I am Rabbi Ami Hirsch of the Stephen Wise Free Synagogue in New York. And you're listening to In these Times, The Assad family's six decade rule over Syria has ended after 13 years of civil war with a lightning rebel advance that seized Damascus and toppled the regime to help us understand how this happened. Seemingly out of nowhere. And what this means for Syria, Israel, the Middle East, and the rest of the world. I asked analyst, researcher, and journalist Dr. Jonathan Spyer to join me today.
The author of "Days of the Fall: A reporter's journey in the Syria and Iraq wars," based on his numerous trips to Syria and Iraq, he's also reported extensively from Ukraine, and he fought in the IDF during the Second Lebanon War. Dr. Spyer is one of the foremost experts on the Levant, And yet, "...Let me just say that had we been having this conversation 11 days ago, I would not have predicted that Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham was about to go barreling down Syria and take Damascus."
Dr. Jonathan Spyer, thank you for coming on on this short notice and during a dramatic week. Welcome to In These Times. Thank you very much, Rabbi Hirsch, and thanks for the invitation. You're one of the, uh, great experts on, uh, the Levant and that part of, uh, the world. Before we get into your understanding of what actually happened this week, you have a fascinating background. Uh, you traveled in areas of, uh, Syria and Iraq. You uncovered evidence of use of chemical weapons.
It led to a groundbreaking book. Could you tell us about your travels in that part of the world? Absolutely. Yeah. I mean, basically when the Syrian war broke out in 2011, 2012, I had already been seeking to report actively in the Levant and in Iraq for about five years at that time, five, six years. And of course, when the war broke out, this created an enormous opportunity. We were all kind of aware. that, you know, we were witnessing history in the making.
And in a way, precisely because ground reporting became quite difficult and quite challenging at that time, it also became enormously valuable. That's to say there was a huge amount of information. Uh, in there, which people just weren't necessarily getting. So I, like many others at that time, kind of made it my mission.
I mean, I was already a field reporter, but I sort of made that a very, very central part of my work pretty much for the subsequent, I guess, seven, eight years, uh, going regularly into Syria, regularly into Iraq, uh, seeking to report from all sides and from all angles with all the combatant sides who were willing to listen to, to speak to me. What year did that begin? Well, I mean, the very first, uh, sort of reporting trip of that kind that I made was actually to Lebanon in 2007.
But I would say in terms of reporting the Syrian war, and of course the Syrian crisis broke out in 2011, and I made my first inter Syria war, torn Syria, so to speak, in early 2012, in February, March of 2012. And who were you working for? At that time, the papers that I wrote from that trip was actually the now defunct Weekly Standard magazine, Tablet magazine, the Jewish magazine, and the Jerusalem Post.
Those were the three papers that I kind of had deals with for that first trip, which was to Idlib province, which is of course later on turned out to be, you know, a very, very historic ground for the Syrian revolution. Revolution. I do remember a young guy in Idlib at that time saying to me, his name was Mokhi Adin. He made the prediction to me, this thing started in Idlib and it will finish in Idlib. And for many years I thought, well, that was a cute prediction.
And as it turns out, he was exactly and precisely right. That the force that eventually destroyed the Assad regime was made possible out of Idlib province and rebel control of it. You, you traveled through pretty rough territory and interacted with pretty bad guys, and you're Jewish. I think you were Israeli at that time as well as being a UK subject. Did that cause any problems for you? Were you ever, were you afraid? It takes a certain kind of person to go in there and do what you did.
I mean, it does, it does very much depend. As I said, I was trying to work with all the different sides in the conflict. And I would say that both with regards to security arrangements and with regard to how they would relate to Jewish or even Israeli people, uh, it varied as to who you were dealing with, you know, the easiest people to work with. With the Kurdish fighters, both in Iraq and Syria, everything was very above board.
Um, of course with the Sunni Islamist rebels and all the more so with pro Iran, uh, elements, that was, that was not the case. And there was a need to have a certain degree of security. Um, it often went up to the point of having to have assumed identities and assumed biographies and all that kind of fun stuff. Uh, with regard to the Sunni Islamist rebels, it was often very chaotic on their side.
So it was kind of possible just to sort of turn up and be whoever, and they would, you know, just kind of welcome you in and say, well, okay, if you're here, you can come and work. So it really did vary very much depending on who we were dealing with. And of course I interviewed ISIS people also, but I never was never able to enter the ISIS controlled area. I interviewed ISIS members in southern Turkey close to the border.
