John Spencer: US can force open Strait of Hormuz if it decides to

arguments around was the war worth it? Was it a victory? What did d what did it achieve? Did it strengthen Iran? Does did it weaken Iran? Where do we go from here? Who better to talk about this than an old friend of the show, uh an old friend of the Daily Briefing as well, uh John Spencer, one of the uh preeminent experts in orbit urban warfare and warfare in general. John, good to see you again.

So that is the uh the American military assessment of what has been accomplished. We also heard Prime Minister Netanyahu. last night in his attempt to color the way this war is being uh will be seen, as saying that uh Israel pushed off the ballistic missile threat, the nuclear threat, and now Israel is stronger than ever. Iran is weaker than ever. And we also had White House press sec secretary Caroline Levitt say explicitly that this was a victory for the United States.

When you take an when you assess the entirety of this 39 days of fighting, does victory come into the conversation for you? How are you seeing the results of this war at this point when we're in the beginning of the ceasefire phase?

You listed what the the Joint Chief of Staff, General Kane, listed. Um the CENTCCOM commander, Admiral Cooper this morning said, um a generational military victory. Uh but these are achievements Um even though what General Kane listed, and I would love your opinion, isn't the the whole picture to It's y a unique aspect of needing not talking points, but needing consumable information uh and measures. Right. But we if you were to look at each of the individual programs

Um which I would assess the war, right? Victory or not cannot be assessed. Just period. As soon as we start talking victory in my opinion, then you have if. Yeah, the Straits of Hamooza opened if the nuclear program ends, if this or that. Um but in the progress of the war, I would assess it against and I and I would love your opinion about the clarity in um Israel's government positions since the beginning on February

uh twenty eighth, uh what the goals were. I've I've been on a lot of shows having to clarify Th almost the uh insanity, the surreal reality that no matter how many times the President of the United States, the Secretary of War, who who Department of State says here are the four goals of the war and th that's what we will measure success and then there'll be a lot of more

discussed, especially in interview questions and everything. And I know y you uh do a lot of interviews, but if the four goals and sometimes the words change, which does matter, Um, since February twenty eighth we're to destroy the missile supply and industrial base, to destroy the navy, to destr to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and to um ensure that the proxy program does not continue. Like

Depending on what day it was, the four goals were it might interchange, destroy to eliminate, or insure to another word. And those sometimes matter for assessment, but If we look at the four goals, of course missiles are easy to talk about, right? So those numbers of how much of the missile supply, um, how much did they have before, you've covered, of course, in the 12 day war, what were the estimates.

Um, and these are all, of course, open source and t estimates versus what has been done in this 30 plus days. I would broaden the conversation like, okay, if we're gonna talk Missile, Navy, Air Force, uh proxy program, nuclear program, then let's be honest with even Israel listing all of the

sites that it hit during the war that are parts of the program, right? The parts of the missile program like the the manufacturing base, the where you get your rocket fuel, where you get the steel to make a rocket, things like that. That I would assess, of course, and this is where people are like, okay, yeah, fine, tactical victory, not a strategic victory.

I mean, there's no way you could argue that Israel and the United States have not achieved a resounding military victory over the Iranian military. Of course, war is the pursuit of political goals, right? So this would go into even the assessment, which I didn't even mention of the complete elimination of the existing political and military leadership, which does matter in war and I don't care what people say about, you know, decapitation strikes don't work.

Um, you can't argue if you put up the the diagrams and the the the wire diagram charts of what the Israel mostly but the Israel and the United States have done to eliminate political and military leaders Which again, hold and see what that the output of that is, what is the result of those eliminations. Is it for the good or for the worse?

But you can't say that the United States and Israel haven't been historically effective at that strategic level, because if you talk strategic leaders, then these are of course strategic goals. to eliminate at least their thinking about the problem set. And we could argue, well will will that lead to a change, which is the wait and see. At this very moment that we're talking, everybody is jumping to

Victory or defeat. And and I don't speak for anybody in administration. Y you know this. I don't do I do war but I don't do politics, which is its own oxymoron. Uh but N anybody who's saying victory or defeat at this moment um is doing it for a reason. Even if you were to say for some reason that it all comes down to the Straits of Hormuz and a nuclear program. Okay, well that's not true and against the four goals, but let's go there. We don't know. Um we don't know behind the scenes why the

w a certain military or force was put in different military locations. I I wrote this article that did very well listing very common sense options the United States and Israel could take and they didn't. And everybody says, well, they didn't because they can't. Like opening the streets. Well, they didn't open it because they can't.

