And good afternoon and welcome, everybody. I'm delighted to present to you a speaker today, Professor Menachem Klein. Professor Klein is a faculty member in the Department of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University in Israel. He studied Middle East and Islamic Studies at Hebrew University in Jerusalem and among other posts. He was also a fellow here at and Anthony's College in the Middle East Centre itself. Since 1996, he is active in many unofficial negotiations with Palestinian counterparts.
In 2000, Professor Klein was an advisor for Jerusalem affair in Israel. PLO final status talks to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Professor Shlomo Ben-Ami, and he was also a member of the advisory team operating in the office of Prime Minister Ehud Barak. In October 2003, Professor Klein signed together with prominent Israeli and Palestinian negotiator negotiator the Geneva Agreement, a detailed proposal for a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian peace accord.
His book, Lives in Common Arabs and Jews in Jerusalem, Jaffa and Hebron, was mentioned by the New Republic as one of the best non-fiction books for 2014 and his forthcoming book this coming July. Arafat and Abbas Portrait of Leadership in a State Postponed I'm sorry, will be published in July, as I said. And the title of his talk today derived from the book is Abbas Leadership in a State Postponed.
Professor Klein, thank you for coming. Thank you very much, Yaakov, and thank you very much for coming. And I'm very happy to see you and very happy to come back to this room. I spent many hours in 92, 93 and then 2001, 2002 in this room and upstairs. And I am privileged to you to come back. I have a problem because I have so much to talk about and not too much time. So I will introduce will say something. Something about the book. What? Well, which topics I cover?
Introduce Mahmoud Abbas. And then we can we can have a discussion and go into details that that I. I prefer not to. Not to mention in my introduction, I. It's better to leave it to you, to hear from you what you want to. To know more about the book. Actually, the book is not unlike lives in Common, which is a very different, different topic and very different structure. This book is a portrait of the two leaders, basically, as as presidents, as presidents, not PLO activists, but presidents.
I, I, I write a portrait or biography, a political biography of the two presidents of the Palestinian Authority. Of course, looking back and what they brought into office, which skills, history and so on. But it's mainly about the personalities of, of, of the two. And all along the book I compare I Arafat to Abbas. Okay? The both of them know Arafat was the president for ten years. Um, Abbas is president slightly over ten years already.
So we deal with an entity, a political entity that exists more than 20 years since 94. Um, and it's, it's very interesting to, to, to see and to look on from above what each of them brought to how each of them functioned politically. Uh, and the personalities. Now, the, the first chapter is about Arafat as icon. And then, uh, I, I introduce Abbas and his early years in the PLO.
The second chapter is about the negotiations with Israel and the United States, the foreign relations of the P.A., not the well, not about Camp David, but post Camp David. Camp David was studied very well. I also contributed to the final status negotiations, the history of. But I deal with details in a with Annapolis process. And so the relations with Israel up to date and with American Presidents Obama and Trump up to date. Luckily enough, the still I have time to update my manuscript.
So I still have, I think about a month or so so I can update the the manuscript. Then I move to domestic politics, institution building, democracy opponents, Hamas. Of course, what happened inside Hamas, the politicisation of Hamas, the changes within Hamas and the conflict between Abbas and and the Hamas, I want say Fatah and the and Hamas, because this this disagreement, the split between the two is led by Abbas more than he the it reflects Fatah negative attitude towards towards Hamas.
And then and then I move to the succession struggle, which actually is running the succession struggle between different candidates. But different types of candidates already opened, I think, a year or two years ago. And it is also part of the P.A. presidency, much of Abbas reactions, especially in recent year, recently, let's say two years and recent two years is kind of it were part of trying to control the succession struggle. So these are the four chapters of of the book.
And maybe I will introduce Abbas. He's less known. Okay. We I think we know much about our father. We remember our father a very well. He was in the public spot for many, many years. I was not. So it's interesting. I think I hope that it is interesting to hear about the early years of hope for Mahmoud Abbas and and how he came to power. So Mahmoud Abbas was the ultimate candidate to succeed Yasser Arafat in 2004. And his road to the Muqata was very easy.
