¶ Geometric Deep Learning & Physical Symmetries
Geometric deep learning is a big part of like is a big part of the stack if for no other reason than when we talk about like modeling the physical world, that means like incorporating the symmetries that exist in the physical world. So it's like we're highly motivated to employ a lot of those methods and techniques.
But is the world written in code or do you mean exploiting the regularities in the code that seem to have some
Exploiting the regularities. No, it's it's like look, we it things are it is the world is translation invariant. The world is like rotation well, not really'cause there's gravity, but like in principle. You know, there is a principal axis, but it's certainly rotationally invariant in the XY plane. Yeah. Um and if you if you wanna have a good model of the world as it actually is, it should incorporate those features.
Build the symmetries in. Unfortunately we've got a lot of great tools that were developed over the last several years that can do
¶ Defining Agency: From Rocks to Planning
What's your view on agency?
¶ Free Energy Principle (FEP)
If I'm being you know like an FEP purist, I have to sort of say like, oh well there's no difference between an you know an agent and an object in in a very real way, or at least there's nothing structurally distinct between what how we model an agent and how we model an object. Um it's really just a question of of degrees, right? An agent is is a really sophisticated object, right? It has internal states that represent things over very long timescales.
Um it you know uh it has uh sophisticated policies that are context dependent, which is basically saying really long time scale. Um and things like that.
Yeah, you know, um b there's the kind of the philosophical highbrow notion of agency that we introduce notions of um intentionality and self causation and things like that. I mean the the really no nonsense version of an agency is it it's just It's just a thing which acts and performs some kind of computation and I guess you could almost model anything as an agent. Yeah.
Well so if i if if your definition of an agent is something that executes a policy, then anything is an agent, right? A rock is an agent, right? Every everything has you know it it's an input uh a policy is an input-output relationship. When many people talk about agents, they they're adding a few they're adding um a few additional elements that I think have a lot to do with how the policy is computed.
Right. So for example, when we think of how the difference between like us and like like really like amoebas, we we often cite things like planning. Counterfactual reasoning, goal-oriented behavior, right? We're specifying things that that um have that that are specific mean that that are all related to how it is we compute our policy. Right. They're latent variables that represent policies. Um that are uh, you know, that are compatible with like well reinforcement learning. Right. And um
And that's the defining characteristic of an agent. But you could very easily just sort of say like from an outside perspective, if you can't look at how someone or something is doing the computations, if the only thing you observe is the policy. Right, does that mean that you can never conclude that something's an agent? And I would say no, right? You'd still like to be able to conclude that this is an agent, even though the only thing I ever get to measure is its policy.
But do you think we should have some notion of the strength of an agent?
the strength of an agent or how uh y is this like a measure of agency? Is that what you or yeah. So I mean I think you could use n like notions of like transfer entropy and things like that in order to estimate like the timetable over which something is incorporating information. or the degree to which it's taken into it it exhibits a context dependent behavior and things like that. And that would be a pretty good measure.
Now, is it normative? No, it's not. It's it's a but it is a measure and you could use things like that. But at that point you're really just talking again about policy sophistication. Right. Not does it have a reward function? Like is it actually executing planning?
Yeah, I mean certainly intuitively agents to me seem to be kind of causally disconnected. Yeah, because they're planning into the future, they are not impulse response machines. They're not just, you know, part of the mass of things going on around them. They are just obviously disconnected from the locality.
So here the trick is that okay, so I've got this agent and I know exactly what it is. Right. It takes and it takes into account information. Um, it rolls out future you know, f internally, it rolls out a whole bunch of like future uh consequences of of various different actions or plans that it could take. It selects the best one and then it executes.
Right. So all of those variables, all of those variables that were that occurred inside, right, from the outside perspective, it just looked like a function transformation. Right. It it's I don't unless I unless I'm somehow going in and recording and somehow demonstrating the fact that the manner in which it is calculating its policy re you know, like involved doing those rollouts.
Right. I wouldn't be able to show that it's actually doing those rollouts. I would just be able to conclude it has a really sophisticated policy. So can you conclude that something isn't is is so so the question is how do you identify something as actually doing planning? And I think that's a really hard question, as opposed to having an incredibly sophisticated policy.
I I think my my intuition is if it feels to me that a function, a simple input output mapping can't be an agent. And in and in a way this is related to what we were talking about with grounding. You know, it it it seems that when things are physically embedded in the world then they're more likely to be agents. This functionalist idea that just a bit of computer code running on a machine, it kind of feels like that can't be an agent.
It does. So suppose I coded it up so it was doing all of that planning. It's like gets its inputs, does some crazy, like massive Monte Carlo tree search, picks the best policy possible, and then executes it. Now you don't observe any of that.
