A Revulsion of Feeling: The Arab Revolt and Collective Identity

don't really have a name yet. But this is the first installment of my attempt at adapting my academic papers that I've been writing into at least somewhat entertaining podcast form. Before we get into that, I want to give a quick shout out to my executive producer level supporters over on Patreon, that is John Andre Sather and Mike Maylebin. You guys are as always awesome and do so much

to help keep the lights on here. And if the rest of you listening would like to also pitch in and help out supporting the show, head over to Patreon dot com slash History Impossible, or head over to Historympossible dot substack dot com and become a paid subscriber there. Every little bit helps. I really cannot stress that enough. As well as just promoting the show as best you can to people who might be interested, especially when the episodes have to do with events that are related to

current events. Really that seems to capture a lot of folks imagination. So please spread the word about History Impossible. Go on Reddit. People seem to be always asking for recommendations there, So if you're a re dditor and you like the show, give it a shout out on any of those subreddits out there. But yes, so this was a quick one in a lot of ways, even though it's longer I think than a lot of average podcast episodes out there. But it's a quick one compared to

what I usually get into with this show. In this case, we are going to be looking at the Arab Revolt of nineteen thirty six to nineteen thirty nine. As I did in the paper that this is based on a lot of stuff might seem familiar because a lot of it is from material that I used in previous episodes of History Impossible and expands upon it. There's a lot

of really good, interesting details in there. Though I think I gave a pretty decent overview of the revolt and why it was so important to a kind of nebulous concept, but one that I find very interesting that I haven't. I've talked about it a little bit in one way

or another, but never in this straightforward theoretical way. I guess about collective identity and historical memory and its role in forming those identities, and I think there's really no better example in modern history, at least than that of the Israeli Palestinian conflict, as well as the role of the British Empire in that. There's other examples, of course, and I do mention one or two in this episode, but this one, I think is the one that is

most recognizable to people. So it's in some ways the best way to discuss the subject of historical memory and collective identities. So with all of that said, let's get into some impossible history. Well, let me tell you what you would have seen and heard. If we're not being pleasant listening, if you're at lunch, or if you have no appetite, now it is a good time to switch off the radio.

disconsolate children at a party. We don't want ja, we don't want honey, we don't want cake, we want jelly, Alas there is no jelly. Edward Keith Roach, the gathering at the Beayrout Department in the spring of nineteen thirty nine was full of high spirits. The members of the

Arab Higher Committee were celebrating. After three years of boycotts, protests, fighting and suffering, they had extracted the greatest victory in the history of their nationalist movement, concessions from the British Empire. This victory was not just over their imperial oppressors, it was a setback for their nationalist rivals, the Zionists, who up until this moment had seemed to have the world

on their side. But with the release of the document that came to be known as the McDonald White Paper, all that had changed Jewish immigration to Palestine not only would cease, but it and all immigration would be placed under the jurisdiction of Arab leadership over the course of a few years, with true Palestinian statehood promised in writing to occur after that. However, one man was not smiling.

In fact, the founder and leader of the Committee, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Jaja min Al Husseini, was firmly opposed to the proposal, despite it being a victory for his cause by most metrics imaginable dissenting from the near consensus on the White Paper's qualities. This disagreement became a feature of the still gestating Arab national identity that had

placed Palestine and its nationhood at its center. A few weeks later, one of the most prominent Zionists in the world, High Invitesmen, gave an address to the English Zionist Federation. In this address, Wetzmen responded to the White Paper by calling it quote the death sentence of the Jewish National Home unquote. Continuing, Wetzmen pledged not to quote conclude on a sad note unquote, and that quote, we will carry

on our work. It is an old tradition of ours, and no amount of obstacles will deter us from our purpose. And he concluded by claiming, quote, I do not believe that very soon there will be a revulsion of feeling, and that these temporary necessities will disappear unquote, and that quote. Long before the Balfour Declaration, God had decreed that our

destiny is bound up with Palestine. And against this decree all decrees of humans, however mighty, they may appear to themselves, and at the time are as not they will blow away like chaff before the wind. The British Empire, meanwhile, had been attempting to thread the needle of the Palestinian Mandate for over two decades by this point, trying to strike a balance between the competing nationalist interests of the Arabs and the Zionists, all while coping with the rise

of an aggressive Nazi Germany in Europe. They were also coming to terms with their once globe spanning empire going into decline, something on which they were intent to see

done with their dignity as a nation intact. Two years earlier, in nineteen thirty seven, a document reporting the results of what was known as the Peo Commission made this clear, pledging that quote the British people will not flinch from the task of continuing to govern Palestine under the Mandate if they are in honor bound to do so unquote.

Seeing colonial holdings as progressing towards self government, a frequently stated goal in the Holy Land, was part of the growing sense and what it would turn out to be post hawk justification that the quote demise of the Empire marked the fulfillment rather than the renunciation of Britain's imperial mission. According to the historian A. J. Stockwell, there was also a longstanding undercurrent of Christian Zionism, informing much of the

decision making that was in play. This was seen most dramatically when British Army officer Orda Wingate stated, quote, there is only one important book on the subject of Zionism, the Bible, and I have read it thoroughly unquote. This attitude, while not wholly representative of the British imperial authorities in the Palestinian Mandate, would still loom pretty large as a

motivating factor alongside their more geopolitical concerns. This confluence of motives ultimately what led to the British Empire to attempt their balancing act behind the scenes. Little did they know that in their efforts to placate their Arab enemies and cushion the fall of their alien empire, while some of them also attempted to fulfill their own sense of mission via their Christian Zionism, they had managed to make themselves

an enemy of everyone. The Arab revolt of nineteen thirty six in nineteen thirty nine has done relatively little to arouse the historical imagination, either among the populace or even among historians studying the long running conflict in the Holy Land. In both the Arabic speaking and English speaking worlds, it has been overshadowed by other events in the conflict's history.

As writer, historian and friend of the podcast or In Kessler explains, quote, no single general interest account has yet been written of this formative but forgotten insurgency unquote, apart from about three books written in English since the mid nineteen nineties, a single book written in Hebrew, and very

little work written in Arabic. This historiographic neglect is due to many reasons, most of which go beyond the scope of this special episode and the paper from which it's derived, but it is usually overshadowed, it being the Arab revolt by the official formation of the State of Israel in nineteen forty eight, known to Arab nationalists as the Nakba or catastrophe, marking it as a foundational date in the

Arab nationalist historical memory. Quoting the Syrian academic Constantine Zurak, historian Gilbert Ascar explains that the Nakba took on a greater significance than other events because it was quote not a mere setback or a simple transitory misfortune, but a catastrophe in every sense of the word, a calamitous ordeal of among the most difficult that the Arabs have undergone in the course of a long history full of ordeals and calamities. This appears to be a sufficient explanation for

how large the Nakba looms in the historical memory. However, according to Mustapha Caaba, a deeper reason that the Arab revolt has been quote completely overshadowed by the memory of the Nagma unquote is because quote dealing with nineteen thirty six to nineteen thirty nine requires more soul searching quote.