I th that's not not a true statement. And if if the US military and Israel, especially combined, want to do something, they've shown whether it's to go get a downed pilot deep in enemy territory.

or to you know whatever it is, the nuclear program to hit it a depth nobody thought was possible, all these things. They can, but there's a reason that they aren't, whether it's a geopolitical uh economic reason, whether it's a who you're dealing with now, the talks that are happening behind the scenes, and lastly, I know that's a long a long answer for a very uh short question in the beginning, is we don't even know Who is the v decision makers in Iran at this moment?

Who are the people negotiating as we as you know, either the foreign minister is saying one thing, the president's saying another, uh IRGC public statements are saying another, and then there's this whole ten point plan, five point plan, fifteen point plan thing. We just don't know. And I come with a bit of as you do, experience and humble pie on going, we don't know.

Israel was able to go where they wanted in Gaza. And what did it add up to right now? Well Hamas still has their weapons, uh they still control almost every single Gaza, and we have this plan in place, which if implemented would equal victory, but Hamas

you know, even last week said we're not going to give up our weapons. I look at the north. I go to Lebanon and I was astounded by the twenty twenty-four operation, how how well it went, how what Kzblah agreed to when the twenty twenty four ceasefire. And there's a pro and anti-Hizbolah government in place. And then what does it come down to? Hezbollah rebuilds and is making the north almost unlivable.

And now I look at Iran and it to me I see a pattern here that Israel, or maybe it's just this government, knows how to how to start a war very well. knows how to uh achieve unthinkable things, unprecedented things. I think so impressive that it's almost expected now of Israel to be able to hit any enemy leader wherever it wants.

And in the end, it gets to these US-backed or sometimes US-imposed ceasefires that turn into just this long reality, and then we have more promises that Israel will go back to war that if it needs to, and it never does. So that's kind of the mood I'm in right now. That's what I wrote yesterday. Um and I think that's a that reflects a lot of Israeli thinking.

with all of this tactical excellence and operations that everyone agrees must happen, I don't think many Israelis are saying, you know, why do we go to war on Iran? But why are is Israel and now Israel and the US? We'll see, but it seems like if this pattern holds up in Iran Why do we have another case where we get stuck in this kind of ceasefire before everything is achieved on the ground and ultimately uh the seeds of the next war are planted? That's how I see it.

of October sixth is not the Hamas of today. You're right, the control is still there. Some arms are still there, but they've been cut off from ever being resupplied. Lebanon equally, um there the deterrence factor, the capability factor of course You know the idea that the goal was never to destroy Hezbollah at that point.

um and what it would take. Same thing with Iran, um, the capabilities that Iran had before. This isn't mowing the grass per se. These are strategic paradigm shifts in my opinion, um, that nobody could have imagined before October sixth. So I look at it as a One is that this ideal that um the history of war you can have this certainty and finality um and what happens. You're right on the Israel never being allowed to win a war in its history. You know, somebody steps in and says,

For all these reasons, we're tell we're saying you have to stop. That that's a historical fact that it of course you could argue as well. Um, and that's not right, but ultimately each one of those campaigns you discuss will be assessed. upon the end result, none of them were actually declared over. Not the Gaza war with the you know, the the the

supposed um peace plan, not the agreement between Lebanon and Israel, um and the movement that was done between from the Lebanese government and military on Hezbollah. Of course never not enough, um complex and then the same thing with Iran.

Um on a slightly different view, if you were to ask me, laser, is Israel safer today than it was on October sixth? I I just from a anybody's ability to wage war, whether it's a proxy army, a proxy or terrorist state, um, is a combination of their means and will. Um from that perspective, I c I d I d I would debate, and if you want to, we can, that Israel is much stronger today than it was on October sixth.

Uh, Iran is much weaker. The Ring of Fire, all of the strength of its proxies. Um, its allies who didn't show up for it versus Israel's allies. Well of course we can talk about the quarter public opinion, but th those who actually um joined Israel in defending Israel, Arab nations to the United States doing an historic, never before joint operation like this, side by side, Israel demonstrating to the entire Middle East that it is essentially

a military superpower in the region by being able to provide almost the exact same capabilities. Of course there's some that they just don't have and they haven't pursued with the United States. I just don't get a I I absolutely um for me I take a wait and see on all of all of different engagements. I also go back to October 6th, whether it's the rocket diplomacy where anybody can shoot a rocket at Israel and they pretty much gotta take it.