And there, of course, it goes without saying, there was a need for an assumed identity and an element of, uh, of that type of, uh, of work. But you didn't, uh, obsess about, uh, being kidnapped or harmed in some kind of way? No, I didn't. Because I think when you're dealing with any type of work where there's also, let's say, an element of physical danger. Of any kind, really, you know, people will, will always tell you that you've got so much to do, you're not sort of there to experience risk.
You're there to do a particular task. That you've set yourself and so you have so much to think about to get that right and to do it effectively that generally you can't, you just don't have time to be thinking about being frightened.
Listen, you guys who go in there for the sake of the story and for the sake of uncovering uh, certain truths that are hidden from the rest of us, you have a certain makeup and it's really an admirable thing and the world owes you a lot because what you uncovered there is directly relevant to the future of, uh, Um, not only that part of the world, but the West as well. So if I can ask you, um, now to explain what happened, uh, this week, are, are there any good guys there?
So Assad fell, he was a terrible person, but are the forces that overthrew him any better in terms of their approach to their own populations, let alone, uh, relationships with the West? I think it's complex and we do have to differentiate between the very different elements, uh, on the opposition side. And I'm not going to go on to say, and there's a bunch of them that are, you know, absolutely tremendous and virtuous, not that, but there are gradations there.
With regard to the regime, I mean, the Assad regime and the people around him, you know, as is now becoming apparent. to the world because of the evidence emerging from Assad's places of incarceration and specifically the Sadnaya jail close to Damascus, it's becoming apparent to the world that this regime deserves to be placed alongside the very worst regimes known to history in terms of its record of its treatment of other human beings, both Syrians and non Syrians.
Um, there is of course, absolutely nothing to be said in its defense with regard to the opposition, the force that has basically achieved the destruction of the Assad regime, pretty much single handedly. I mean, this was, it wasn't really a coalition of rebel forces. It was a single force, which is Hayat Tahrir al Sham. is a Salafi jihadi organization. That is to say it is an extreme Sunni Islamist organization.
And frankly, I would not encourage people to expect anything particularly positive to come out of organizations like that. And I think it's already becoming apparent. The Ayat Tahrir al Sham is in the process of setting up a very repressive Sunni Islamic successor regime to the Assad regime. Where the caveats and complexities come in, I would say, are in two areas.
Firstly, in the south of Syria, there were also small rebel groups that mobilized in Daraa province, Druze forces in Suwayda province. when it became apparent that Assad looked like he was going to fall. And these are rebels who are not necessarily Sunni. Islamists, some of them, by the way, have worked closely with Israel in the past, in the course of the civil war. These are, you know, local fighters who wanted to rid themselves of a repressive regime. They are not as significant as HTS.
HTS is going to make the government, but we certainly shouldn't forget them. And lastly, of course, with regard to the Kurdish forces that control, currently at least, 30 percent of Syria, namely Syria, east of the Euphrates. Those are the forces that united with United States and Western air power in order to destroy the Islamic State caliphate a decade ago. And in so doing, I think performed a vital work for humanity. So while they are not by any means a perfect administration, yeah, they are.
You know, those are forces that are certainly worth aligning with and certainly worth, uh, defending. I want to have you, uh, help us understand what was the background to this lightning overthrow of Assad and then, uh, what, in your view, will happen in the coming period. You paid credence to the suggestion that In one way or another, you can track what happened during the last two weeks to October 7th and to Israel's response.
Okay, so that's a very interesting way of framing that vitally important question. First of all, with regard to the issue of October 7th, yeah, I do, uh, I do think there's a connection. It's simply in the following terms. Assad's problem, Assad had a number of problems that caused him to fall, but a central one, this time around, was that the forces that mobilized to help him a decade ago didn't mobilize this time.
One is Russia, of course, and the other was Iran and its various proxy and client allies. And this time, neither of those mobilized. With regard to Russia, Israel's actions since October 7th had no relevance. Russia did not intervene because it's bogged down in a massive strategic challenge, namely trying to push forward in its, uh, invasion of Ukraine.
But the second component, namely the inability slash unwillingness of the Iranians this time to mobilize in support of their friend in need, the Syrian dictator, I think does derive directly both from the fact that Iran is still engaged in a several front war with Israel, and maybe even more tangibly That the main paramilitary client or proxy that Islamic Republic of Iran used a decade ago and would have used again, had they been able to this time around, namely
the Lebanese Hezbollah organization, is currently in a state of absolute disarray. And that is directly related to Israel's actions, not since October 8th, 2023, actually, but basically since September of this year, the, uh, assault. Which Israel has basically subjected Lebanese Hezbollah to.