This is in part because the Arab volt's outcome came to represent one of the greatest failures of Arab nationalism, paving the way for the future Nakba, making it an inglorious event in their history that their leadership brought upon themselves. As Kaba explains, quote, it resulted in a self inflicted

wound that weakened Palestinian ability to cope with future challenges unquote. Similarly, the Zionist would frequently invoke nineteen forty eight as a historically definitional event in their history in defending his new state's war with the Arab states and against accusations of quote unwanted in transigence unquote. Chiam Weitzman would write in nineteen forty eight that quote for treat would be fatal quote, and that quote independence is never given to a people.

It has to be earned, and having been earned, it has to be defended quote. Weitzmann, like many who echoed him in the years and decades that followed, was mistaken if he believed that the idea of Zionis statehood needing to be earned as opposed to negotiated, was borne by the struggles of nineteen forty eight. The Arab revolt of nineteen thirty six. In nineteen thirty nine was thus significant

for multiple reasons in the history of the Israeli Palestinian conflict. Overtly, it was a conflict between a semi unified front of Arab nationalists and the British authorities of Mandatory Palestine, with the Zionists both taking part and getting caught in the crossfire, drawing them further into the conflict and deepening the divides that already existed and continued to exist in the region

between these three factions. Less obviously, however, it was a conflict that served as a logical endpoint in the formation of these different groups, very identities that came to define them in the years that followed. This was thanks in large part to the historical memory that revolt itself and what its outcomes represented. Therefore, it is important for us to ask to what extent were the respective identities of the Arab nationalists, the Zionists, and the British Empire the

events of the Arab Revolt. The short answer is to

a significant extent. When examining the events of the revolt themselves, combined with the contemporaneous observations and later reflections of those involved and the three factions involved, it is clear that each major power involved in the revolt largely developed and even in some cases finalized, their collective identities visa vis the revolt's events, turning the revolt itself into a powerful example of historical memory that informed future behavior, including that

of the State of Israel and the Arab nationalist movements that opposed it. Historical memory and the formation of identity, thanks to its invocation of a collective past, social memory is tied tightly to the creation of communities and nations.

This is the basis for historical memory. As Jeffrey Cubitt observes, quote, the past takes mental shape by being viewed as the breeding and testing ground of today's social collectivities, which are themselves interpreted by the same token as the possessors of an organic durability rooted in the deep continuities of an earlier history. Now, some might understandably assume that historical memory begins after some time is passed, similar to the regular

individual memories that populate our minds. However, this is not the case, as Cubit notes, with the obvious exceptions of events that likely never happened in the first place. Quote, the memory of an event or of a historical experience begins with the event or experience itself, while a consensus on the contents of an event can never be reached through objective measures. I mean, this is history, after all,

It's not exactly a hard science. This does very little to prevent the events in question from taking on significance in the minds of those who experience them firsthand. We're talking about national myth here, both in this particular case but broadly speaking as well. Now, in fact, this lack of consensus is why historical memory is so powerful. Now, counterintuitive as it might seem, this lack of consensus, in fact, is why historical memory is so powerful. Interpretations of the

events themselves lies in the eye of the beholder. Like I was basically saying, just a moment ago, which is subject to all kinds of bias, preconceived notions and political concerns of the moment. Now, these biases, notions, and concerns

affect people at all times. So it is obvious that events which take on greater meaning with time become meaningful almost immediately upon their occurrence, though it by no means is always the case, Cubid explains, quote, the establishment of this status as potential objects of memory can be more

or less instantaneous. Whether or not this status is conferred immediately following the event or years later is less relevant than the power that such memory possesses to change or even create a new collective identity, i e. A community based largely on imagined kinship through shared experiences. As Benedict Anderson and writes, this identity is built on imagined kinship because quote, the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members meet them or

even hear of them. Yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. Anderson also persuasively argues that this collective identity quote is imagined as a community because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. The power of the imagined community comes from the historical memory, and this historical memory can form just

as the event that created that memory is happening. As Jeffrey Cubit explains, Quote, the ways in which an event or collective experience is registered in public and private consciousness at the time of its occurrence and during the period when it is still in living memory exert a powerful, though not necessarily a determining influence on the meanings it may later be invested with.

that provide evidence of collective suffering. We've seen that in a lot of episodes of history impossible, particularly the ones that concern Israel and Palestine, but also the ones that

concern places like Yugoslavia and its own constituent identities. And indeed, as Jeffrey Cubitt explains, quote, civil wars, national des feats, foreign occupations, with their accompanying experiences of resistance and collaboration, genocidal atrocities, episodes of state sponsored terror produce ruptures, conflicts, and insecurities within society at large and within the lives

of countless individuals unquote. However, even though violence often plays a role in this process of identity formation, I mean again, this is history. A lot of history is built on violence, if not most of it, at least the history that gets written about. But that's a whole other story. Even though violence does play a part, though, like I was saying, it is not always framed in a negative light. Sometimes the social memory is one of overcoming impossible odds to

achieve greatness or even quote unquote mirror survival. Good examples of that include a lot of the histories of the Holocaust, as well as those of anybody who survived the genocide. Sometimes the framing reflects a desire to justify investments of capital, time, effort, or even lives. These different manifestations of historical memory, and certainly others, can be seen in various examples across human history.

Like I was saying, and this includes everything, not just the examples I gave, but also ones like the dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan or the conclusion of the American Civil War, which are examples given by Jeffrey Cubitt when he's talking about historical memory. However, I believe among the most pointed examples of identity formation via historical memory, and most relevant to this special episode that we're doing, are those of the Arab nationalists, the Zionists, and the

British Empire. During the Arab Revolt of nineteen thirty six to nineteen thirty nine, all three factions developed and constructed their identities around their relationship to Empire and connections to a particular place, that is, the Holy Land. This was even recognized in the years leading up to the revols itself, with the journalist Neil McNeil observing in The New York Times in July fifth, nineteen thirty one, and I was actually able to look at this issue of the newspaper.

