I am Rabbi Ammi Hirsch of the Stephen Wise Free Synagogue in New York. And you're listening to, in these times, Israeli politics like ours here in America or anywhere these days have become increasingly complicated, divisive, and just plain messy. It's hard for outsiders looking in to understand how a seemingly unifying issue, like the return of the hostages held in Gaza could actually be polarizing.
But explaining these complicated issues to Jews in the diaspora is the times of Israel's business model, and they become great at it here today to help us understand what is holding Israeli society together and what's threatening to tear it apart. He is a returning guest, the founding editor of The Times of Israel, David Horowitz. David, you're our first repeat guest. I've been doing this podcast for about, uh, two and a half, three years.
And, uh, you're the first person I've asked back because, uh, you're such an expert on, uh, Israeli affairs, but also explaining Israel to, uh, diaspora communities. So welcome back to, in these times. Thank you. Um, yeah, I just hope that eventually we'll get to one of these where we're, um, being encouraging and upbeat. So, uh, I'm glad you, uh, mentioned that I wanted to talk to you about the current security situation, the state of the war, and of course the domestic situation.
The political situation, which you've been very vocal about and written some penetrating deep articles. First of all, it's been, uh, two and a half years since we spoke. We spoke right before the government, uh, was formed after the elections. What do you think about the last two and a half years? Well, it's been, um, a very difficult time for Israel. I think you'd have to say because of October the seventh, the worst period in modern Israeli history.
The government took office at the very beginning of, uh, of 2023. I. We'd had loads of elections, there was lots of political infighting and so on. And then we entered the period with the efforts to legislate, really subjugating the judiciary to the elected political echelon. This caused, you know, tremendous divides in Israel. You know, everyone's pretty familiar with that by now. And, uh, then came October the seventh, which is an enduring nightmare for Israel. It's, it's anything but over.
I'm sure you wanna talk about some aspects of this more in depth, but broadly speaking, you know, we've not really mourned for the people who were lost on October the seventh. There are, there are days of remembrance, of course, but most of our attention has been on an ongoing conflict with Hamas who are still capable of fighting rockets. In Israel, we, we've had significant conflict with Hezbollah. You have Iran closing in on the bomb, which is of course a very fresh.
Headline story right now as well because the Trump administration has opened semi direct talks and o of course, at the heart of much of the attention is the issue of the hostages, which you know, was very cynically planned by Hamas. 251 people were taken hostage and 59 still there, 58 from October the seventh.
We hope that 24 are still living, 35 are confirmed dead and an effort ever since a year and a half now to try and square the circle of needing to ensure that Hamas cannot rise to do October the seventh again, as it has vowed that it will, if it gets the chance and needing to get the hostages home. And, uh, lots of back and forth and controversy and divisiveness in Israel. And this, you know, speaking to you in the States, it's worth stressing 'cause perhaps people don't understand.
The hostage issue is a divisive political issue in Israel in a way that it isn't in the United States. I mean, I'm generalizing, but you know, you had two massive conventions by the two major parties in America shortly before the presidential elections, and in both of those conferences, families of hostages spoke and tens of thousands of people were unanimously empathetic and supportive and horrified and welcoming and warm that that's not the case in any unanimous sense.
In Israel, there's almost no. Effort being made on behalf of the hostages that does not have political overtones. There's almost no gathering without heckling or dissent or very heavy police presence, shall we say. It's not a unanimous above all else issue, in part because of the real security implications of deals done and deals not done. It's by its nature, I suppose, in Israel, more divisive than it would be amongst supporters of Israel abroad.
But you know, that's a, a huge tear in Israeli society. The controversy around how do you get hostages back? I mean, most people, even those who are critical of the families, think that Israel needs to get the hostages back. But in isolated extreme cases, and you may have seen stuff about this, people demonstrating on behalf of the hostages even released hostages.
Have been subjected to quite appalling terrible abuse, the most recent of which is Larry Alba, who's one of the IDF surveillance soldiers who was released in the currently stalled last deal being abused for ultimately blaming the Prime Minister for the failure surrounding October the seventh. Well, of course, the Prime Minister is ultimately to blame for the failures surrounding October the seventh, and she has said other things that are quite respectful, shall we say, of the Prime Minister.
But she was, you know, castigated, denounced in language that is, and more repeat, but including, you know, they should never have got you out kind of criticisms. So, can I ask you to help us understand this? Because when the war started after October 7th, they laid out three broad objectives of the war. One to return the hostages, two, to dismantle Hamas' military capacity, and three, to ensure that the day after Hamas would not be governing, uh, Gaza.
None of those objectives have been achieved fully. All of them were universally supported, and to my understanding, they are still supported. So what is the essence of the controversy now? I mean, apart from the fact that the controversy takes place in the context of such a divided Israeli political entity. Right. This is, again, I, I I refer to it before in passing, but it's very relevant.
We had five elections in four years here because the country is very divided or essentially does it want Prime Minister Netanya to, to, to remain its leader? So that's before any of this started. And then, you know, the actual practicalities regarding those three goals, you know, you can argue as the Prime Minister has done intermittently and very much of late, and so does his defense minister.
That military pressure is the only way you're gonna get hostages out either because they'll be able to be rescued, and that's kind of very at the margins now because it's become increasingly difficult to carry out any kind of rescue. There have been a very, very small number of hostages who were saved by the army. But the assertion is, and like I say, very much so now that Israel's renewed its military campaign, is that without heavy military pressure, you're not gonna get Hamas to give way.
There are other people who say, no, those, those goals are all important goals. We have to destroy Hamas. We have to make sure that Hamas cannot revive, but we can be doing that for a long time and we will probably be doing that for a long time. The urgent priority now is get the hostages out, and if that means stopping the war, stop the war.
