David Snyderman on Specialty Finance and Data in Investing

Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, radio News. This is Master's in Business with Barry rid Holds on Bloomberg Radio. This week on the podcast, I have a fascinating and extra special guest. David Sneinermann has put together an incredible career in fixed income, alternative credit, and really just an amazing way of looking at risk and trade structure and how to figure out probabilistic potential outcomes rather than playing the usual forecasting and

Thank you very much for having me, Barry. I really appreciate it and I'm looking forward to our conversation.

I am. Also, I'm very familiar with Magnetar and it's history. It's really a fascinating firm in so many ways. Let's start, though, talking a little bit about your background. You grow up in suburban New Jersey and then you head to Saint Louis for college. Tell us a little bit about where you went, what you studied.

Sure, I grew up in Freehold, New Jersey, so most people a know home of Bruce Springsteen. You know, my focus coming out of high school was playing football. I want to play football at the highest level I could.

You are not much bigger than me. What made you think you could play on the gridiron?

I don't know. I thought I could, but I definitely thought I could at the time, and so I wanted to play at the highest level possible. My parents were much more focused on academic institution and so wash you sort of met both criteria.

Did you play born college?

I did all four years. It was a lot of fun.

What position did you play?

I played strong safety, and yeah Division three is the highest level I could play up, but I loved it.

Right, So safety you have to be pretty fast, and.

That was the issue.

So but for that you would have gone pro there you go. What did you study at Washoe.

Washoo back then? Was it was a great They had a great medical school and they still do today. And in my family, being a doctor was the highest level of achievement. So I had an older sister starting medical school, and I had a relative that is actually a dean of Duke Medical School. So I had this nice glide path to be a doctor.

Right.

So I started off pre med, but I didn't end pre med. I found out quickly that's not what I wanted to do. The hardest part is telling my parents and especially my grandparents, you know, no more pre med. So I switched to be an economics major. I graduated economics with a lot of courseworking accounting and finance.

Huh. Interesting. So you come out of college, you go to Price Waterhouse Cooper and then Coke Industries, where you're focusing on convertible securities, merger arm and special situations. How do you get from medical school to that? What was the career plan?

Yeah? My path was certainly non traditional. I didn't go to one of the East Coast Ivy League schools, knowing I wanted to go to Wall Street. I didn't even know what Wall Street. Working on Wall Street meant at the time, So for me, it was much more around, you know, being around fantastic people and really taking advantage of opportunities. It's like you said, I started a price waterhouse and I went through a one year rotation there.

Where in Switzerland was a Geneva somewhere.

Else it was Frebourg, So a town twenty minutes from Burnho was a tax free canton.

Uh huh.

So I was in a town that spoke, you know, half French and half German and I spoke English.

So there you go. But no taxes, no income.

Taxes, no income taxes for the company.

And then Coke Industries. I don't think a lot of people realized one of the largest private companies in the United States and maybe even the largest. They're giant energy powerhouse. What else does Coke do?

Yeah, so when I was there, that had thirteen thousand people, and that was before they bought Georgia Pacific. I think now it's probably thirty five thousand people. Immens It's immense, and so they have many, many different business lines there. For me, I sat mostly in their internal really an internal hedge fund, so it was their excess cash. They borrowed money at live bid at the time, so they borrowed money very cheaply, and our job was to make money on that money.

So you end up as head of global credit and senior managing director at Citadel Investment Group. Was that right from Coke Industries? That was seven years at Citadel. That's supposed to be a tough shop.

To work at.

What was your experience like there?

It was a perfect job for me at the time, So I always thought I worked at a high level of intensity right right. But when I got there, I realized I was one of many. But I had the opportunity to work for gentleman Dave Bunning. He was one of the original few handful of people that started at Citadel. And Dave was fantastic in so many different ways. A great leader, a great investor, but really a great person and he took me under his wing there. It was a lot of work, but a lot of formidable lessons

So I want to rephrase that for some of the less option involve savvy members of the audience. When we buy fixed income, we just wanted to be steady and pay a divinend and not swing up and down. And if it does swing up and down, the odds are it's not in your favor. That volatility you can look at as an insurance product. If the volatility goes up, Hey, we can make a bet that will offset the draw down in the bonds.

That's exactly right, all right.

And you you at Citadel, you were running a convertible bond and credit trading desk. Is that what you eventually ended up as head of Global Credit?