Many hopes were pinned on Mahmoud Abbas after his election. For Israel and the international community. He was the perfect person in the right post at the right moment. Not because he proved extraordinary management skills in his previous posts in Fatah or in the PLO, but because he has shown that he is different than Arafat. When Fatah founders started their armed struggle in 65. Abbas remained in Qatar, where, besides running his private business, he export to Qatar.
Sony Electronics from Japan. He collected donations for the younger movement. He arrived in Qatar in 57 and first worked as a teacher, later moved to the growing oil industry that offered him much higher income. Abbas returned to Damascus in 1970 and started investing time in Fatah and PLO political activity in the late seventies early eighties, when the PLO confronted Israel from Lebanon. He was the student in Moscow.
Who helped advocating the Palestinian case between 70 1970 and 1982, when the PLO headquarter was in Kahani neighbourhood in Beirut. Not only the the PLO discourses for Kahane, La République, Abbas preferred remaining in Damascus to where he and his family fled in 48 from the city of suffered. Damascus was a parochial city, whereas Beirut in the early seventies was Paris of the Middle East.
The Lebanese civil war of 75 and the Israeli invasion in 82 made it the focal point of conflicting armed groups and regular armies. This. Both. Both faces of Beirut did not attract Abbas. Thus he did not experience the Israeli siege of the PLO headquarter in 82 war. He joined the PLO fellows in September 82 when they moved to the quiet city of Tunis. See, he is not. He is takes part, but not takes part in the PLO struggle and and and the movement history.
Unlike most of Fatah PLO seniors. He did not make his living from what they called the Palestinian revolution. He became a very rich person in the in Qatar, nor had a key position in Fatah or the PLO. He played a minor role in maintaining PLO relations with Arab leaders, taking care on what the PLO chairman Arafat and Farouk Academy, the head of PLO political department, both both at the centre state, had left for him. He wasn't. He was not an important person in the PLO.
He chose to keep distance also on the field. He considered himself the best PLO expert. Zionism and Israel. Before 93, he knew Israelis only from far away and not argued in favour of reaching a compromise with Israel.
His son, Saadawi, who represented the PLO in meeting with the Israeli Council for Israel Palestine Peace from 75 until his assassination in 83, said Hammami, who representative in Lebanon from 73 until his murder in 78, promoted politically a two state solution in the second half of the seventies, and Abu Yad and a number of number two in the PLO hierarchy, argued for the two state solution in the eighties and nineties. Abbas was not there. It was interesting. Interestingly, at no point.
His interest in Zionism led him to keep in contact with the PLO Research Centre that studied Israel and Zionism, its library and archives. He did not visit the set the PLO Study Centre or the archive or the library. A third, however, showed interest in the centre work, but it was limited. Typically, Arafat demanded to approve every nominee, impose his view without consulting the director. No studying the issuance. Think that's typical of Arafat? Abbas was totally out of it.
Although this was Zionism and the state of Israel was his page, the thesis in Moscow on the margins almost outsider welfare and financially intended. Abbas was free to differ with Arafat. Abbas did not like Arafat's one man show management management style and preferring political loyalty to qualifications and performance in appointing senior positions.
Abbas also was against the militarisation of the second intifada that Arafat, according to Abbas, could have prevented, and based on his page, the on zone ism, he considered himself understanding the Israeli society much better than his leader. Indeed, the this this respect was mutual. Arafat thought that Abbas view on Israel is simplistic and he is too soft with Israelis. Therefore, he should not let negotiate along with them. He did not let Abbas negotiate alone with Israelis.
Abbas remained on the sideline for many years exactly where the Oslo talks began as a private initiative of two Israeli peace activists One Boondock and the Al Hirschfeld and the PLO representatives. Abu Aline Hanan Ashrawi, once Oslo truck broke into the mainstream in summer of 93. Abbas found himself in the spotlight, but he was once again relegated to the margins. His Israeli counterpart, Shimon Peres, won Nobel Prize along with this crap in another thought.