¶ Monte Carlo Tree Search
Right. Because you know it's going on, you could say, oh well it's it's clearly like executing, you know, this is it's doing planning and counterfactual reasoning. It's going on. Like look, there it is. Because you coded it, so you know it's doing it. But if you're looking at it from the outside. Right. It r uh you know, if you don't know what's happening inside, it's going you know, all you have access to is oh well here's the action that it w that it c that it did given this long series of
And so it's it's really hard to identify what you know, something as an agent per se from the outside. You kinda have to know what's going on in This by the way is why I don't think that like, you know, can you know, these sort of prediction based approaches to like AI
um are necess you know, that you could sort of say, well, it it's not really doing anything even remotely agentic unless it's executing it's doing planning and counterfactual reasons. So like your chess program is is like, oh clearly it's doing some planning and counterfactual reasons. because you know it's doing it. But um but it but you could like write yeah I could describe the exact same set of behaviors just with the policy function.
I I think the counterfactual thing is is an important feature here because we could take something which was conscious or something which had agency and we could just be able to do that.
Yes.
take a trace of the actual path which was found. And now we've just got this a reductio ad absurdum, but you know, now we now we've just got a computational trace. And that thing clearly has now lost whatever agency or consciousness it it had. So there's something about considering all of the possibilities.
Yeah. So in in my mind that is the fundamental feature of of of of an agent. Like if you can show that it's engaged in planning counterfactual reasoning and and then it's definitely an agent. My my argument is just simply that that's hard to do unless you crack it open and see what's going on in soft. Now you could take a a a pragmatic view and say, well, if the simplest computational model of the behavior, model it as if it was doing planning and counterfactual reasoning.
then you can draw an implicit conclusion that, oh yes, well, I may as well say it's an age. And that's kind of the approach that I've taken. So like one of the things that comes out of the physics discovery algorithm is that you apply it to agents and what do you get? Well you get a model. Now bear in mind I called them all objects before and I didn't change anything to make it special to an actual agent.
Right. But what I do have the ability to do because of the model is I can look at the internal state. associated with that object that I want to call an agent. And look at how sophisticated it is. Right. And that degree of sophistication is what allows me to say, oh well, I'm going to go ahead and say that like and I like the whole idea. It's a great idea. Like it's have a metric.
Right. And I'm sure it would be something that would effectively be like transfer entropy or something like that. But like we have this metric on like, well, how sophisticated were the internal states that were necessary in order to generate this output? And if it's above some threshold, we'll call it an agent. I don't like threshold. But, you know, we just sort of say a degree of agency, a degree of sophistication.
¶ The Intentional Stance
And coming back to Dennett's intentional stance, so this is that, you know, there is um a level of representation which serves as a useful explanation, even though it's not actually, you know, the the the microscopic causal graph. And Maybe we can agree that no agent can possibly be the cause of its own actions, but when there is a degree of planning sophistication for you know, macroscopically it's as if it's the cause of its own actions.
Yes. And that's why this as if phrase comes up a lot, right? I mean this it's it's important to remember that like no matter how clever your model is and no matter how clever your approach is and how clever the words are that you use to describe it, um a lot of this stuff is is is as if.
Right. This is this is the best model. Right. It's not the it's not th this is why like I I I repeat this over and over again. Grind it into the students, right? Is that that, you know, science is about like prediction and data compression. and like nothing else. And the same thing is going on here, right? You you'll never n you know, just looking at behavior, you'll never know e g for sure in any meaningful way
like whether or not it's it's just doing a function transformation or whether it's engaged in planning and counterfactual reasoning. But if your best model of it
If you sort of say, well, I tried to model as a function transformation, but goddamn it, it had a lot of parameters. Right. But then I tried to model it as something that was just doing Monte Carlo tree search on the inside and giving the answer, and that had like, you know, 40 parameters. And it's like, well, that's the model I'm going to go with, and now I'm going to call it an eight.
If we had a physical agent in the real world that was doing all of this planning and so on, would that have some kind of primacy to a computer simulation of agents that were doing all of this planning?
Oh is this is this like uh if I uploaded my brain onto a computer and didn't connect it to the world, would it still be thinking even though it's like doing all of those things? Is that the idea here or am I like?
That works. So yeah, let's say a high fidelity computer simulation of Jeff. Would would would Jeff be an agent?
No.
Wasn't expecting to say that.
'Cause I'm the agent. And if you uh uploaded no, I don't know. Um so If you r uh is do a high fidelity computer simulation and you put it in my body, then I think I would have to say it's an age. Yeah, right. If it's doing exactly the same cal I mean, this is like the standard argument, it's doing exactly the same calculations from from a purely like phenomenological perspective, it's like it's the same. It's indistinguished.
Okay, so agents need to be physical.
So I do believe that an agent needs to be physical. Absolutely. I don't believe you know I I believe you can have a model of agency and not have an agent. Right. I you know, you can put that model in a computer and run it and make predictions as to what an agent would do. You st and it might even be a hundred percent correct, but I still wouldn't call it an agent. But again, this is like getting into philosophy and like philosophy frustrates the Bayesian because Philosophy is not probabilistic.