That's correct. I started there on the convertible bond arbitrage desk, and then we started capital structure arbitrage, which meant we were, you know, buying or selling credit and against that buying and selling equities. And finally we consolidated that together and I ran that business for Ken and Citadel.

And some of the folks Ken being Ken Griffin. When people say Citadel is a lot of work, you don't realize there's a whole other gear you have to move into and its next level was that your experience.

It was and for me, I actually loved that part of Citadel. It was sixteen hour days and it was six or seven days a week, but you really got to learn the financial markets there.

Huh. Interesting. So Magnetar launches in two thousand and five with some capital and you joined. You you weren't one of the original founders, but you joined not long afterwards.

That's correct. So Alec Litowitz and Ross Lazar founded the firm, and you know I did join the day we launched our main fund. Now, for me, Alec was a known quantity. He ran equities at Citadel with Dave Bunning, my prior boss there, and then when I moved up into Dave's spot, Alec moved out and they started and he spent I think two years in a noncompete and then started Magnetar.

So you have people from Coke Industries with you. You have people from Citadel. Did those prior employees have a piece of you guys? Did they seed you, did they invest you? Or was it just a clean break and we're off on our own.

It was a clean break. And Ross Lazar came from the fund of Funds World and he was the primary money raiser and business builder there and so he did a fantastic job. I think were the largest launch of two thousand and five with about two point three billion dollars.

How long did it take you to get up and running? Were you felt, oh, this is really all the pieces are in place.

Yeah, it's a good question and funny funny you asked that question because we talk about it often around Magnetar. You know, I started and I hired three or four people that I started with, and Ross Lazar, right, and again he's a he's my partner, my close friend, and a great business builder. Two weeks into it, he came to me and said, what's the first investment, Like, when

I need a computer and an internet netline and maybe a trader to help us out.

That's exactly what what Ross was saying. And he very politely said to me, you know, you're here to invest, not to build software. And so he I think he stopped by my desk for the next nine months every single day and asked the same question. But it truly took us nine months to build the systems in infrastructure just to be investment ready.

Wow, that's amazing nine months. And I have to ask why Evanston in Illinois? I mean, I like Lumel, Natty's and super Dog as much as the next guy, but why the middle of the Illinois suburbs the Chicago suburbs.

Yeah, so it was just north of the city and it's across the street from Northwestern, so that would be the draw. You know, the train lines in there, so you can recruit people from the city. But it was probably a little more selfish, like we all lived on the north shore of Chicago and so it was an easy commute for us to work, and so that that's where we started the firm.

And that is really a lovely part of the world on the lake. It's such a manageable, easy city to operate within. I mean, the winters are a little cold, but still it's a lovely place.

It's a great quality of life in Chicago and outside of Chicago.

So only a few years later, we're right in the teeth of the Great Financial Crisis. How did you guys navigate that?

We were very fortunate and we performed quite well in our credit strategies, which which certainly we can talk about. We had both long and short credit products, and we had a long voltary position, meaning meaning we protected the balance sheet very well if there was a dislocation. And I think that went back to some of the prior lessons from prior firms, like we really need to have portfolios that we protect the balance sheet and make sure that we're able to stand up in difficult environments.

I have noticed that a lot of firms that describe themselves as hedge funds really aren't very hedged. You guys operated pretty fully hedged it most of the time, right.

We really did. And the systems in infrastructure we built were not only to measure risk, but to manage that risk, and so we'd find good investments both on the long and short side.

So even if you have a position that that's long you have an offsetting or matching position, or do you just hedge out that long position with a short bet.

So there's a quality of earning's question embedded, and I think what you said, and that's we're trying not to take macro level bets. Those for us are low quality bets. And so what we're trying to take is idiosyncratic bets, meaning we're focused on one factor or're betting on that factor. Then we're going to hedge out all of the macro risks around the portfolio.

Huh. Really interesting. So we were talking about you guys launched a few years right before the financial crisis. I wanted to talk about a couple of trades from that era, perhaps most famously, you guys put on a CDO bet, a collateralized debt obligation bet that was designed to do well if housing made some extreme moves and it was nondirectional. It was hedge. Tell us a little bit about the magnetar CDO bet from the financial crisis.

I talked about setting up the infrastructure to prepare to invest, and we looked at every asset class. So we looked at corporates, we looked at mortgages, we looked at credit cards, and what we found in the mortgage market is something you don't read about in textbooks. We found that we could invest on the longside in what they called the equity piece or the most risky piece of a CDO, and we could short the next level up, so the mezzanine piece, and we could short two or three times

Right, Options cost you money, and that's the old joke. Option traders never die, they just expire worthless.