Uh, since September, uh, has effectively decapitated that organization, killed, of course, it's a historic strategic leader, Hassan Nasrallah, but also the next couple of, uh, layers of leadership below him, crippling the organization's fighting capacity, uh, and, uh, taking down a massive number of its rank and file fighters.
Because to the extent That Lebanese Hezbollah simply was not able to mobilize, to mobilize in a very small way, an inconsequential way at the end, but to any extent to save Assad. So in this respect, yes, I think that Israel's response to the Iran Leb regional axis, and I should include, by the way, Israel's destruction of Iranian air defenses in October 26, which leaves Iran a little bit helpless.
So it's not really in a situation to escalate against Israel either at the present time, including that Israel's treatment of Iran and its allies in the course of the last year was a significant, maybe even. Decisive, but certainly not exclusive factor in explaining the reasons for Assad's rapid collapse.
The issue, which I think we should discuss of the central and pivotal role played by the Republic of Turkey, which I think really stands at the center of the, uh, insurgent and Islamist success this time, of course, wasn't to do with Israel. But the weakening of Iran, which undoubtedly plays a central role in Assad's collapse, is yeah, pretty much the work of Israel over the course of the last year and especially since September.
So if you look back at the events of October 7th, it was launched in the first place to attack Israel from several fronts, remake the Middle East to a certain degree in Iran's favor and Hezbollah and Hamas's favor. So looking back at how events eventually unfolded in the 14, 15 months since, is it accurate to say that was a massive miscalculation both on the part of Hezbollah and Iran and Hamas for that matter? Yeah, I think so.
I mean, Um, we should note that all the evidence suggests that Hamas had not, uh, informed or coordinated the October 7th assault and massacre, uh, with its allies in Lebanon or indeed in Tehran. So from their point of view, uh, yeah, it turned out to be a clear miscalculation in the sense that the Iranians did not fully mobilize simultaneously on, uh, Hamas's behalf.
By the way, many people here in Israel have said to me, including people from border communities and people involved in security, that had the Iranians and Hezbollah mobilized simultaneously with Hamas coming from Gaza on October 7th, things might have looked A lot different. In other words, some of the stuff that Iran and Hezbollah have done since October 7th, had they done it on the same day as Hamas assault, Israel would have faced a much more difficult situation, but they didn't.
So yes, uh, they mobilized piecemeal and partially. And as it turns out, yeah, I mean, I think in terms of, uh, you know, the results being what matters here, it was a massive miscalculation. They intervene partially to help Hamas. Hamas, uh, carried out, clearly carried out October 7th to try to strategically transform the situation in the Middle East. And arguably they have strategically transformed the situation in the Middle East, but not to their benefit.
It now looks like The main strategic result of October 7 is the decline and near collapse of the Iran led regional alliance and the thwarting or defeat, if I can put it that way, of Iran's strategy of use of proxy militias in order to advance Iranian power across the Middle East. And that's Inevitably, that's good for Israel, right? No matter what eventually develops in Syria. The fact that the Iranian axis has been so weakened, at least in the short term, is good for Israel.
Do you agree with that? Yeah, I do. I think, I mean, there's no, there is no downside from an Israeli point of view to the weakening of the Iran led regional axis. It has been the central enemy of Israel. Over the last decade or decade and a half, but it doesn't mean, of course, that what's coming next, or what's coming to fill the vacuum, uh, left by the decline or retreat of Iran, uh, is necessarily positive.
So, I want to ask you Do you think it's fair to suggest that Israel's unwillingness to abide by the American preference? They were always worried about starting a regional war and they cautioned against going into Gaza. They cautioned against Philadelphia. They cautioned against Rafa. They cautioned against launching a full scale war on Hezbollah. In retrospect. Do you think that the Americans were overly cautious and it's a good thing that the Israelis in the end decided to ignore that advice?
I, I would say advice. I would, it, it, you could even call it pressure. Really pressure. There was pressure. As we now, as we, we know, we're probably gonna find out in the future that there was more pressure that we even currently know. Do I think it was a good thing? Yeah, unambiguously, I do think that it's a good thing.
Indeed, I think that friends of the United States, of whom I'm certainly one, and I think most people in Israel certainly are too, might want to suggest that it may even be possible that there's even maybe a lesson in this here for America. I mean, let's remember, the United States has had two very major involvements.
In the Middle East over the course of the last two decades, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and in my estimation, both of those ended in clear defeats for the United States of America. And both of them were conducted along lines that Israel very clearly has not been trying to emulate in the course of the last year.
