's neighbors, and Iran could return to that. So this is not

a problem that's been solved. To say the least, how important is the price of oil to not just Middle East economy, but how how important is that to creating a nuclear free Middle East and to at least have people negotiating in good faith to try and resolve some of their regional differences. You're not going to have a nuclear free Middle East. You've got Israel that has nuclear weapons, Pakistan Pakistan's Pakistan is not that far away, and they've

got the world's fastest growing nuclear arsenal. Iran has virtually all the prerequisites of a of a nuclear weapon. Other countries are beginning to put into place certain types of nuclear power programs. So at the moment, UH, the idea of a nuclear free Middle East looks to me like a pipe dream. So was it a big mistake to remove Saddam Hussein as the counterbalance to two I ran? When Iraq and I ran, we're at each other's throats.

No one really had time to develop a nuclear program. Well, actually, both both of them had elements of nuclear programs during their eight year long war in the eighties. But I take your larger point. I opposed the two thousand three Iraq War even though I was in the government at the time, I was at the State Department. UH. One of the reasons was I did think that the balance of power between Iraq and Iran suited our interests. And I was also wildly skeptical of our ability to build

a post Saddam Iraqi society to our liking. And I think it's fair to say that strategically, Iran was the greatest strategic beneficiary of the Iraq War, no doubt in my mind about that. The the enemy of my enemy is my friend. And and that's a lesson that it seems we occasionally, uh I forget about. I would state the lesson differently in the Middle East. The enemy of your enemy can still be your enemy, and we're paying a price for that yet, no doubt about that. So

you opposed the invasion. But at the same time you were one of the special advisers to General Colin Pale. How did he wrestle with the issue of of going to war in Iraq? If anybody understood the consequences, he more so than the civilians who were agitating for war. He he really understood what we were getting into absolutely, And I would simply say that, like a lot of military men, he is often very wary of large juices

of military force. He comes out of Vietnam and he understands just how dangerous and risk he can be to American military personnel. He doesn't see wars and abstraction. He sees a war as as all too real. So you know, he was the one who years ago, if you remember, developed the quote unquote Powell doctrine, the idea, if you're going to go to war, do it with a lot of force. For very clear objectives. And the problem with

the two thousand three Iraq war. We did it with the minimum a force, and we had objectives that military force could not accomplish. Military force can destroy things, it's very, very hard for military force to create things. So Powell was properly skeptical. But then when it was clear the President had made up his mind, this is President George W. Bush. Powell then tried to influence how we would go to war diplomatically through the U N with with and so forth.

But there I would simply say, and I'll let him speak for himself. But the preponderance of the voices in this administration this is uh. George W. Bush wanted to go to war. Some for reasons. They thought that the Iraqis might have weapons of mass destruction. Others thought that Iraq was going to be an easy target topple Saddam. And they actually thought, very quickly and very easily, you could create a democracy that would set a precedent and an example that the rest of the region would and

be able to resist. I was profoundly skeptical that that would happen, but you couldn't prove it wrong. People believed it. They thought this would be a transformational act, and they and the rest again his history. In hindsight, that view of taking our values and transferring it to a completely different culture seems a little bit naive, doesn't it. I mean, it's benefit of mindsight, but it didn't even need hindsight.

I thought it was wrong beforehand. It was naive. I also thought it was arrogant and just simply and it wasn't. It's funny. I got criticized once for suggesting it wasn't gonna work, and being called, if you will, the foreign policy of equivalent of a racist, and I said, no, I'm simply saying that the prerequisites for democracy aren't to be found in the contemporary Middle East, so we ought not to embark on a foreign policy which posits that

as our objective. That that, that's quite fascinating. Let's talk about Cuba, which is another change that seemed to be so long incoming. What do you think about this, uh re establishing relations with Cuba? What does it mean to us? What does it mean to them? You're right, it was a long time in coming, largely because the opponents have changed, even though they weren't more numerous, had a great political intensity to their South Florida and and the impact on

that allectual minority, if you will, held us back. I think the feeling was, with the end of the Cold War, there was no longer a strategic reason not to open up that clearly embargo and isolation when not bringing about the kind of political changes we wanted to see in Cuba. So the feeling was, let's try engaging with them, Let's

try trading with them. Having tourism since ending their isolation, you then take away the excuse of the regime that it needs to keep control because of the American threat. And so I think this is a worthy experiment. Uh, the other wasn't working. After fifty years you still had communists power. So let's let's try a different approach, and maybe this can This can bring down or at least bring up, bring about the mellowing the moderation of this system.