Um that that's gone. And again, the ability for like you said to kill leaders um and what that means on well then we're just gonna destroy you and they don't have that capability. That doesn't mean they're not gonna continue it. But even if we just look at Iran today, it does not have the capabilities that it did, the means to wage war against Israel sp very specifically. Nor does we could argue, well, does it have the will to do it anymore? And this is the you know, we

as of what we're talking, people already jumping to the end before even the dust of a single bomb cloud settles. We don't know what's going to happen with the n the d the deal, what are the terms of the deal, and we don't know and Um, I would argue strongly. We don't know what's going to happen to the regime.

I've argued strongly you didn't ask me that this was not a regime change war. I don't know if you think for um Israel's government it was, but the United States, I mean President Trump had to make it crystal clear This is I never said this was a regime change war. It is not. And yes, they could come to if they agree to these terms, the same, you know, theocracy, Islamic regime, um, saying all the things that they they want to say.

can still ha will still be in power, but that doesn't mean the goals weren't achieved.

Uh so it seems like there was some much more hope on the Israeli side that this would end differently in terms of the Iranians or or maybe even the Kurdish groups rising up.

And it all of this, it is actually if you look at what Israel was doing specifically versus the United States, who was destroying military means and will as to do things, to be able to do things, Israel was attacking all of those levers that the regime would ever use.

to oppress the population and to survive. So you can't say that Israel Israel said these I can't, I wouldn't say that Israel said these things to the population and didn't follow through with that, attacking all of the besieged headquarters, the police headquarters, the besieged checkpoints. the financial means of the regime to oppress the population. And that's the wait and see part of this.

I would argue, even from that, which was not one of the listed goals for the United States, but to say that Israel and the United States haven't set the conditions to give the Iranian population a once in a lifetime p chance to if they and then we could argue, well, they can't, you know, they killed tens of thousands of the the the ones that were involved in the January twenty twenty six.

All can be argued, but I would argue from an assessment perspective, and I'm not inferring, but just from as objectively as I can, did the United States and Israel set the conditions to make the regime weaker in even its its ability to oppress the population? In my opinion.

Well let me take a step back. Let's look look at at at the actual campaign. Is there anything that you realize now that you understand now about either the IDF or the US military after observing uh almost six weeks of of them fighting together that you didn't know before in terms of capabilities, in terms of approach, in terms of their potential when they fight together.

But, you know, being a former military guy, the military to military relationship between Israel and the United States massive. Um but I would say understanding the The ability to do an operation like this from a more of a military analysis, the synchronization between US and Israeli forces.

to be doing even in the opening moment, you know, you have Israeli aircraft in the sky with Tomahawks um in flight, all of it synchronized in time and space, to have this massive never before in the history of war effect on an enemy nation.

That was surprising, uh, because of understanding how much integration has to have, no longer, you know, different rooms or anything and commanders working with each other daily. That aspect the I mean I shouldn't be surprised, but you have to be surprised that Israel's

intelligence penetration of an enemy forces um and their ability, whether it's to tap into highway cameras to track the Supreme Leader or whatever whatever it is, there's that little bit of that surprise. Um the You know, I know the difference between air superiority and you know, you're basically being able to do your mission over an enemy nation without interference.

but still have a lot of risk versus air supremacy. So the ability which I shouldn't have been after the twelve day war, but I was, I mean,'cause I understand even during the twelve day war Israel could create corridors of air superiority to do a mission and get out versus what was essentially um

Yeah, for the United States thirteen thousand m combat sorties or flights and with you at Israel's probably over fifteen thousand and not to have only to have two uh aircraft down by enemy fire It that's surprising, really, from a military history perspective.

These things seem easy and I also don't want people to think that that's the future of all warfare because the idea that you could do an operation of this scale with no c you know, no cost to to human life, uh um which there was of course cost to human life, but uh people will have this ideal of a bloodless, perfect war, when that's just even in the strategy, if you would say, Okay, what was the plan going into this? I can tell you what the goals were.

I can tell you what I believe many of the plans are based on what the strikes were, right? The attacks on Iran's different centers of gravity. But war is not a checklist plan that you start on day one and implement. The enemy always gets a vote. So I'm surprised, of course, by the the dominance of Israel and the United States working side by side in straight parity of capability to where you're dividing up targets across the nation.