Israel has been adopting a very, very different approach, not an approach based on Trying to work with local partners or strengthen local partners, not an approach based on hearts and minds, an approach absolutely based on kinetic action, if I can put it that way, and very good intelligence work and very judicious use of air power in particular. Now, it's a very different way of doing this. It's a very different way of dealing with arguably some quite similar enemies, by the way.
And in some cases, even the same enemies as the ones that the Americans were fighting. In Iraq, and maybe even in Afghanistan, too, in the sense of Sunni political Islam. And I think it's produced very different results. So, yeah, I think that Israel was right not to take the advice. In a certain sense of folks whose track record, at least when it comes to conflict in the Middle East over the last decade or two, is not stellar, let's say.
And I think from that point of view, the events of the last year may indeed be a subject for some study by students of policy and strategy and military affairs. I think it might be fair to say there are three major powers in the Middle East, Israel, Turkey, and Iran. What is Turkey's role in all of this? Turkey has been strengthened significantly as a result of Assad's fall. They, they pushed for it, they wanted it, they supported it. What do they have to gain from all of this?
And I say that also in the context of the uneven relationship that's developed, uh, with Israel and to a certain degree with NATO in the West. I should preface the remarks I'm about to make by saying that I am very much not a friend of the current Turkish government or regime. I certainly like Turkey very much, the country, and I've spent a considerable amount of time there. This is not in any way, I think, a positive regime.
The reason why I wanted to preface those remarks is because I'm about to say something very praising of the Turkish government and of its leader, President Erdogan, namely that it was his. strategic foresight more than any other single factor that led to the possibility of Hayat al Hirasham's victory in the course of the last two weeks. What do I mean by that? It's, it's a very plain and clear point.
Uh, five, six, seven years ago, The world, including the West, including Israel, was saying, okay, the Syrian rebellion is basically done. Assad has won, Iran and Russia have won. This thing is finished. You can say it's a good thing. You can say it's a bad thing, but it's a reality. And the only significant country that stood out. And they said, no, well, you know, we're just not abandoning the Sunni Arab Rebellion.
We're going to stay in occupation of a little area of northwest Syria, and we're going to allow the insurgents, the Sunni Islamist forces, to keep on building and to incubate their new organizations and to train and to get ready with Turkey. And people couldn't figure out what Erdogan was doing, and people, smart people who, you know, who didn't, uh, necessarily support or oppose him, were just saying, Surely, eventually, Erdogan's gonna realize he's wasting his time with this.
This is just pure cussedness and bloody mindedness on his part. He's just not prepared to accept that his side of being defeated. Well, here we are. And all of that comes down to the decision by Erdogan not to abandon the Sunni Islamist rebellion. So I say this in no way to, because I regard either him or the fighters he supported as positive, I certainly don't. But when it comes to effectiveness and strategic foresight, I think it's necessary to give credit where it's due.
And right now, it's certainly due to the Turkish president. At the same time, uh, he's quite a ferocious enemy of the Kurds. The Kurds are allies of, uh, Israel in the West, um, and I think they control something like 30 percent of formal Syria. How do you see that playing out? Yeah. It hasn't been sufficiently covered in media coverage of events in Syria because of course of the very dramatic, uh, occurrences regarding Damascus and Homs and Amr and then Aleppo before that.
But there is a second offensive underway, erupting out of Turkish controlled Northwest Syria, being carried out by a parallel insurgent force to Hayat Tahrir al Sham, a thing called the Jaysh Suri, or Syrian National Army, which is in its entirety a creation of the Turks. And this force is conducting its Uh, fight against the Kurds. And it has now taken the town of Manbij.
And I was speaking to Syrian Kurdish friends who told me that this force has now crossed the Euphrates and is pushing towards the town of Kobani. And they have genuine fear, given the nature of this force, that something terrible might be about to happen if the Syrian National Army enters Kobani. When I say something terrible, I mean a massacre and ethnic cleansing. Uh, what they've told me. Is that the SNA fighters are not particularly good fighters.
And if it was a straight fight between them and the Kurdish fighters, they'd be able to hold them back, certainly had to defeat them. But the problem is, at least from what I've been told, that Turkish drones, Turkish artillery, and indeed Turkish air power, now is being deployed in support of those fighters. As a result, the Kurds are finding it very, very difficult indeed to mount an effective defense.
And a kind of SOS is being raised by the Syrian Kurdish authority now, both to the United States, also to other countries that have expressed support for them in the past, because they really are in a tight spot right now. And unless something is done, uh, we could be looking at some very, very Uh, worrying developments east of the Euphrates in the period ahead. So, let me ask you, uh, what you think about the coming months and years.
