Palestine’s Stolen Future

been following cool Zone media projects for a while. I was happy when Robert and Sophie reached out and said, hey, come talk to our listeners on a more regular basis.

media every other day. Maybe now we recognize that this is an important issue to understand, Maybe one can hope, But you would not believe how many people in DC, in the American government, and by extension, lots of people in power, convinced themselves for years that the Pasadian issue

and internal Pastadian politics were not worth addressing. For today's episode, I want to start to tackle a sort of big question of what is going on with Pastadian politics, and I'll give you the takeaways for this episode right away. Number One, the Palestinian people are totally unrepresented by their leadership right now. The Pasadian people haven't had a say in a very long time, and that's a big problem because if we want to resolve any part of this

conflict sustainably, will need people to go along. And the conflict got to where it is now because international actors thought that they could ignore the Palestinian people. That's literally as simple as it gets. Number Two, no one internationally

or state side seems to have learned this lesson. In the US, we've had bipartisan support for ignoring Palestinians and internationally, the response has been Okay, let's go back and try to do the same things we've always done, and maybe this time it'll work out for us. I'll explain more of what I mean as I go along.

step to support Israel in its war. As Krada del Guindhi, author and political analysts wrote for Foreign policy last year, Biden's embrace of Nittanne, who was rooted in the belief that only positive inducements and constant reassurances, both militarily and diplomatically, could restrain Israel's actions in Gaza.

and population transfer settlement in Gaza. Perhaps we all remember what happened here, but even as time went on, none of this was enough for the Biden administration to change course on the type of support it was extending for this war. But let's also remember that the Biden administration had little interest in the Israeli Palestinian conflict before the October seventh attack, or indeed any interest in the Middle East. The State Department under Biden had wound down its Middle

East engagement. They didn't undo any of Trump's major policy changes visavi the Middle East during his first administration. In fact, they doubled down they agreed. For example, Trump during his first term officially recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital, even though this is contested and you and Resolution one four seven says it should be an international city, internationally administered so

that studients could also have access and claim to it, but Trump says the US doesn't care accepts Israel's sovereignty over Jerusalem. Trump also during his first term tried to sideline the issue of Palistine entirely by engineering these quote

unquote peace deals between AIRB governments and Israel. Now, most Arab governments have had the position since the Arab Peace Initiative of two thousand and two that they would not have diplomatic relations with Israel and not recognize it officially until the implementation of a two state solution, that palsienens would need to get some sort of state and only

then would AIRB governments normalize relations with Israel. For a variety of reasons I can't get into here during this episode, but might be good to touch on in the future. Some of these Arab governments and the Trump administration decide to undo that precedent, sign these agreements with Israel, and basically make the claim that the Pasienen issue.

They thought that that status quo looked pretty sustainable. Two years into the Biden administration, my colleagues at the Arab Center wrote a report titled the Biden Administration and the Middle East in twenty twenty three, where they try to

trace any shifts in his foreign policy towards the Middle East.

even believe Palestinians exists as a people. He has repeatedly said that the occupied territories are not occupied, often uses their biblical names. Judan Samaria when he was one of the candidates running for president in two thousand and eight, he said that the Palestenian identity was quote a political tool to try and force land away from.

Palestinian state in another Muslim country. Despite these types of people, the Trump administration is weirdly more willing to take steps without Israel's approval to try and get a ceasefire in Gaza and resolve the war that's cramping everyone's hopes and dreams for a Gaza Rivera maybe complete with bearded belly dancers. And if you don't know what I'm talking about, I

really envy you. So Trump's team, Steve Witkoff, US Special Envoy to the Middle East and Adam Bohler, US Hostage Envoy, actually have direct talks with Hamas the Trump team is talking deals with Saudi Arabia without trying to pressure them to make a deal with Israel anymore. Bohler says, the US isn't an agent of Israel. It has to have its own policy. Honestly, the Biden administration could never not. To be clear, the Trump administration is still talking about

population transfer. They don't care about stopping Israel's worst excesses like targeting schools and aid organizations. They in fact go along with this idea of creating eight distribution points under an new organization they called the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, which all the other aid groups are screaming warnings about. The

United Nations Relief and Works Agency ONNERWA. Their Commissioner, General Felipe Lazzarini has described the distribution sites as quote a death trap with quote scores of injured and killed amongst starving civilians. Doctors Without Borders as an organization put out a statement affirming that this proposed AID organization is quote

conditional en forced displacement and vetting of the population. So this humanitarian foundation is really just a way to politicize AID, and indeed the Israelis promptly use them to make arrests at AID sites and use them to sequester Palestinians into smaller katayd areas. You'd think in the Gaza strip that wouldn't even be possible, but they are finding a way. The first executive director of this foundation, Jake Woods, literally resigns in a matter of weeks because he can't do

his work while respecting humanitarian lis. He said specifically, it was quote not possible to implement a new Israeli back to aid system in the enclave while remaining neutral and independent. So we're talking that bad. What's the endgame here for the Israelis? Like I said, it's been pretty clear they want population transfer for the US. We shall see to what extent the Trump administration will go along with that.