Right. Philosophy is really about drawing clear lines and distinctions. And in my world those don't really exist, right? There's everything has an error bar. You know, all of i there isn't a clear delineation between you know, uh you know, an object and an agent. It's really you know, in from this modeling perspective, it's really just a question of degrees and philosophy is terrible at handling questions of degrees.
My friend Keith, he he's a big fan of um computability theory. And and he thinks that an agent is basically, you know, like a type of computation and it has access to ambient state and it can take action and there's this kind of like cybernetic loop. And for him the strength of the agency in the system is the compute type that the thing is doing, right? So if it's if it's a finite state autometer, then it's a weak agent. If it's a Turing machine, it's a strong agent.
Yeah, to the degree of sophistication of the compute.
Pretty much. Yeah. D does that ring true to you?
I mean that if if you were gonna ma if you forced me, like uh w you know, at the point of a gun to put a measure on agency, it'd probably look a lot like that. Yes.
Jeff, let's talk about energy based models. Sure. So um uh Jan Lacoon, he had a monograph out, I think in two thousand and six talking about this. Oh yeah.
¶ A Tutorial on Energy-Based Learning (LeCun 2006)
when you fit your neural network to data, you know, via gradient descent. Right, then you have written an energy function in weight space. And you are follow and you are following it to its energetic minimum. You know, the the advantage of using an energy based uh taking an energy based approach as opposed to taking, say, a straight up like function approximation approach is that an energy based model comes with something that's kind of like an inductive prior.
Right. It it basically, you know, energy-based models, you know, uh if you're just doing function approximation, you're basically saying there's any mapping from X to Y, X is by inputs, Y is by any mapping is out there, I just want to figure out what it is. Right. Now in an i you know, in an energy based model, right, you're you're you're you're effectively placing.
on what that input-output relationship can be. I like thinking about the distinction between an energy-based model and a and a traditional sort of feedforward neural network has to do with where your cost function is applied. Right. So in a in a traditional neural network, you take in your inputs, you got your outputs, and the cost function is just a function of the inputs and the outputs. And the only thing that you're optimizing is the weight.
In an energy-based model, there's another thing that that your cost function operates on, and that's something, one of the internal states of your model. And as a result, like in order to figure out what the best, you know, the best approach is, right, you actually have to do two minimizations.
One that that finds the energetic minimum associated with the the the part of the the cost function that operates on the internal states, like the hidden nodes of your network. Right. And then one that is the prediction that is your like effective prediction error.
Um this is this is very much consistent with the approach that a Bayesian would take, right? You have a you have a a a prior probability distribution, which gives you an energy function over every single latent variable in your model, and you are optimizing it with respect to all latent.
So you take a probabilistic progeny. Good examples of this are like a variational autoencoder. A variational autoencoder, I think, is the gr is is the best example of the most commonly used energy-based model out there. Why? Because you have an encoder network, you have a decoder network.
¶ Auto-Encoding Variational Bayes (VAE)
Right. And your cost function is based on the difference between inputs and outputs, right? So that's just like a that's fine, that's still a regular no but it also is how how Gaussian in it well it depends on what flavor of VA. But you also have some c uh some some part of your cost function um is a function of the actual repr internal representation. Right in a traditional VAE it's it's how Gaussian is it? You want that internal representation to be as Gaussian as possible.
If it's a VQVAE, then it's like mixture of Gaussians. But it's still like a cost function that is applied on the internal states as well as on the inputs and outputs.
Very cool. So a VAE is is a fairly canonical example of an energy based model. And what you were saying about the I mean you know, the whole DL world is obsessed with test time inference at the moment. And in a way that that is a step towards what you're talking about. So
Yeah, you're treating a certain weights of your model. Right. I mean that well, yeah, you're treating some of the weights of your model as if they're latent variables. Right. Because when you you when you show a new input, right, you're allowed to change some of the weights without looking at the output. Right. And so what are you doing? Well you're treating the weights as light.
Now, I think that like which which makes it a great trick, in my opinion. It's like, oh great, like yeah, they're they're they're they're they're moving in the direction of energy-based models. I love it. The only thing I don't like about test time training is the vast majority of the training that is done. So in a traditional energy-based model,
You always find the minimum with respect to the latent variables, right? These extra weights that you know, which in this case, which in the case of test time training is the you know, the subset of weights that you're allowed to to change during you know during test time. When you do the training for a traditional energy-based model, you're allowed to make those changes right throughout the entire course of training.
The way that we're often doing test time training these days is we just do regular old neural network learning, like we don't do and and then and then and then finally when it comes to when we get to the deployment phase, then we suddenly turn on Right. Th these additional latents which are basically some of the weights of the network.