I, I hesitate to do this because prophecy is difficult to begin with. Uh, it's a fool's, uh, errand and, and, uh, things are seen, at least from my, uh, Innocent lay perspective so chaotic in Syria that well, they surely are my maybe and nobody really knows What what what is going to happen? But how do you see the next period unfolding? Do you think it's pie in the sky there? Jolani gave a nice interview on CNN recently and talked about democracy and respecting people's rights.
And I mean, these forces are, are really, really bad forces in control of Syria at this point. What do you think are the prospects of Syria becoming a, a more decent place? More decent place, I think, might be hoping for a bit too much. Uh, Jolani is a, is a, again, an effectual leader.
If we want to look at the ways in which he will try to lead, we have some precedent to look at because of course Jolani has been running a little government of his own now for the last five years inside the area we were talking about before of Northwest Syria that the Turks kind of carved out for the rebels because Jolani and Hayat Tahrir al Sham created their own. De facto government, which they called the Syrian Salvation Government.
And it ruled over Idlib province in the four or five years prior to the current events that we're witnessing. What did that governance look like? Well, it wasn't the Islamic State caliphate. It wasn't the sort of lurid government. celebration of everything that was evil and wicked in the human possibility and the way the Islamic State was. And it wasn't, it wasn't something utterly insane of that kind.
It was a deeply repressive Sunni Islamic form of governance, which made non Muslims second class subjects or second class, I hesitate to use the word citizens, but second class inhabitants. It did not, however, carry out to mass slaughter or enslavement of non Muslims in the way that ISIS did.
But what it certainly was, was an authoritarian form of rule in which notably the official positions of government were held by people other than Abu Muhammad al Zulayni, and at the same time, he was the real power. So that looks to be like what he's currently trying to create in Damascus. He's just announced the appointment of an interim prime minister yesterday.
The man's name is Mohamed al Bashir, and we know about him because he was Joulani's Prime Minister of the Syrian Salvation Government in Idlib. So it tells us he's a little bit trying to replicate that model in which, once again, Mohamed al Bashir handles all kinds of administrative tasks, but the real power behind him is Hayat al Risham's guns, and behind them, the decider, Al Bashir. is Abu Muhammad al Julani. Power is his game. That's what he's after.
Much more so, I think, than the implementation of this or that ideology. So what I think we are witnessing is the birth of a very repressive form of Sunni Islamist governance, now holding power for the first time, consequentially, in the, uh, Levant. Islamic State, of course, was a kind of experiment in governance, as was Hamas in Gaza, but these were provisional and partial and certainly never accepted by the world.
I think Jolani stands a fairly good chance of becoming the accepted leader of Syria if he doesn't make any massive mistakes. So that's what I think we're looking at. I think that we can tell quite a bit about where this may be heading from Israel's actions. Israel, as you are aware, has been engaged in a very large scale process of destruction of Syrian weapons capacity. And that's clearly because Israel thinks that what's about to be born is something very negative indeed.
I would tend to concur. with that assessment. Now, could it get worse than that? That's what I think is fairly certain. Could it be something worse than that? Could we be heading for a kind of Libya scenario in which this new government doesn't succeed at even creating order even in its own repressive terms across Syria, but rather we have a kind of fragmentation and ongoing war between different forces inside broken Syria? That's possible too.
That's kind of the other possible scenario I would suggest. One in which rather than Jolani sort of putting a repressive hold over the country. Instead, you have the emergence of a Jolani dominated administration, but then you have other forces within the, uh, former rebels who are not satisfied with what he's done, who start to organize against him, who start to seek to undermine him.
That you would also have elements from the former regime who are very worried now that you would have those people trying to organize maybe with the help of Iran, the help of Lebanese, Hezbollah, and that you would also have the Kurdish forces holding out as I hope they will east of the Euphrates and keeping their authority guide. And then you'd have a kind of Libya situation of a sort of fragmentation and partial collapse. of the country.
That, I would say, is just as realistic as the prospect of a new centralized Sunni Islamist Syria headed by Zulani in Damascus. I don't really see there being much of a third alternative. I think it's going to be either one or the other of those scenarios, I would suggest. Either of those scenarios portend tense and belligerent attitudes towards Israel. Is that right? Yeah, I think that's, that's an uncertainty. I mean, unfortunately, what the Syrian civil war consisted of.
was in effect an Iran supported brutal dictatorship, the Assad regime, facing against a Sunni Islamist insurgency, looking to create Sunni Islamist governance. Nothing within that possibility, I think, portends well for Israel. And I would add, In the past when Israel has made peace successfully with its Arab uh, neighbors, specifically with Egypt, it was when Egypt was at the end of a trajectory of ideological governance. The free officers remember, came to power in Egypt in 52.