I was able to find a digital copy of it. That the factions quote conflicting elements make their conflicting claims, each backed by an extensive propaganda that disputes everything put forth by the rival organizations, while insisting on its own as alone, just and fair. While both the Arab nationalists and the Zionists' relationships to Empire were those of opposition in the interest of particular national self determination, the British

relationship to Empire was one of maintenance. These are the waning days speak of the British Empire, or at least of the dominance of the British Empire, were only a couple decades removed from the era of decolonization. So at this point the British relationship to Empire was, like I said, one of maintenance. Their notion of maintenance was particularly tied to their imperial self concept, but broadly speaking, all three factions relationships to Empire were determined by their own particular

connections to the land that would become Israel. These connections were both internal and external, with the former manifesting and spiritual and religious connections and the latter being more secular and political in nature. These connections would be forged and strengthened through the historical memory that was created by the collective experiences that occurred during the Arab v of nineteen

thirty six to nineteen thirty nine. In the most generalized framing possible, the Arab nationalist's historical memory would be one characterized by notions of suffering and humiliation, which led to a fractured identity that would ultimately be defined in significant part by the revolt's primary leaderships lethal obsession with Jews

as a people. The Zionist's historical memory would be one of overcoming impossible odds in the face of existential destruction, both from their Arab rivals and more to the point, from the growing threat of Nazi Germany and Europe, which would lead to a more unified identity that would be defined by a sense of being isolated and without meaningful allies.

And finally, the British Empire's historical memory of the Arab Revolt would be defined as one of imperial failure thanks to their inability to force really a compromise between either the Zionists or the Arab nationalists who would continue their

agitation and even violent revolt against colonial authority. This would manifest in a desire to justify their imperial investments, which included not just untold amounts of money and thousands of lives by the revolt's end, by framing their presence and thus their identity as one of peacekeeper, guide and the builder,

the shepherd maybe of new nations. This identity would be further complicated by the ever present existence of the Christian Zionist beliefs held by many colonial authorities and British politicians involved in colonial affairs. It is to this complex relationship within the British Empire that we now turn for the first part of our deeper examination into the formation of these factions collective identities through the historical memory of the

Arab Revolt the identity of imperial decline. Some aspects of British identity underwent a major transformation in the early years of the twentieth century, especially when it became clear that their new Palestinian mandate was eventually one from the Ottomans. After the First World War ended. However, it began to become much clearer almost a year before the Armistice that

this would be the case. On November ninth, nineteen seventeen, five days after it was written, the British press released what would become known as the Balfour Declaration, which guaranteed quote a national home for the Jewish people unquote, as well as the promise that the government would quote use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object. Clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the sin and religious rights of existing non Jewish communities

in Palestine. This pledge from the Declaration marks what is often considered to be the official beginning of the British Zionist relationship, but in truth, the relationship predated the Declaration by many years. Many members of the British government were already in support of the idea of a Jewish national home, with Winston Churchill proclaiming in nineteen oh eight that quote I am in full sympathy with the historical traditional aspirations

of the Jews. The restoration to them of a center of true racial and political integrity would be a tremendous event in the history of the world. Lord Balfour himself had also developed a Zionist identity in the years leading up to nineteen seventeen when he made his declaration. Similar to Churchill, he had actually become friends with one of the most prolific Zionist advocates, High Invitesman, first meeting the

future Israeli President in nineteen oh six. Despite his sponsorship of a nineteen oh five law that restricted immigration primarily of Jews from Eastern Europe. Weismann was a dinner guest of Lord Balfour's in nineteen sixteen, and after considering a lengthy conversation in which Weismann quote laid out his much repeated argument that Zionist and British interests were identical quote, Balfour attended a cabinet meeting in which he declared I

am a Zionist. As described by the celebrated and for good reason celebrated historian Tom Segev in his book One Palestine Complete, the table had been set for the British Zionist alliance. This was also part of a growing trend within the British government that was more religious in nature than it was political, and one connected to the very nature of British identity at that point in history, as tom Segev notes, quote Lord Balfour also considered Zionism as

an inherent part of his Christian faith unquote. This dual identity of being both a Christian and a proponent of a Jewish national home was both symbolic and representative of many British statesmen and officials of the time, both coming from a problematic quote belief in the mystical power of

the Jews unquote end quote biblical romanticism. Also, according to tom Segev, another example of this was Wyndham Deeds, the Chief Secretary to the British High Commissioner of Mandatory Palestine, who believed that it was his Christian duty to quote assist in the return of the Jews to the Holy Land unquote, in order to quote hasten the second coming of the Lord unquote, believing that the quote unwritten compact between the British Empire and world Jewry would be part

of a common effort to bring about world peace. Again, to use the words of tom Segev, in order to achieve this view that was so common in the British government,

a tool would be needed. That tool was one of Empire, in addition to their Christian romanticism that probably sounds pretty familiar to a lot of you listening, at least those of you who are familiar with Christian Zionism, or as we call it here in the United States, dispensationalism, the idea that if the Jews are not in Israel at the second Coming of Christ, then Christ and therefore God would be displeased, to say the least, the Jews need to be in Israel, in other words, in order for

the faithful to ascend to Heaven at the time of the apocalypse. But in addition to that romanticism, to that way of looking at things, the British saw and justified their backing of what became very aggressive Jewish immigration into the Holy Land in imperial terms, playing the dual role

of Zionist and British official. The famed future First High Commissioner for Palestine, Herbert Samuel, would write a memorandum in nineteen fifteen advocating for a British imperial conquest of Palestine, claiming that it quote would allow Britain once again to fulfill its historic calling of bringing civilization to primitive lands. To Samuel and others in the British government who had the same mindset. Zionism was the goal, and imperialism was

the tool to achieve that goal. It is also clear that this attitude was not exclusive to the Zionist project. It was in act the norm of the time. As Tom Segev explains, quote, the proposal to seize Palestine accorded with the way people in London were thinking.

First World War unquote. While circumstances would change over the coming decades following the First World War, culminating in the events created by the Arab Revolt of nineteen thirty six to thirty nine, this imperialist perspective will continue to inform British decision making, especially regarding their intentions with the Mandate's

Arab population that was already living there. In many ways, the development of the British relationship with the Arabs of the Holy Land ran parallel with that of their relationship with the Zionists. British interests in the region as a whole long predated the First World War, thanks largely to their battles with Napoleon in the early nineteenth century and their later alliance with the Ottoman Empire and their occupation

of Egypt in eighteen eighty two. It was in this interest that an attitude of what we would now call Orientalism began to develop, and would later inform, at least in part, their interactions with the Arabs of the Holy Land.