And we do additional an additional bit of learning at that point. This seems monumental now, again, not an expert here, right? But this seems unwise to me. And the reason it seems unwise is because you didn't train the original network with that on. Right. You trained it as in a completely supervised way. Yes. Now I'm sure that people have s are aware of this and have it's been addressed in the literature, but I'm not personally aware of that. I don't think that's how it's used in practice.
We should also introduce this term transduction. So my definition of transduction is that you're actually doing search or optimization as a function of the test samples. Like I interviewed uh Clement Bonnet, he had a VAE on ARC, you know, searching latent spaces and he actually um searched through the decoder as a function of the test sample. Yeah. And because these models, they are maximum likelihood estimators, right? Which means they're always giving you a kind of smoothed out average.
And there's so much information in the test sample. Let's just riff on the relationship between energy-based models and and Bayesian inference. So of course they have this advantage that you don't need to do this for expensive and tractable normalization test.
Yes.
Yes, tell me about that.
My take on it is that an energy-based model and a Bayesian model have a lot in common, right? In many ways, like energy I mean well literally in physics, right, energy is like log prob energy is log probability. Now, of course, there's a normalization ca you know, factor that you don't need to worry about if you're just doing if you're just minimizing energy.
And so the difference between uh you know, like w which is sort of like s you know, in a Bayesian framework, that's like saying, well, you know, I'm not actually gonna treat some of these latent variables i in a probabilistic way. I'm just gonna do maximum or map estimation.
on some of my variables and just be okay with that. And that's one way to interpret the relationship between an energy-based model and a properly Bayesian model. There's there's a happy medium here though, right? And the happy medium is you can still treat it.
As if it's, you know, you know, you don't have to just minimize the energy function, but you can calculate the curvature down there too, do a Laplace approximation, and call yourself a Bayesian again, right? Yes, there is more computation involved, but we've got a lot of great t tricks for making that totally tractable.
What's the relationship between the free energy in the free energy principle and the energy and energy based models? Uh
Uh regularization term, I think is the short answer, right. Um no so so uh the difference between uh and and and uh if you're being very, very very pedantic, the difference between an energy-based uh you know minimizing energy and minimizing free energy is that free energy has this additional entropy penalty term.
Now, if you're just doing maximum likelihood estimation, if you're minimizing your energy function with respect to some particular well just well, let's pretend we're only we're at one variable. Um, and I'm just gonna like get a point estimate and call it a day, do like, you know, some kind of map estimation to get to get that that one thing.
There's not that big of a difference, right? Because you're you're not there is no probability distribution over the latent that allows you to compute that regularization term. But that's the only difference. It's it's are you regularizing or not? Is uh I think the easiest way to think.
So Lacoon is a big advocate of uh Jeppa. So these joint embedding prediction architectures using this non-contrastive learning where essentially the the learning objective is is comparing the um the the the latent.
¶ JEPA (Joint Embedding Prediction Architecture)
Yeah.
Okay, so what does JEPA stand for?
Yeah.
And prediction architecture. There we go. So what's the joint embedding bit about? Well, the joint embedding bit about is is you know is well I'm gonna take my inputs, I'm gonna take my outputs, and I'm gonna embed them in some space, right? And then I'm gonna learn a prediction between the two embeddings.
And that's a great idea. It's a great idea because it has some of the flavor of what we would like to get out of our models. In many situations, we're not interested in predicting every single pixel on the image. we wanna get, you know, maybe something that's a little more gestalt, a little more high level, a little more conceptual understanding of what's going on. And so emphasizing the goal of predicting every single pixel, which is what's typically done in generative modeling right now.
You know, might lose some of the power, the abstractive power of some of the networks. And so like, let's do so so the whole point of JEPA, as I understand it, I'm sure there are other points. um is that uh is that you're gonna take the you're you're gonna you're gonna compress your inputs and compress your outputs and then do all the learning in this compressed space.
Love it, right? Science is about prediction and data compression. Let's make that compression explicit on the front end and the back end. The downside of this approach is that is it is it it doesn't work out of the box, right? Because it's very easy to find a compression. Or an embedding of the inputs and an embedding of the outputs for which prediction is perfect. Yeah. Which is to basically make both of them zero.
And so you have to do some other things. Other tricks need to be employed in order to make it
Yes. Yes. I remember Lacoon was talking about this. So there was there's the the traditional contrastive method which is From it's it's kind of Hinton's idea apparently, of like the negative sampling and and whatnot. And and that's very expensive because you actually have to do lots and lots of sampling and this non tr non contrastive thing.
This is this by the way is what he should have won the Nobel Prize for.
Right.
In my opinion. Yes. Because the whole the whole point of of of of of the wake sleep algorithm and contrastive divergence was that oh, it's actually biologically plausible. Right. It was a w it was it was an end run around the need to do backprop and that's what made it so clever and interesting.