While Abbas never received credit for his contribution to the deal between 9495, he continued to remain on the sidelines. Immediately after the signing on 93 Oslo agreement, Abbas called for a move from revolutionary governments to state building, which required professional manpower, functioning institutions and performance pattern that could provide the Palestinian people with good services.
Accordingly, 94, Abbas came to an agreement with Yossi Beilin, what is known as bail in the Abu Mazen document. Beilin was a work then under Peres in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on principle principles for a long term peace deal. Rabin's murder drove a stake through those plans. Regretfully, Peres rejected both the plan and the very idea of making the principles a central component of his campaign to succeed Rabin.
He did not want to move fast forward. Unfortunately, he was, Beilin asked him. But Peres refused. Nor he then supported the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Till his last day, Peres was against an independent Palestinian state. The Oslo process brought Abbas to keep close contacts with Shimon Peres. He came against his public opinion. He participated in the Paris funeral against the pressures within the Fatah and the Palestinian public opinion. He agreed to to to come.
Once the Peres family ask him to attend, and he did not put attention to the domestic criticism inside the Palestinian territories. Remind you, the Israeli Palestinian Knesset members boycotted the funeral. The is what we call the Israeli Arab representatives in the Knesset. I prefer using Israeli Palestinians, call them Israeli Palestinian Knesset members.
They boycotted Abbas. But Abbas came, I thought, establish that the Palestinian Authority in the Palestinian Authority, a chaotic system like that which character characterised the PLO in Beirut and in Tunis. This kills flourished as a result of lack of coordination between P.A. branches and between its senior members.
By duplicating authorities, the P.A. president sought to promote competition between his ministers, as well as between different police and security service units in order to solidify his control. The absence of systematic planning units in the in administrative departments and the personification of the political process, including Arafat's personal participation in top establishment forums, added to the chaos.
Thus, the political and administrative system suffered from high degree of institute institutionalisation. This words of political science decisions were made primarily ad hominem instead on the merits of the issue or personnel at hand. The personification of the political and ruling systems was centred on a chain of patron client systems operating from top down.
In early 2003, Western leaders and Egypt forced Arafat to create prime minister position within the Palestinian Authority that till then was a popular presidential system. Appoint Abbas in March and transfer him. Some of Arafat's powers, including on security. The president typically and as expected, undermined his prime minister authority, limited his executive power and caused his resignation just after five months in office.
Similar power struggle developed between Arafat with his executive branch and the Legislative Council. I rather write about it in details in another chapter. Leaving office after so short time, five months only was not considered Abbas weakness and his incapability to hold off pressures. The international community charged Arafat. Ironically, Abbas prove that he is a good student. Later, he made the same to Salam Fayyad, also a prime minister. International community heavily favoured.
Abbas endorsed Arafat's centralism for Israel and the international community. Abbas was the polar opposite of his predecessor from 2000 and until his death. International leaders had grown tired of Arafat, while Abbas still earned their praise. Western leaders had good reasons. Unlike Arafat, Abbas is not theatrical, but business minded. Arafat did not hesitate to promise much beyond his capacity to act.
I must look beyond his capacity to accomplish. Although he used to say, and I quote, We are not asking for the moon. End of quote. Like an accountant. Abbas is cautious. Abbas You can't can be principal of a school or accountant dry person as far as leaders are players on the diplomatic and political stage. And they are, in my view, Arafat was a player, though more than in a few occasions, and convincing and convincing and melodramatic. Abbas has no playing skills. He does not run a heroic show.
Unlike Arafat, his style is dry and straightforward. Indeed, all politicians mix fantasy and wishful thinking with reality, but differ on intensity. Abbas, on the other hand, creates the impression of trustworthy men, though unimpressive, physically consistent, and you could always count on his word. World leaders warmly endorse and help maintain Oslo Accords that he was one of its architects.