Um, but also dividing up efforts, whether it's the the regime's ability to maintain power and to threaten it versus the the its ability to project power outside of its borders.

Um, if you were to ask me laser, which I hope you you don't mind me answering, what am I surprised on the Iranian side? So the the I you know, if I I have actually, you know, from my own military career had war games um

different scenarios in Iran like Bandar Abbas and the Strait of Hormuz and just in my own professional military training and the ideal that the United States military and I'm sh I'm sure it'd go to the same for Israel didn't plan for things like the Strait of Hormuz being um threatened

is that scenario in the Strait of Hormuz. The idea that we weren't we don't have plans, we didn't believe that they would do it. I think it's just fantasy. I mean it's it's ridiculous. Of course the enemy gets a vote on when it's executed and then Everybody wants to discount all the other decision making factors, right? The what we call decision points of when the United States and Israel's saying, okay, do we shift efforts to that being the focused uh

Or based on the you know the impact of the global market for the United States, which is really important and other factors. Absolutely not. But Iran surprised me in attacking fourteen different nations, not just the Gulf States, but attacking Turkey, Azerbaijan, Cyprus. Cyprus. I mean I yeah. I get the kind of the the chaos strategy of creating that geopolitical crisis in in especially in media and within allies, saying, you should just stop. It's almost like they took an Israeli approach

to the United States. So they they took this approach of if we force enough international condemnation and that this is going to escalate and spiral out of control, United States would be forced to stop. Yeah, the United States would have fought it differently because the United States can fight it differently. We would have

put a lot of pressure on Egypt to open up its to create a humanitarian uh area for the civilian population so Hamas couldn't use that as its sole primary weapon, the human sacrifice and other things. But I was surprised that Iran continued to attack all of its allies t which I think will lead to the strategic effect of bringing Arab countries that were close trying to get closer to Iran, away from Iran. Closer to Israel and the United States, I mean, of course there is the financial bit of

the UAE recertifying their one point four trillion dollar deal with the United States, Qatar their one point two trillion dollar deal. Like all those are now ironclad. Um and we'll see what the strategic effect of this strategy of Iran attacking everybody simultaneously and not just military locations where US forces uh were or were not stationed, but civilian sites.

energy infrastructure, it's like it's almost the bar I I really think John Stewart called it right. Like the worst I've been in a few bar fights myself, but the worst strategy, if you're fighting a really big guy is just start slapping everybody around you. um to asking them to hit you as well as the big guy d to hit you. It strategically it's just um I understand uh like kind of the small strategy aspect of that that which

failed. I mean it did not stop. It actually just increased the operation, increased the destruction of their means and validated laser. Ivan's strategy, which I find surprising, validated the rationale for the necessity of the operation. the the longer ranging missile on Diego Garcia, the these things that they they said they didn't have, um the Navy threat you know c using its threats, not capability, but threats to the Strait of Armers to close it.

Iran has validated, in my opinion, the necessity of doing the operation, that the ideal that Iran, which is what if they they I don't believe personally And I can be wrong,'cause I'm now guessing at I think it is highly unlikely that Iran ends with control over a international shipping lane. uh not a toll system, nothing, because it just would be historically strategic defeat. Um if not

you know, you could argue the United States has said, you know, it's not ours, we don't care about it. Absolutely matters. But it validated by doing it the necessity of the operation because no matter how much the world was shown, how Iran was a threat to not just Israel, its neighbors, Europe and the United States. Iran has now validated that position in intelligence saying that they were indeed the threat to stability in the region.

might get we think the Iranians think we might get some sort of cash cow, you know, through the Strait of Hermuz, which will let us rebuild. So the strategy was exactly what we needed. It guaranteed our survival, which is our victory

So for me that then we get into the capabilities of Iran and do you truly believe that it was destroyed, eliminated, set back, all of these things, which everybody says, that's tactical, that's not strategic. No. Iran cannot claim that it achieved a victory by surviving the war. One, because it's not the same people, so who survived? The regime. Okay, the form of government survived. Maybe. We'll see.

