Hello, this is COI Time podcast series on markets and economies from DBS Group Research. I'm Tambek, chief economist, welcoming you to our 150th episode. Today we're excited to have with us Pirush Gupta. He was with us 100 episodes ago, and now he is with us again during his last week as CEO of DBS and what a 15 year run it has been. Push Gupta, welcome back to Cui Time. We're
happy to join you again, as you can see. Uh, I'm a little differently dressed this time. time more because I have 5 more days of devious life left.
Like I said, what a run it has been. Great to have you and I look forward to having you in the future as well, which will be my parting word to you later on as well. Uh, I'd like to break our conversation into two parts. First, to take stock of how banks have done since the GFC 0809 financial crisis and the aftermath of that, and then to get a sense of your thinking about where banks are going.
So let's start by looking back. Uh, major global banks today are definitely more capitalized than they were 15 years ago, and they're definitely much more digital. How else are they different?
Well, I think the consequence of the GFC, the most profound impact was the huge increase in capital, uh, across the system. I think there was a change in the liquidity rules, so I think it's safe to say the banking system, uh, specifically is a little bit more safe than it used to be 15 years ago, uh, but I think part, um. Uh So I want to say that weather's good. I think there were a lot of attendant challenges that came along with the transition to safety.
The first, I think we took enormously long to build these safety pillars, and frankly, even today, 15 years later, the work is not done because the regulators keep tweaking. Um, they call it different names. Some people call it Basel 3.5, some call it Basel 4, some call it the Basel Endgame, some call it the Swiss Finish, but in every jurisdiction, regulators are still going back and revisiting
what they did. In some cases trying to lighten the rules, some cases trying to, uh, add to the rules, and it just seems to me that 15 years is a long time to try and get to where you need to, um, so I think we took too long and that um. Passage of time created a degree of uncertainty in the system. The second thing is we didn't solve everything. Liquidity in
particular created some consequential challenges as well. Um, holdings of treasuries, for example, you know, the banks started running shy of doing some of that, so they started creating these saw effects in the treasury markets. We saw through the US regional bank crisis that many of the smaller banks did not actually embrace some of the liquidity rules completely.
So not only did we take a long time getting to where we are, it wasn't completely consummate as well, and we left some gaps in the process. I think we could have done better as an industry. I'm. Reminded of the Asian financial crisis, so post '98, the Asian regulators and the Asian system also responded to the crisis in pretty much the same way. They added up capital requirements, they rethought some of the liquidity requirements. They became a lot more intrusive in their supervision, but they
did it in a few years. They did it with a lot less song, dance and drama. And by now the Asian banks have proven over the subsequent 20 years that they became relatively strong uh uh in that period of time. So now when I say that this is a challenge, what is the implication of that been and that is bearing on how our banks different. The implication of that has been that the banks in general have won a battle which is around capital liquidity and solving for the old crisis.
But I do think the banking system has not done as well as it could have in terms of the war, which is thinking about the shape and nature of banking in the future. Um, today, most banks have embraced digital, but the reality is that as late as 2016, 2017, I used to reflect on the fact that there are only a couple of banks in the world who are as focused as DBS was on the digitization agenda. Uh, in fact, when I talked about it at many global forums, it was
so interesting that banks were still bothered about Basel. Nobody was talking technology or digital. So banks are not as advanced in the digital agenda as they should have been. Um, a lot of banks have great apps, but if you look at the underlying architecture of technology, uh, have banks shifted to, um, microservices, API based, cloud native technology? Very few have even now, and that says something that banks are still not as far advanced as they should be.
Um, in some ways I was actually quite surprised in the last few months. The one country which has really made huge, uh, leaps in that regard is China, right? Uh, we realized that through the COVID period when, you know, nobody is watching, the Chinese leapfrogged in terms of their transition to the new technology architecture, and I find today that some of them have made even more progress than
DBS has. But when we compare ourselves with many of the Western banks, I think we're still 57 years ahead. So long way to say safer banks, but might not have made as much progress on technology and digitization as you would have expected them to or would have liked them to.
Right on that point that you referenced the '97, 98 crisis, it was a cataclysmic crisis. There was a lot of political dislocation and there was a lot of scarring. It took many countries years to come out of the crisis, but the banks were not considered villains in that crisis. In the 809 crisis. The banks were considered villains. I, I recall reading articles about that, you know, that there should be so much regulatory oversight on banks that their profitability should be minimal.
They should be turned into utilities. But looking at the bank's performance, say the last half a decade, they've done very well with the interest rate cycle and so on. So that, that portrayal of banks being the villain, being the problem, not the solution around 809, was that overstated?
I think it was. So I think partly, well, it was self-inflicted damage. So you've got to figure forget two things that I think the industry did wrong in particularly the 80s and 90s, the build up to 2000. 1 was compensation became egregious and it started attracting a lot of attention when traders, investment bankers, individuals were getting paid $10.20 dollars, $30.40 million dollars. That attracts a lot of attention and calls the basic question to account. I mean, are you really worth it?