Now, the counter to that, which I have to add people around Netanya, I'm not sure if Netanya himself has said it publicly, but the notion that you could somehow defraud Hamas, right? In other words, that you'd sign up for a deal. Under which you agree to stop the war in order to get the hostages out, that then you restart the war in Netanyahu Circle. And I'm sure the Prime Minister believes this as well. There's an assertion or a sense that, that you can't do that. Hamas is not that stupid.
And one way or another, whether it would be through binding security council resolutions that could then not be revoked or overturned. 'cause Russia would veto, you know, you can't pull the wall over Haas's eyes. And therefore, I mean the, just to go into a little, into the minutiae, a deal was signed in January in which, as you know, phase one saw the release of 33 Israeli hostages, 25 of them alive.
And under the terms of that deal, which of course Israel signed onto, it was supposed to be that we would negotiate on a second phase and the third phase, and in the second phase, the rest of the living hostages would be freed and Israel would withdraw the IDF completely from Gaza and agree to end the war. Now Israel signed off for that and it's often misreported as though Israel signed on to a binding second phase. In other words, it's now breaching that deal 'cause it hasn't ended the war.
That's not the case. Israel signed on to a binding first phase during which it would negotiate on the second phase. And instead the prime minister said, listen, I can't go through to phase two. 'cause phase two means ending the war, and if he ends the war, he won't be able to restart it. And therefore he has been trying to extend phase one more, a longer ceasefire and some more living hostages to be released. The Americans have been supportive of this. Steve Woff has been supportive of this.
There's endless reporting, including right now, suggesting that the Egyptians have made progress with Hamas on possible more hostage releases without an Israeli commitment to actually end the war. An Israeli commitment to discuss ending the war and so on. But that's why those three.
Goals, widely supported goals don't sit easily together because Hamas has not been prepared, essentially to release any more hostages at this stage without a sort of Israeli commitment guaranteed to buy America to end the war. And therefore you can't, as things stand, get more hostages out and destroy Hamas. That's the way the Israeli government sees it. And could you explain in detail for us, what is the national interest in getting all of the hostages out first?
Presumably the living hostages, is it simply a humanitarian issue, or is there something about Israeli national social cohesion that elevates this into also a security issue? I think it is a security issue. It's certainly all those other things you said as well in terms of, of why this might resonate in ways that aren't immediately apparent. The 24 hostages, broadly speaking, are men. Many of them are soldiers. Israel has always had a philosophy that says you don't leave anybody behind. Right.
And now it's much worse than leaving somebody behind in a battle. This is, these are people who were abducted in many, many cases fighting off the enemy inside Israel, trying to save lives. In some cases, in the most extraordinarily heroic way they've been held in Gaza. We know because other people have been held with them, uh, exactly the conditions under which they're held. They're chained in tunnels. They are starved. They're physically and psychologically abused.
It's been going on for 18 months. You know, the fact that we, we still believe that up to 24 are still alive, is quite extraordinary. And therefore, these are everybody's sons and fathers in some cases, right, who have been held for a year and a half and Israel. Obviously is facing the most cynical terrorist army, but has failed to get them out. So it's, I don't know if it's uniquely Israeli, but everything about this story is uniquely Israeli.
I don't know of parallels, certainly in the western world of hostages being taken in this number, being held for this long, and the incredible challenge of tackling a terrorist organization that is widely supported in the urban territory. It controls that cynically exploits everything about being able to fight from under and next to a civilian populace. It's incredibly emotionally and, and security wise, wrenching and untenable for Israel.
You can't just say, well, you know, it's only 24 people think how many other people might die. As a consequence, there are people who would make that argument. That leaves out the fact that nevermind these lives, which would, would just be unthinkable to just. Essentially give up on them. There's also the message it sends to Israel as a nation from its leadership that we will send you into battle and we won't always do everything to get you out.
And just, I would contrast that with the 2011 prisoner deal that Israel did, a single Israeli soldier was abducted from within his army base in Israel. That was the Gill Shali, right? Gid Shali. And in that deal, it was actually Yessir who was one of the people who was released, which adds, of course, again, underlines the complexity of this. So Israel under Netanya freed 1,027 Palestinian security prisoners for one soldier.
And therefore, the notion that the same prime minister would not, I mean, you know, the price paid for Shali as an individual, as things stand for sure is higher than the price that Israel is paying. For anybody who has been released so far. And these people were taking hostage because of a complete failure of the Israeli political and military leadership to understand what Hamas was up to. So that's another reason why it seems unthinkable.
Adding to the complication, of course, as you rightly say, among those who are free that day was Yu s There are people, I'm, I'm in that mix personally, who were very troubled by the 2011 deal because it was obvious that many, many more lives were gonna be lost, um, for the noble cause of. Getting home Gilet. I think that the balance and the equation is very different this time. And I hope that some of what I've said has sort of tried to explain why the context is so different this time.
Can I ask you, uh, as one who looks abroad and has expertise about Israel abroad here? Sadly, the issue of the hostages in the, uh, general population and as the media covers, uh, the conflict, uh, has sort of receded and, uh, it's mostly about Palestinian casualties. And from the beginning really, except for the first few weeks or maybe a month or two, that's the way the issue has been portrayed in the west. Help us understand the issue of Palestinian casualties.
Is that a significant issue in Israel and what is the moral equation in your view? First of all, I'm not even sure. It was a few weeks, I think from very, very soon, maybe sooner than that, after October the seventh, there was an effort internationally. I don't think it was coincidence. I don't think it was a genuine flaring of mainstream public opinion. I think it was a very well orchestrated effort to basically deny Israel the right, the capacity to defend itself.
And by the way, with extreme content of antisemitism as well, in some cases at least. So you had a very, very rapid effort to minimize or get over the fact that thousands of terrorists had invaded from a territory where Israel had no claims. Back to the pre 67 lines. Remember, Israel was, was out of Gaza, so they'd invaded, they'd killed 1200 people in horrific circumstances, most of them civilians. Unprovoked. You can argue as defenders of Hamas do that.