But that wasn't like i I just wouldn't do that in any other war laser. And I really try as I study, you know, whether it's the the Nagana Karabakh war that I'm currently just finished a book on Indo Pakistan uh four day war. We would not use that framework of well, they survived it. Um, unless like Hamas, you said you were going to remove them from power, then you could say, Okay, you did not achieve that goal for for now, although there is a plan that

they signed supposedly signed an agreement to give up power to this other force. Um, I don't think that holds water. You know, the whole capabilities part, more importantly, Same thing with Hezbollah, right? Nobody said they they were going to destroy Hezbollah. It was about their means to wage war to threaten northern Israel, all these elements. And if you think that it if you're an outsider, so that's kind of answering the those advocating that Iran achieved a strategic goal by survival. Now

Eventually we can say, Well, did they m did they get this new control over the Strait of Hormuz? That is a question to be answered and I just think it's unlikely, but I could be proven wrong. And then you could say, Yes, they they had a they achieved this strategic um go your victory in that per perspective. I I don't know for the whole set of the war, again going to the goals of both sides, w who achieved their strategic goals.

Is the one side didn't say that they wanted the regime to change. We wanted a regime behavior change, capabilities to do all this. Um and then we could try to get honest. And this is why calling you know, we teach a whole class when I taught strategy at West Point is how what defines victory, right? The achievement of the strategic goals in a campaign. Um and it's really it isn't easy and it didn't clear cut as people want it to.

And but we live in this information space where people will grab the data they want to support what they want their opinion. uh and I'm just doing trying to do and I know you do as well is um you can have a devil gap you you can take a contrarian view, but is there enough evidence to support that at the moment or eventually.

non aggression pact. Iran demands that they would c maintain some sort of control over the Strait of Hormuz, like you talked about, the ending of the regional war on all fronts. So that would include Israel's campaign, Israel's ability

to weaken Hezbollah and keep them from from uh from rebuilding themselves. How about this one? Withdrawal of US combo combat forces from all bases in the region. Okay, that's not gonna happen Reparations they want, uh, acceptance of Iran's right to nuclear enrichment, lifting of all primary secondary sanctions on Iran, termination of all resolutions from the UN and from the IA.

I don't see a single one that America could accept. And then America Trump has his fifteen points. That's what even forget about the Pakistani fight. Is there any chance in your mind that the two will be able to find something that's workable.

And anybody who has any bit of information on the situation of Hezbollah, even after uh Israel's historic, you know, from the Pager operation to the the leadership elimination and rocket supply degregation that they were destroyed. Nobody thought that. There there was supposed to be this other operation and wait and see But for me from the deal. Um one side has a maximus both sides have a maximus position, right?

I think one side, the United States of Israel, has more leverage, um, but the other side does have interests beyond survival, which I think again, I I strongly believe the United States at least the United States, and I only speaking from my own opinion, is willing to let the regime survive as long as it you know, the certain um certain terms that we view as critical are met. And I would be looking specifically as the time unfolds.

the status of the nuclear program to include the physical material, right? The a thousand pounds, I don't do kilos, almost a thousand pounds of sixty percent rich uranium, the straighter from moose ultimate status. No toll booth, no c um no Iranian control outside of their own territory or waters, or force of control, or threat of control. And then I would be looking at the money situation as well because

I really try not to attack people, I attack um veracity of claims. The ideal that Iran comes out of this as a superpower much stronger. It's just you know, mental home insanity, uh to be frank. Um, the rej the regime was not strong before this, but it had immense capabilities, right? Just like Hezbollah, immense capabilities. But for Iran, it was not strong as a government functioning, right? So

It will need cash flow to survive. So I believe that's one of the levers that the United States and uh others will be able to say, like, you want to survive. Like, that's always the goal, even of a you know, a terrorist regime that does actually

has some irrationality into it, but is a rational actor. They want to survive and they will make decisions like, well we want we still want to destroy you later, but for now, we want to survive and we need a lot of money to recover from this war. Now it's Yeah, the fantasy of reparations, but I think they're you know, the sanctions relief and other elements of yes, if you agree to these terms that the you know, the nuclear, the straight, the you know

ending of the long range missile program, all of these elements, then you could see sanctions for leaf and economic uh assistance. That is an uh ultimately, which I I don't personally want, right? I want the people of Iran to be free. And I imagine personally the the power of the the Persian culture, the Iranian people, once free of this oppressive regime, as much so as I do in other areas. Uh but

They're playing the strategy to survive, which will require fake saving, of course. They're gonna say a bunch of stuff, but that that's where, you know, again, don't listen to what they say, listen to what they do. What happens with the nuclear, the strait. And there are other programs that are tied, but they're going to want money.