So that is one thing of our own making. And if you look at the industry, this big step up in competition only happened in the 90s and 2000s, so it was a focused period of time. The second thing we did wrong is we lost sight of the purpose of a bank, which is the fundamental
of doing real things for real people. So to an extent, some of our product selection and some of the things that the industry was doing uh started looking like it was self-serving as opposed to actually having a hand in furthering the interests of the real economy or individual citizens. So I think some of it was, um, you know, um, coming as a consequence.
You contrast with Asia and even though the Asian banks got hammered in '98, by that Asia has worked as Asia Inc. The banks play a more constructive role along with the rest of society and therefore you never saw the same degree of angst about banks and banking. So I mean, the point is too, the reason why there was so much political outrage and therefore so much regulatory overhead was because of that. People thought that the banks and bankers were the villains of the piece.
Uh, in some ways, even now, 15 years on, there pockets of the universe where this has not disappeared. There's some places where it has, but in some places you can still see this and the underlying nature of the dialogue and the nature of regulation, so it hasn't entirely gone.
The other thing that I would have expected over the last 15 years with better analytics and better credit research that banks would be expanding their sort of volume of creditors or borrowers and that we will see the unbanked, whether it is in the corporate space, the space, or the retail space. Would be, you know, captured by banks because they have better data and better knowledge, but it seems like that
space has been ceded to non-bank finance companies. So what's your sense of the banking, the unbanked dynamic over the last 15 years?
Well, first of all, when I said the banks have not done as much on technology and digital, uh, I have to add they have not done as much on data and um AI either. I mean they have, don't get me wrong, banks are fundamentally different, but they've not done as much as they could and should have. I remember banks had a head start in the 80s and 90s, the biggest users of
data were the banks in the credit card systems. And so by, you know, 2010, 2020 to figure that banks don't have the right data, don't have the right data lakes, don't have the right data protocols, uh that's telling. But so part of the answer isn't that the banks just did not do as much as they could have. But the second part of the answer is I don't think it's across the board. It depends on the region
of the world. I will tell you that in India, the largest outreach to the unbank has been the State Bank of India. The Prime Minister Jandar Najar now with 300 million new accounts is all State Bank of India, and they do it all digitally on a mobile phone, and the unsecured lending on Euro is all on a mobile phone. Uh, in Indonesia, the largest amount of unbanked outreach growth is BRI. And they still continue to be the largest footfall and
footprint and they're adding customers at scale in China. The policy banks, including Agature Bank of China, etc. are still doing a lot of this. So in many countries, the state, the, the, the banking, the the treasure banking sector is indeed leaning in. Now, to the extent that, you know, they're not doing as much and they haven't done, uh, new stuff like in Alibaba did or some of the new Fintechs did.
Uh, that links back to my first comment. Some of the fintechs were more advanced about use of data and about use of ecosystems where they were able to garner some of that data. My views in the future, it doesn't matter whether you're a traditional bank or you're a FinTech.
It really matters how much progress you've made in terms of thinking about data and analytics, how you rethought your credit underwriting process, how you rethought your portfolio management process, and then you could be an e-commerce company, a telco or Fintech or a bank. If you cracked that puzzle and you know how to be where the customers are, you will win many of these games.
Uh, putting aside the data issue, um, just from a risk management perspective, despite all these buzzles, various iterations, and so on, we still have a regional banking crisis which seems like a very one on one type crisis, you know, duration risk and this bank get caught. Um, does that mean that we haven't really made that much progress on risk management?
Well, first of all, the banks which went through the regional crisis were not subject to the Basel rules, so you've got to understand that. Uh, because the Fed gave them a pass, they weren't doing all the things the big banks were. So I do believe that all the banks that have gone through the Basel regime are fundamentally safer and better managed than in the past, and you see less of that, uh, but the question, will there still be risk in banks?
Of course they will. The nature of banking is that you intermediate time and you intermediate risk, and I don't think that's going to change, uh. Would you believe that only banks have the risk, the other fintechs and other people who are intermediating finance will
never have risk. I refuse to believe that either. So if you look at the history of the last 5 years, you could argue that the regional banks or Credit Suisse was one set of problems, but I could equally name to you half a dozen new fintech companies, token companies, tech companies, you know, etc. etc. who also had different kinds of problems.
Uh, so the challenge is quite fundamentally this that when you have provided the capital use the capital, somebody sitting in the middle, intermediating intermediating risk and time, no matter how smart you are and no matter how forward looking you are, you will wind up from time to time
stubbing your toes. To me, the analogy is, you know, any country, even though you say you have a great police force and you have a great legal system and judiciary, you name me one country that doesn't have crime. This is like trying to argue that if you do your job really well, there should be no crime in the country, and that can never be.
Sure, um, I'm sort of conscious of, you know, the whole duration risk question even in 2025, 2026 with all the noise around the US, but we'll, we'll keep it to the past and the future as opposed to the conjuncture because I want good shelf life out of this podcast. But one question on the dialogue between regulators and banks. Do they listen? And is it a two-way communication?