Well, you know, Israel is illegitimate altogether, or Israel still holds the West Bank. But let's just look at Gaza. Israel had left Gaza, and by the way, if Hamas or anybody in Gaza had built a safe and secure and dependable neighbor, Israel would probably have pulled out of a lot of the West Bank as well. So it hasn't been terribly helpful to the Palestinian cause that Hamas has been relentlessly murderous.
So I think the effort to deny Israel the right to defend itself, you know, what does, what does it mean? Divest from Israel. What does it mean? Don't sell arms to Israel. It means we'd like to see Israel destroyed. And if you have any doubt about that, our banners say from the river to the sea, Palestine will be free. Which means no Israel, that's basically the Hamas ideology. So I don't think it was a genuine flaring of mainstream public opinion.
I think it was orchestrated hostility designed to ensure that Israel would not survive. Um. In terms of how Israel has tried to fight, I don't know that there's a precedent for the kind of warfare. We are talking about a terrorist government in the entity next door that subverted all assistance for a war machine. Hamas, on the eve of October the seventh have 24 battalions, untold miles of tunnels.
I don't think Israel, in fact, I'm sure Israel underestimated quite how much of, of a, of an underground hell Hamas had constructed in Gaza. I, I think an awful lot of it is still intact, by the way. And in terms of civilian fatalities, you've got, I mean, I'm sure you've heard this before, but the fact that I'm repeating it doesn't make it any less true.
You've got a government indifferent to the wellbeing of its people that's Hamas, deliberately putting them in harm's way, and Israel trying to prevent, or trying to degrade, radically degrade. This would be genocidal GA and government. Without harming civilians. Has Israel been perfect in every regard? Of course not. Have there been incidents that Israel has apologized for and has rightly expressed regret over? For sure.
The bottom line is, of course, that it's Hamas that has chosen to fight this way. It's Hamas that opened this war, knowingly cold Bloodedly knowingly invaded the country next door.
I'm not sure whether they thought Israel would try as hard as it has tried to degrade them, but they were certainly ready for it, and they were certainly looking forward to it because they knew Israel would be fighting in their territory in an incredibly complicated urban environment in which they would be able to cynically blame Israel for all the death that they had brought onto Gaza. But I think in terms of morality and in terms of, well, how and why would it stop?
It would stop tomorrow if Hamas laid down its arms. It would never have started if Hamas had not invaded. And therefore the ways to bring this to an end. Unless, or until Israel can destroy Hamas as a military entity. And that's an ongoing effort. It could end tomorrow if Hamas behaved in a humane way regarding Israel and regarding the people of Gaza.
So do you feel that those, uh, international arrest warrants for the Prime Minister and the former defense minister, are they just something that Israelis don't even pay a passing attention to? Except for, you know, maybe on some kind of political level, do they consider the, uh, international legal system to be stacked against Israel? And what do you think specifically about those arrest warrants? I don't think, uh, Israelis are indifferent. I think they are aggrieved by it.
I think that there's a sense here that the international legal system has not been inclined, certainly not been able to recognize that the world is a different place from a few decades ago. There are terrorist organizations that are not some kind of ragtag, relatively weak organizations, but essentially governments. Gaza was governed by a terrorist organization. It was a, a, a terrorist government, uh, Hezbollah, which is less central and we don't know how that's gonna play out.
But Hezbollah basically was the dominant army of Lebanon, not a terrorist organization in the sort of familiar sense of the word from a few decades ago. An essential, maybe the dominant part of the government with the most powerful army in that country. And by the way, if you look at Hezbollah, one of the most powerful armies in the world, nevermind terrorism, Hamas is and was a terrorist government.
And I think Israelis feel very strongly that the international legal community in its various forums, and part of this is very much the UN have failed to evolve in any kind of. Reasonable and pragmatic and aware way the world has changed.
And, uh, you want to issue arrest warrants for an Israeli prime minister overseeing an effort to ensure that the terrorist government that is bent on destroying his country, you know, he's, he's the guy he used to be arresting when he is going to consult with allies in Europe or anywhere else abroad. I don't think Israelis are indifferent to it. I don't think they shrug it off.
And I think even lots of Israelis who don't have a great deal of time for Netanya or former defense Minister Gallant take personal offense at the issue of arrest warrants against them. And that describes your position as well? Uh, well, most of what I said thus, yeah. Um, no, in terms of. We can talk about what I feel about the Prime Minister, but in, in this context, absolutely. That the, the warrants are outrageous.
There's an argument to be made that, uh, Israel security situation, you've probably heard this argument as well, is better than it has been in decades, if ever. Hamas is, for all intents and purposes decimated, at least to the extent of envisioning that they would ever in the foreseeable future, be able to mount another. October 7th. Hezbollah defeated the Syrian government has gone. The Israelis revealed the weaknesses of the Iranian position.
You have a, uh, what is perceived to be a much more sympathetic American administration. Do you think that's true? Do you think just geopolitically and militarily in the region, is Israel better off now and could you make the claim that despite the immense pain and the unbelievable suffering and losses, that Israel actually improved its geopolitical situation? No, I would ferociously, uh, disagree with that argument.
First of all, Hamas is not finished and it's anything but finished ideologically, which is just a terrible thing. How can that be the case? These terrible people who've murdered vast numbers of innocence and who have brought ruin upon Gaza, they seem to have a great deal of support both within Gaza and as we've said already, go to the American university campuses, people that are, you know, cheering for Hamas. That's unbelievable and uh, so they're not out of the equation.
Hezbollah, it's interesting that definitely not the force that they were. Without getting carried away. And, you know, saying something vaguely, slightly positive from an Israeli perspective, they're weakened and you now have a new leadership in Lebanon that at least is saying things that are, uh, in the direction of trying to ensure that that country is not dominated by a genocide and terrorist organization. That has brought a fair amount of disaster down upon Lebanon as well.