That's exactly right. In this case, we were going to hold an option that we were going to get paid fifteen to twenty percent a year.

Though, oh really, that's real money.

So you never see that and you never read about that. But that's the way the markets set up. It was just too fragmented. You had people that were willing to buy pieces of these structured products because of the ratings, and on things that weren't rated, no one was willing to buy. So we took the other side of that trade.

So you bought the unrated portions and you shorted the rated portions. That's correct, that's very contrary that's very interesting. How did you identify that opportunity? That's such a talk about idiosyncretic niche trades? How did you figure that out?

The firm was built on finding white spaces, and so I remember back back in two thousand and five when we first started, you know, we'd think about the banks. The banks would have an equity trading desk and they'd have a debt desk, and they'd both value the same companies, and both sides of the firm with vlume completely differently. And so for us, those are exactly the opportunities we were looking for. But we didn't find it in the

So heading into five six, we saw real estate peek in I want to say, in volume in five and price and six. So if you're getting paid fifteen twenty percent to hold the unrated piece, isn't there a lot of downside risk that hey, if some of these mortgages go south, you could see, you know, you get cut in half or worse.

That's exactly right, and so our what the modeling actually said, though, is if nothing happens in the world, we make this twenty percent return. But if anything happened, not only would our equity piece suffer, but the short side or our mezzanine pieces would make the money back. And that's the raceo, that's the ratio we had to be on. So what they call that is delta neutral in the options world. So we had a we were hedging an option, and that hedge made us a lot of money in downside scenarios,

So let's talk a little bit about what's going on today, especially in some of the private alternative spaces you've talked about. Pensions are now facing ill equids. The issues because private equity and venture capital have gates up a lot of long term tie ups. How has this affected your business?

That's been the most challenging part of the business. Really, it really hasn't. And pension funds they're on hold today, they're not investing, and it's been not just a headwind for us, but for the entire industry. So I'll step back and I'll give you my view on it. So pensions have this mandate, they have a diversified portfolio they invest in, they receive cash flow from the portfolio, and

Huh, that's really intriguing. Do you see this across the board or is it really just more generalized that when you have the dislocation of five hundred plus basis points in eighteen months, what does that do to the landscape.

It always changes the landscape, and so no one's ever prepared for moves of that size, even though everyone says they are. And so it's opportunities that have come out of this mainly are around the banks today, right, and so we can talk a little bit more about that.

Well, let's talk a bit about Magnetar has more of a specialty finance focus than other credit managers. Tell us about that and how has the shift and rates impacted specialty financed.

Yeah, so after the GFC, these private credit markets really developed and they went in two different directions. They went in direct lending, right, and so ninety percent of the market went direct lending. So that's going to middle market companies and disintermating the banks and lending directly to them. For us, we went in a different direction. We went in specialty finance and especially finances is a bit smaller, but it's been around for ages and it touches our lives every day.

Define it if you would, Yeah, so's it's.

The cars we drive, so auto loans, it's the houses we buyer ranso, it's mortgages. It's the podcasts that we stream, right, so it's all the music royalties and streaming royalties. So it's it's assets like that. And the interesting part about these assets is there's a very strong investment thesis around them because they have three attributes when combined together, that most other asset classes don't have, and certainly I don't think direct lending has. So the first is you can

Really interesting you mentioned in banks earlier. I know that Magnetar has had opportunities to partner with banks via what some people call rig cap transactions. Tell us a little bit about those.

So rag cap or some people call them significant risk transfer transactions. That is a massive opportunity for credit funds today. And so a lot of people would think that the banks are selling assets, right, but in our experience, we're seeing them efficiently transfer the credit risk of assets but keeping the customer relationship. It's a very important distinction.

How do you do that either you have the asset and the credit risk. I would imagine or if you don't, if it's a mortgage, you sell the mortgage and you're out, how do you have How are you a little bit pregnant?

Exactly? So the solution to that are these reglatory capital solutions. And so you're taking a portfolio of credit risk and you're transferring that credit risk to a private credit fund like us, but maintaining the customer relationship. And what banks I think eminently realizes the customer relationship is how they drive revenues. So traditional banking FX advisory services, you know, high net worth and so without that they start to lose their franchise. This is the product that allows them

So I'm trying to figure out if they're transferring the credit risk to you, I'm assuming you're taking some sort of contract with the bank that you're going to assume the liability if X happens, and then you, with your expertise, are hedging out that risk through your options or credit desk.