¶ The Wake-Sleep Algorithm
my opinion. Lacoon is a big fan of this non contrastive thing where you work in the the latent space. There are many different algorithms that do this. We we had a whole load of shows all about non contrastive learning. There's things like uh V Craig and BYOL and Barlow twins and there's there's an entire thread of research all around that.
And in many different ways what they're trying to do is avoid this mode collapse problem that you're talking about. And they use different forms of regularization
There's an old school way of accomplishing the same thing. And that is that is to to um do all of your is it's to it's called pre-processing. Right. And this is this is something that a lot of people do. You take your data and in fact we do this all the time with the with with with like vision language models, right? So we want to do s we want to use an LLM and we want to predict images. So what do we do? Well the first thing we have to do is tokenize the image.
Right. And so what do we do? We run a VA that we do the pre-processing. And we do it by the pre-processing step is completely independent. Right, from the actual algorithm that's gonna be the be be be tasked with solving the problem of interest. Um and you know That's not something that we necessarily have to stick with, right? It would be very nice
if there was a way uh i i if there was a way of like again, well uh jointly. Ha we're getting right back to JEP again. What we'd like to do is we'd like to choose our pre processing algorithm in a manner that that the it you know you know uh not a priori, not do it first. We like to choose the preprocessor that works the best in in this space.
And I think that that's the ultimate motivation for a lot of this work is that it's like what's the right embedding? One of my favorite tricks, like of course I you know, I pre process the VA's all the time. In fact it's when you know, the second w every time someone hands me a new neural data set, the first thing I do and I'm
You can
I'm I'm not ashamed to admit. I run PCA on it and pass it through a VAE and then sort of take a look, right? It's the first thing you do with your data because it gives you a good idea of what the signal to noise ratio is in the data set itself. Yes. And then I yeah, and then what do I do? I subsequently do most of my analysis right in that discovered embedding space. Um and there's I I I I don't see a huge problem with that from a purely pragmatic perspective, but it it it's certainly cleaner.
Right, to to have a single algorithm and approach and not just be stringing these sort of things together in an ad hoc way. There's, you know, when when doing PCA, PCA is a really great example of this. There's a failure mode for principal component analysis.
Um, which is actually really common in neural data because principal component analysis basically says, well, where's the most variability? Okay, I'm gonna worry about that. And then all the stuff that's not varying very much, I'm just gonna throw it away. Right. It's just like look, you know, dimensions in which there's low variability are not important. Well, it turns out that in neural data, the dimensions in which there's very little variability are some of the most important dimensions.
Yes. And so pre-processing with PCA runs a risk of throwing out the most valuable information in your data set. Yes. And so there's a lot of wisdom in in in jointly, right? Pre i in in jointly fitting your pre processing model as well as your inference and prediction.
I mean on this subject of not throwing things away, um JEPA and non contrastive learning, i it's part of this bigger field of self supervised learning. And we want to learn representations that maintain fidelity and richness. And Lacoon's hypothesis is that when you do something like supervised learning with, you know, some particular downstream task in mind.
um the neural network gets wise and what it does is it kind of discards all of the the the l the long tail stuff that aren't relevant for that particular task. So when you train these models, what you're trying to do is sort of maintain enough ambiguity So that it it compresses the information but it also maintains enough fidelity to work broadly for different things.
Yes. And that that and that is a laudable goal, right? And and I certainly share it, right? The last thing you wanna do is I mean, you know, fortunately like networks are so big we don't really run the risk of of like uh overfitting so as much as we used to. Um, but the last thing you want to do is throw i is is is train your network to toss information that you might need down the road.
Um that said, like the vast majority of what you know the brain does, just like these neural networks, is decide what information is currently task irrelevant. But that's all the more reason to do things in a self-supervised or unsupervised way, right? Because you're basically not telling it this is the important stuff, you know, you're not telling it like what's all task relevant.
So um I interviewed uh Cholet about the version two of the Arc Challenge. And one thing that struck me is I I think of intelligence as being multidimensional. So version one got saturated. The ARC was actually really amazing because it's the only intelligence bench benchmark that has survived for five years before being defeated. You know, since the advent of these thinking models it has been defeated very quickly. But
They're working on version three and there'll be version four, there'll be version five. Will there always just be something left over?
That sounds like another philosophical so yes is my answer. There will always be there will always be something left over. In the sense that like, you know, we you know w we we ha we have this this has been the trajectory things have been going for a really long time.
Right. It's sort of like we get algorithms that do amazing new cool things and then someone comes along and says, Yeah, but it can't build me it it can't pull a rabbit out of a hat. Right. And then and then of course what does someone do? They oh they They figure out the a new training protocol, a slightly different architecture, or they just train it to pull rabbits out of hats and then suddenly it can't.
And then someone proposes a new challenge and a new challenge and a new challenge. And it's always this game of like one-upsmanship. So the question becomes, well what's the point at which there are no more new challenges? And I'm not entirely certain we're ever gonna get there, right? Um it may very well be the case that we get uh you know, these sort of
algorithms that are capable of replicating the complete suite of human behaviors and then someone will come up with some criticism like, yeah, but it's not really doing X. It's just faking it, right? This is just the direction things go because people really do think they're important.