You know, you, you didn't mention the Houthis who are just on the relative scale of things. Right? Yesterday afternoon, I don't remember what time the sirens, Blair and millions of Israelis have to run into bomb shelters if they want to be secure, that they're gonna survive. Not because the missiles are getting through, 'cause most of them aren't.
But because, and good physicists will understand this better than I do, Israel, you know, has been quite good at knocking their ballistic missiles out of the sky. But it's a shrapnel and who knows what. Can still travel hundreds of miles more and land, you know, in your garden or in your house or on your school in isolated cases. And that's like the least of our concerns at the moment.
Uh, Syria, I dunno, uh, he's wearing a suit now, but does that mean he is not a terrorist who wants to destroy Israel? I'm not convinced regarding Syria's new leadership. And by the way, you now have a greater Turkish role and certainly a much greater Wouldbe Turkish role. And the leader of Turkey, last time I checked, was a great supporter of Hamas, a vicious critic of Israel. And by the way, a self-declared by the president friend of Donald Trump, right?
So you've got a very dangerous, very well harmed regional player who's got good relations with the United States, even as he denounces Israel and talks up Hamas to his own people and others. And then I guess the last of those, in terms of geopolitical forces, you've got Iran, I. And Iran is closing in on the bomb, and Iran is no change there. Wants to see Israel wiped out. And you've got the beginning of negotiations, which I don't really wanna prejudge at this point.
But the early signs I think are very worrying. Iran is extremely expert and extremely cynical when it comes to its nuclear program. And I'm not sure if the American interlocutors are either of those things. And then the last thing, I mean, and maybe this is the reason, I guess why I disagree, most of all, with that assessment of Israel being unprecedentedly strong, you've got this tremendous strain within Israel. You know, we're still fighting a war, we're still missing people.
Reservists have been serving hundreds of days with tremendous economic consequences, psychological consequences, you know, fathers coming home and, and their very young children barely recognizing them. I'm not exaggerating it. A divide in Israel about military service 'cause the ultra orthodox don't serve and so on. So it's not as though there's this incredibly unified Israel that has defeated or radically set back all its enemies and is sitting pretty.
And, you know, I'm, I'm over simplifying that summation, but that's really not the way it seems, I don't think to Israelis as a whole serve him up to me. One more question before we get to the domestic situation. Mindful that, you know, there's a phrase in Judaism that prophecy has been given to fools. Do you wanna speculate, uh, whether 2025 we'll see the end of the hot war in Gaza, and where do you think we'll be by the close of 2025?
Yeah, I'm, I mean, I, I'm kind of tempted to answer the question, but the truth is. It would be so foolish. I, you know, I don't know. And nobody knows. And nobody knows. To the degree that two days before Bahar Assad was no longer the President Assyria, and nobody saw that coming. I mean, literally days, right? There's just no way of knowing this. All the elements are there for things to get much better and for things to get much worse.
There is so much hostility to Israel in this part of the world that both the extremes are possible and anything in between. Well, let me ask you in a slightly different way. How would it end for Israel positively? What would have to happen for Israel to say, okay, this war is over? From our perspective, we've achieved our national objectives. Well, you have to get home every hostage that you can get home in.
I mean, I, I'm not sure that 59 people can be brought home because I'm not sure that anybody knows where everybody is, who's no longer alive. The foreseeable danger of Hamas or Gaza being able to constitute a threat to Israel, that Hezbollah is a sort of semi guaranteed non threat across the northern border. So the people who've already begun moving home need not worry that things are gonna become terrible again.
Now we can go to the, wouldn't it be great if, but it's not a million miles away from this is what we need. Uh, we need to be sure that Iran, that this regime can't, can't get to the bomb because they're not very far away and we know that they enrich uranium to near weapons grade level. We know that they have ballistic missiles that can deliver a bomb. I'm not sure if we know everything about how far they are along on weaponization, but I think they're potentially fairly close.
Not to being a threshold nuclear power, but to being a nuclear weapons power. I don't see how we can be secure in Israel when this regime is that close to the bond. Beyond that, going beyond your question, the outcome that Israel needs ultimately is a neighborhood in which people are not being educated to try and wipe out this country and kill the Jews.
And that's why in, in terms of a strategic generational different reality, to me it comes down to education and that young people's minds are not poisoned. That rather there's a recognition that there are conflicting claims and conflicting narratives. And if one sanctifies life, then one has to find a way to compromise and genuinely coexist. Now that's beyond your question, and it's beyond the reasonable potential goals of a war. But I do wanna go beyond that.
'cause even if the war ends relatively well from an Israeli point of view in terms of its security and its national healing and so on. Israel's not gonna know. Abiding, stability, security, I, I wanna say the word peace, unless what people are taught in this part of the world and all over the world reflects the sanctity of life.
Can I ask you, looking back now on two and a half years of, uh, Netanyahu and elections have to take place, I think by 2026, they may happen, uh, earlier, as I mentioned before, you're a tough-minded critic of, uh, Netanyahu. You're very worried about domestic cohesion as well as threats to, uh, democratic norms.
Are you able to say, broadly speaking, if you had to identify the one or the two or three major transgressions of Prime Minister Netanyahu and this government over the last two and a half, three years, are you able to identify that and give us a broad sense of what is the central indictment against this government? Yeah, I mean, it's not something I seek to do or seek to be like a nonstop critic of Netanya.
I'm somebody who wants this country to survive and thrive as a democratic and Jewish state, and it has a prime minister who's incredibly divisive, who I don't know what his actual principles are. I think he's very intent on survival. I think he's persuaded himself that Israel is lost unless he is the prime minister and he's in that mindset.