Yeah, and that's exactly right. But importantly, the first thing we're doing is we're using data to really understand what the credit risk is. And with that data, then we can start thinking about what what the likely hedges are for the macro risk of the portfolio.

So let's talk about that. What is your approach to data, How do you institutionalize data management and how do you leverage the idea of hey, we know a lot about this, here's how we monetize it.

People talk a lot about the importance of data, but it's usually in a different context. It's usually for these quantitative strategies or quantitative hedge funds. For US, data is the lifeblood of specialty finance. So for US, we use data to solidify our assumptions. What we do with the data is we forecast a performance of assets by matching statistically significant characteristics. So back to the redcap examples, we've looked at hundreds and hundreds of these types of investments

So this is really fairly sophisticated financial engineering. That is, it sounds like it's a way for the banks to meet the SEC requirements, the increased post financial crisis financial reserves that they're required to have, but not have to sell off big parts of the business and not have to sell off the relationships you described.

I think that's exactly right. And even when you get to what happened earlier in twenty twenty three with Credit Swiss, that again put pressure on the banks to really think about how they're going to hedge their credit risk. This is their hedge to credit risk.

And then related to the way you guys work with data management, tell us a little bit about Magnetar Labs.

Yeah, Magnetar Labs has been a great initiative for us. It's really the institutionalization of our data. So we're trying to produce infrastructure where we can ingest large data sets very quickly and not only use them in specific business lines,

So so what sort of hardware using is this? Old? Cloud based? Is this I think of like, oh, sounds like a mainframe. I don't even know if mainframes still exist anymore.

Everything's gone to the cloud now, right, it is pretty amazing.

And that sort of distributed computer has no ceiling, essentially no capacity correct, infinite capacity correct. Really really interesting. So let's talk a little bit about the status quo. I read something where you said it was important to not maintain the status quo. Explain what that means.

We're not efficient market theorists, but we certainly believe that in the medium for long term the markets are efficient.

Kind of mostly eventually.

Efficient, eventually efficient. Right, So we know that what works today at work several years forward, right, And so I'll give you the converts example. Like you mentioned, I've been in the convert market for thirty years now, and sometimes converts are very cheap, you know, commal bonn arbitrage, and when they are, we have a lot of our portfolio in it. But today we have less than one percent

And is the expectation is that whatever inefficiencies were there, markets figured it out. It's arbitraged way, and the odds are against that ever becoming really cheap or might it you know, become a trade again.

Yeah, some of it's supplied demand, right, and you're driven. But I think the most important part is we're not hiring desks of people to stay in an asset class. That's the status quo. That's not what we're looking for. We're looking to aggressively rotate our capital to get to the optimal portfolio, to get to the best risk adjusted return.

So does this mean you're exploring new business areas and strategies or is it just that you're rolling through the various other opportunities that you've fished in before.

Yeah, it's a good question. We maintain our diligence on other strategies, but we always have a strong research and development pipeline. Huh.

Really interesting. So let's talk about some of the things that are going on today. Artificial intelligence AI dominated the twenty twenty three narrative. You made investments in core Weave, a specialized cloud provider. Tell us a little bit about what you're doing in that space. Is that related it all to what we talked about earlier with Magnetar Labs.

Yeah. Core Weave is such an exciting story for Magnetar. I can't say enough good things about it. Sometimes the stars just align. You have the right time, the right product, the right team. And for the listeners that don't know who core Weave is, corev is the largest owner of GPUs outside of the hyperscalers, Google or Amazon Web services. They sell is high performance compute, which is sort of the picks and shovels to enable AI. So if you are a new AI lab, you need somebody like core

So for a firm that specializes in credit, this almost sounds like a venture investment.

There are parts of this that are venture ish, but what's interesting is the underlying asset, this high performance compute is something that we can really scale with and so I think that's been the innovation in the marketplace. So you mentioned in twenty twenty three on the venture side, we actually let around for them a four hundred million dollars Series B round, but we also let a two point three billion dollar financing on their high performance compute assets.

So it's capital and credit, it's equity and credit.

It's equity and credit, and it's a true partnership between the firms. Towards the end of last year, in December, the firm got valued at seven billion dollars. And to me, it's just a start. This company just the you're just going to see it continue to grow over time.