Again, you know, there's no one size fits all answer, it's a function of where you are. Um, um, taking a third step at the same thing, I think in the West, um, the US as well, but certainly all over Europe, UK, etc. the dialogue between the banking system and the regulators was more broken for an extended period of time. There was a going in belief that banks needed to be uh carefully and closely managed, and a high degree of suspicion about banks' motivations and capabilities, both.
I never saw that in Asia. Um, right from, you know, the 9 when I first took on my job, by and large Asian regulators have been constructive in dialogue. They've been forward looking. They've tried to keep a developmental hat along with their regulatory hat, and even in Asia, obviously, you know, it changes a little bit in degree depending on which country you're in. But broadly speaking, you've not had the same degree of antagonistic engagement as you've had in several countries in the West.
Now even in the West I think the dialogue is beginning to change a little bit in the last few years um as uh more and more regulators are beginning to see the world is progressing in a direction of a tokenized economy, new ways of making payments, etc. and they realize they have to engage the private sector more constructively and so it's beginning to happen, uh, but again I said that it's not entirely changed yet.
Are you surprised or you think it's par for the course, the kind of credit losses we have seen on the portfolio banks from exposure to China? I mean, China has slowed quite dramatically in the past half a decade. Would you have expected even bigger repercussion, or do you think what has happened is pretty par for the course?
Well, given the, my first I got to figure out two things about China. One is China slowed, but it's still growing at 45%. I do not see a steep recession. You're not seeing a complete falling off the cliff. So most countries in the world at 4 5% growth rates, you see some pain, but you know it's not a huge amount of pain. So you've got to start with that. China is in a relative sense slower, but in an absolute sense it's still growing, um, decently.
Uh, the second thing about um the China situation is that, um, a large part of the credit in the system, um, is still benefited by some form of state support and therefore, whereas in the US system, by and large, you know, all the rocks show up as soon as the tide starts receding in the China system all the rocks don't show up immediately.
So it could well be that you know some things are turned out 1015, 20 years in any other environment you would, you know, call them credit losses but uh in, in more supportive environments you can just term out of credit so maybe there's some of that um going on as well. um, however, even if you account for all that, um, the fact is that the total credit losses in China have been lower than one would expect.
Even if you take the real estate sector, where you should expect to see the biggest damage, there has been some. Um, but not so much in the bank books. There's been some in the bank books. A lot of it is in the financial markets, the bond space, bondholders, etc. So one, this speaks to the fact that the banking system has changed a bit. So banks are holding less
of the risky assets. The financial markets are holding uh more of the risky assets, and so there's been a fundamental shift in the nature of the banking system, um, as well. I should have mentioned that when you asked about how the banks changed. See, in truth I sometimes reflect that. It's not that financial sector risk um has disappeared, uh but the risk in the formal regulated banking sector is lower because it's been squeezed out and so some of, some of the risk is just shifted out. uh, why
is private credit such a big market today? right? It's a big market because banks are refusing to put on that kind of credit.30 years ago, banks would have been doing structuring and putting on the credit, the banks don't. Uh, project finance. So large nature of the financing has become prohibitive for banks to do and they get squeezed out to the non-bank world, right? And therefore, when the losses are, are seen also, it's also proportionate. You see less of it in the banking sector.
And perhaps more of it in the nonbank world.
Let me expand on that issue because I'm really curious about that. So what's your sense? Are we pushing risk to the private side, which is by definition a little more opaque than the banking system balance sheet, and is that something that you're uncomfortable with?
Well, I do think there's no question, of course we push this out to the private side. You look at the relative size of the private pockets, both private equity and private debt today. It's extraordinary. So you look at the total intermediary capital and see how much they move from public markets and the former regulated banking sector to the other side. It's huge, and which can only mean that there's more activity, action, and nature of risk happening over there as well. Um,
Am I uncomfortable with it? See, the argument that some would make, you know, Macro and a reporter makes it very compellingly that people who fund those private side sectors do it with their eyes open and therefore there's better duration match. People come in recognizing that they're going to be in there for 678 years. So when private credit, private equity puts money for 678 years, it is match funded, right. Whereas in the regulated sector, the household savers come in
with short term expectations. They put money into savings accounts and therefore need to withdraw money in a in a hurry. And therefore, when the bank takes on the same nature of the 678 years, this is putting on duration gap. I think I have some sympathy for that argument that when people are going into a fund with their eyes open saying it's a 6 year fund or a 7 year fund or a 7 + 1 + 1, by nature you've shifted the risk to the investor depositor.
Now, having said that, I think that on paper the investors deemed to understand that risk. In reality, I found that most investors, when, um, you know, things get bad, turn around and say we don't know, and they wind up standing in front of the same doors whether there's the regulator or the politician or the bank saying hey we did not know we were misled and we need somebody to make us go right. So this happened with Lehman mini bonds in the '09 crisis.