And I think there's a decent chance. We've been speaking with Richard hass He is the President of the Council on Foreign Relations and author of the upcoming book A World in Disarray, American Foeign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order. If people want to find more of your writings. UH, CFR dot org is that correct? C far dot org is a good place to start. Amazon's another. If you have enjoyed this conversation, be sure and stick around for our podcast extras, where we continue talking about

all things UH, diplomatic and foreign policy relations. Be sure to follow me on Twitter at Ridholts or check out my daily column on Bloomberg dot com. I'm Barry Ridholts. You've been listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio, brought to you by B A. S F. We Create Chemistry. Welcome to the podcast. Actually, as Richard, thank you so much for doing this. This has really been um fascinating.

I last year interviewed your predecessor, Leslie gelb uh and it was a fascinating discussion about a different aspect of international relations. This couldn't be more timely between everything that's going on in the world. You know, has business ever been better for people studying foreign relationship? It seems that more than I can remember over the past I don't know how many years foreign policy issues are driving the

news cycle. UH the sad answers. I think you're onto something, but if you look at the Middle East, it's as close to chaos as the as any part of the world. We talked about Europe for a while that is suddenly much more unsettled than we ever imagined. Asia very uncertain future, given who knows how China is going to play out issues potentially with the South China Sea, the East China Sea, North Korea. You've got India growing at seven eight percent,

but you still have the problems with Pakistan. And then you've got all the global issues from cyber to health, to trade, to proliferation to terrorism. So the the international plate is as full. And then domestically, there's probably less consensus in this country about America's relationship with the world than at any time during my career. So the combination of a world that to some extent is unraveling and the United States, where there's no longer consensus about what

role we ought to play. The combination of the two, I think, as much as anything else, explains what's going on. Someone wrote an essay not too long ago about a pencil that if you want to make a pencil, it would cost you to just make it yourself. It would cost you about three thousand dollars, as opposed to taking some wood and some lead and some metal and some rubber and buying it for eleven cents from someone else. And it was really to me a brilliant way to

explain the advantages of trade. You couldn't make this yourself, or the cost would just be so exorbitant without free trade. It's amazing. I wonder how you you mentioned the scapegoating factor of it. How significant is scapegoating of trade along with the demographic trip changes we've had globalization, automization. How effective a technique is that for politicians trying to uh

touch a chord amongst the populaces. Look, trade is important economically, it might even be more important strategically as a way of bolstering allies promoting development, uh tying others who are potential adversaries into relationships with they'll they'll think twice before they they overturned. The problem is that there is to the energy and the domestic debate is anti anti trade. It's blamed for a lot of things, including job loss and who knows what else, So it's it's gonna be

hard to win that debate. I think you know this. President Mr Obama has a few more months left in his term to try to begin to shape the debate about globalization in this country's relationship with the rest of the world. His successor indeed his successors over the years, we'll have the same opportunity or necessity. But I but I worry that it's part of a larger turning away from the world. I worry about certain elements of isolationism

we've seen in both parties. It's not a republican or a democratic problem in some ways now the biggest debates in this country or within political parties, and we're seeing it, whether the opposition to immigration, opposition to UH trade more broadly, this pushback rejection of globalization, and not just in this country,

we see it throughout Europe and elsewhere. So the lesson I take is, if you want this country, in this society and this economy to derive the benefits of globalization, then you had better go out and make the case. Forn't uh is it a matter of sharing the wealth that is generated by that or how Because you referenced inequality in Europe and some inequalities here, how significant is globalization as a response to income inequality or anti globalization

as a response to to income inequality? Well, here I'll probably alienate some of your listeners, but I don't think inequality is the real issue. I think the real issue is a loss or absence of upward mobility. And we've had an equality in this country since day one. What we what we've also traditionally had those tremendous opportunity and mobility,

And to me, the goal is to resurrect that. And as long as people see real improvements in their standard of living and the prospects of further than I think we do just fine as an economy and as a society, and people don't wake up every day angry about inequality so long as their specific circumstances are improving, are improving, and are likely to continue to improve. So so you mentioned UH some presidents before you served in both Bush administrations.