There was no less than three full scale wars that their regime fought against Israel at 56, 67 and 73 before, you know, at the end of that trajectory. The ideology hadn't worked out. The leaders were getting older. The leaders were tired. Then they decided it was maybe time to give the next generation a chance and to make peace. I would remind all of us that Abu Muhammad al Jolani is a young leader of an ideological movement.
So in a certain sense, we're only at the very beginning of his trajectory. The possibility, therefore, that he will adopt a kind of pragmatic view and be willing to coexist or sell less to make formal peace with Israel, I think is fairly remote. So, that explains, as you mentioned, Israel's, uh, really immediate bombardment of, uh, Syrian assets, military assets, trying to take out as many of them as, uh, possible.
And I would also add, they immediately moved into the buffer zone in the Golan Heights and seized control over the Syrian part of the Golan Heights, the Hermon Mountain. Um, the Israelis, uh, define that as a temporary, uh, measure, but That's gonna be a long time. They're not, they're not leaving that part of the Golan Heights anytime soon. Right. I would think that's right.
I mean, from the Israeli point of view, the dm, you know, the DMZ, the demilitarized zone, which was created by the separation of forces, uh, agreement in 1974, was conducted with a Syrian regime that no longer exists and that therefore the agreement is. Do you think, with all of these forces fighting over, uh, Syria, and with, uh, invasion of territories, just seizing territories, the, the borders of that part of the world were set in, during World War I, in the Sykes Picot Agreement.
I think that was 1916. Does that have any meaning anymore? Is that ever going to be a demarcation line in the future? I mean, the interesting thing has been in the course of the last decade when these borders have been in all parts of the region rendered largely fictional and not only in the areas affected by Sykes Picot, but I'd say beyond that also in Libya and also in Yemen. Official state borders have been rendered largely fictional.
You could even argue In the case of Israel, or the area between the Jordan River and the sea, that the emergence of the Hamas enclave was kind of a similar thing, where a de facto statelet, a kind of de facto terrorist sovereignty came into being without any official recognition. But what's been notable in the case of Iraq and Syria and Yemen, I would say, and Libya too, is on the one hand, the borders have become largely fictional.
On the other hand, there is an enormous reluctance on the part of The international community, I don't like the term, but you know, this is the states of the world to formally recognize new borders. There's a very, very clear reluctance to allow any of these countries to formally break apart, even when de facto they have broken apart. And this strikes me as anomalous. And I think it's something which probably the stakes of the world should try to move beyond.
As an example, in 2017, and I was there and witnessed it. There was an internationally observed, very fair independence referendum held in the Kurdish regional government, part of Northern Iraq. And over 90 percent of residents voted for secession, for independence from Iraq, but they were prevented by force from doing so by Iran supported militias. And the world didn't really make a squeak. The world didn't say, well, that's kind of not really fair.
So, you know, there's a, there's a awareness that these countries have. But there's an enormous reluctance to acknowledge that and perhaps build a new diplomacy with regard to the facts on the ground in the Middle East. Marc Thiessen Two more brief questions. I know you can spend hours on them, but I want to talk to you about the Americans and then finally about the Iranians. What do you think? There's a new administration coming in.
What do you think the American approach should be and what do you think it will be? Uh, what I think it should be, I, we've discussed earlier that the Iran led regional axis has taken a number of very significant hits over the course of the last year. The Iran led regional axis is of course committed to Israel's destruction, but it's also committed to the expulsion of the United States from the region and to acquiring dominance over U. S. associated countries, notably in the Persian Gulf.
Uh, area. That means, in my view, that if an enemy that's committed to your undoing is suddenly vulnerable, you'll be well advised to keep pushing. I think that Iran is very vulnerable at the present time, and what I sincerely hope begins in the new year with the coming into office of the president elect. is a newly confident forward strategy in which the goal should be the demise of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Because without that regime falling into Iran, you cannot have normalcy, not in Iraq, not in Yemen, not in Lebanon, not with regard to the Israeli Palestinian conflict, and probably not also even in Syria, even if its main client has just fallen there. So that's what I think should happen, and I think that Israel should have a part in that. Other regional assets and allies should have a part in it, and it should be led by the United States of America. What do I think will happen?
I hope that's what will happen, of course, and there's some evidence to suggest that it may. There are people who think that way, such as, for example, the soon to be Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, who I think would probably sign on to most of what I just said. Uh, so we'll see. The president elect is, of course, famously unpredictable and can go in all kinds of directions. So I wouldn't want to say with any certainty that that strategy will be followed. Uh, I hope it will be.