Historian Zachary Lachmann notes that this attitude can be seen most prominently in the writings of the Earl of Cromer Evel and Baring, who was quote widely regarded as a leading authority on Egypt and the Orient in general, and his views can be fairly taken as representative of much of British elite and popular opinion, and who quote established what he saw as the unbridgable gap between the logical West and the illogical and picturesque East, between the European

mind and the Oriental mind unquote. This attitude pervaded both British imperial policy in the Middle East, and in part explains why British pledges toward their Arab allies in nineteen fifteen, in a series of documents that have colloquially come to be known as the McMahon Correspondence, quote became an outstanding bone of contention, quote which the Lebanese author and diplomat George and Tonius also called quote the main piece of evidence on which the Arabs accused Great Britain of having

broken faith with them unquote. These letters, which were between British Indian Army officer Henry McMahon and the King of Hijaz, Hussein Binali, contained promises of territory to be given to the Arabs in exchange for their support of the British against the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, because

at that point they were enemies. It is important to remember, but this territory discussing the McMahon whoseying correspondence eventually went to the Jews thanks to the later promise made by the Balfour Declaration. This inconsistency, and that's what it was, was informed by British orientalism, but it was also imperialist hubris in what Tom Segev calls the British quote imperialistic

arrogance and a powerful sense of cultural superiority unquote. It is actually understandable that one might believe that they took the concerns of the Zionists more seriously than those of the Arabs. The thing is this is only partly true, As Segev also points out, quote, the British pretended, and perhaps some of them even believed that the establishment of a national home for the Jews could be carried out

without hurting the Arabs unquote. It was this hubris, fueled in part by their orientalist interpretations of the Arab quote unquote mind as being one of irrationality and in need of tempering, that informed British counterinsurgency policy when the Arab Revolt of nineteen thirty six to thirty nine actually kicked off.

In earnest. The British response to the outbreak of violence during the Arab Revolt, which began with quote an attack on April fifteenth, nineteen thirty six, on a convoy of taxis on the Nablist to Tulkarm road, in which the assailants murdered two Jewish passengers unquote, was swift and would quickly become defined by its brutality. To quote from the work of men Matthew Hughes in his paper The Banality Brutality British Armed Forces and the Repression of the Arab

Revolts in Palestine. In practice and indeed in implicit principle, British counterinsurgency was defined by policies of treating all Arabs as equally complicit in the violence that broke out across the Holy Land during this period. This often came in the form of collective punishment techniques, policies that often resulted in the mass destruction of property and many deaths. We've discussed this before in History Impossible. Some of you listening

might remember. These were policies very similar to the ones that the Nazis made use of in Yugoslavia. As the aforementioned Matthew Hughes also explains quote, during army searches, soldiers

would surround a village. The men and women then divided off, held apart from the houses, often in wired cages, while soldiers searched and often destroyed everything, burnt grain and poured olive oil over household food and effects, with the largest destruction occurring during an operation on June sixteenth, nineteen thirty six, in which up to two hundred and forty buildings were destroyed.

These brutal policies also resulted in violence against the villagers themselves, like I was hinting at a moment ago, and this included sexual violence as well as forms of torture against captured combatants. All of this was done to break the spirit of the rebels in the revolt, who were fighting against the British. However, the cost of doing this was ultimately too high for the British Empire, and by nineteen thirty nine, the possibility of negotiating a settlement with the

rebels entered the picture. Because the central issue was Jewish immigration into the Mandate. The Peo Commission of nineteen thirty six and later the MacDonald White Paper of nineteen thirty nine both centered on this topic. The Pew Commission contained the first official suggestion of what we would now call a two state solution, making it clear that quote the problem cannot be solved by giving either the Arabs or the Jews all they want quote in the words of

the Commission themselves. The Commission therefore concluded quote two sovereign independent states would be established, the one an Arab state consisting of trans Jordan united with that part of Palestine which lies to the east and south of a frontier, and the other a Jewish state consisting of that part of Palestine which lies to the north and west of that frontier, quote, as would become quite common at this point. This plan was rejected by both the Arab nationalists and

the Zionists. The McDonald White Paper, which we've talked about on this show before as well, made a far less conciliatory approach for both sides and placed the question of Jewish immigration solely into Arab hands over the course of

a decade to come. According to the deliberations that were made in Parliament on the White Paper, this move was based on quote the desire to give the Arab section of the population of Palestine an opportunity of putting forward their views, such as was enjoyed by the Jewish Agency for the other section of the population. Unsurprisingly, the Zionists

rejected the proposals. But more surprisingly, though less surprisingly to those of you who are longtime listeners of this show and remember us talking about this in previous episodes, the Arab nationalist also rejected this proposal. Both of these episodes of the Pyoku Mission and MacDonald White Paper represent the British desire to end the violence, violence that arguably they helped cultivate, as well as create two states and then later one state on their terms, which were influenced by

both Christian Zionism and Orientalism. This attempt by them to balance the scales on their terms was ultimately a failure, and with the issuance of the White Paper of nineteen thirty nine, it created a greater instability than what previously existed by solidifying the push toward radicalism that became more endemic within the Zionist movement. No sacrifice will be too precious. The Zionist history with the Holy Land is lengthy, diverse, and beyond the scope of the original paper that this

is based on. Plus I have talked about it at length in multiple episodes of this podcast, and there are plenty of other podcasts that also get into that history that are probably more qualified than me to get into it anyway, regardless, in order to understand how the Zionist identity became significantly formed by the immediate historical memory of the Arab Revolt, it is important to briefly explain some other similar defining moments in Jewish history in the Palestinian Mandates,

some of which might sound familiar to a lot of you longtime listeners. These, namely, were the riots that broke out in nineteen twenty one and then again in nineteen twenty nine. The former, known colloquially as the Jaffa Riots, resulted in the murder of forty seven Jews, and the latter, far more shocking than its violence and brutality, saw the

murder of one hundred and thirty three Jews. According to a parliamentary report on the Colonies, well quote, there is no evidence that the nineteen twenty one riots were premeditated, unquote, they were among the first events to set the tone of understandable defensiveness among the Zionists. The nineteen twenty nine riots were not just noteworthy for their viciousness, which has

been covered at length on this show. We have a whole episode back in the third of the Muslim Nazi series back in twenty twenty one that talks about nineteen twenty nine, and it's pretty clear that their viciousness was

almost unprecedented and very significant. But these riots were more noteworthy for their more directed nature, thanks largely to a religious dispute that began between Orthodox Jews and Arab Muslims at the Western Wall that had been blown out of proportion by mostly just agitating by Arab nationalists and Zionist