It happened to a large extent in China with the P2P lending crisis. So I've seen this repeatedly that people think that the risk is better understood, but actually it's never better understood. And therefore by squeezing the discount and leaving it there, I do think that the fair amount of residual risk, which is not adequately thought through or accounted for.
So I find it interesting that we always worry about, you know, depositor funds and the need to insure depositors. That has systemic implications, but a large asset price decline also has systemic implications. But somehow we don't worry that much about, you know, controlling that risk, but we always worry about the deposit side of the business.
That's my point. I mean the assumption is that the large asset pools are held by rich people who know what they're doing, so you know everywhere. In reality, it doesn't always work that way.
Well, they're the ones with, I guess, bigger purse strings to actually lobby even more so than the average depositor. Um, let's look forward. Uh, already this has been at play for more than a decade, but it'll be a big issue going forward, traditional banks versus pure play digital banks. What are your thoughts?
So I alluded to this just not time or I think that's um artificial bifurcation. I think the real bifurcation is that, you know, providers who get digital and get data and those who don't, and those could be anybody. It could be a traditional bank, it could be an e-commerce company, or it could be a pure play digital bank part of a system. Uh, I like to believe that DBS has done fairly well, you know, we've been able to digitize, we use data well, uh,
you know, 18% ROE doesn't come from nowhere. So a lot of it comes, I think we hold our own against any pure play, uh, digital bank today, um, but you know, it's not across the board. So I think the thing to look for is those people who can embrace digital and those who can't. One of the advantages that traditional banks have is, um, obviously a lot an install customer base and a lot
of inertia in our industry. Um, the switch away from our industry market share moves gly, and they take a long, long period of time, much longer than, uh, brick and mortar e-commerce versus e-commerce. And I think that's a lot to do with people's attitude to money and the sense of security that they need, which comes from a physical brick and mortar presence that they can see.
So even though the banking sector started getting unbundled and digital started happening about 2010, so it's been 15 years, if you look at the market shares of any new banks anywhere in the world, they're less than 1%, 1, 2%, right? So after 15 years, you hardly see market share shifts, including in country where you say the traditional banks have
lost it, they're not doing very much. You look at the UK with some of the first new banks were there like Starling, Monzo, A. And then you could argue that a lot of the high street banks were on the back foot, but you fast forward 1015 years, you know, the high street banks are still high street banks. So the, the old banks have benefited by an installed customer base and tremendous degree of inertia, uh, in the system. Uh, new banks, um, interestingly, the big advantage is obviously
a low cost structure, right? They can focus on what you want to do, but by now the disadvantage because they tend to be relatively narrow in the product offering. The very few new banks which are full purpose, large scale full purpose, most tend to be either in the wealth space or in the lending space or in a microcosm of the system, and that's one of the reasons why they find it hard to get incremental share very quickly. People like to be able to go to a full service offering.
Uh, the other thing I found that new banks, traditionally, my view was that the cost of customer acquisition would be much lower because they acquire customers digitally. Uh, in reality, I found that there's not that much difference between uh traditional acquisition model.
Maybe a couple of percentage points, but after you wind up building your technology systems, your marketing, uh, systems, and start paying Facebook, Google or YouTube for the uh uh marketing dollar and then you multiply it by the click through rate, it's not that advantages. There is some but not huge.
So, um, the best performing new banks to me are the ones who have the capacity to leverage some other ecosystem because if you already have hundreds of millions of customers coming to you through another ecosystem, then the marginal cost of converting the customer to a banking relationship is lower, that's for sure. But there are not that many companies which have a large and robust ecosystem which they can then market banking services on the back of.
So long way to answer your question. I think new banks do have some advantages, but I think the advantages are often overstated, and um I think as long as the traditional banks are able to embrace both digital technology and data in a meaningful way, by and large I think they will hold their own.
Let me hold on to a subset of that discussion which is the wealth angle. You just touched upon it briefly. Um, even in Singapore, we now have these, uh, startups which offer pretty impressive breadth of wealth offerings aimed at not necessarily the ultra high net worth individual, but definitely, you know, let's say less than $10 million wealth, uh, customers and so on. Is that a big threat to a bank like DBS,
you know. See, look at all of the operators in Singapore. They all have 1 or $2 billion in AUM, right? DBS has $400 billion in AUM. Every year EUMs are increasing by $50 billion. The AUMs are increasing by a billion dollars if you're lucky, $50 billion. And so it speaks to the fact that if you have scale, if you have credible offerings, the trust element counts for a lot. The fact that you have presence counts for a lot.
Um, if you look at the biggest growth in the wealth industry in the last 10 years across the board, not just the high rate, but into this thing, is the traditional banks which have mobbed up most of it. So yes, you know, the endaas and stash away, etc. they're credible, they're good offerings, but the ability to scale is still, um, um, limited. OK,
I'll keep that in mind. I sometimes look at some of these shiny new apps that they offer. Pretty impressive.