Well, let me know about the C round when that comes. What do you guys, in all seriousness, what are you guys looking for? What sort of characteristics are you looking for when a company like this comes along. You mentioned idiosyncratic types of investment. This sounds very specific and not all that usual.

It is. It's very specific, but we always start with the assets. So it's assets, it's data, and its structure. Right, So first on the assets, we're usually focused on specialty finance because the assets drive the performance of the company. Right.

Huh. Sounds really intriguing. So as long as we're talking about twenty twenty three, we saw a lot of bank failures last year, we saw the response to a rapid increase in rates. You had a front row seat to what transpired. Share what that was like, and what did you guys see in the space. Tell us about the opportunities that came up from those events.

Those were stressful events for the entire community, you know, for Silicon Valley Bank in particular. I remember it was Friday night, and the question of moral hazard appeared immediately. So it's California based, right. It was a lot of venture funds that had accounts there, and the questions started coming out, is their cash safe, will they be able to access it? If so, when will they be able

You mentioned moral hazard. Where was the moral hazard with Silicon Valley Bank? Was it the equity investors in the bank or was it the customers with way over the FDIC limits? And if there isn't a quarter million or half a million dollar ceiling, did the Federal Reserve essentially say, okay, FDIC insurance is now unlimited? Is that the moral hazard?

We found that to be the moral hazard. Who's the governor of how much risk a bank can take? So the federal government came out and they said, you have a two hundred and fifty thousand dollars limit, but people were putting in one hundred million dollars into the account because they got twenty five basis points more of interest, right, So how do you actually control that? That's the moral hazard we saw now. I think at the end of the day, it was just too big of a risk to the economy.

The contagion risk was Hey, there's a moral hazard question to the depositors. But rather than stand on ceremony, let's stop this before it spreads.

That's exactly right.

Huh, that's really that's really kind of intriguing. What else has been the result of this rapid spike in interest rates? What do you see in the private credit world that hey, blame the fed. But here's what's gone off the rails.

For credit investors. Everyone thinks about fixed rate risk, right, but that's easily hedgable, and that's a choice that that credit investors make. So for people like magnets, are we swap everything back to floating rate, we don't have any edge on a macro risk like that. But the second order effect is much much more difficult, and that's the

So given this current environment where first rates went up further and faster than it seemed like, the consensus amongst analysts was they stayed higher longer than people expected. There's no recession. People have been talking about that for two years, and the expected rate cuts I guess tied to that recession haven't showed up yet. We were talking about March, now we're talking about May, even June of twenty twenty four. How does this affect how you think about putting portfolios together,

It's a very good question, and for us, we think a lot about the affordability factor. So I'll give you two examples at both extremes. So we have a partial ownership in an auto loan business in Ireland, and so when rates are at zero, we're loaning to consumers. It's somewhere between five and a half and six percent, and we're gaining market share rapidly. All of a sudden, risk free rate goes to five percent, that equivalent loan we're

Right, different calculus, different.

Calculus, And so we have a decision to make. We can stay at eleven percent, keep the same margin but reduce origination, or we can take our margin down and try to keep market share. Either way, the business is worth a lot less. That has a lot of affordability factor effect to it. On the other end of the stream is our music royalties business. So in music royalties, you know, the simplification is you get some small part

Private credit seems to be getting a lot of attention these days. Why is that.

If you would have asked me going into the global financial crisis, I know we keep going back fifteen years now, I would have said the banks had it all right. They controlled origination of all of the different asset classes, especially finance and lending, so whether its credit cards or mortgages or loans to their customers. But after as the financial crisis happened, there was a spotlight flashed on their balance sheet. They just had too much risk and so

So let's talk about talent a little bit. One of the things I know your firm is proud of is more than half of your workforce has been with the firm for five years or longer. So first, I'm assuming that's not typical in your space, and second I have to ask what contributed to that sort of retention.

I'm very proud. I think we're very proud of that fact, and I think it is very atypical. But the credit really goes to so many people at Magnetar. You know, we're a global firm, but I think with a Midwestern ethos, so it's work hard, stay humble, be a good teammate, good person, And I think if we can consistently demonstrate those qualities will attract people who value them. And it's a virtuous circle. And what's incredible about the firm is when we get when we're focused, how much we can

So one of the things we've been hearing a lot about as big companies try and get their staff back in the office five days a week is corporate culture. Tell us a little bit about what is differentiating Magnetar from a cultural perspective. You know, starting with Evanston, Illinois, not a lot of private credit shops in the neighborho that's true.