leaders these two riots. These two events, especially the latter, saw many Zionist leaders like David Ben Gurion and Rahavem Zaivi invoking past programs, including the famous nineteen oh three Kitshenev pogram that was often used as a rallying cry for the cause of Zionism in the early twentieth century. These Zionist leaders invoked them in order to demonstrate that the need for a Jewish state was self evident for

the sake of Jewish safety. The Jews of Palestine had already begun to establish self defense forces known as the Haganah, and they had their efficacy in defending Jews from being accosted at times, but they were still not enough, especially

when demonstrations and riots increased in frequency and intensity. In addition, there was very little that the British authorities could do to stop the violence due to a lack of manpower, so these events served as very bitter pills to many Zionists who thought that their initial alliance with the British Empire via the Balfer Declaration would ultimately serve them and their mission of obtaining a Jewish national home as well as Zionis leader High Invitesmen recalled in its memoirs quote

I realized at once that they would use this opportunity to curtail Jewish immigration into Palestine. This reflection demonstrates that the ultimate result of the policies put in place a decade later, that is, the curtailing of Jewish immigration into Palestine, was already on the Zionist leadership's minds as a possibility

of what might happen. The bitter pill of what many Zionists saw as Britain efficacy in protecting them from the violence brought upon them by the Arab nationalists and the mandate never truly went away, and in fact, it only intensified after the Arab revolt actually broke out in nineteen thirty six, which actually began in Earnest with a murder

of two Jews. According to historian Tom Segev, while quote at first, Arab terrorism was directed principally at the British unquote Jewish casualties quote became more frequent unquote, resulting in greater calls for quote unquote retribution and revenge, which began to define the Zionus experience from nineteen thirty six to

nineteen thirty nine. This contributed to not just a greater incentive for the coming cycle of violence between the two factions, but also to the growing hostile suspicion of British motives when it came to the question of establishing a Jewish

national home. The sense of an externally driven moral imperative was also growing, not even just year by year, but month, thanks to the rise of Nazism in Germany and the growing persecution of Jews, made most evident by events like krishtaal Knacht in nineteen thirty eight, which occurred during the Arab Revolt and carried just as much meaning to the Mandates Jews as it did for Europe's Jews, and even more meaning for the Zionist movement, because again, like most

programs and violence directed at Jews, it proved the point of needing a Jewish national home for self protection. Nevertheless, there was not a consensus on how to respond to the Arab nationalist violence within the Zionist movement. This was thanks to the two most influential groups within the movement, the more moderate labor Zionists under David Ben Gurion and the more militant Revisionist Zionists under ZIAV Jabetinski. To use

the words of Tom Segev again. While quote Ben Gurion denied feeling the desire for vengeance unquote, the revisionists quote argued that restraint would be interpreted as weakness, because if the Arabs believed the Jews to be weak, they would only increase their violence.

A new, more unified identity had formed arguably out of pure necessity. In the aftermath of the publication of the MacDonald White Paper, there was an almost universal uproar in the Jewish community of Palestine. In his memoirs, Herbert Samuel recalled quote, the Palestine White Paper of nineteen thirty nine has aroused the most vehement opposition on the part of the Jews in Palestine and in all countries. The reaction was one of spectacular violence against the colonial authorities, unmatched

since the initial outbreak of the Air Revolt itself. While there was no consensus on the appropriateness of the violence, the Zionists as a group as a whole became much

more unified in their opposition to the British Empire. This could be seen on May eighteenth, nineteen thirty nine, when, as described by historian Bruce Hoffman and his excellent book Anonymous Soldiers quote a n the oath was taken in synagogues and other public gathering places across Palestine, in which gatherers pledged quote no sacrifice will be too precious in order to set the new policy of the White Paper at knought. While David Ben Gurion remained at odds with Jabatinsky,

and the revisionists. Ideologically at least, he endorsed quote, an intensification of efforts to bring Jewish immigrants to Palestine illegally, and the Haganau's Jewish self defense Force transformation into a full fledged underground army. In the words of Bruce Hoffman. Again, things were complicated by the outbreak of World War II between Britain and Germany in September nineteen thirty nine, but again in the words of Hoffman, quote, it did not

diminish Zionist opposition to the White Paper quote. This was thanks to the growing perception that the Zionists could only rely on themselves, even if they they supported the British against the Nazis, which they did most of them, at least, including the most radical among them like Zaiev Jabatinski. There were only a few exceptions, which we'll get to in a second, but regardless, there was a relatively unified front

against the Third Reich within the Zionist community. Now, this perception of needing to only rely on themselves was driven by the immediate historical memory that had formed during the Arab Revolt, building upon the past memories of Jewish helplessness during the riots of nineteen twenty one and nineteen twenty nine. Thus a new identity had formed, one of resolve to achieve the goal of a Jewish national home by any means necessary and without the help of anyone but themselves.

Around this new identity, the previously fractured Yeshiv, that is, the Jewish community in Palestine could unify. This unification resulted in an increase in revolutionary and thus violent activity both during the waning months of the Arab Revolts and many years afterward. The rise of the Stern Gang in nineteen forty represented the only meaningful split found within the Zionist camp thanks to its quote fateful step toward an alliance with Italy and Germany unquote during the Second World War.

To use the words of Bruce Hoffmann again, the Stern Gang, which if you didn't pick up on that was a radical Zionist group of Jews who sought to seek an

alliance with Nazi Germany. They were obviously on the more extreme end of autonomous Zionist identity and continued to actively fight against British colonial forces through acts of terrorism, even while the British kept fighting the Nazis during World War II, but the rest of the Zionist organizations, while ostensibly allied with Britain during their war with the Nazis, remained dedicated to forging their own path toward a Jewish national home. They just didn't take it as far as the Stern

Gang did. For it should be pretty obvious reasons. To call them the more principled ones in comparison to the Stern Gang is a bit of an understatement, especially given the Stern Gang's leader, Avraham Stern's, own, for lack of

a better way of putting it, messionic complex. This was made most plain in the less extreme but no less radical Irgun, under the command of the controversial Monock and Began, who issued a proclamation in nineteen forty four claiming quote there can no longer be an armistice between the Jewish nation and its youth and a British administration unquote, closing with a pledge that quote, our nation is at war with this regime and it is a fight to the finish.