And when it comes to predictions, let me just say that, have we been having this conversation? Eleven days ago, I would not have predicted that Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham was about to go barreling down Syria and take Damascus, so I'm probably not the best one to make predictions. One final question, and it was a good segue to my question about Iran. How stable do you think that regime is and how realistic would it be to topple that regime as you yourself pointed out a few minutes ago?
In the course of the last five years, Iran has experienced two episodes of very serious discontent in the period 2019 in a limited way and then in a very very extensive and serious way in 2021, 2022. And the events of 2022, many Iranians tell me, represented the most significant domestic unrest that the Islamic Republic of Iran has ever experienced since its inception in 1979. So my sense from that and from our conversations with Iranians is that this is not a popular regime.
And this is not a, that's not a controversial thing to say. Many Iranian analysts and observers and citizens will tell you. that the core support of this regime is probably around 20 percent of the population. But I think most serious analysts of Iran will tell you also that that 20%, you know, it might be narrow support, but it's deep. Those are people who have benefited enormously from their association with the regime.
Ideology, Iranian friends tell me, is not as strong there in any way as it used to be in the early days of the regime, but self interest certainly is there, and that provides an incentive for them to fiercely Defend the regime, and they are well organized, and they're well armed. So, it means that anybody who wants to make revolution in Iran will have to get past some pretty formidable barriers.
The other thing to note is that as of now, at least, there does not appear to be anything remotely resembling a nationwide, let alone united revolutionary leadership. So my view is that that is a necessary element that needs to be established and only Iranians themselves can establish that. Maybe with the help of external forces, we can think of examples known to history, such as the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917. The Bolsheviks were certainly an authentic local force.
But their ability to organize was made possible by the support of the German Empire. So external forces can play a role too. I sincerely hope that the enemies of Islamic Republic of Iran are thinking about ways to work with Iranians inside Iran who want to bring down this regime. That has historical precedence. That can be done. I think the regime is vulnerable. I think internally they've messed up the economy.
They've messed up the husbandry of Iran's resources, the management of its water, for example, the management of its agricultural land. Inflation is high. The currency is not doing well. I think that the defeat region wide, which they're in the, process of suffering at the hands of Israel will wipe out also any claim they may have had, that we may not be able to manage Iran internally, but hey, we're kind of making Iran, uh, advance, uh, on the regional level. That's not going to be true either.
So I think the legitimacy is going to be further declining. So yeah, everything's there to make revolution in Iran and the bringing down of Islamic Republic a possibility. But once again, one should not predict anything like that. There's, there's everything to work for. It's what I would say. And do you think that the Israelis and or the Americans will take out the nuclear facilities before Iran gets a bomb? And are the Israelis even capable of doing that on their own?
I think that Israel clearly is capable of doing very severe damage. To the Iranian nuclear program, taking it out once and for all completely and conclusively, probably not. It's not even clear that America can do that in the sense that in the Iranian case, unlike in the previous Syrian or Iraqi cases, the nuclear knowhow in Iran is produced by the Iranian higher education system. In other words, these aren't foreign specialists coming in to Iran.
So I mean, if the knowledge is there, then even if the current program was destroyed in its entirety. You could still theoretically, you know, pick up the pieces and start again. Can very, very serious damage be done, certainly by the United States, yes. I think also by Israel, and I hope that there are serious considerations to that being given for the following reason. Some smart Iran analysts are saying that if the proxy strategy has been defeated.
Then it is natural, it will be natural for Iran to fall back on its other areas of strength and power projection. One of those is ballistic missiles. The other is the nuclear program. And therefore, from that point of view, there is a greater chance now that we could see Iran trying to move towards a rapid breakout and testing of a nuclear weapon. That may have been the case even just a year ago.
I hope that our intelligence is good enough to know when that decision is made and that we'll have enough time between the decision being made and the weapon being tested to then act militarily. We'll have to, I guess, wait and see, and I guess we're going to find out quite soon. Dr. Jonathan Spire, thank you, uh, thank you very much for, uh, being with us, for spending this time. In particular, for all of the work you've already done, your expertise, your courage.
Uh, keep writing, keep thinking, and I wish you and your family a joyous Hanukkah and a good and productive 2025. Thank you very much, Rabbi Hess. When leaders launch wars, what may begin with tactical victory often ends up in catastrophic defeat. Amen. While we never know what tomorrow brings, especially in the Middle East, I think it is not too early to conclude that what began with a devastating defeat for Israel on October 7th, 2023, has turned into an overwhelming victory.