How do you compare and contrast the different styles of of George SR and and and uh George W. Bush. I would say that forty one the Father's administration was more formal, decision making was a bit more orderly, process oriented. Is this ste more process oriented, a little bit more careful. I think the W's administration UH a little bit less form a little bit less careful, And some of the

decisions as well as some of the follow ups. So I thought that the the administration of the father, all things being equal, I think history will judge as a more a more successful presidency. So let's talk about the third bush Um Jeb I was kind of surprised that he seemed somewhat surprised by the Iraq question. How can we put that into context? He clearly has been prepping for this for a long time, and by all accounts, is a really intelligent guy. That Jeb Bush is very intelligent.

I think he would have made a good president. On the other hand, he had in campaign for a while and just rusty is that? Is that the answers? I can't explain it. I wasn't involved. I can't be involved in campaigns. I'm just an observer like you are. So whether it was rust or just people thought they could handle a question and then it turns out they couldn't. I can't explain why it was, why it played out

the way it uh the way it did. But it wasn't the only area, quite honestly, where he stumbles as a as it kind then it's quite possible. So this two thousand, fifteen sixteen wasn't his year, he's he represented a degree of establishment continuity. And as you saw with with both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, this was not a year of great public outpouring for establishment continuity. So you mentioned Trump when when Trump was jabbing at Jeb

and using his brother to as a cudgel on him. Um, he took a page out of the Democrats side of the island said Iraq was a colossal blunder, and there were Republicans who flocked to that position. First, was Trump right that Iraq was the two oh three invasion of Iraq was a colossal blunder? And seconds, um, how did he as a Republican say that when no Republican was

willing to address that publicly in the past. Well, I wrote a book about the tour about the Gulf War, in the Iraq War, cold war of necessity, war of choice, and I was a great critic of the two thousand three War of necessity, meaning the desert shields after Saddam invaded Kuwait absolutely, which I thought was a war that we were right to in fight, and we fought it in the right way, very much a Colin Powell specific objective overwhelming force and then get out when you're done right.

It was Colin Powell was President, Bush, Brent Scotcroft, James Baker, and Dick Cheney by the way with Secretary of Defense, and it was a very effective team. But considerable means for limited goals very different than the two thousand three. Uh, considerable means for limited goals as opposed to limited means for considerable goals. And it you know it needless to say. And I think history will be uh extremely critical of the two thousand three, So I think it's legitimate to

criticize it. And I think what it also shows is uh a lot of consensus within the Republican Party about this country's role in the world. So you those who thought the Iraq War was a great idea at the time, some in retrospect, many people who opposed it at the time or certainly in retrospect. And I just find this part of a larger pattern that the most interesting conversations about foreign policy happened within the parties. There's not a

democratic versus Republican foreign policy that is that is quite fascinating. UM. So let's let's move beyond the bushes and and move beyond um spend a little more time. We we mentioned the parallels between Brexit and and Trump, but is it really fair to say that, uh, we're we're striking the same populace chord. Is it immigration and and lack of opportunity and some wealth inequality? Are those the factors that are driving to a lesser degree the Sanders Um candidacy answers. Yes.

And you've had, as you know, for many Americans, a lack of real increase in living standards over the last decade decade and a half. So and this concerns about the inadequacy of safety nets, of retirement savings, a lot of social change in our society, and record speed. So I think you add all this up and there's a lot of Americans who feel uneasy, uncomfortable, threatened, anxious, choose

your your adjective, but I think it's it's widespread. And the fact that you've had outsiders like Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders do as well as they've done in this political season tells you something. So let's talk You mentioned Trump, Let's talk a little bit about I mentioned Trump, so I can't really pin that on you. Let's let's talk about our relationship with Mexico. My understanding has been that following the financial crisis, we saw not immigration but immigration.