The Irgun then bombed the immigration offices of Haifa, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, quote, striking at the organ of government responsible for implementing the nineteen thirty nine white papers restrictive immigrants policy. Again in the words of historian Bruce Hoffman, Meanwhile, the moderates among the Zionist movement, like high Invitesmen, publicly condemned the terrorist actions and approved of the counter terrorist

efforts to arrest any found responsible. But the directives put in place by the Haganah authorities went out of their way to ensure the safety of the terrorists themselves in an effort to remain independent of British authorities and by

extension reprisals by them. As Bruce Hoffman explains, the Haganah authorities quote sought assurances that the British colonial security forces would take no action against any terrorist or suspected terrorist without first consulting the Jewish agency, which would be essentially a quote unquote blank check for the Zionist authorities to quote deal with the terrorists entirely in their own way, completely outside the law, and without any vestige of due

process unquote. The proposal for this was rejected, and again, in Hoffman's words, quote, a perceptible chill in the agency's relations with the government followed. What this demonstrates is that even though there was a range of hostility toward British authorities, ranging from wanton terrorism to targeted symbolic attacks on individuals

to cooperation only on the Zionist terms. There was nevertheless a unification in that hostility toward the British Empire only made possible by the historical memory of the events of the Arab revolt. This sense of unity, however, disparate in its own way, became obvious, as Hoffman notes, quote, the same attitudes permeated the Yeshuev unquote, with newspapers that formerly denounced the terrorist actions now going silent except to denounce

British applications of the death penalty on Jewish prisoners. By the mid nineteen forties, the Zionists could reasonably say that for all of their differences, they stood together under one banner. Conversely, their Arab nationalist counterparts developed precisely the opposite problem.

to the formulation of a specific program of national aspirations. However, the rise of Arab nationalism remained relatively diffuse, especially in those early years. As Israeli critic and historian Ilan Papa explains, unlike many typical expressions of nationalism that quote appropriate any useful historical event that precede them on quote as precursors, there were other precursors that included quote the secret societies that promoted the teaching of Arabic and the study of

Arabic history and culture. Quote. It was also a growing trend within Islamic academia, particularly at the prestigious Alazar University in Cairo, where it had become a feature of the teachings of a sheikh named Rashid Rita, who a lot of longtime listeners might remember was the teacher of a very important figure in this story and one who has come up a lot. Hajamin al Husseini will get back

to him now. Rita's lectures centered on three ideas, three core principles essentially, which Ilon Papa, for all of his faults, lays out quite comprehensively here quote that Muslim society everywhere ought to be very cautious in its encounters with Western culture, that it was necessary to return to a distilled form of Islamic precepts, sifting out all vestiges of negative Western influence, and that the religious undertakes must be tied to the

political and national struggle. This line of thinking would deeply influence Rashid Rita's most infamous student, who we just mentioned, and who combined it with his own political and spiritual preoccupations as he took on a more active role in the cause of Arab nationalism in the Palestinian mandate. Hajamin al Husseini was part of one of Palestine's most noble families, the Husseinis, who claimed lineage from the prophet Muhammad himself

for well over a century. By the time of his birth in eighteen ninety four, his family had occupied the religious position of Mufti in Jerusalem, placing them in charge of the community's donated wealth of the Vakfa. Hajamen would rise to this position himself in nineteen twenty at the recommendation of Herbert Samuel, who would later admit that it

was the greatest blunder in his career. And while Haaja Mien cooperated with the British in the years leading up to the Arab Revolt as well as a number of Zionists, surprisingly I know he never forgot the teachings that he

had absorbed during his time studying under Rashid Rita. While this helps explain Haja Mean's willingness to work with the British, according to historian Orren Kessler and friend of the Show, since quote, unusually among Islamic thinkers of the time, Rashid Rita favored the British Empire to the Ottoman and imparted that sensibility to his student unquote, it also helps explain why Haajamen ultimately made the choices that he did when the Arab Revolt kicked off in Ernest in nineteen thirty six.

The Arab revolts beginning can be traced to the actions of one man, a Muslim preacher named is al Din al Haassam, Assyrian by birth, al Caassam, like Jajamin al Husseini, was educated at Al Jar University, but he took a more spiritual path than his contemporary's own place polytical one. He frequently preached the need for a quote unquote return to God, and as European imperial activity in the Middle East increased in the early twentieth century, the necessity of jihad.

This continued into the nineteen thirties, when his activities became base in the Palestinian Mandate, and as jihadis rhetoric continued to escalate to include Jews as well as the British, which quickly turned into violent action. After Alcassam and his men killed a Jewish police sergeant on November sixth, nineteen thirty five, the Sheik retreated to the forest surrounding Haifa.

After British authorities caught up to him, a gun battle commenced, resulting in Alcassam's death, which quote gave the Arabs moral power they had hitherto lacked unquote. To use the words of Orrin Kessler again and comparing him to the Zionist Ikon Joseph Trumpeldor, who died defending the tel High Settlement in nineteen twenty, Tom Segev explained, quote, both men each

gave their national movements a heroic myth. This sparked the beginning of guerrilla operations in the Palestinian Mandate, leading to the General Strike and other actions taken in the name of the nationalist cause, which became the Arab Revolt. The rapidly developing legend also forced Hajajamin al Husseini to pick

a side. As Israeli historian Zivie Elpeleg explains, quote, more than any other individual at the time, it was al Cassam who contributed to the process which was to lead Hajamen and the Palestinian leadership into confrontation with the British. It is more likely than not that Hajamen resented al

Casam for forcing his hand this way. As longtime listeners might remember, up until the Arab Revolt, Hajjamen had been trying to balance his relationship with the British and his own image in the popular imagination of his fellow Arab Natalists and, more to the point, the Palestinian people in general.

But once the regardless of how you spin it, very romantic legend of Alcacam and his death began to form, Haja mean quote faced a dilemma un quote, to use the words of Zivielpalleg Hajamen ultimately read the room, and noting that the growing unrest was signaling a unifying force among anyone who considered themselves a Palestinian or Arab nationalist in general, or even merely an anti imperialist or anti Zionist, he formed an organization known as the Arab Higher Committee

or HC, placing the various Arab national committees springing up all over the Mandate under one umbrella and signaling the official beginning, the political beginning, if you will, of the Arab Revolt. This is laid out very effectively by Orren Kessler in his book Palistine nineteen thirty six. While a general strike served as the centerpiece of this unified front, the violence that occurred across the country and eventually within the organization's purview gave a sign of things to come.

For all of the Arab unity that was being felt during the outbreak of the Arab Revolt, internal tensions began to make themselves apparent very quickly. There had already been an existing rivalry between the Hussini family and another notable Palestinian family known as the Nashashibis, which frequently, if impotently, manifested.