Even though he presided over the worst disaster to befall the Jewish people since the Holocaust, the judicial overhaul, this was initially what's presented as some kind of reform. There are aspects of Israel's judicial system that could use reforming, but subjugating the judiciary to the political echelon is not one of them. And that's what this legislation is intended to do. It's unthinkable. We have no constitution.
The legislature is a tool of the executive when there's a unified coalition as we have now, which means if you don't have an independent judiciary, the government can do what it wants. And that's terrible. That's, that's not how you safeguard a democracy. It's the opposite. So that would be one thing. And then the second thing is, is the failure of October the seventh.
Now you or any of your friends or my children, if they had been Prime Minister in the days, weeks, months, even years before October the seventh. I submit would've done a better job than Israel's leadership, ultimately Netanyahu, ahead of October the seventh.
Because you'd have looked at the intelligence assessments that unanimously insisted that Hamas was not interested in escalation and was interested in governance, and you would've seen that this was the conclusion, despite the fact that here's this plan that Hamas has drawn out to invade, and here's this 24 battalion army that they've built. And in the months before, here they are drilling near the border.
And here's this TV series that they've shown on television in which they're dramatizing an invasion of Israeli army bases and crossing the border in multiple places. And getting closer still. They're drilling right next to the border with Toyota White pickup trucks, and they're sending up drones to blow up cameras on the border, and they're blowing little holes in the fence.
And you just said, okay, I understand that you all think that this is bravado, and Hamas is not really interested in invading, but all the evidence would suggest that they are. So what precautions are we taking just in case our intelligence estimates are wrong? And if you got an unsatisfactory reply, well, maybe we should send some more troops down to that border just in case the assessments are wrong. Right? None of that happened.
I didn't even mention the fact that for years, Netanya encouraged Qatar to send money into Gaza to help ensure calm and a reasonable humanitarian situation when Hamas, of course, was subverting all resources to build this war machine when October the seventh then happens. If you don't wanna resign because the buck stops with you, then there are two things I think you really owe to the public. One is when it's not going to fatally disrupt the war effort, you hold elections.
If you're not gonna resign, you at least give the people the choice of whether they want to keep you as their leader. I don't think that's a democratic prerequisite. I just think that would've been the right thing to do. But the one thing that I think in this context is unforgivable is you order the proper inquiry into what went wrong.
Not only because there will be people whose the finger of blame will point towards them with consequences, but most importantly, to make sure that you are gonna not be vulnerable to this again, that you'll be as effective as you can integrating Hamas now, and that the errors and the blunders and the blindness. That enabled this to happen, you know, the processes and the norms and the steps are in place to ensure that it cannot happen again, and that he has refused to do.
He knows that a state commission of inquiry will ultimately place blame on his shoulders, even if the military and the security establishment were the insistent prisoners of an unfathomable mis assessment of Hamas. Nonetheless, the buck stops with him and he has not consented in.
In fact, rather than consent to a state commission of inquiry, he has battered away at the legitimacy of the judiciary by saying, I can't agree to a state commissioner of inquiry, because the head of it will be appointed by the chief justice and the head of it will be a former justice. And half the country doesn't trust the judicial system anymore. Well, half the country doesn't trust the judicial system anymore. By the way.
I'm not sure that that's true at all, but a proportion doesn't because he has been inciting against the credibility and decency and representative nature of the judiciary. So those are some of the areas that I've criticized him, all of which I should stress out of an interest to ensure that this country survives. Thrives, is not vulnerable again in the future. You know, if Netanya called elections and he was elected again, which I think is entirely possible, so be it.
So the people of Israel said, we understand what happened nonetheless. We think he is the best person to leave this country. That would be, you know, you can't argue with the voice of the people. I think after October the seventh, it would've been appropriate to go back to the people.
Do you think there's merit to the criticism against Netanyahu, that he's extending the war in this way in order to keep the coalition intact, uh, prevent, uh, the commission of investigation being established and eventually elections? I I, I don't wanna give you a definitive answer because I'm not sure, um, when you asked me before about those war aims and why is it that they're problematic, you know, that's part of the reason why on this, I'm wary of saying something definitive.
The war aims are, are the necessary war aims. I, you know, I agree with that. You've gotta get the hostage back. You've gotta make sure Hamas is no longer capable of militarily or in a civilian way governing Gaza. And you've gotta somehow do your best to ensure that Gaza, again, whether it's Hamas or some other entity. Cannot threaten Israel, and therefore if you are in trying to work out how to do that, which Israel has tried to do, I don't know if other leaders would've been more successful.
I'm not sure. We can't know that. And I don't know if one should be that cynical. Even for example, I don't know what to make of the claim that you can't do a deal or you couldn't have gone through to the second phase of this deal, got the rest of the living hostages out and not been able to resume the war. I don't know what to make of that claim, uh, especially with this administration. So I think there's an argument that leaves room for some cynicism. Um, but I'm not sure.
I'm not sure enough, you know, is it possible that you couldn't get a deal with Hamas without a security council resolution guaranteeing that phase two happens in the way it's supposed to. In other words, the army would withdraw. It's the end of the war, and then afterwards, because there was that resolution, and Russia would veto any revoking of that resolution, you truly can't go back to tackle Hamas. I don't know what to make of that. I'm not in the room. I dunno what Hamas is saying.
I'm not convinced by it, but I think it would be inappropriate or I don't know, too arrogant for me to rule that out as a serious consideration. You know, by contrast, when Netanya said we can't leave the Philadelphia corridor, 'cause if we do, we'll never be allowed to go back. And that was an argument that delayed the January agreement. I don't buy that argument. I don't think that's true. I think Israel could have gone back, and that was before Trump was reelected.
If Netan had said, listen, I, I did that deal in 2011, 1,027, security prisoners fate, and we let ua, I can't do that. I, again, I can't do it the way Hamas is structuring its demands. I can't do it. I would've been much more empathetic than him raising the issue of the corridor along the Gaza Egypt border. But we, you know, we're not in the room. I don't know what Hamas is saying. And therefore I can't be that definitive.