When we look at the amount of money being wired from the US to Mexico, ostensibly by illegal Mexican in the United States sending money back to their family, that's really taken a big drop, and and the amount of illegal Mexicans coming over the border seems to have reversed. It seems to be going the opposite direction. So, first question, are we really threatened by Mexico? And second question, are we really going to get them to pay for a wall? How is that going to work? As you say, there's

net migration now in the direction of Mexico. It's a combination of slowing economy here, the economy there is doing well, smaller family size, uh there. So that's that's essentially what's driving it. I also think that Mexico is something of a success story, the fact that it's you've had several rotations of power. It's it's increasingly a peaceful, legitimate democracy.

You've got problems in some cases domestically with drug gangs with guns and so forth, but that's really a lack of government capacity, and that's the kind of thing that over the years or decades, I believe canon will UH be solved. The fact that you don't have massive flows of people out of Mexico and the United States. I also see in some ways there's a reflection that the

NAFTA agreement worked. Next, Mexico's economy is doing better. It can increasingly support its own UH population and a lot of goods which are made in one country the other, as you know, because the supply chains are really made increasingly in both. But to answer your question, no, there I do not believe there will be a wall between the United States and and Mexico. If there water be one, it wouldn't be paid for by Mexico. I would just make a larger point about immigration. I think we need

to break it down at the three parts. We need to continue to have a flow of talented individuals into this country. It's a great driver of economic success in this country. We've got to find a way to deal with twelve million people who had this uncertain status. We're not going to deport them. We've got to find some kind of a legitimate path, a conditional path to a legal status or citizen ship. And we've got to have real security and I'm not worried about economic migrants. I'm

worried about terrorists. So I want to make sure that the United States is secure and its borders on its land borders, its air borders, and its sea boarders north, southeast, and west. So we've got to be safe, and that to me is a a real challenge that we've got to face up to. So, but you mentioned NAFTA, I have to come back to the Trans Pacific Um Partnership that that is now stuck in Congress for years. What

happens if that doesn't pass? And and what does that say to our trading partners And what are the odds that that under new administration, perhaps with a new Congress, UH might might actually be fast tracked. Well, you're right that the agreement has been parked in the Congress. There's zero chance that gets touched before the election. If Hillary Clinton were to win, there's some chance it could get

touched in the lame Duck. More likely though it comes If it comes up again, it would be sometime after the new president takes UH takes office if it If it doesn't pass, we'd pay a little bit of an economic price. The estimates are point three or so percentage GDP in not a lot, not like the Brexit costs, which is a couple of percent, much smaller, exactly much smaller. I think the bigger costs would be strategic and reputational. What it would sell to these other countries is the

United States is no longer reliable, dependable, predictable country. And it would also be the biggest winner would be China. What the Chinese would say is, oh, great, well, we're going to do a trade agreement with you. We're going to replace the United States economically. So I don't see

people connecting the dots in this country. And if you want to be against t p P, that's your prerogative, but then you have to be honest about the strategic consequences and as well as the economic consequences being against it. It seems to me the case for it is so strong, and there's ways of helping people who would conceivably or potentially be hurt by it through economic displacement. Well, then you help them with education, retraining and transitional financial assistance.

But to throw the baby out with the bath waters to me, a uh strategic error of the first magnitude is that the deal that has to get done. T p P passes, but here's money set aside for retraining of anybody who loses their job or or whose factory closes as a result of this path. That's the way, quite honestly, that is the way we've passed previous Trader graft Naft and others, is that there's always a side deal, if you will, where you help people who are like

not everybody gains, not everybody wins from globalization. So as a society, we've got to take care of the people who lose from globalization. That's part of putting together a majority that supports these agreements. So I never asked for forecast of predictions. That's that's part of our motto. No stock picks, no no forecasts. But I'm gonna I'm gonna cheat over to that that area a little bit and say, is there any chance we see t p P passed over the next five years. The answers yes. What you