Don't get me wrong. I'm not saying they're bad. They're good apps. They're credible. All I'm saying is that, you know, if you had to bet to me 10 years from now, will one of them be bigger than DBS? I think that's a hard call because there's just too much inertia in our system. If the traditional banks do nothing at all, right, and so you're still in the 1980s banking world.
Then yes, I think the market shifts will be faster, but most banks are doing enough, certainly in Singapore, most banks are doing enough to be able to hold their own. I
guess that's the key. Um, to switch the topic to digital assets. There's a lot going on on the token side, the crypto asset side, and then all these CBDC as well. So, your thought on that, and one specific question in that regard is the future of stable coins and is that a threat to bank deposits? So both of those issues.
So as a general rule, I think you will see more tokenization of assets. Um, it has always been that the value of money tends to follow technology, you know, we started off with cowry shells, then we moved to metal, gold and silver. Then after the printing press, we moved to bills and then currency notes. And then in the 20th century when plastic became good, we moved to credit cards and plastic.
So it is logical to assume that in the world most people will look for new forms of value and changing value and already in the last 10 years, certainly in our part of the world. Everybody pays on a mobile phone and everybody pays by QR code, right? And so obviously you've seen that evolution. I think there are 2 or 3 other reasons why a tokenized world where tokenized assets or tokenized money will
be prevalent. Um, one is that the minute you tokenize, you can fractionalize, so you can go down to 0.0001 of anything, which means you can distribute more widely. A lot more people can participate, so fratalization is quite important. The second thing with the tokenization is that you can program. So today, if I give you some money, $10 I give you the money, but in a tokenized value this thing, I can program saying you will get this $10 provided 123456 things happen.
So today conditionality moves separately from value. You can actually layer in conditionality into value that has immense, immense potential and power, right? When you can layer conditionality into value, then you're not looking at two streams, an information stream and a value stream. You marry the information stream and the value steam, and then you put conditionality on top of that. A third thing tokenization does is lets you do atomic settlement in real time 24/7 atomic settlement.
Whether it's PVP DVP, you know, uh, and exchange trade versus uh foreign currency trade, it can all be done in real time. So there's a lot of value that technology brings that can take out inefficiency in the current clearing settlement system processes. So my general view is that tokenize money and tokenize value, in fact, tokenize every kind of asset form will happen. It happened over time. Now that's different from um.
Money in the sense of will it will it replace fiat currency right so I do think it's a token, but I do think that eventually certainly in our construct for the next few years, um, money will still be feared in the sense it'll be state backed. I think private money and the world has experimented with private money in the past. In fact, it, you know, in the 19th century, there are a lot of issues
of private money. It has all of the weaknesses that we've seen historically with private money, um, that's compounded by the fact that today the Westphalians and the nation state means that if you're running a government, you want to control monetary supply, you want to control monetary policy. Why would you let abdicate the control of the monetary system to some private player, right?
So one, the inherent weaknesses in private money. Second, nation states won't let private money succeed because it undermines the capacity to function as a government, as a nation state. So I don't think you'll see private money, you know, privately issued money, um, and so it could be a store of value, but as a medium of exchange and a unit of account, I don't see that happening, uh, anytime soon. What store of exchange, store of value, yes, of course.
There is about $12 trillion of gold in the world. There's some 4 or $5 trillion of Bitcoin or crypto coin in the world. Already's 40% of the total value of gold. So the minute you have that stock of demand and supply, there's a market. And the minute there's a market, people will use it to store value. So I do think it will continue to be in that form. Um, going back to this, so if I say private money won't exist, but tokenize will exist, what does that mean?
That means I do think you will get tokenized money but linked to the current feared banking system, and that by and large can happen through tokenized deposits or central bank digital currencies. I think central bank digital currencies will occur, but mostly in the wholesale space because there's a real problem to solve, which is what the multi currencies have the same dollar, the sterling, the US dollar, we never got around to
a single global currency. If you can use a central bank digital currency and an exchange process to get around this multi currency thing, you can get all the benefits I talked about instant settlement, more money with this thing. So I do think there's a problem to solve, and you will see that. There are several experiments going on right now, but eventually I think you'll see some kind of wholesale CBDC with a clearing house which will work.
In the retail CBDC, I'm less certain because to me the detailed CBDC, if you have a very good efficient payment system in the country, instant payment, QR code based like our pay now, pay you can pay at point of sale, it's not clear to me what problem the retail CBDC is really solving. Um, and actually it winds up creating incremental challenges because the minute you go to retail CBDC then you have
two choices. Does the central bank issue the retail CBDC and open up accounts for all the citizens in the country with the central bank. Now if you do that, you undermine your current banking system. Uh, more than that, you take on the onus for credit creation, and no central bank wants to take on the onus for credit creation. So there's some challenges with the retail CBDC. You could do an intermediate CDC. You don't go directly
to the consumer. You go through the banking system, but then that's like a tokenized deposit, you figure. So my own view is that I think the prevalent form of tokenization will be tokenized deposits. So you have a deposit, but you tokenize it, then you get all the benefits of programmability, atomic settlement, etc. etc. without actually bastardizing the current fiat currency system. I think that's where you get to. You are especially about stablecoins.
