Section seventeen of the Groaky Marius and Sulla by A. H. Beasley. This librovox recording is in the public domain. Read by Pamelinagami, Chapter fifteen, Sullah's reactionary measures. It is difficult to say about part of the legislation of this period whether it was directly due to Sullah or not, just as some of the changes in the army may or may not have been due to Marius, but were certainly made about
his time. The method of gathering all the changes made within certain dates, attributing them to one man and basing an estimate of his character on them, has a simplicity about it, which enables the writer to be graphic and spares the reader trouble. But it is an unsatisfactory way of presenting history. Enough, however, is known of Sullah's own measures,
to make their general tendency perfectly plain. His main object was to restore the authority of the Senate, and to do more than restore it, to give it such power as might, if it was true to itself, secure it from mob rule on the one hand and tyranny on the other. Though he foresaw that his efforts would be futile, he was none the less energetic in making them, and may reasonably have hoped that they would, at any events, last his time and enable him to enjoy himself in
Campania undisturbed by another revolution. Our acquaintance with his laws is only second hand, for none of them survive in their original form. They are known as legace cornelie, a term which, though applicable to some other lawses, usually apply to those of his making. The Senate had originally been an advising council. Then it had acquired superior authority and issued commands to the magistrates. It was placed by Solah in a still higher position. To fill up its exhausted ranks.
He admitted to it three hundred of the Equestrian order, and though it is not certain what its numbers were to be, it is probable that they were fixed at about five hundred. Then he provided for keeping the list full for the future. Hitherto, a man had become a senator, either at the Kensor's summons, of which he was practically certain if he had been tribune or chwistor, or if he had been consul prietor or ideal Sola made the choister ship instead of the ideal ship. The regular stepping stone,
and increased the number of the Chuistors to twenty. He also, in all probability, though it is not certain, took away from the Kensors their right of conferring or taking away senatorial rank. Once a senator, always a senator was therefore now the rule, and as the Chuistors, who were the main source of supply, were nominated by the committee at Tributta, the Senate became a more representative as well as a
more permanent body than before, and independent of the magistrates. Secondly, we have seen that Sullah had given to the Senate by law the power which it had previously exercised only by custom, of deliberating on a measure before it was submitted to the vote of the committee. This was one
security against any measure being carried against its interests. Before this, the practice had been either for the Senate through the Tribunes, to submit a measure to the vote, or for the tribunes to submit a measure of their own after obtaining
the Senate's authority to do so. Saturninus, as we have seen, had overridden this custom, and the only way in which the Senate could maintain its old privileges would have been either by proclaiming a eustacium, as it did on that occasion, or by picking out some technical informality in the passing of the plebiscitum had not. Sullah thus made its previous off authorization absolutely indispensable, the tribunes, being deprived of the power of proposing a measure at will to the committee.
A tributta would also lose the power of prosecuting any one before it, and probably lost the right of convening meetings in order to address the people. Sulla too provided that those who had bidden tribunes should be ineligible to other offices, and though the right of the veto seems to have been left to them, it is not clear that it was left without restrictions, while the abuse of it was made a heavily punishable offense. It is likely also that he made senators the only persons eligible to
the tribunate. Positively, therefore, by making the senate's previous consent to a law necessary, and negatively, by these limitations of the prerogative of the tribunes, legislative power was placed wholly in the Senate's hands. Thirdly, the balance in the committee of themselves was so adjusted that the voting would be mostly in the Senate's interests. Something has already been said of Sulla's changes on this head in reverting to the servian mode of voting. Some explanation of what this means
may be given here. Sullah did not abolish the Committee a tributta, but the measures just mentioned, as they left the practical power of legislation with the Senate, left the formal power with the Comittia centuriata. We know the origin of the Committia canuriata. We do not know the origin of the Committee a tributta, but we do know that by degrees the latter obtained the legislative power co ordinate with that of the former, and that the plebiscitum became
as binding on the nation as the leks. There were, in short, two parallel bodies in which the people could make laws, ranged in the one by tribes and voting on measures submitted to them by their tribunes, ranged in the other by centuries, and voting on measures submitted to
them by the consul. But as the state became more and more democratic, the Committee a tributa was more used than the committea canturiata, in which legislation was gradually confined to special matters assigned to them by law or custom. Besides these functions, the Committee tributa decided on war or peace, elected the tribunes, idles and lesser magistrates, and also usurped judicial power, arraigning magistrates for their conduct and office, et cetera.
The functions of the Committea conturiata were, as we have seen, also legislative. They elected to the higher magistracies and exercised jurisdiction in capital cases, a function which grew out of the Roman citizen's right to appeal. Each century had one vote, and as by the Servian arrangement, the first class, though containing fewest voters, had nevertheless, owing to its highest assessment most votes, it could by itself outvote the other classes.