can't do is renegotiate it. You can't reopen it with eleven other countries. So if it were to pass, what it would take a little bit. What we've been talking about is a side agreement between whosever president and the Congress, which would deal with everything from various forms of assistance for affected workers, might also deal with with perceived problems with the agreement, for example, to deal with the potential the currencies are manipulated so other countries exports are cheaper here,

might deal with government subsidies. So what I would expect is you'd have a side agreement between the President the Congress that would, together with the agreement, would provide a package that people, even skeptics, could support. So I think the odds of that happening over the next five years are better than even. Since you mentioned manipulating currency, let's talk a little bit about China. Do you think China is a persistent currency manipulator or is that just an

easy thing to paint them with. I think they were historically, but they've stopped and in the last year or two the evidence just isn't there These things that criticize China four such as well. Obviously we talked about it before, the question of property theft. Intellectual property theft is an issue of government subsidies, government investments, and so forth. As there's issues I just sort of column somewhere. I can't recall that Amazon is having a problem that they're flooded

with Chinese knockoffs of of name brand goods. So if we have a dumping problem from China, then we have something called the World Trade Organization and we take we should take China to task in the w t O. Often we get rulings in our favor. Let's use the machinery. Not too long before we sat down to do this interview, there was a decision by an arbitration panel that basically says China has no historical eights to parts of the Chinese Sea that they're the South China South China see

that they're claiming as their own. What does this mean going forward? Is this is this have binding force? Uh and as China still gonna be flexing military muscle off their own coast in in in the Pacific. Well before the decision came down, the Chinese, knowing the decision was going to go against them, essentially preempted and said we're going to ignore the decision and before we feel too much holier than now about it, we would do the

same thing. As a major power. We wouldn't allow our foreign policy to be determined by some tribunal like this, And so I don't in that sense. There's no surprise. Now. The real question is not whether China goes along with

the ruling. There was zero chances that. The real question is whether in any way they adjust their behavior and stop some of the reclamation projects, the island rebuilding projects, whether we see a little bit more reasonable nous on their behavior on my hunches, there's a debate within China on that that historically over last. If you think about a forty years, China's foreign policy has been quite restrained because they've understood they needed a stable environment external environment

in order to develop and grow economically. In the last couple of years, you're seeing a more assertive streak coming out of China. So my prediction is you're going to see something of an internal struggle between these two different schools. I thought, can we say it's been more than forty years, it's been about five thousand years of China not looking to project Look at the British Empire, the Spanish, but look look at the Napoleonic You never really got that

from China. They were much more about taking care of their own so big territorially and demographically that that's historically been an up and now China is a major power, and the question is whether they want to have a certain influence or respect, if you will, accorded them in the in the region. They want to assert certain things, and I think they are the juries out. But again, as growth has slowed significantly in China, again there's two

skills a thought. One says they're gonna continue to be restrained because they can't afford to upset the economic out applic cart. The other is saying they're going to turn to a more nationalist foreign policy as a way of compensating for their their slowing economic growth. And Western observers

are divided. My hunches the Chinese themselves are divided. Do the Chinese feel disrespected because I don't know anybody who's not a leader in technology, in in economics, in any global perspective that doesn't look at China as a behemoth deserving of respect. Or are they still feeling a little bit of a of a third World chip on their shoulder. I'm not sure to put it quite that way, because they're at one and the same time both the developing

country and a power. But I do think they feel based on my conversations with them, and what I read that this is still an American dominated world. There's some Chinese who think that the United States gets up in

the morning trying to block China's path. That really, uh sure, When we, for example, opposed over the last couple of years the Chinese sponsored Infrastructure Investment Bank in Asia, there's a certain Chinese feeling that, again, the United States wants to keep China in its place so it doesn't emerge as a full fledged uh competitor. So there's a bit of that in Chinese. Uh. I think in the Chinese political debate, aren't the Chinese already a full fledged competitor.