The thing with stablecoins is that um they actually don't function to serve anything that a tokenized deposit does except one thing, they can be privately issued outside of the regulated banking system. So somebody that a coin base, etc. can say, OK, I'm creating a reserve against a bunch of assets. I'm going to issue a stable coin against it. Now that flies in the face of my first thing. Why would nation states let you do that easily.
And therefore, if you look at BI has published a paper recently, I remember, comparing a tokenized deposit in a stablecoin, and obviously argued that the tokenized deposit is a much better way to approach all the benefits you want as opposed to stablecoin which is privately issued. Also, the fact that stablecoins, some of the stablecoins, you know, as you saw, which were linked not to a reserve, but linked to an algorithmic balancing, uh, ran into trouble.
So that obviously took some of the sheen of the algorithmic rebalanced stablecoins. Um, when it comes to stablecoin back reserve, they will exist, uh, but then you get to the question of how, how often do you audit the reserve? How often do you make sure the reserve exists and operated away? How do you make sure that all the other controls are there?
So for my money, I would argue that as long as again the traditional banking system leans into tokenizing deposits and availing of the benefits of the digital uh asset universe. I think that will be the game to back. If the banks don't do that and you know and they leave a big vacuum, then yes, private players will come in and try to disintermediate that inefficiency through other forms of
stablecoins, right? Your views are very much aligned with Augustin Carstens, the former general manager of BIS. I remember him writing this essay that even the Dutch East India Company for 50, 60 years maintained very successfully a copper-backed stablecoin.
But after a while, because it's privately issued incentives get misaligned and you want to issue a little more with a little less copper and erode the value and then the trust collapses, whereas if you have state backing that theoretically at least, you know, not necessarily on the table.
Now again, the caveat to all this, all states are not the same. Sure, right, and so of course you would argue that where you have states where the state is not doing a good job but doesn't have the trust of the people. The currency is getting devalued, inflation is sky high. Of course that creates a huge opening for an alternate provider
who gives you greater trust, greater efficiency. So you could see situations of this sort, but I'm talking about in general if you assume that you have a well functioning government and which is supported by the people. I think it's hard to displace that.
Can I ask you a supplemental question on the issue of uh technology making banking seamless and transactions seamless. Should there be some friction in banking? Back in the days when there was bank runs, you would give a bank holiday, let people just calm down. RTGS and 24/7 settlement, does that add to volatility or does it actually create a greater good?
I think they're asking a more philosophical question. Should people continue progressing or should we put friction across different parts of the value chain, right? And it's a good question. It's not a nice question. I think a large part of what we're doing with technology, we're hurtling down this path without having thought through the other, you know, attendant and consequential challenges that you get with it.
Um, one simple example, we made payments instant and what happens with that is that you know you do something, the money leaves the bank instantly, and if 10 minutes later, 20 minutes later you had a second thought, you had an afterthought, you suddenly figure maybe you got scammed. There's no stopping it's all gone. It's like free flow, but when you look at the reverse and say, OK, so should we therefore. Uh, building so much friction to them that you don't
get the efficiency and speed. People don't like that either. There's a lot of value from instant, right? So it's a hard question to answer, you know, where do you draw the line? What we're trying to do these days is. Um, let most transactions proceed frictionless, but use AI and data to pop up the ones which look like there might be a challenge, and then see if we can put some friction only in those. How successful we'll be with that, uh, demarcation is anybody's guess.
Because related to this is the question of cybersecurity. Uh, I had Goutam Kirti on my podcast a few months ago. He scared the bejesus out of me detailing the kinds of, you know, attacks that institutions like DBS get on a daily or minute by minute basis. So your sense of the whole move toward digital and seamless banking and the trade-off with cybersecurity.
Well, you know, for the time being, I think. Cybersecurity is OK, right, and so as you said, we get hundreds of attacks every day, but we do, um, number one, our peripheral defenses are quite sound. We have multi layers like an onion ring of peripheralral defenses, and, um, you know, we, we, we've been able to keep people out. We do our pen testing regularly. We have third parties trying to hack us and attack us deliberately and people
can't get in. So and by and large I think that's true for a lot of the financial system. I'm not sure equally to all other infrastructure providers, though informed governments like Singapore have actually designated various other critical infrastructure providers and pushed them to get the same level of safety safeguards. Uh, but on top of peripheral defense, the other thing that we've done is relied a lot on, um, building up strength within, you know, we call it inside is
the outside. You assume somebody is inside because sooner or later we leave a window unguarded and somebody will get in. So how do you protect if somebody's inside? And there are techniques for that as well. Microsegmentation is one. So if you come in, you only hit a particular segment, you can't go everywhere else. Uh anomaly detection is another.