It came at an unimaginable price. Fifteen months of war and counting. 1, 200 innocent Israelis slaughtered in their homes and in the fields. Another 800 plus soldiers killed. Thousands wounded in combat. 250 hostages, a hundred of whom are still captive. The erosion of Israel's diplomatic standing and the explosion of anti Semitism in the West, severe damage to the Israeli economy, morale, and social cohesion. 80, 000 Israeli refugees displaced from their homes.
And, tens of thousands of Palestinian and Lebanese casualties, many of whom were non combatants, and whose deaths and ongoing suffering I also mourn, despite the support of many of them for Hamas and Hezbollah and their apparent and appalling glee for Hamas's brutality on that day. In prevailing, Israel has defended Western civilization itself. If it is not acknowledged now. It will be, when history records its judgments on our era.
While multiple factors contributed to the fall of the House of Assad, it would not have happened at this time, without Israel's decimation of Hamas, its defeat of Hezbollah, and its weakening of Iran. The source of so much terror, extremism, and instability. The world is a better place because Sinwar, Nasrallah, Def, and their henchmen have all been sent to the place of eternal damnation reserved for the worst of our species. These are historic times.
The Middle East is being remade, as Sinwar intended when he launched his terror campaign, just not in the way he wanted. I hope that Syria can be transformed into an oasis of pluralism and human rights. I hope that the new regime will seek peace with Israel and the West, but it seems to me that much more likely will be the emergence of some form of Islamist fundamentalism. Or years of chaos and civil war. I hope I'm wrong. I'm not an expert on international affairs, as is Jonathan Spyer.
But I do know something about Jewish values. While Judaism recognizes that sometimes there is no alternative to war, our tradition yearns for peace. Who is a hero, our sages ask? One who turns an enemy into a friend. Seek peace and pursue it, is Judaism's message. All that is written in the Torah is written for the sake of peace, the Talmud teaches. You are your brother's keeper, Judaism insists. We are obligated to recognize the humanity in every human being.
During the height of the Syrian civil war and the refugee crisis that washed over Europe, I led a synagogue delegation to Greece and Germany. We stood on the shores of the mythical island of Lesbos, 14 miles from Turkey. Waves of desperate men, women, and children clamored to reach this beach. Many drowning in the strait or close to the shore. Many others were rescued, their saviors among the most admirable souls our species can produce. There were Israelis among the rescuers as well.
People who left their comfortable jobs and their comfortable homes, ever ready to wade into the ocean and risk their lives to save the desperate and the drowning. I remember meeting several Syrian children in Greece. I asked them where they were from and they all said Palestine. They had lived in Syria for generations. Assad butchered their families. They endured chemical attacks, they fled Syria, and they each responded that they come from Palestine.
Still, all I saw were beautiful children, now refugees, swarming around us, eager to receive not only the supplies, clothes, and treats we brought with us from the United States, but more importantly, to connect with us on a human level. They, who had witnessed the worst in humanity. These kids were like any other children in the world. They were like our children. I could envision them on any playground and in any school in America. Excelling in any endeavor that we value.
I think of those kids often now, seven years later, and wonder what became of them. I met a Yazidi young man, so traumatized by his period of captivity in ISIS and his subsequent escape, that he couldn't even be in the same room as he told his story. One of the social workers had to read it for him. I met a young Yazidi woman who was a slave of ISIS. What she endured was obvious. She did not have to spell it out. She wanted to meet, nonetheless, and to tell her story.
She told it in three word sentences, her eyes cast downward. Exposing agonies that would never vanish. This is who we are. This is human nature. We inflict the most horrendous brutality on each other. But we are also those who waited on the other side, on freedom's shores. They, too, told harrowing stories of rescue and daring, wading into the ocean to pluck the floundering from the jaws of death.
They recounted how they left high paying, high flying jobs, to attend to the lowest of human beings. Jewish sages asked, Why did God choose to put the Divine Presence in the burning thornbush? That ugly, stout shrub. Why not some majestic oak or cedar of Lebanon that would symbolize the majesty of God? The sages teach, God put the Divine Presence in the lowest of trees to remind us that God is present. In the lowest of human beings. There are people in our world who take that seriously.
Be with them. Support them. Become one of them. I love this poem by Seamus Heaney. Human beings suffer. They torture one another. They get hurt and get hard. No poem or play or song can fully right a wrong inflicted and endured. So hope for a great sea change on the far side of revenge. Believe that a further shore is reachable from here. Believe in miracles. That means someone is hearing the outcry. And the birth cry of new life at its term.
It means once in a lifetime that justice can rise up and hope and history rhyme. Until next time, this is In These Times.