I wouldn't call him full fledge, but I think they are a significant competitor, and they're the closest thing to an emerging rival great power that there that there is in the world. I think the real question is whether they can pull it off and whether they can maintain the political stability at home amidst lower rates of economic growth.

So I actually think China is an underappreciated political question mark over the next five to ten to ten years, another potential surprise, like you absolutely speaking of surprises, Before I get to my favorite questions, we really haven't talked much about Russia other than their little Ukraine and crimea adventure. What the hell is going on in Russia? It seems that Putin is speaking of wild cards. He seems to

delight in surprising the West on a regular basis. Absolutely, and there's nothing holding him back if he wants to surprise us tomorrow. Mr Putin is shall we say, unconstrained. He uh. There's not a lot of checks and balances in the Russian political system, and economically and politically, he has consolidated power to unprecedented degree. So he retains the capacity and the ability to UH, to surprise if he

decides that it's in his interest to do so. So you mentioned China is focusing on growth and political stability. What what's driving Russia? What motivates Putin? Putin has political stability at home. His economy is pretty much one dimensional with energy. I think what he's trying for is respect and attention, and I think he wants to uh. He wants Russia to be a scene perceived, judged to be a major power. It's why he is doing some of

what he's doing in the Middle East. I think you've got to look at the last twenty five years of history. For many Russians, particularly of Putin's mentality, someone from the security services as a humiliating era, and what Putin wants to do is in some ways compensate for what he sees to be the humiliations of losing the Cold War, NATO enlargement, you name it. That. Essentially, Russia has been

kicked off its pedestal. So during the Cold War, Russia was constantly cranking out world class mathematicians, world class code writers, world class physicists. If they wanted to compete with the US and China on an economic capacity, uh we talked about more stem uh education degrees, careers. They have that in spades. Why haven't they taken that huge human capital they have and create a serious competitor to Chinese manufacturing,

to Silicon Valley to New York finance. They have all the components, but they just don't seem to have the philosophy there. There's a simple answer to your question. If they were going to free up their economy to do exactly what you're talking about, it would have political consequences. One of the advantages of having such a heavy state run economy with so much of the wealth and oil

and gas is the government controls things. If you had a real economy where people were starting up businesses where they could be independent, they had sources of capital outside the control of government, they would then demand political freedom. Vladimir Putin does not want to oversee Russia where he does not keep control. But that wouldn't be his headache. That would be a twenty or thirty year transformation that would make Russia an economic power. He's not going to

start that process. He is not going to start that because you would begin to create momentum that would weaken the share of power or the relative role of the state. That is just not his vision of his country. Isn't that the eventual disposition that's going to happen in Russia? Maybe not next year or ten years from now, But well, are they going to have a future beyond energy? It

has to be, but they're not. They haven't. The tentative states they made a few years ago in that direction they were going they were going to create or after after a few years under that, jev and Putin there was some experimentation about a high tech area around Roscow and essentially they pulled the rug out from under it because the same people who had the creative ideas to start businesses had dangerous creative ideas about politics. That's fascinating.

Let's jump to some of our our favorite questions. Um, I was gonna ask what you did before you started at at D O D. But really you came right out of school and pretty much straight into government, right. I've been in it, Like my entire career is, it's a very American career. This is one of the few countries where you don't have to make but for the Oxford part, but it's very American in the sense that you don't have to make a single choice. Like if you're in Europe, you would either have to be a

career diplomat or an academic, and you never academics. Don't people go back and forth here all the time. Here you go back and forth. We call him in and outer. So I've been in and outer. I've worked in four administrations. I've worked on the hill, I've taught a couple of times at universities. I've been at various think tanks, including the current one, the Council on Foreign Relations. So I've been incredibly lucky. I've been able to follow this very

flexible set of you know jobs. So who are some of your early mentors You mentioned you started in Senator Pel's office. Who mentored you diplomatically and politically? I wouldn't say, uh, he did that. I admire. We disagreed on a lot, but I admired his principle and I admired it was very old school Claiborne Pell was a patrician and for him, politics weren't a blood sport. Politics were what gentleman did, and it was a higher calling, a no bless no