Can I ask you to elaborate on, uh, your comment a few minutes ago that you think it is eminently plausible that Netanya could be reelected? Uh, the elections will take place at the latest in 2026, so sometime within the next, uh, year to year and a half. Although usually even governments that serve close to their full term, they never actually get to the full extent of the term allowed by law. Uh, so some, it's fair to assume that sometime in the next year there should be elections.
Elaborate on why you think there is a realistic possibility that Netanya would be reelected. So, first of all, the elections are due very late next year, towards the end of next year. We don't know whether they'll be brought forward or not. He's in a different league from, I think all other Israeli politicians. He's incredibly articulate. He's incredibly compelling.
I mean, I don't know how many prime ministers would not have been finished by October the seventh, just mass public criticism and despair. A leader who didn't himself step down. I can't imagine very many who would've survived the anger at the failure, not because people don't know that the blame points mostly to Hamas. Of course they do. Hamas invaded, Hamas, murdered and sorted and brutalized, and burned and raped. But you were the prime minister on who's watched this happen.
So the very fact that he survived that Ammi is a testament to his extraordinary political skills. That's what it is. And then, you know, you look at the history and you look at oppositional leaders like Benny Gantz, who several times came quite close to Ousting Netanya. But in the end. Seems to make the worst possible decision at every crucial moment with good intentions. And one of those was basically saving Netanyahu.
When Netanya was nearly finished, there was the Bennett Lapid government that unseated Netanyahu for, um, a fairly short period, and which Netanya brought down because Bennett had been, I don't know, not attentive enough in putting together his list of candidates who came with him into the class. And one by one, they were prized away until his coalition had lost its majority.
So when you look at who the alternatives are and how skilled and effective they might be at the Dark Art of politics, I think it's surprising that anyone would assume that Netanyahu is finished. I understand why people think that. 'cause they look at the opinion polls. Well, the opinion polls are reliably wrong in Israel. There are all kinds of factors behind that. But among them is the fact that they underestimate Netanyahu's electoral skills. Just take an issue like social media.
'cause I, I think I checked this not too long ago. If you look at social media followers for Netanyahu and people like, uh, Bennett and Gantz and Lapid, he's got, last time I checked something like 3 million people following him on Twitter on his main account. And the leaders that I'd mentioned probably have about a sixth of that. But beyond their endless circles of social media influence, and therefore anything that Natanya wants to get out impacts millions of people multiple times.
And his opponents have nothing like that sway. Um, and it's nuanced as well. There are people who are more extreme supporters spreading more extreme messages. Look at Israeli media. I. There's a television channel, channel 14 in Israel, which is basically a Netanyahu TV channel. There's another one that's heading in that direction. There are newspapers or websites that are very supportive of him.
By the way, there are newspapers and websites that are very strongly opposed to him, but in terms of tv, I think it's very significant that he has Channel 14 in Israel, which is probably now the second most popular TV channel in the country having been sort of nowhere a couple of years ago.
So this is a very, very smart world class politician with tremendous support in media and tremendous support in social media up against people who are all familiar, and one of whom, or two of them, if you wanna put Lape and Ben together, briefly unseated him. And even that experiment underlines how ultimately successful he was and how. Inept. They were, you know, they defeated him and he still got back into power because he persuaded some of their loyalists, you know, to cross the house.
Three more just brief, uh, issues. First of all, with respect to the Haredi draft, the Army is groaning under the manpower burden and they're pleading with government for more, uh, manpower. As you mentioned earlier, there are people who are doing, uh, hundreds of days of reserve service as it is. Where do you think that issue is going to evolve in the coming period?
So, again, I, I don't know how it's gonna play out, but I think it's a very significant issue and it's very significant also in the context of the last question. In other words, there, I think he's pretty vulnerable, Natanya, he's got to keep the two ultra Orthodox parties in his coalition on board and their leaderships do not want their constituency to do any kind of military or national service.
And we're not only talking about those young males who are in Yeshiva full-time, we're talking about young males generally, and this is a point of real conflict with the rest of Israeli society, but it's also a point of real conflict with modern Orthodox Israelis who are disproportionately represented in the military and who have as a consequence, disproportionate loss. And you can see that friction escalating really month by month.
Why is the Prime Minister not obligating the fastest growing community in Israel to share their responsibilities to the protection of the state? Moreover, in an environment in which the army is basically saying, whatever you need us to do, in order for you to be able to serve and not have your lifestyle sort of destroyed from beneath your booted feet, if you, you know, we'll build Yeshivas in the Jordan Valley so you can help protect that border and mix that with Torah study, for example.
You know, the Army has. Projects like that. And instead of which you've got tens of thousands of call up orders going out to the Al Ultraorthodox community and almost nobody actually heeding the calls. I'm not sure that there isn't a significantly greater willingness or desire even to do national service in the community, but the leadership, rabbinical and political is set against it.
Um, just again, to give you a little flavor here, there's a mother, bereaved mother from an Orthodox community who's kind of leading a battle for the Al Orthodox to do military service. And, uh, with, with significant support. She may even start going into politics to champion this goal, but it's, it's the area in which Natanya is pretty vulnerable. And in terms of electability, it'll be a problem for him. I mean, it's been a front burner issue for a long time.
It's never been more prominent an issue because as you rightly have stressed there, this inequality of the burden. In the interview I saw with her last night, this Beave mother was quoting Derry, the leader of the Shas party, saying, you know, something like he, he wouldn't want his son to return from the army, having lost his orthodoxy or his ultra orthodoxy. And she said, you know, my son returned from the army in a coffin, and that was kind of atypically burning from her.