For Arab leaders, for international powers outside the US, they're all scrambling to go back to a two state solution framework. They want a press reset on this war. Go back thirty years to nineteen ninety three when Israel in the past time the Liberation Organization signed the Hostile Peace Accords,

and they want to restart these promised negotiations. The Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Vesan Binfarhan bin Abdullah, has repeat heatedly emphasized the Saudi Kingdom's commitment to the two

state solution, both at the Arab and Islamic Summit last year and in internal ministerial meetings. French President Emmanuel Macron and Saudi Crown Prince Hammad bin Seman even recently co chaired what they called quote a high level international Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Palestinian Question and the implementation of the two State Solution.

start the discussion about a two state solution. As part of that, it established the creation of a Palstinian Authority, a government that was supposed to start building up the parts of an eventual Palestinian state and occupied territories, Now where those lines eventually would be, what the word state actually meant for Palestinians, who would get to have sovereignty in Jerusalem, What would happen to refugees. All of this

was put on the table for continued negotiations. But the ASCO Accords were significant and have shaped the modern Israeli Palestinian conflict because not only was it the first time Israelis and Palestinians were directly negotiating with American oversight and control, of course, but also because it creates this Palestinian authority apparatus. The biggest problem is the Ascil piece of coords didn't work.

We don't have a Palestenian state today. Palstenians, in fact have become more repressed, more restricted in their political rights

and freedom of movement, augmented physically and politically. After the ASCO courts, the ALSCOLL courts create a system of separating different parts of the occupied territories into Area A, B and C. Eventually, Gaza and the West Bank are no longer governed together and Palestinians in the occupied territories no longer can access Jerusalem or inside the Green Line in Israel.

And all of these changes happen because of the Oslo Accords, not to mention, of course, the fact that the Palestinians continue to deal with the repression of the occupation as

well as the Palestinian authority. The Prime Minister of Israel who signed the ASCO Accords, Yitzak Robin, literally said in his last speech to Israeli parliament, quote, we will give them something less than a state, and then after he's assassinated by a right wing Israeli we get successive Israeli governments that don't care about these negotiations at all, that continue to take more and more land in the occupied territories,

build new Israeli settlements, and restrict Palestinian life. The Palestinian people have not had a real say in any of this, and the ASCOL Accords fundamentally shifted internal Palestinian politics in such a way that disempowered the Palestinian people even more. Keep this in mind, it's a very important point. Before the Also Accords, Palestinian politics was defined by the PLO, the Palestine Liberation Organization. The PLO is an umbrella organization with a number of political factions.

PLO outside occupied territories. And then during the First Palestinian Uprising in the nineteen eighties, we also have the emergence of militant Islamus groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, who are not part of the PLO and represent a sort of opposition to them. But the PLO is the internationally recognized representative of the Palestinian people. It's a national liberation movement by its own definition. It's not a state and it's not a government. The Palestinian Authority, a governing body,

is supposed to be subordinate to the PLO. In actuality, it really became the key player, and the PLO becomes a zombie organization. Some parts of the PLO haven't seen meetings since the nineteen nineties. The PLO today is not representative, it's not very active. The PLO National Council, the main legislative body, is supposed to meet every year, that has only met twice in the past three decades. And then certain bodies within the PLO, like the Executive Committee or

the Central Council really only meets to rubber stamp the Palestinian Authority leader's decisions. Why is this relevant, Well, it means the issue of Palestine became the issue of negotiating over what this quote less than a state governing body called the Palestinian Authority gets to do in the bits

of the occupied territories where it's allowed to operate. This framework doesn't include Palestinians outside those bits of the occupied territories, and the issue of Palestine is no longer about the right of refugees to return, for Palestinians to have actual sovereignty, to have a say in their own future. The PA

doesn't defend the Palestinians it's supposedly governing. In fact, it coordinates with Israel to maintain Israeli security, and there's no institutional way for Palestinians to impact their political leadership that might actually negotiate away their rights. Because the p LOO is no longer functioning and the PA itself is undemocratic, the US and its allies consistently make sure it stays