bless ablusion there was. You treated your opponents with respect and decency. It was all very mannered. It was all very gentleman. It was a very different uh world. My mentors were more teachers in terms of people I studied with that say, Oberlin, where I was an undergraduate, had a fantastic teacher of comparative religion. I had my teachers give us a name, oh Man named Tom Frank, great

professor of a New Testament. And is what got me interested in the Middle East, because I went off ultimately to do an archaeological dig, which is how I got interested in the Middle East. I had a series of wonderful professors at Oxford historian named Albert Harani, another named Michael Howard, alistair backin Headley Bull one of the great political scientists of the twentieth century. Uh So all these

people had. In fact, I think the person who probably had the greatest impact on me in terms of my career was brentch Brncroft, who was the National Security Advisor at the White House for and I was the senior person for the Middle East and the Persian Gulf in South Asia and working with Brandon watching how he balanced the two sides of the job. He was both an advisor or counselor to the president, but he was also the person who dispensed due process and made the system work.

And how he balanced advocacy and fairness had a tremendous impact on me. He's legendary. I mean, he used the gold standard, he used the gold step right, and this year's surprisingly cross party lines to endorse Hillary Clinton, which I was I should say I was shocked, but uh, not surprised. Is that a good way to describe that he really is? You go back and read some of his history. He's a rocks Are, There's no other way

to put it. He has the gold standard of people who have held that critical job of national security advisor. It's very hard to get the balance right. To be an advisor, you have to be someone who all your colleagues trust to make the process fair and accountable, and Brent pulled off that balance better than any other individual I've ever seen. So we talked about mentors and professors. What thinkers have influenced your approach to foreign policy. I'd

single out two or three. One would be Henry Kissinger. Kissinger's books are better than anyone else's and going from particular moments of history to taking a step back and making larger judgments or conclusions. So when I write, I do my best to do the same. His most recent book, Tom Keane cannot stop talking about it. He world. He's been lavishing praise on it for most for good reason. Uh so. Reason one second is a man named Headley

Bull I mentioned it before, Professor. Professor, Australian academic wrote what I think is the single best book ever written in the last fifty or hundred years about my field, called the Anarchical Society. Anarchical society and it's a whole idea of international relations at anyone moment is always a balance between forces of anarchy and forces of society, things

coming together, things going apart. And so I found Headley a great influence in his And then if some of my former colleagues when I taught at the Kennedy School at Harvard, name Dick new Stat and Ernie May, and they did they did a book called Thinking in Time and the subtitle is something like the uses of History for decision Makers. And the whole idea was how you could and should study and use history to shape challenges that might come into your your in box, and how

to use it and not abuse it. And I think it's a fantastic primer, Thinking in Time for anyone who's to be in a position of decision making stat and who is Alright, since we're talking about books, so so these are the thinkers who have influenced you. What what are some of your favorite books? What do you like, whether it's related to your field or outside of it, and um fiction or nonfiction. I've just given you the my favorite books in my field. Uh yeah, I like

reading biography as much as anybody. I've been reading much recently cause I've been so busy writing and when I write books, it's very hard to read because you're you're kind of more in a transmit than receive mode. Uh. And then in terms of I don't read a whole lot of fiction, though I have read the entire Jack Reacher. My wife loves those. Yeah, I like those two. Uh. My favorite line of his is I'm so cool you

can skate on me. But the first movie, she said, Tom Cruise was miscast and not because should have been a foot too short and it ought to be a big bruising uh uh guy. But I don't read a whole lot of fiction, but I you know, I'll pick up the New Yorker every week, and I like, you know, more nonfiction. I think I gravitate uh towards. But if I could read anything, I usually like reading um biography. I find that the to me, the most interesting place

to go. So what what do you see as having changed in the world of diplomacy over the past twenty five or thirty years? What what? What are the most significant shifts that have occurred? A couple come to mind. One is uh espetially at the end of the Cold War years ago, and the whole structure of international relations change. Second, of all, you've had a whole trend in terms of