uh, to survive and that's that the actual leverage that the United States brings. It's not like the United States doesn't have anything at the negotiation table, right? Not that all You know, I had to we had to dissuade people this of the you know, just with dealing with Hamas and others. Not all war ends at a negotiation table. I mean y sometimes it

it ends at a surrender table. Um unilateral surrender. These are the comments and the you know, the the the statements that have been made like unconditional surrender, things like that. Um but there is a reality of the history of war. And in this case, because it was laser by defined as we will teach it a limited war. This was not an unlimited war, which I have actually partaken of, of seizing an enemy's capital

taking what they value most, their their centers of gravity, their power struct their government, the rule of their population, that you can't do um easily, but that's not what this war will go down in history. It was an un a limited war. for these terms. We'll see whether those were met and then we can start to make assessments of victory when when the when it has actually entered this ending state. But this is the the the clarity that people want that isn't the history of war.

I I'm not the person that's gonna argue predicting that Trump's uh the president's behavior or the admi administration. And again, I think people think like it's just him. Um if you if you don't understand the United States national security apparatus, um there are borses that he listens to uh amor, but you know, you you in our decisions we have the national security advisor, Department of State, your Treasury, everybody making these

Well, if this happens, here are the second third order effects for us, which are unique. Every nation does this, right? Um this is what it means for us. Uh but I think that is a very credible threat and I actually I agree, John Spencer, personally, that take the president serious but not literal. Um, take him seriously but not literally. Um I do think he is both serious and literal that if the negotiation doesn't go the way the United States

could even uh um allow it to go that the th the use of continued military force is absolutely there and beyond just what you mentioned, of course the Marines, the eighty second. I mean, I flew from Italy as a paratrooper to Iraq. It's a five-hour flight. If the United States wants to mobilize

more than what is currently being discussed. It i it absolutely can. It's it is the only global projection power there is, and that's one of the many reasons that it's a superpower. I think he's serious and I don't say it's likely. I I think that it's very it's The actual the US administration, like everybody should, wants an end to this war, but not on crazy terms that which is the statements that you read by the Iran. Those are just

Those are unlikely. I can be I have more certainty that those terms that you read out are unlikely to be what the United States accepts. And it is very likely that if the United States doesn't, because it did that I mean the Witkoff and Kirschner negotiations before the start of the operation. I think we're honest in good faith. I think the leadership at that moment, which doesn't exist anymore, was not negotiating in good faith.

So the United States is going to try it again in this case. And if they aren't in good faith and just being ridiculous, I think it is very likely that continued military operations and all the list of things that the United States could do that it is talked about. and of course debated on legality, which is insane as well, um, are on the table. There's so much on the table that um it is the this is when you have military dominance.

Of course this is a limited war for certain political goals, but I think it's very likely, laser, yes.

The United States has never had an ally in modern history with that comes with that capability and willingness um to go side by side and that that will have second and third order effects. when it's a demonstration white war tests everything laser. I mean it tastes it tests you know, we sit and talk about how big and great other people are, your China, Russia Iran, war test everything. This put the the relations the capabilities and relationship to the test and was shown

that all the years of investment. I personally, John Spencer, again and people say I'm biased, but I try to be literally as objective as possible. There are allies, of course the you know, the as Churchill said, the worst y you know, it's actually worse to be fighting with allies than fighting without them. Right? So there is that aspect of political nature of of

of allies that have had historic relationships for a long time. I think those will continue. Those are important. For me, I think you need another term for Israel personally. I mean, there are allies and then there are there are allies as in um with capability, right?'Cause then we can talk about Israel's investments in in its national security and its ability is capable becomes a resource, a uh of for the good of many nations and the United States together doing this operation.

it will have political, military, economic and information benefits for a long time, but it also came after years of military to military indust industry to industry and that will be advancing as well as as you know we've talked about in the past. I mean, um n necessity is the mother of all in innovation. There's a reason that Israel is like a skunk's work

of military capabilities that nobody's ever seen before. One, because people are always trying to destroy Israel and they're not successful, which generates an a different cultural way of thinking about threats.

and a different uh innovation cycle that has benefited uh this is again the US military talk has benefited the US military uh for decades uh that ca that Israel has has paid in in blood and treasure, but the benefits of a stronger military nation, region, um, even the United States military, i is for me uh very objective.