Yeah.
Yes. I do think that is so so I think that one of the most critical missing elements right now is some form of continual learning. Right. You at the end of the day you really want an algorithm that that doesn't just learn on the training that on the training set and then just gets deployed. You want something that that that runs around in the world and comes across things that it doesn't understand. Right, and then is able to incorpor to build, you know, append its model in some sense.
Right. So this is like the is you know, and there are some approaches that it's all based on like Bayesian nonparametrics and Diersley processed priors and stuff like that, where you you sort of see something that's surprising or unique or different, something you didn't expect. And it causes you to say, I need to turn learning on because I gotta figure this out.
That is an absolutely critical element that we need to be developing. We are developing that. And it turns out that that's one of the nice things about this sort of object-centered. Physics discovery thing is because it's object centered, if it comes across a new situation that it does not understand, it is capable of instantiating a completely brand new object just to explain this new situation.
Continually learning agents can acquire new knowledge autonomously and and the whole you know, the whole thing just learns more knowledge. But intelligence feels different. It it it it feels like it in in the system that we've been describing, the intelligence is the way we're implementing the you know, the the Bayesian updates and and, you know, actually building the algorithms.
That's a very good question. Something that would be closer to true artificial intelligence than what we currently have. Would be capable of building models on the fly to deal with new situations, to taking things that it knows about, right, and combining them in new and different ways. Um uh there are approaches that have some of that aspect to it. Like G flow nets from but like Bengio stuff is like is like a great example.
of something that at least in principle is a generative model of generative models, right? It's sort of like, oh, like you know, I might actually need a new node. Like it's time to create a new latent variable because like like the current set's just not cutting the mustard anymore. Those are things that that that I think are hallmarks of of true intelligence. I don't want to ever make the statement, as soon as it's got that, it's truly intelligent. I will never, ever, ever say that.
Um but I do think that that is a a a a critical component that that needs to be present, right? Is the ability to generate new models on the fly to deal with novel situations and data. Um most of that, you know, w um you know, as well as the ability to um uh combine old models, previous models in new and interesting ways. This is actually how the brain evolved, right? We started out with like um
you know, really simple brains and there were different regions and they solved sort of different problems. And what eventually happened as we evolved is that these different regions of the brain learned to communicate with each other in new ways. And through that communication acquired new abilities, right? And then eventually evolved into in, you know, you know, um new capabilities and things like that.
Right. I I often like to point out to the the ol uh I think olfaction is like the the sense that's not studied nearly enough. It's an incredibly old part of the brain. Um and arguably, right, it's the it's the first part of the brain that evolved the ability to do proper like associative processing. Right. Odor the odor unlike visual space, right, where there's translation symmetries and and all that sort of stuff and things are smooth. Olfactory space that does not exist, right? It's it's
Really, really, really combinatorial and complicated. And the part of the brain that evolved to solve the olfactory problem arguably is the part that evolved into our frontal cortex. Don't quote me on that. There's a lot of disagreement there. That's just my take.
Um, but it certainly has a lot of the features that we associate with associative cortex, right? It is it wow, I just said g got like six uses six three different uses of the word associate in that sentence. But but y I think you see what I mean, right? It it um It was all about like taking old capabilities, right? Combining combining, you know, simple models and modules to create something that was more complex.
And then over time, right. So so that was what made the brain work, right? It was all about taking little things that work. and combining them in new and different ways in order to evolve, you know, uh effectively an emergent, you know, emergent properties, emergent calc, you know, computational abilities and an emergent understanding of the world in which we live.
And I do think that like what what you know, if when we get to the point where we start really saying, oh, this is actually truly intelligent, it's going to have that feature. It's going to have the ability To have a m- It's gonna have a modular description of the world, and it's gonna have the ability to combine those modules in a way that creates a more sophisticated understanding.
It's like Legos, right? I can, you know, the the Lego bricks all connect in certain ways and I can build like all sorts of new and amazing things that were never built before. right, out of them. That's a capability that we have. And that's the essence of like creativity. It's why I refer to systems engineering as like the thing we really want our our our AI models to be able to do.
Collective intelligence is a bit different. We we have this plasticity, right? We can adapt our behavior day by day. We might see some kind of meta learning or some kind of change in our organization dynamics. You know, maybe some agents will specialize and It it might be an existence proof of this kind of recursive super intelligence that we're talking about
Yeah, I do I I I think that's absolutely correct, right? Is that you know, so the specialization is great. In fact I would argue that specialization is how we got all of this, right? And this was I'm pointing at London in case you there was some confusion there. Um right. It was it was really about, you know, the interconnected, highly specialized intelligences that are people.
and their ability to learn how to to to work together that that uh you know gave rise to the technological revolution. The brain is the same way, right? It's i in my view. It's highly specialized little modules or agents that are capable of of of uh of of um being repurposed, reused, um, capable of communicating with one another in order to solve really complicated problems. But there's always a benefit to specialization.