away from concentration of power. We now have so many actors and players in the world who can make a different it's you know, whether it's the Gates Foundation or groups like Doctors Without Borders, to CNN to Bloomberg two again, dozens of countries around the world or groups like Isis. So the chessboard, if you will, to use a terrible cliche image is much more crowded with many different types of things. I think also putting on my former policy maker had it first struck me during the Gulf War

twenty five years ago, seven news cycle. I remember that that was the first time the CNN effect was real. I recall that explicitly. And suddenly you had one new cycle you couldn't wait, and that anything said in one place was heard everywhere, So there was no longer narrowcasting. Everything was broadcast everywhere. So it created And that was

before social media. And now you've got social media, so you're you're much more uh exposed and you you feel much less in control as a as a politimate policy maker. And so think it's gotten tougher because also elites have broken down. I think the entire environment of making policy and carrying it out has become more decentralized. Just look, it's the reason you mentioned that you're nice enough to mention before. I have this book coming out in January

called The World in Disarray. But I think objectively, if you're going to measure the trends in the world, things have gotten messier. Things have gotten much less orderly, whether at the global level, or the regional level, or the domestic level. So those are the changes of the recent past. What do you see as the changes going forward? What's the next shift that's going to take place in international relations?

I feel, like Yogibertt, predictions are always difficult about the future here, but one as we've seen elements of it. I think with the globalization debate, we talked to you and I at some length about Brexit and as well as about trade in this country, I don't think that's a short term thing. I think that debate about how to how societies and individuals are to navigate globalization that

could become a dominant debate for some time. I think the possibility for a North Korea issue, we're gonna wake up in a couple of years in North Korea is going to be able to put nuclear warheads on missiles that can reach the United States. What are we gonna do about that? Terrorists can at some point get ahold of some truly awful weapons systems. What about that we talked a little bit about a potential domestic crisis in China?

You could have weakening within the you. I'm sorry, I don't mean to be My kids call me Debbie Downer, but hey, these are legitimate threats. These are things that that civilized societies have to think about and figure out ways to protection. And I'm more worried about the potential

downside than I am optimistic about the potential upside. Again, it's it's an astramatic, asymmetrical risk, a small possibility, but with a real absolutely and and there's more things that could go wrong than that than that could go right. And that's what worries me. So our last two questions, because I know they're they're champing at the bit to get you out of here. So a millennial or a recent college grad comes to you and says, I'm interested

in diplomacy. What sort of advice would you give them? Two things. I'm glad you asked me that one is read some history because it's too easy to graduate from too many of America's colleges and universities and not have any grounding in history. Second of all, uh, this look at me in trouble, but it's it's my general advice to millennials, which they need a little bit more patients. There's a a rush to arrive and an expectation of I think it's probably because too many of them got

participation trophies when they're playing soccer. But I think people have got not the first person who's brought that up. Okay, but I but I think there's got to be a willingness to pay your dues a little bit. I know that makes me a dinosaur, and I apologize, but there's something to be said for slogging and to work in your way through and taking positions where you the print. The principal measure of the value of the job is

how much you learn. And our final question, which will make Sam very happy in there, um, what is it that you know about foreign affairs and international relations today that you wish you knew when you started thirty years ago? That there's nothing inevitable, that everything is up for grabs, and the two biggest forces out there are people and ideas. And if you can people and ideas, and if you can come up with some ideas and harness them to the right people, you can make a real difference. And

I've seen this in white houses or anywhere else. Uh. There's almost nothing that's inevitable. And the good side of that is that you can make a real positive difference. And the bad side of that is beats. Bad stuff can happen, and people can drive things off the I didn't realize how much of history, in a funny sort of way, it gets decided day in day out there. The historical forces are there. I get that there's large

historical forces, but within that there's a human agency. The difference that people can make, uh, for better and for worse is extroyed there. Richard, thank you so much for being so generous with your time. If you have enjoyed this conversation, be sure and look up and inch ure down an inch and see the other or so conversations that we've had over the past couple of years. I have to thank my producer and recording engineer Charlie Volmer, my Booker h Taylor Riggs and my head of research,

Michael bat Nick, for all their assistance. You've been listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio, brought to you by B A s F. We create chemistry.