We use a whole bunch of algorithms and AI to detect, hey, something's happening which is not consistent with what you would expect, so you can quarantine and shut down very, very quickly. Um, but the truth, time is, you know, the bad guys have the same technology too sometimes smarter than you, and they continue to proceed at a rapid pace. And so you're constantly hoping that you can keep up with them, if not stay ahead of them. One of my current
big nightmares is obviously quantum. And so with the amount of um technology power available with quantum and the ability to crunch through everything and unravel everybody's keys instantly. Uh, that's a nightmare, uh, possibility. Our hope is that quantum will guard against quantum, right? And so we're trying to work on that as well, uh, but, uh, you know, it, it,
it could be challenging. One of the things is you know in Singapore that we did in the last year or two as an industry is this whole thing called money lock or, um, you know, we call a DBS vault. So even though all your accounts, etc. are digitally available, we encourage you to take some of it and park it in a section of the account where digital is not, does not work. So at least you have a corpus of savings which, you know, cannot be digitally impacted. I
chafed at the bit when we started that. I said this is really going backward. You create a digital capability and then you say, OK, I'm putting this aside so it cannot be digitally, uh, touched. But I began to think the same question is, you know, sometimes friction necessary. I think because the changes that are happening are so acute and nobody knows where it could go, it's not illogical to say let's produce fiction in the sky and lock some money away and not make it digitally available.
My wife always says that the jewelry that she has is immune from cyberattack, actual theft, yes, but not cyberattack. Um, I've left your favorite topic for the very end. So looking ahead at banking and the potential of artificial intelligence and particularly the advent of the large language models, how do you see that changing banking?
Well, you know, in the short term, the changes are immense, right? And you think, by the way, it's not just banking, you think about any white collar jobs or what do white collar jobs entail? We read stuff, then we sort of synthesize them in our brains and put them together. Then we produce some output to either send an email out or you do a PowerPoint presentation or you do a pitch book to someone.
Um, and then maybe you'll act if you're sitting there, you, you know, maybe pass some transacting entries or you still got to send a follow up to somebody you have to call somebody, right? Today's um GEI with the LLMs in the back of it. uh forget domain specific ALM broad LM, they do all four. They read, they read better than we read, they synthesize, they can produce a 4 page summary like this of everything they do synthesize it. They produce output, visual output, audio output, pitch books.
And with agentech, they do your actions. They will pass your entries for you. They will send a follow up email, they change for whatever. So if you think about the nature of uh GEI, it does everything a white collar person does in banking, 70% of our jobs are of this nature. So you'll find that increasingly the computer can do a lot of this more efficiently, better and more effectively, and so there's one big change. The second big change we've already seen, which is the capacity to predict.
Right. And so exactly as Netflix and Amazon, we predict what will the customer want to do, what, what can we tell the customer to a large extent it's very helpful because you can give the customer a much better level of experience and service because at, uh, you're not dealing with the customer the segment of one and you
know the customer intimately. You don't, but AI knows the customer intimately and can therefore, whether it's new products or just service, do a much better job than you could before. So I think the way banking will be done will change, efficiency will increase, your um um the customer experience will change, the customer outcomes will change, um, all of this, and this will happen in the, in front of our eyes in the next 3 to 5 years. The big question is, do you get a step beyond that?
So at um um recent um an offsite meeting we had, we had the COV Bank and he said they're speculating about a purely AI driven and design bank where the customer designs the bank. You don't even need a bank, right? So you have the AI moves and the the customer can pull it together. The customer creates his own AI bank and each customer creates the 9 billion people have 9 billion banks all created by themselves using AI tools who can do all of the things I talked about but for the customer.
Right, can do the management so it's a customer agent which is working in the world of finance directly for a customer. Now I haven't thought enough about how this will function, but I can see the underlying philosophy. If you can get to where I'm talking about, could you take it to the next level? I think it's not impossible.
And from a risk management perspective, are we thinking sufficiently about the disruptive impact of AI, whether it is cybersecurity related or just overall trading related or bank behavior related?
I think to an extent everybody is, for example, we have a whole bunch of people focusing on the tech challenges, you know, hallucination, wrong information, AI is a life of its own, and we have whole committees and model reviews, etc. to do that. But in truth, I would also say that we don't know what AI can do. We frankly don't even know how the models always work, but more important, we don't
know to what extent AI can go. Does AI get to a stage where it's almost sentient and therefore it is now doing things you hadn't thought about, not impossible. So are there a risk that will come along the pike? I think there might be. And so we've got to be quite thoughtful and cautious about, you know, how do you put things to work. One thing you take GEI over 18 months we've used a lot of GEI and DBS.
And until this month we basically said we won't go direct to consumer, so we will put a man in the middle, a human in the loop just because I'm not sure what else is going on over there. But eventually you get a greater degree of confidence and say, OK, let's try this. Let's do a low risk and you start building from there. Um, we will have to do trial and error and make sure you do the low risk things and not bet the farm as you go forward.