She's not like a, an aggressive speaker, but that gives you a sense of how profound the argument and the friction is. Tell us about this Qatar controversy now. How serious is that and does it pose a threat to the government? I mean, the allegation essentially is that 1, 2, 3, maybe aids to Netanya. Were working for Qatar and paid by Qatar to lobby on behalf of Qatar even while they were working for the Prime Minister and.
Allegedly also may even have disseminated materials from the Prime Minister's office that were in anonymous communications with reporters that were not messages coming from the leadership of Israel, but rather messages that they were relaying on behalf of Qatar, which is pretty radical. Nakata is not, it's not an enemy state. It is, as Tenino likes to say, it's a complicated state. Of course, he was encouraging them to send tens of millions of dollars into Gaza for years.
I don't know where it's gonna go. It's kind of linked to an earlier case in which charges have already been filed against two people for the theft of classified IDF intelligence documents, and in one case, the leaking of material from one such document to a German tabloid in a way that was designed to sort of take the pressure of Netanya after Hamas killed six of its hostages last August. I don't know where the Qar gate saga is gonna go. If you did make me try to make a prediction.
I tend to think that it might not go anywhere. I'm not sure that people will be charged, and if they are charged, I'm not sure that they'll be successfully prosecuted. 'cause maybe there's a lot that hasn't come out yet. I mean, a colleague from the journalistic community, the editor of the Jerusalem Post, was arrested and questioned under caution.
And if we know everything that is to be known about that affair, there's a fundamental misunderstanding of what journalism is on behalf of his interrogators. He went to Qatar and he reported on Qatar. Now you might not like his reports, or you might love them, but that's not actionable behavior in terms of criminality. So I don't know how savvy all of these investigations are and if they really are gonna lead to prosecution. And beyond that conviction, not not convinced.
And my last question here on the internal situation is, uh, the head of internal security, Shabbat looks like he's on the way out, although it's being litigated. Now, between the, uh, judiciary and the government, there's some speculation that after they finished with him, they want to go after the Attorney General. How serious are these developments and how serious is this attack against the Democratic infrastructure? So yeah, that's, that's the context in which to view it.
The head of the SBA was in fact fired by unanimous cabinet vote, but the Supreme Court, as of now has issued two. Interim injunctions against his dismissal. And there was a hearing last week which was pretty raucous and unpleasant with, I would say, orchestrated protests against the legitimacy of the court. He may step down, I suppose, of his own accord, or it might be that the court engineers a compromise, dunno how that's gonna play out.
And in the case of the attorney general, first of all she told the government that you can't fire him in the way that you are planning to do so because there are procedures. Including a committee that recommends people for such appointments also has to be consulted if they're to be rescinded. Israel's never fired a serving Shin BET chief before, and she was saying, I, I won't be able to defend the government if you do go ahead with this. And that's exactly what happened. They fired him.
There were petitions to the Supreme Court. The Attorney General said, well, you know, you shouldn't have fired him. I told you not to fire him and I'm not gonna be defending you against these petitions. Um, they took a vote in her case just days after they had fired the Shin bet, um, to begin the process of seeking her dismissal. That's more complicated. It's not something that they can do overnight, but you are trying to ous the head of the legal hierarchy, the law enforcement hierarchy.
She's the government's chief legal officer and she's also sort of the head of the prosecution system. It's a very. Demanding role. And by the way, there's room to reform that role, but that's not the goal here. The goal here in her case, Gali Ra, is her name, is to get rid of an attorney's journal who keeps irritatingly telling the government what she thinks are the democratic requirements that they're not always honoring.
Uh, and therefore it is part of, it's part of the battering of the institutions of our democracy. You have a police force that is led by a minister, ITA Beng Vir, who is a criminal recidivist and is brutalizing the police. You can see it, you can see the behavior of the police at demonstrations becoming rougher. So you've got a police force with a ministerial chief who's should not be in anybody's government.
You've got a justice minister who's determined to subjugate the judiciary, the Shin Bet chief, who's, you know, the, the one of the claims is that Ronen Barr was fired because, uh, Natanya has actually asserted that he and the attorney Journal initiated this QAR gate investigation. So that Netanya would not be able to fire a hin bet chief who was investigating him. But the timeline doesn't actually work like that. It, uh, it doesn't back up Netanyahu's argument.
It is part of this wider challenge to the institutions of democracy and it's, uh, it's very trouble. So my last, uh, observation here is to give you an opportunity to express to the diaspora Jewish community your sense of what are the strengths of Israel and are you optimistic about its future? So the strengths of Israel, I think are its people. I think we're incredibly resilient and capable and innovative people.
And we also feel very strongly, I think, speaking on behalf of the people of Israel, that the Jewish people better hang onto their state because the wellbeing of the Jewish people everywhere depends upon it. I also think in time there'll be a new generation of public leaders, and I think they will be shaped by the circumstances of the last 2, 2, 3 years and restore some of the value of public service. But that's, you know, that's my, my source of optimism. The, the people of this country.
You know, I'll end with this. What we've been through, I don't want you to have to imagine the United States, just something like, you know, an Iranian ballistic missile attack. This was the, the story of last year. By the way, the Iranians have, you know, they've sent some drones our way. It'll take about 12 hours to get here. Don't worry. He says the army spokesman, we'll keep you informed and then a few hours pass. Well, they've actually launched some cruise missiles now.
They'll take a couple of hours to get to you. But you know, so, you know, don't go too far from the safe rooms that we've been building in our homes for the last, you know, half a generation. And then, well actually ballistic missiles are on the way now. They take 12 minutes to get there. So right now you need to enter the sealed rooms. And don't worry, we've got the best missile defense systems in the world, multi-level, and you'll be fine.