I don't believe in like like AGI. AGI seems like a bit of a a misnomer to me. What we really want is not artificial general intelligence, we want collect we want collective specialized intelligence.
What about scientific discovery? Do you think that we could I mean you know, what would the world look like when we could discover new drugs, we could discover new knowledge in science?
You know, right now the way that we're doing that is is um largely focused on summarizing vast troves of data and looking for correlations that are present in it. Um I think the next major milestone um in this trajectory is is experimental design. Right, not just oh well here's here here's some correlations you you may not have seen because they're really small and this is what computers are good at. They're really good at identifying small but highly relevant correlations.
Um and uh the next step of course is design i i is constructing a system that tests these hypotheses explicitly, right, and generates the experiments that will identify like that will the fill in the gaps of our knowledge. And all of this I believe can in fact be automated in a very sensible way. I d I d you know, I d I don't see any like major obstacles to automating empirical inquiry.
Other than we probably want to place some safety constraints when we start letting them work when the we start letting the AIs run the labs, right? Because you never know. It's sort of you always have this AI where it's like, well, you know, the most effective experiment to determine if this is correct is to set off a nuke. And that that would be
Yes. Right. So pure empirical inquiry, right, does run risks like that. But I think that that's not not not the biggest issue. I think what we need to do is we just had need to have a nice concise framework for saying like, Oh look, you know Like I'll give you an example. So we had this we we we had this um a problem that popped up a while back.
A gentleman we were talking to is is um is you've got these laun y you know, you've got these robots and the robots see something they've never seen before. And in an idea, you know, so a robot is like running around, it comes across like a beach ball, never seen a beach ball in its entire life. And what you'd like is you'd like the robot to know how to figure out that it's a beach ball and to figure out what its properties are.
And if you tell the robot like like if you see something new, just stop. Right, you're kind of then that's that's no good. Right. What you really want to do is you want to figure out a relatively non-invasive procedure for the robot to like poke d do what a child would do.
What does a kid do when they see a beach ball, right? They run up and they poke it and they say, oh, right, yeah, and then it moved and and it it actually learned it actually experiments with its environment for the purposes of identifying the properties of the objects that exist in it.
Um now I do think we probably want to test this out virtually before it's deployed in the real world because you never know. It might very well be that the optimal experim experiment is to run up and kick it as hard as you possibly can. Um, and we we certainly want to avoid that. But like something along those lines. Something you know, a robot that is able to test the theories that it has um about how things work.
in an online way and learn from those results in an online way is definitely part of the goal.
Looking forward, what do you think the future will look like when we have more autonomous AIs among us? A lot of people worry about enfeeb enfeeblement, loss of control, you know, it making us dumb, all of this kind of stuff. I do
I do worry about AI making us dumb, right? I mean offloading uh offloading your thinking onto a machine, which is something that that that that AI allows is is is is a potentially a big problem. I mean I I don't really want to have a situation where humans are reduced to like val they're they're just review to reduced to like value function selectors. They're just basically going, Oh no, I don't like that outcome. Like do this instead.
I do want to see a future where where where we have an AI that actually improves our understanding of the world. And simply automating everything runs the risk that you specified, right? It runs the risk of people becoming couch potatoes that just watch T V and occasionally say, like, yeah, you know, these chips are no good. Um uh that seems like a bad outcome to me. Um I worry less about that, I think, than some because people are remarkably adapted.
Right. I mean I you know, you they have all these arguments about like, oh, you know, this new technology comes along and it's gonna completely destroy this way of life and you know, and that's gonna be awful for people and it is maybe in the short term. Um, you know, I think of like tractors, right? Or just go back how many hundred years do you have to go back when like ninety-nine percent of people were involved in agriculture and now it's like what two?
Right. I consider that a solid improvement, right? Because it allowed the rest of us to d it allowed us to do a bunch of other things that we find more satisfying that are more interesting. It allowed us to like, you know, like I can read, you know.
Spend some time reading a book, don't have to labor in the fields all day. Um, that's the future that I sort of see, and that's the future that I hope for. Is that is is one in which You know, all of these artificial agents running around and doing things autonomously are there to free us up.
to pursue more interesting and more, you know, you know, to improve ourselves in in in in in more interesting ways. But at the end of the day, it's just another technology, you know, at least initially it'll just be another technology like the tractor. Um now a hundred years from now, who knows?
What will the value of work be if the AIs can do everything and there's nothing left for us to do?