At some time or other, this classification was altered, and a new system, based partly on centuries and partly on tribes, came into use. Each tribe was divided into ten centuries, five of seniors and five of juniors. The first class consisted of one of each of these from each tribe, so that as there were thirty five tribes, each class would consist of seventy centuries. It is said by some that the first class included also thirty five centuries or
eighteen centuries of equitase. If this be true, the first class would still have retained the preponderance of votes. In any case, it had the best of the voting. For even if it was decided by lot, which century of all the centuries should vote first, still the first class voted second, and the moral effect of the wealthier and weightier citizens voting one way or other would naturally influence
the votes of the other centuries. Moreover, some say that the lot was confined to the centuries of the first class. Such then was the original and such the modified constitution of the Kamytia Kenturiata. Appian expressly states that Sullah reverted to the original mode of voting, but he may be confusing things and only mean that Sellah took the voting power from the committea Tributta and vested it in the
committea Kentoiata, and this probably is what Sullah did. Fourthly, as Sullah weakened the cancership in order to exalt the Senate's authority at its expense, so to prevent any individual again obtaining undue influence. He ordained that no man should be consoled till he had been first kwistor and then pritor, and that no man should be re eligible to a cur rule offe office till after an interval of ten years. This, however, was not enough. It was his object to curtail the
powers of every magistrate. And therefore, though the Consulate was not dangerous to the Senate in the sense that the Tribunate was, he laid hands both on it and on the pritor ship. The functions of the consuls and priters had hitherto been these. The consuls had the general superintendence of all except judicial matters at home, and the military superintendents in all the provinces except Sicily, Sardinia, and the two Spains, in which they only occasionally exercised their imperium.
One pritor, the pritor urbanus, presided over civil suits between Roman citizens. Another, the pritor peregrinus, superintended such suits between a citizen and an alien, or between two aliens. The other four were over the four above mentioned provinces. Piece of need, one man could do the work both of the priter urbanus and the prider Peregrinus, leaving his colleague
free for a military command. Or the consul or prider might have his term of office extended, being bound to continue in his command till a successor arrived, or one consul might manage the ordinary functions of both, and the
other be similarly left free for some special employment. The Senate could in any given year assign as business to be superintended by a consul or a priter, some military command or judicial commission, and then the consuls or priters had to settle by law or by agreement who should undertake it. As the state grew greater, these special assignations had to be made oftener. There had been eight officials
for eight offices. Now five new superintendents had to be provided for Asia, Africa, Macedonia, Narbo and Silicia, as well as one for the Quistio de Repetunda. To enable eight men to do the work of fourteen, the Senate made prolongation of office for a second year the rule, and the officials confined by the nature of these duties to the city during these years of office were generally sent at the end of it to the transmarine provinces, where
most money was to be made. Sulla increased the six pridors to eight, and made the two years term of office the legal term. But if this added to their power and appearance, he diminished it in reality by separating the civil from the military functions altogether. The consuls and priters were to manage the civil business of Rome. The pro consuls and proprietors were to command the army. In the first year of office, the two consuls had the general administration of Rome, and two of the priters its
judicial administration. The other six presided over the various courts. In the second, the ten exercised the anas imperium in Sicily, Sardinia, the two Spains, Asia, Africa, Macedonia, Silicia, and the two Gauls, and none of them might stay in his province beyond thirty days after his successor's arrival, or under penalties for treason, might leave his province during his term, or attack a foreign power without express leave from home. The effect of
all this is plain. Whereas formerly the magistrates directly elected in the committee and might combine civil and military authority, now the military authority could only be held by those whose term of office was prolonged by the Senate's pleasure, For though the practice became invariable, it remained at the
Senate's discretion to break through it when it chose. Fifthly, having thus lessened the power of the cansors, consuls, priters, and tribunes, he, by way of compensation, a serio comic compensation, it must have seemed to his shrewd yet so superstitious mind, restored the right of co optation to the sacred colleges of augurs and pontiffs, and increased their numbers, thus multiplying harmless objects of rivalry analogous to the ribbons and garters
of modern courts. Sixthly, he took away from the equitase and restored to the Senate the eudykia. The udykia have been often mentioned, and something may be said about them here. In civil suits, the priter, as we have seen, had the superintendence. Sometimes he decided a case at once. Sometimes, if he thought the case should be tried, he appointed a udex, giving him certain instructions by which, after the investigation,
he must decide the case. His action here would be something like one of our judge's charges, but given before hearing the evidence, there is nothing to prove that a udex of this kind was at this time taken from any special class, or that Salah interfered with the established mode of procedure. It was about the constitution of the criminal courts that the long struggle had raged between the
Senate and Equitas, and here he made great changes. He found some permanent criminal courts, for example, the kuistio de repetundus, or court for investigating cases of extortion in the provinces, already in existence. He instituted or settled others. But it cannot be ascertained how many of the following which were
in existence after his time were due to him. There were at least nine of these permanent courts quistiones perpetui, the kuistio may estates deui des sicariis, and et cetera, de wenefiki es de perichidio de falso de repetundus, peculatus ambitus, or courts for trying cases of treason, violence, assassination, poisoning, parricide, forgery, extortion, embezzlement, and and there may have been more, for example de adulteries and de plagiis for trying cases of adultery and
the enslavement of freemen. His object in consolidating them was to take from the Committea the settlement of criminal cases, and to obviate the necessity for appointing special commissions, for there was no appeal from the Christio, and the special commission was seldom requisite when so many courts were available.