But there were also more practical frustrations felt by the figures in the AGEC, like the Mayor of Jerusalem, Houssein Fakrie al Khalidi, who interestingly enough, is the uncle of the famous Palestinian activist and writer Rashid Khalidi, the author

of the One Hundred Years War on Palestine. Hossain Fakri al Khaledi had been deported by British authorities of the Seychelles after the Arab Hire Committee had been banned along with all other national politicals parties, and in a diary entry from November of nineteen thirty seven that I was able to obtain, Al Khalidi expressed presentment that he had quote not received one cable of encouragement neither from Palestine or from outside unquote of his prison cell is what

he's talking about, and quote couldn't Hajamin wire a word of sympathy, greeting or encouragement unquote, And one month later al Khalidi complained again that Hajamin was completely ambivalent toward his and the others suffering at being exiled so far from home at the time Hajamin was hiding in Syria, and as al Khalidi noted, quote, his family will join him sooner or later, and he has money enough to keep him and his children going on for years unquote.

The question of money was a frequent one that came up, and for good reason, as we covered in the last major episode of the Muslim Nazis in which we talked about the immense salary or allows maybe is a better word for it, that Hajamin commanded when he was hanging out with the Third Reich, but that is another story. This frustration fell by al Khalidi was by no means universal, and it's worth noting that, but it was arguably representative. Though many of the Mufti's opponents had if many of

you longtime listeners remember, been cowed into silence. Now the evidence is circumstantial, but internal violence that had been linked to supporters of Haja Meen was plaguing the Arab revolt, as historian Tom Segev explains, quote in the name of patriotism. That were also threats, intimidations, blackmail, and other forms of hooliganism, and at times the rebellions seemed more like a civil war than a national uprising. Indeed, the rebellion quickly deteriorated

into internaceine fighting. This not only plague the revolt and whatever unified Pan Arab national identity it implied, it became a feature of the revolt and of the Arab nationalist movement itself and many of its future incarnations. In fact, as Palestinian historian Isa Halleff explains quote, for throughout the time of the Arab Higher Committee's belated attempts to encourage a semblance of unity in Palestine, infighting and personal conflict

served to hamper effective national leadership. This infighting would come to define the largest blunder made by not just the Arab nationalists, but arguably any side in the revolt, and it comes from the story that we open this episode with.

Despite this rapidly deteriorating situation in the Arab nationalist faction, the continued violence was wearing on the British, who, after the failure of the Peo Commission suggested two Ston partition, caved and published the White Paper in nineteen thirty nine, which, if you'll recall, proposed to transfer all immigration authority over

to the Palestinians. During the next ten years. While everyone in the Arab Higher Committee, which met in Hajjamin al Husseini's Beirut department on the day the White Paper was released, was supposedly pleased with the propositions and result of the White Paper, it was Haja Mien who remained steadfast in

his rejection of the proposal. According to Isa Khalaff, it quickly became clear that quote, it was not until the White Paper had been officially rejected by the Arab Higher Committee at the end of May that the political differences between the moderates and the Mufti came to the fore unquote, according to the recollections of a doctor who was present, quoted by Oron Kessler, quote, the sole concern of the committee was now concentrated on convincing Hajah that his negative

stand was extremely detrimental to the Arab cause and was serving unintentionally the Zionist cause. Hajamen argued, and eventually some of the more radical among the group agreed that the paper did not contain enough guarantees to his liking, including a provision in the White Paper that still insisted, despite turning immigration policy completely over to the Arabs, that the

new authorities would still guarantee a Jewish national home. While Hajajamin al Husseini did not see his rejection as a misstep, this was not how many who took part in the Arab revolts saw it as Orin Kessler explains, quote nine Arabs out of ten welcomed to White Paper, The editor of the Palestinian nationalist newspaper philstine reckoned, and anyone rejecting it must be quote an Arab ass or an Arab

trader unquote. While rebel leaders in Damascus said the same as other critics, castigating Hajamin for having desecrated the Holy

Rebellion for his own self as shames unquote. For the Mufties part, he never wavered in his conviction that not only had he made the correct decision, but that even with the olive branches offered in the nineteen thirty nine White Paper or even the nineteen thirty seven Peel Commission, Britain had quote given Palestine to the Jews unquote, something that he wrote in an essay published in nineteen fifty four, concluding that quote Palestine fell into the hands of Brittan,

the exploiter and greedy world jewry quote. Hajja Means's own prejudices were not completely post Hawk bitterness, as we've covered on this show, or justification for that matter, again, as we've covered. By nineteen thirty nine, he had made his feelings on Jews as a people very well known. In October of nineteen thirty seven, he made a speech titled Appeal to All Muslims of the World, which was recorded in a pamphlet Maid for propaganda purposes by the Nazis

a number of years later. In this speech, Hajamin claimed that quote there must be good reason unquote for why Jews had been oppressed over time, as well as repeating the conspiracy theory that quote the Jews were the epicenter of the plague of Justinian unquote, and that this quote was the reason that the Jews to this day are

called microbes unquote. This was Haja Means fixation, and it was clear that anything that even hinted a conciliation toward Jews was unacceptable to him, and he would not tolerate it with anyone around him. That was what motivated him ultimately to make the decision that he did in that Beirut department in nineteen thirty nine. This also explains why, in the midst of the Arab Revolt, that Hajamin had been placing diplomatic feelers with the new Notahza regime in Germany.

While his alliance with the Nazis was partly born out of necessity, one could argue thanks to his overt opposition to the British or in the Arab Revolt, and the hostility between the British and the Nazis was growing, his alliance with the Nazis was still, as we have covered on this show, very willing, very enthusiastic end quote, not for want of an alternative that Hajjamen acted as he

did unquote. To use the words of Ziviel Peleg Again, this alliance between Hajjemen and the Third Reich, thanks to the outcome of the war, more than for a distrust of the new German government in the nineteen thirties, was one of the major reasons that Hajamen became discredited as a story in Gilbert Atchcar writes quote. Even before the nineteen forty eight Knakba utterly discredited him, Hajjamin's reputation had reached a low ebb in Arab and Palestinian political circles.