Abbas openly opposed violence and terrorism of the second intifada, which to his mind was catastrophic for the Palestinians and their state building project. The 2003 conflict between Prime Minister Abbas and President Arafat led to an increased appreciation for the former. Whom would hope from whom they were viewed as an ideal leader to succeed Arafat. It was hoped that through his leadership, the Palestinians would undergo the same change that Abbas himself underwent.
The man who began as a supporter of armed struggle and the establishment of a Palestinian state to replace Israel, has since the eighties supported negotiations and a small Palestinian state alongside Israel. The Israeli peace camp was sure that that the public that elected Abbas would soon stand behind him when it came. When the time comes for a peace deal with Israel. I think that the Israeli peace camp is wrong in this.
But this this is another argument. Abbas is not a political interpreter, Preneur nor manipulator. Actually, he dislikes them, which explains the distance he kept from Arafat and his bad relations with Mohammed Dahlan. They write about it also in details. He did not push his way up the presidency by using intrigues. It was given to him as a default choice domestically and the first choice internationally. In 2005, Abbas won the support of the Palestinian people and the Palestinian establishment.
He is the last founding father of Fatah. Still around today, Abu Yared in Abuja were murdered. Both of them were seniors. Then Abbas, a Palestinian opponent, killed Abu Yard and Israel killed the Abu Jihad. Marwan Barghouti is the leader of the young generation. The young god who is much more popular was always much more popular than Abu Mazen is an Israeli Israeli jail. So he was the only one around that enjoyed the external support of the Israelis and the international community.
However, not only his age and veteran status worked in Arabic in Abbas favour. Thanks to international support, many Palestinians and the Israeli peace camp viewed him as the only person who can force Israel to end occupation and win independence for his people. Similarly, many in the West Bank and Gaza were afraid that Abbas was willing to go too far and give up the right of return for 48 refugees into Israel.
But the hope that Abbas would gain freedom from the occupation lessened the worry among Palestinians that facing strong Israeli objection, his weak personality would bring him to give up the dream of return. Since his election. Abbas frequently, frequently travels abroad to politically, politically to promote Palestinian independence. But at the same time, his fellow Palestinian citizens oh, sorry, is Palestine.
His fellow Palestinians criticise him for staying far from their everyday life problem and the occupation and occupation that they suffer from. Abbas functions in a dissonance reality. On the one hand, he uses head of state style symbols and ceremonies. For Abbas, the state of Palestine under his leadership is not fake, but rather gradually emerging from national rights this close to reality.
On the other hand, he has to get Israeli permission to each of his trips and ask his people to stand fast then against the occupation that one day will end and full independence achieved. How much time I have? Okay. I. We should cut it shorter on a fat, attractive, young activist. He started his career in Cairo as an activist student in his twenties and became involved in Fatah at his thirties.
Later, Arafat, the symbol, attracted the young generation despite lacking outstanding wisdom of the ageing person. Abbas has almost no connection with the young Palestinians. Abbas, unlike Arafat, does not fascinate the younger generation. He did not build direct contact with them during his many years in the PLO and was elected president at his seventh is now is over 83. For Abbas, age is an obstacle rather than an advantage in building cross-generational support.
No less significant than the company is the symbolic dress. Arafat always covered his head with black and white keffiyeh that during the 3639 revolt has become a symbol of Palestinian nationalism and wore army style khakis throughout. He even pushed forward the iconic zation by claiming that he shapes the keffiyeh on his head to resemble Palestine borders. In the rare occasions that Abbas work a fire, he put it on, folded on for a put it folded on his shoulder like a show one.
There are different personalities as reflected also physically. Arafat eyes restlessly, restlessly, moved, seeking for the approval or checking the impact of his word makes. Moreover, he easily became emotional. Abbas, on the other hand, is the restraint looks straightforward and self-controlled gender wise. The Palestinian Authority remains a male elite, also under Abbas.