that way. They elevate the current leader, Mahamad Abbas and back is essentially uncontested election in two thousand and four to the presidency, they push our best to hold parliamentary elections in two thousand and six, and then when Hamas wins a plurality, help him overturn those elections. Within the political party that Abbas is also a leader of Fate, the emergence of new leaders is often blocked, sometimes by Israel simply not allowing party members to travel at attend

the conferences. Palestinian scholar thought It Dana has some really

interesting research on that front. If people are interested in a chapter titled Lost in Transition the Palestinian National Movement after Oslo, suffice to say, everyone ignores demands by Palestinians in the occupied territories to have new leadership or to hold elections, and the Palestinian people's regular everyday life is such that they face more restrictions, more violence, more of an inability to live. When Hamas takes control in Gaza, Palestinians and Gaza all time so have to face a

brutal blockade. Everyone in Palestine faces layers of authoritarian control, not just the occupation but the Palsidian authority itself, and everyone with power around the world basically expects them to just accept this reality. Well, they won't, not because they're crazy, but because this is existential. There are more uprisings, some very violent. The second Palestinian uprising that starts in two thousand is more fragmented and much more violent than the first,

based on both death toll and tactics. Wendy Prohman's book Violence Nonviolence in the Palestinian National Movement has an excellent analysis of how and why this happened. There are also nonviolent campaigns. There is the call by Palestinian Civil Society in two thousand and five to boycott, divest from, and sanctioned Israel, the BDS movement. There are non violent protest campaigns, especially in village areas where the new segregation wall is

going up. People really lean on getting the attention of the international community and pursuing non violent tactics as a form of legitimacy. There are village campaigns in places like Bilayin and Layin and Budrus, lots of books, documentaries and press coverage.

of ending the Israeli occupation. Fifty three percent of respondents support armed struggle and twenty percent support negotiations. I remember being interviewed by the Ukrainian Outlet Commons, and I'm not the first to say this, nor was I the last, but I remember talking to them in August twenty twenty three and saying, it really seems like mass violence is

coming because all of this isn't sustainable. On the Israeli side, with every election, their government was becoming more extreme, more vocal about population transfer.

also critical of HAMAS and its conduct. In May twenty twenty five, that same center, the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, had a poll which showed that only fifteen percent of respondents from across the occupied territories thought that the Palsaenian authority's conduct had been satisfactory. Forty two

percent support its dissolution. So, given that this is how the public views thinks, plans for Gaza that rely on the return of a previous status quo, something like HAMAS in Gaza or the PA in the West Bank, or returning PA controlled to Gaza altogether, will not be popular in any shape or form, and yet there haven't been any clear proposals for anything but such a scenario. In fact, it seems Israel is banking on the idea of sequestering

Palestinians into smaller camps. The US doesn't seem to have a problem with that. The Arabs and EU actors are still talking about supporting the Palstinian Authority. Foreign Minister of Sad Arabia and December twenty twenty four put out a statement affirming that quote the Kingdom and Arab and Islamic

countries will continue to support the Palestinian Authority, noting its capacity despite all challenges to manage the situation in the West Bank and Gaza end quote and because they're worried about where the PA will go from here. Given how old the Palestinian president what Abbass is, He's eighty nine. Arab governments have also pressured him to figure out a

succession plan. A few weeks ago May twenty twenty five, he did indeed convene the PLOW Central Council, despite objections and despite the fact that most factions within the PLO boycotted the proceedings. Those president changed the bylaws to make a new vice president position understood to be Abbess's successor. Abbess then appoints a man named Seenan Chez, a businessman, a security coordination guy who pulls at two percent. I mean, this just won't be acceptable to the Palestinian public, but

this is their best plan. Because of these shenetigans, there are Palestinian initiatives with political leaders and civil society actors calling to revitalize the PLO to make it more representative. For example, there is the Palestinian National Conference initiative, which

has been pretty consistently attacked by the PA. This National Conference attempts to involve a wider diaspora and include input from all the political factions, and it's called on PA leaders to revive the PLO meaningfully and allow for more input. There are also initiatives such as Land for All, which includes Israelis and Palestinians that talk about a new type of two state solution and they want to move beyond

the current kind of political impacts on both sides. But no one is really paying attention to these calls from outside initiatives or from civil society, so as of now, the only plan being taken seriously is the Israeli US plan of repressing Gaza into oblivion. There's even reporting by how much haw that at Zeteo that the Israeli forces have activated and supported gangs in Gaza, some of them

with affiliations to Isis, to advance their political aims. What's clear is that we do need to go back to the drawing board, and we need to understand that unless Palestinians have a say in their internal politics, no solutions will be meaningful. But I don't see any indication that anyone with any power talking about solutions for Gaza and the war has absorbed this fact.