In addition to the risk in the banking system itself, you know, the model is they do model it right and so on that even human beings can make a difference. But the bigger challenges to me are the social challenges, right? And so I talked about a new way of working. I talked about, you know, a new nature of work, but what does that mean for society? What does that mean for the workforce? What does it mean for labor markets?
What does that mean for, you know, uh, the old equation, the capital and labor, this thing, productivity. I don't really thought about any of those things and when you push the argument people say, OK, we all work 3 days a week and rely on UBI universal basic income, but I don't know whether people have thought through, you know, how this works and what it means if
you're just sitting and working 3 days a week. So I think there are a lot of uncertainties out there, and this has been one of my big challenges in the last couple of years as CEO. How do you calibrate and get that balance right? One part of me.
Responds to the Chuck Prince uh statement and the music on you got to get on the dance floor, and I think as CEO I would have been remiss if I had not led DBS into embracing data, AI, GEI, new ways of working we'd have got left behind and we owe it to our shareholders and our customers to do well by them. But at the same time I've been acutely conscious of all these big issues the ethical problems, the moral problems,
the humanistic problems, the risk problems. So while we've been embracing this, we've been trying to make sure that we get the balance right through our oversight committees through, you know, one step at a time, um, say, OK, we don't have to be first to market for this, we can be 3rd to market because we just need to understand what is going on. I'm hoping we have the balance right so far I think we have, but we've got to continue to make sure it's a balanced approach.
OK, since you mentioned the banks for, maybe I'm going to ask you one more question. Pius have the banks, which seemed very enthusiastic with respect to carbon pricing and helping their clients to go through the journey, have they really managed to move the needle on green transition? Well, you know,
I think it's not a reasonable question. What I've always maintained. That to put the monkey on the back of the banks saying they will make the green transition happen is kind of short sighted. There's a macroeconomy, an industrialized economy that we've all collectively built up over 150 years, very carbon carbon intensive economy, but that is industry after industry.
So the notion that the bank would sit here and say, OK, I will now change this by deciding whether I give you money or don't give you money. Is a little bit um short sighted. I mean it's it's unreasonable. Who's the I say who's the bank to play God? If an elected government of the country says I still continue to need fossil fuel energy for my people because the people who elected me still need electricity, power,
and the GDP is only $2000. Who's the bank sitting outside to say, hey, you know what, I know better than you. I don't think your people deserve energy and so I'm going to turn off the tap on this and you figure out how to get renewable energy, right? So it's not straightforward to say the banks should do it. Have the banks been able to help with the process? I think they have, but the whole transition itself has
been slow. So, you know, yes, the banks have, you know, we've got $80 to $90 billion in sustainability link loans. Do those loans make a difference at the margin, yes, I give somebody cheaper money if they're doing green stuff. It's more expensive money. And so hopefully that incent the right behavior to do more. Activities to do less brown activities and so on. We're giving people money for transition as we move from brown to green, we'll give you more money. We'll create more programs.
So I think we are being facilitated. We're trying to make sure that we help people go from one end to the other, but can we be the principal driver of the change? I don't think that's realistic.
Finally, what makes you hopeful?
Or humanity, and if you think about the 5000 years of known human history, uh, whether it's geopolitics or whether it's innovation and tech change, this is not the first time we've, uh, come to this. People say that geopolitics is unprecedented even in my lifetime, forget the, you know, the, the, the 20th century.
I can name half a dozen times when geopolitics was more fractious than it is now, and if you go back to the 19th century, I mean, people are constantly warring with each other all the time, so this has not been the worst. And if you look at the pace of change in the 1880 to 2000 period, uh, to the 1900 period with that went to electricity, power, steam, transport, globalizing world came together, and the world saw some massive, massive changes at that point in time as well.
So even from an innovation standpoint, where there's a lot of innovation happening now, we have seen that before and I am heartened and hopeful about the fact that we as humanity have been ingenious enough and creative enough to see our way through these issues and by and large the world is in a better place today from a uh uh um quality of life standpoint, uh, if you, you know, um uh um park the environmental challenges for a minute.
You know, healthcare conditions are better, life spans are longer, you know, infant mortality is lower, educations are higher, poverty is lower, and now the world has progressed, uh, well. If we can see a way to addressing some of the big planetary challenges climate and biodiversity for sure, um, I think we're still, um, in a good place in terms of where mankind needs to go.
Well, on that note, Piush, thank you very much for your time and insights. I'm not gonna say goodbye to you because I look forward to having you back on coffee time. All right,
maybe the 200th episode we'll go again.
So very good. Thank
you very much. Take care. Thank you.
Thanks to our listeners and viewers as well. Copy Time was produced by Ken Delbridge at Spy Studios. Violet Lee and Daisy Sherma provided additional assistance. It is for information only and does not represent any trade recommendations. All 150 episodes of the podcast are available on YouTube and on all major podcast platforms, including Apple, Google, and Spotify. As for our research publications, webinars, and live streams, you can
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