I don't think that it will ever be the case that the AIs can do everything. Like I said, the future I worry about is one where like it's you know, the the sole role of people is like sitting around like making sure the AIs aren't aren't going rogue and and and things like that. Um which I don't consider a good outcome. I would really like to see human improvement. You know, I I I envision a future of I don't know, this like
cybernetic transhumanism, if I'm gonna go sci-fi on this, right? Where where, you know, the technology and us evolve together in a way that's beneficial for both. That's the goal. Um, you know, are there these dystopic possibilities where like, oh, well, what are humans in a world where well what are they? What are what are humans in a world where everything can be done by a robot? Yeah. You know, that's that's a good question. And th that's and at the end of the day, right.
they end up just becoming like reward function selects. Right. They end up just sort of saying, Oh, I don't like this and I do like that and they're basically, you know, I mean, you end up with a c is another nightmare scenario. I don't like talking about these dystopian futures.'Cause honestly I think people are too clever.
And I think people are too motivated and people are too interested in how the world really works and that people are too interested in actually understanding things, that they will never stop, that they that AI will become a partner, not an adversary or a crush. And that's that's that's what I think will happen because that's but that that's a statement more about my belief about humans than it is about my belief about the development of AI.
You know, I am a techno optimist, if you will, not a not a pessimist. I I believe that we will find a way to adapt to an ever changing world as we have done for millions of years, including one that includes technology that alleviates most of our labor.
certainly my parents don't understand anything about it, but by the same token policymakers don't understand anything about it and there are People saying AI is gonna kill everyone and there's people making negative arguments, there's people making positive arguments. So there's a bit of a fog of war now because there are so many people saying different things about AI. How should they make sense of all of it?
Well we are now well outside my area of expertise, so I'm just gonna say that before I say anything else. Um AI is developing very quickly. But I am much more concerned about what people will do with the new technology than I am with what the technology will do all by itself. I don't have the this big concern about I don't really believe that like, you know, Skynet's gonna take over or the internet's gonna suddenly become conscious and kill us all.
Right. Um, in part because, you know, AI is not that advanced, but also because we are telling A we you know, we are still in the position where we specify the goals of the system. And that will likely continue for a very long time. And it will always be the case that these systems, you know, will can be you know w
are are subject to review. We will always keep an eye on them. They will always at least initially be be be released in relatively restricted domains and where we're where we're test where where we're keeping a a close eye on what it is that they are and are not doing. So I don't worry too much about like the going rogue. I worry a lot more about somebody who
building, you know, it's sort of like a virus, which we already have to deal with. Like somebody builds like some insane virus and like takes down the internet. I'm more worried about malicious human actors than I am malicious AI actors because at the end of the day, all of these algorithms, they simply do what they are told. Right, we train them, we tell them here's your objective fun.
As long as we are specifying the objective function and we understand the objective function, we're probably going to be okay. I think the safest way to deal with AI concerns is to tell people, hey, look. This AI is just doing what we told it to. We train we we you know we we set it up to make really good predictions and to achieve these outcomes. Now is it dangerous to like specify these outcomes without being very, very, very careful? Yes it is.
Right. That's this is the whole like hey Skynet endworld hunger and it kills all humans. That that's a that is that that is a real possibility. But whose fault was that? The fault was the person who like was very, very naively specified their goals. There are in fact relatively straightforward ways to specify the reward function that that don't run that risk nearly as badly.
And the best one is so are you familiar with like maximum entropy inverse reinforcement learning? I like to call it active inference because it's really similar. Um and so there what you're doing is you're basically observing someone's policy and then you're trying to do a maximum entropy um model you're you're doing maximum entropy model on the reward function itself.
Um at the end of the day, what what ends up happening when you do this is this is why it's like basically just like active emperors. You get a reward function in a so you have some, you know.
organism or whatever and you're trying to do this for it and and it it's got some stationary distribution over actions and outcomes, right? It's inputs and outputs of a stationary distribution. That becomes your reward function. Like not directly, there's some math involved, but basically your reward function is a function of the steady state distributions over actions and outcomes.
So we could do this, right? We could take the current we could take the current manner in which humans are making decisions. And we could write down
Right. What's the stationary d what what is the current estimate of the stationary distribution of our actions and outcomes? So this would include things like everyone's getting you know, you know, this number of people are going hungry, this you know, and and you know, all the stats that describe like the inputs and outputs to our policy make you know, to our policy distribution.
Um and then we could just ask an AI Your reward function is the one that results in the same outcome that we currently have. Right, on average. And it would execute it and it would and and to the extent that it works, right, it it it it would it would ultimately result in a in an AI algorithm that just sort of is like mimicking human behavior, right? Or it's at least achieving the same outcome that we were achieving before.
Now here's the safe way to like improve the situation. You don't say endworld hunger, right? You perturb that distribution over outcomes, right? And just just over outcomes a little bit. And then you evaluate the consequence. Right. In the reward, in an empirically estimated reward function, right, rather than just sort of specifying one by hand, because that's the dangerous thing.
Jeff, thank you so much for joining us today.
It's my pleasure.
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