Only one woman in Fatah Central Committee, out of its 19 members and ten out of 81 members in the revolted Revolutionary Council are women. Only one women. Hanan Ashrawi is PLO executive member. In addition, there is two slow generation mobility in the Palestinian elite Palestinian Authority, Fatah and PLO senior age at seniors age between mid-fifties and late sixties and joined has the high status political power and financial resources. They are by far older than the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Palestinians, according to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. The median age is 19.8. 39% of the population were less than 15 years old and only 2.8% were above 65. So the elite represents, let's say the group, the age group of the elite group is similar to less than 3% of the population. The younger generation is underrepresented in leading institutions, nor has a voice in this decision making process.
Arafat and Abbas or Abbas and his colleagues expect them to respect the old guard hierarchical status and abide to its decisions. And they control actually all the institutions. Lacking experience in institution buildings and mass mobilisation or doubting his party man executive performance to stick to a plan Abbas considers the Palestinians as incapable to run an unarmed intifada. The Palestinian public, according Abbas, according to Abbas, lacks civic self-control and restraint.
Soon it will react violently to the expected Israeli provocation. Violent Intifada. Only serve Israel in letting her use military might and condemned the Palestinians. Abbas consistently rejects Marwan Barghouti request to establish a managing apparatus of non-violent popular resistance based only on his and his fellows experience in running mass demonstrations during the first intifada.
They, Marwan and his assistants, suggested establishing public education campaign, a non-violent enforcement theme that will meet Abbas right concerns. However, Abbas was not convinced or feared Barghouti his popularity, his security forces and Israeli army. BLOCK Weekly, non-violent civil society demonstrations from spreading outside to three villages into central West Bank. They attract local and international activists unaffiliated to Barghouti's Fatah group without expanding to main cities,
settlement gates and IDF roadblocks. Those demonstrations remain ineffective an anti-occupation ritual and catharsis. Rather than rolling down a snowball. Abbas limits non-violent resistance to advocating Palestinian rights internationally, increasing the number of states that recognise Palestine and joining maximum international organisations. According to Abbas, surviving the ground is non-violent form of resistance that supports the supports his international initiatives now have.
I would like to to and this part of the present my presentation and the discussion the seminar with the conclusion that the late Roger Owen made in his book on authoritarian regimes. And I was very sad to read about Roger's passing away. I met him here in 92 and 92, 93, before he left to come to the United States, to Harvard. Arab presidential authoritarian regime. Roger writes Our post-independence reaction to colonialism.
The authoritarian state is a security state without political pluralism or checks and balances. Instead, power is personified in charisma routinised through the leaders admiration. No successor is single out. No democratic change in presidency is possible. Key positions are held by those that the president trusts most his family, and close assistance that came from the security establishment or party seniors.
The regime runs formal political practices such as elections and party conferences to gain legitimacy. But they, the president, closely supervise and orchestrate those operations. Arab authoritarianism aim to replace the fragile sovereignty that national movements achieved with the with a strong state that will prevent the return of the colonial state.
Although the Palestinian Authority did not achieve independence and its authority is fragile, it has much in common with Arab presidential authoritarian regime. It is a security autonomy with limited democratic institutions and procedures. Indeed, Arafat faced problems in person if Arafat faced problems in personifying his power inside the Legislative Council. Yet he preserved his iconic status. Abbas, who never had such a status, bases his rule on sheer force.
Actually, according to researchers, among them, Professor Nathan Brown from Washington. More democratic institutions were established under Arafat than under Abbas. The the P.A. was more democratic under the thought than under Abbas. I can go to many details, but this is well shown. Moreover, under Abbas, the colonialist power of Israel intensifies is expect its expansion into the autonomy areas and and in its affairs.
This and other weaknesses increase the fragility of the Palestinian Authority. Their colonisation is harder today than ever and creates the ground for heroic liberation struggle. Moreover, which I think may happen the next stage. Moreover, based on post-colonial Arab state history, postcolonial Palestine expected to remain authoritarian and justified by the need to prevent the indirect return of Israeli colonialism. Now let's discuss. Thank you.
Professor Klein. I think there are many, many different aspects to address this, and I would like to open the. Thank you. Thank you very much for this presentation. You mentioned that after the assassination, it's been Paris declined or rejected the.