You know, first principles, it's always about integrity. But I think for most tenured firms integrity is high. But for us, the north star is always creating the best portfolios to deliver to our clients. And we really have two foundational points there. One is we run a very flat organization and secondly, we've thought a lot about alignment. So on the flat organization, it doesn't matter who has the right answer. We know we're trying to reach the right answer. So

Huh. Really very interesting, So we only have you for a limited amount of time. Let me jump to my favorite questions that I ask all of my guests starting with tell us what you've been streaming these days? What's been keeping you entertained? Either video or audio, Netflix or podcast? What's keeping you entertained?

Yeah, I think this will be different than most of the people have stated on this show. But for me, it's been.

Flow sports, flow sports.

Flow sports. So I have my older son is in between high school and college right now, and he's playing hockey and juniors for a year, and so all of his games are on flow Sports. So Christy and my son Jake and I sit around and watch every game together.

What does he what positions does he play?

He plays defense. It's been a lot of fun flow sports.

Is that like a YouTube channel on internet channel? How do you find that?

We pull it up on Apple TV or on our phone, and yeah, it's been great for a lot of youth sports.

Huh. Interesting.

And then on the podcast side, this podcast aside on.

Here you never have to bring this podcast up.

Of course. So I listened to one by Larry Burnsteed what Happens Next, and he's been doing it since COVID, and it's sort of six minutes of really relevant topics that come out every weekend.

What happens next. I'm going to check that out. I love the idea of these having done long form for a decade, I love the idea of five, ten, twelve minutes and you're done, And there's something very appealing about that. Let's talk about your mentors who helped to shape your career.

You know, it always starts with their parents, and then you know football coaches like like Larry Kimbaum. But I mentioned Dave Bunning before. I think most people would say, you know, I'm a product of his teachings over time.

Huh. Interesting. How about books? What are some of your favorites? What are you reading right now?

You know I always like Michael Lewis books. We had him at one of our off sites a few years ago. You ever remember this book is one of my favorites. You know, Memos from the Chairman by Alan Greenberg. Sure, that was a.

Great bay Greenberg Greenberg correct.

And what was so interesting about his book is, you know he's running the firm, but he's really in the nuche of every detail.

It was very interesting, including the paper clips recycling.

Between every expense.

So let me interrupt you one second. Say I was at a lunch just with you know, three people at a table and he came in and sat like a table or two over and the whole meal, I mean this was later in his life. The whole meal was a parade of people coming in to genuflect in front of him and just pay their respects. It was like

I met him when he was at bear Stearns and I felt the same way. He was a special person.

What other books are you reading? Anything else you want to mention?

So my colleague and the head of our London ops, Alan Schafferan, recommended the book The Missing Billionaires and the reason that I just started. But the reason it's interesting is it's very focused on asset allocation and mistakes and asset allocation and how much that can cost a portfolio over time. So it has a lot of parallels to the way we think about asset allocation and magnets are.

Huh really interesting. Our final two questions, what sort of advice would you give a recent college grad interest in the career in either private creditor alts, fixed income, any of the areas you specialized in.

It's what we think about for the firm. I know what I tell my kids would be, it's people on platform. You need to be around good integrist people that are great mentors, and the platform needs to be growing over time, so each seat should be more more than the person in it.

Huh. Interesting. And our final question, what do you know about the world of investing, of credit of risk management today that you wish you knew when you were first getting started thirty years or so ago.

Yeah, this may be an atypical answer, but I think about luck versus skill a lot more than I ever did before. If you make a decision today and don't have an outcome for ten years, you don't really know if you were good at it or not right, whether you won or lost. If you're able to have a much faster feedback loop now, you can really hone your skills and understand whether you're making good decisions or bad decisions.

Very interesting. I have a book for you, but I'm gonna bet you've already read it, Michael Mobison's book I have not Please, Separating skill from luck in investing, business and sports like that is right up your al that is thank you, and he's a fascinating author and really a fascinating book. I would bet you you would appreciate it.

Excellent.

Thank you David for being so generous with your time. We have been speaking with David Snyderman. He is the global head of Alternative credit and fixed income and managing partner at Magnetar, a fifteen billion dollar multi strategy, multi product alternative investment management firm. If you enjoy this conversation, well check out any of the previous five hundred or so we've had. You can find those ato Spotify, YouTube, Bloomberg,