To preside in these courts, there were six priters, but as there were more courts than priters, a senator called udex Chistionis was appointed annually for each court where a president was wanting something, after the fashion by which one of our judges, sometimes impressive business, appoints a barrister as his deputy to clear off the cases. The priter or udex Christionis presided over the judges in each court, and the uticase returned a verdict by by a majority of votes,
sometimes given by ballot, sometimes openly. In choosing these uticase, this was the process. The whole number available was, it is said, three hundred, divided into three de curii. In any given case, the priter named the decuria from which the jurymen were to be taken, and then drew from an urn containing their names the number assigned by law for the case to be decided. Each side could then challenge a certain number, and fresh names were drawn from
the urn in place of those challenged. What Sullah did was to supply these d kurii from the senators instead of the Equitaise. One of the permanent courts found by Salah already existing was that of the Kentumwiri, who had jurisdiction over disputed inheritances. The members of it were elected by the tribes, three by each tribe, one hundred and five in all. Though it was directly elected by the people, Sullah could apprehend no danger from such a court and
did not meddle with it. Other measures as attributed to Sullah on evidence more or less probable, such as the suppression of gratuitous distributions of corn, the abolition of the right of freedmen to vote and of the reserved seats appropriated to the equitase at public festivals, the re establishment in Asia of fixed taxes instead of the farming system, the extension of Italy proper from the Isis to the Rubicon,
and the conversion of Cisalpine Gaul into a province. It may be considered certain that he did all that he could to humiliate the equitase, but the settlement of Italy was probably not due to him. Other minor laws of which he was the author, dealt with specific criminal offenses or social matters. One, as we have seen, specified the penalties for all sorts of assassination and poisoning. Another dealt with forgery, another with violence to the person or property,
another with marriage and probably adultery. Another was a sumptuary law, which is said to have limited the price of certain luxuries. If this was the case, it was even sillier than other sumptuary laws, for it would have encouraged, instead of checking gluttony. Lastly, there was a law for the settlement of his colonies through Italy and at Aleria in Corsica. Selah had, for the moment undone by his legislation the work of ages. He gagged free speech by the disabilities
attached to the tribunet. He kept the government within a close circle. By his process of recruiting the Senate, he made the magistrates subordinate to the Senate. He filled Italy and Rome with his own partisans, and therefore with those of the Senate, and he gave back to the Senate that coveted possession of the Eudikia for which it had
struggled so long with the equities. But a system which could endure only by the repression not only of hostile interests, but of the ambition of his own adherents, carried in itself the seeds of early dissolution. Almost before the reaction was complete, a counter reaction had begun. Abdication only revealed monarchy, and the broad road which Sullah had laid over the breakers and quicksands of revolution, in reality paved the way
to a throne. When he abdicated, he offered to render account to anyone for his acts, and there is a story that one young man thereupon followed him to his home, loading him with abuse, which Sullah listened to with meekness. If the story be true, the incident was probably a prearranged part of the ceremony of abdication, which, in everything except the fact that Sellah slipped off the cares of government, was of course a farce. His funeral showed what his
real power continued to be. And if another anecdote be true, just before his death he had a magistrate of Puteoli strangled because he had not collected in time his town's subscription to the restoration of the capital. He had, in fact done mischievously what the Groki would have done beneficently, and greedy swordsmen occupied the soil which the tribunes would
have divided peaceably among peaceable men. The civil wars and the triumvirates are the best vindication of the policy of the Graki, unless we can bring ourselves to fancy that the Graki created, instead of attempting wisely to satisfy the demands of the age, by an orderly intermixture of Italians and foreigners with the corrupt body of Roman citizens, new life might have been infused into the old system, and
something foreshadowing modern representative government have been established without proscription or prietorian rule. As it was, the vices of society only became aggravated at Inns era of violence, and the sharpest remedies failed to stay the creeping paralysis by which it was assailed. The gradual depopulation of Italy has already been described. In spite of Sullah's colonies. The ruin of the country must have been vastly accelerated by his civil
wars and those which followed them. And while the honest country class was dying out, the town class was ever plunging deeper into frivolity and voluptuousness. To defray the cost of the sumptuous life of the capital, the fashionable spendthrift was forced to resort to extortion in the provinces, which, as we have seen, became so crying and evil that a permanent court existed for dealing with it. Before the time of Sullah, the greedy throve in usury or involving
the state in war to fill their own persons. The fortunes amassed by an aquilius o veras Seleucullis spoke as eloquently of Rome's rapacity abosd Rod as did those of Crassus or Sullah in Italy. Such being the state of things under the government which Sullah strove to perpetuate. His character as a statesman deserves as strong reprobation as his conduct as a man. To lay down power from a sense of duty is one thing, cynically to shrink from
responsibility as another. The misery of the following half century must be laid chiefly at Sulla's door. The inevitable goal to which everything was tending, was as patent in his time as in the time of Augustus. Whatever may have been for the interest of the Roman aristocracy monarchy was by this time for the interest of the Roman world. End of Section seventeen, read by Pamela Nagami, MD, in Encino, California, November twenty twenty one. End of the Groci, Marius and Sullah by A. H. Beasley