With the defeat of the Axis powers unquote. This forced the memories of Hajamin's reckless decision making during the last year of the Arab revolt, particularly with the nineteen thirty nine White Paper, to be relived by those who had them, that is, those memories. One of Hajamin's early allies, the Arab nationalists, Musa Alami quote, eventually recognized the mufties fundamental extremism, but by then it was far too late. Haja Mean was his tragedy set a close acquaintance unquote. In the

words of historian Orn Kessler. Ultimately, while some of his fellow Arab nationalists had little issue with Haja means anti Semitism as far as their own biases went, they hated him more for what he did to their movement, which had been done thanks to the anti Semitic blind spot that he always carried. By the time the consequences of Haja Means blind spot became more apparent, the specific issues underlying British mandatory authority and Jewish immigration had faded into

a general state of fear. As George and Tonius observed quote, to the Arabs, the problem is now essentially one of self preservation. Thanks to Quote, Arab fears of eventual dispossession into a certainty. This led, in part, according to Antonius, to Quote, an understanding between Arabs, British and Jews increasingly difficult to attain. Hajamen and his influence had helped create

this certainty of eventual dispossession. Therefore, the historical memory of the Arab revolt, and namely how it came to be defined by the Mufti and his failures due to his own bigotries, proved to be the unspoken that fractured the Arab nationalists identity, with various factions such as a secular PLO and the Islamist Hamas vying for control of the movement until the early twenty first century, when the latter, that is Hamas finally seized control.

the Arab Revolt in the historical record. However, by no means that the historical memory of the Arab Revolt diminish, especially when we examine how its historical memory shaped the identities of the three major factions who took part in it. It is clear, based on the evidence available, that the respective identities of the Arab Nationalists, the Zionists, and even the British Empire were significantly shaped by the events of

the Arab Revolt. The Arab nationalists fractured identity came about thanks to the suffering and humiliation brought about by the counterinsurgency tactics used by the British authorities during the revolt itself, the intensifying retaliatory strikes from more radical Zionists that escalated during and after the revolt, and the shortsighted bigotry motivated decision making of the self appointed leadership, which was all the more delegitimized by the leadership's alliance with the Nazis

during World War II. The Zionists more unified and radical identity came about thanks to the Arab Revolt, reinforcing the belief that had been building for nearly two decades that they could not rely on external help from the likes

of the British or really anyone else out there. The historical memory of the revolt and the British authorities proposals to end it that the Zionists saw as unacceptable also built upon the existential threat that they saw coming from Nazi Germany, and this brought all the different factions together in a more defensive form that would come to define

future conflicts and even political radicalism. Finally, the British Empire's historical memory would be one of imperial failure of decline, which they both sought to avoid by striking a compromise and then sought to justify after the fact as a peacekeeper and builder of nations. As historian Tom Segev explains, quote, the deterioration in Arab Jewish relations was threatening the prestige

of the entire empire. This small strip of land clearly carried a lot of importance for a global spanning empire, as unlikely as it might seem. This, combined with the lingering presence of Christian Zionism among many colonial officials and government representatives, helped define the British self conceptualized identity as a peace key being decolonizing force deeper into the twentieth century.

The identities constructed by the events and outcomes of the Arab Revolt are also significant to the broader literature that already examines the formation of the State of Israel and the origins of the ongoing Israeli Palestinian conflict, for many

reasons unique to each faction of the revolt. For the Arab Nationalists, it supersedes the narratives that Palestinian suffering is unique to the experiences of the nineteen forty eight Nakba, which both contextualizes a situation that Palestinians have faced for over eight decades and acknowledges the full spectrum of agency

their leadership possessed before the foundation of Israel. For the Zionists, the identity formed by the historical memory of the Arab re volt surfaces the reactive defensiveness that came to largely define the Zionists experience after the Arab Israeli War of

nineteen forty and reveals its origins as existing a decade earlier. Finally, for the British Empire's identity being forged by the historical memory of the Arab Revolt, it ultimately questions the imperialist narratives of state building and magnanimous diplomatic overtures that dominated the discourse during the era of British decolonization in the

twentieth century. Without the events of the Arab Revolt acting as this catalyst, the collective identities of the British Empire, the Zionists, and the Arab nationalists would not look the same after nineteen thirty nine, much less in the twenty first century. While the Zionist project has been in essence completed, the British Empire dismantled, and the Arab nationalists more atomized

and radicalized than ever. The importance of the decisions made by the major figures of each faction cannot be exaggerated. Nothing is preordained in history, much less one that involves the mass movements and displacements of millions of people. But it is difficult, very very difficult to envision the same outcome occurring if the three competing interests and identities had not come together to be formed by the historical memory of the Arab Revolt. Hello again, everybody, thank you for

sticking around. I just want to give a quick shout out to the supporters of History Impossible over on Patreon who are supporting the show at the comrades and friends level are above. That includes Bob Downing, Eric Hodges, Greg Hunter, s O Skip A Chaco, Molly Pan, John Pisano, Anna R. PJ Raider, Matthew Rice, Emily Schmidt, and of course f you. I very much appreciate all of these, you know, kind and generous monthly donations. They really do mean a lot.

They help keep the lights on. Like I like to say, it's especially important while I'm you know, doing this grad school thing that does seem to be paying off. I'm learning a lot, I'm having a good time with it, and I'm glad to share with you now, like a lot of what I've been working on. If you read if you read the History Impossible newsletter or check out the posts on Patreon, you you know have already been seen that I've been putting a lot of stuff from

there onto there, so you guys can see it. But you know, the medium is the message, and the medium in this case is a podcast. So I wanted to, you know, make it into something that you guys are all used to, and I think I did an okay job as difficult as it is to adapt academic writing into podcast form, I think, so let me know if you think it's a little stilted, of course, but I think it worked out. I have a couple more coming in the near future, two more specifically of research material

that I've done. The next one is something that I have never really talked about before on this show, so I think you'll find it really interesting. I'll be trying to pair it with a polemic each episode, like I did with this one. This one is a nice sort of factual addendum to my question of genocide episode. I guess maybe just thematically. I'm not sure how to put it, but yeah, it's they pair together nicely, I think, and I'm hoping to do that with each of these episodes

that are coming out. While I yes, believe it or not, I am still working on Muslim Nazis. In fact, we are about to get into the writing of that and the note taking and the incredible detail that I have to unspool. The knotted rope that I have to unspool might be a better way of putting in it, because we're going back to Yugoslavia. It is very confusing, but I do think this episode that I'm working on will

I don't know. I feel the most confident about it that I have compared to most other episodes I've done, just because I think we're finally getting into the meat of that story. We're finally going back to where we started the entire series with so many years ago. So anyway, with all that said, thank you again for listening and for sticking with me all these years, for those of you who have been here all the time, and welcome

to all of you newcomers. I mean, I love having you here here bring you feedback from you via email or direct message or whatever. So thank you again for listening, and stay tuned for the next episode of History Impossible.