But make sure you listen to us, we'll tell you when it's safe to come out. And the Nation of Israel does what it's told and goes into its sealed rooms when the moment has come and waits for a few minutes and then you know, comes back out again and the next morning, you know, did the country rise up in anger at anybody? Its leadership, the Iranians, the world. No, just went back to work and went back to the cafes. I'll bring you right up today, yesterday. There's a HT missile on its way.
Sirens ring out all over Israel. It's a very loud noise. People are on the beach in Tel Aviv. You can see the footage. They all run towards whatever shelter they can find, and then a few minutes later, the all clear goes, literally minutes later, people are back in the cafes. The yoga class on the beach has resumed. I saw someone posting the picture of it. Okay. And, and on we go. Now that's, that's incredible. It's also radically atypical.
I don't know of another society that could deal with that. And we do. I don't, I wish we didn't have to. Don't get me wrong. But you know, this is a pretty tough country with some pretty resilient people. With that, David Horowitz one. Thank you for the time you've given us now, and two for the incredible work that you're doing. It's so important. One to explain to diaspora Jews what's happening, but two, for you to be this constant check on what is right, what is good, what is democratic.
It's a phenomenal, uh, task that you've undertaken and that you're doing, and we're very grateful to you. I just have to say, we have a fantastic team here at the Times of Israel who are like all Israelis going through. I mean, we're 18 months into a war. The diplomatic correspondent, you know, will be going back to Milam fairly soon. Another of my reporters, her son is in the paratroopers, has been in Gaza a lot of the time. One of our desk editors has been up north.
Reserves, et cetera, et cetera. We're all, you know, we're living this as we're trying to report it fairly, and it's a terrific team that we have here. It's good to know and, uh, convey to them on our behalf too that you just, all of you are doing a terrific job. Among the central functions of a free press is to hold the powerful accountable. Great journalists not only report the news, they express opinions that are often critical of public officials.
David Horowitz and the Times of Israel are doing a tremendous service for the Jewish state and world Jewry. Jews do not hesitate to debate and criticize. Our tradition celebrates when people debate in good faith, when they differ with each other in pursuit of a greater truth. Jews argue over everything.
The Jewish tradition is one long, remarkable, millennia old record of disagreement after disagreement, controversy after controversy, and dispute after dispute, our sacred texts explode with conflicting opinions of the same Biblical verse. You can hardly open even one page of Talmud without encountering numerous debates over seemingly minor matters. Often these disputes are unresolved. The rabbis were content to leave room for future generations to join the fray and try to sort it all out.
Judaism is emphatic persuasion, logic, reason, proof, vigorous challenge, openness to debate evidence, and a willingness to reconsider when new evidence emerges. These are the tools of the intellectual trade and the prerequisites for social progress and communal decency. It is one key reason why Jews do well in Western democracies that are themselves based upon the same principles of intellectual and communal pluralism.
Around 85% of American Jews define themselves as either pro-Israel or Zionist. While the 15% of our community that is not in this camp makes a lot of noise, they are in reality, a small component of American Jewry. What we, the 85% debate is how best to improve Israel, not whether a Jewish state is a good idea or how we should join our enemies in destroying Israel.
Jews once debated whether a Jewish state was a good idea at all in the early years of the Zionist movement, but the time for this debate has long passed since the Holocaust and the creation of the state of Israel. Israel is now a fact. There are 10 million Israeli citizens, seven and a half million of them Jews. I spend considerable time speaking with and reading the opinions of those Jews who claim to be anti-Zionist. As a matter of principle, I do not cancel any Jew.
If they are prepared to speak with me, I certainly am prepared to speak with them. This is especially the case with regard to young American Jews. I feel I have an obligation to state with clarity and forcefully what I and most Jews believe and to tell yes. Even young Jews, when I think they are wrong, I don't really know what they mean when they say they're anti Zionists, and I'm not sure that they themselves know. Do they mean they dislike Israeli governments and policies?
If so, join the long line. Or do they mean what Israel's opponents mean? That Zionism is an evil ideology and that Israel is a European oppressor state that is persecuting minorities of color. Do they mean what Hamas means and executed on October 7th? Do they mean what Hezbollah and Iran mean?
Do they mean what anti-Israel campus and street activists mean from the river to the sea globalize the Antifa, and do they take into account how many of our people would be murdered and dispossessed to achieve this dream of our enemies? Since I believe that the way to deal with bad ideas is to present better ideas.
I take every opportunity I get, both publicly and in more intimate conversation to emphasize, especially to younger American Jews, that the idea of the national existence of the Jewish people in the land of Israel is not a 20th century innovation. It is as old as Judaism itself. The idea of the national restoration of the Jewish people in the land of Israel began the day after the Romans destroyed the Jewish kingdom in the year 70 ce.
A contemporary political movement called Zionism is simply the latest and most successful political expression of these sentiments. Jewish sovereignty in the land of Israel has been the cornerstone of Jewish beliefs and the foundation of Jewish history since the birth of our people. The Jewish presence in the land of Israel gave birth to three great faiths long before Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon were carved out by the British and the French.
After World War I, the Jews were in the land of Israel. Long before the birth of Islam, the Jews were there. Long before the birth of Christianity, the Jews were there long before Mecca, there was Jerusalem more than anything else. Israel reminds us that we are part of a bigger story. It compels us to hope, to dare and to accomplish. As David and I discussed, there are plenty of challenges in Israel.
There are enough serious problems to keep Israelis and all those who care about Israel busy for a very long time. But Israel testifies to the resilience and the grandeur of the human spirit. The Jewish people's craving for life is indomitable. What is this so-called right to exist that the Arab world and some Western intellectuals throw at Israel as if from all the nations of the world, only the Jewish nation's right to exist is somehow in question. Jews do not need your permission to exist.
The Jews are here to stay. The Jewish state is here to stay all this noise from foes of Israel. So what? To paraphrase, mark Twain noise proves nothing. Often a hen who has merely laid an egg cackles. As if she has laid an asteroid. Until next time. This is in these times.