Lock and Key

that is. To the future too. Anyway, what's your what's your actual question? No, no, no, I may have made this comparison before, but I've got to make it again. Do you remember all the Internet paranoia in the nineties, Yeah, yeah, And so thinking back on it now, it's often very funny because we were all thinking back then, oh no, what if evil techno criminals used the net to do

horrible things? And and it's funny how some of the fears we had back then turned out to be hilariously wrong and overblown, you know, like Sandra Bullock gets caught in the net. Yeah, it turns out. She was perfectly fine. She never got she got caught in a net, but it wasn't the net. But then, uh, some of it represented threats that we actually do have to deal with now that we're in this this internet, ubiquitous future. Identity, theft,

privacy compromises. I mean, these were things people were worried about back in the nineties and that they turned out to become reality. Sure, yeah, not everything depicted in those films was completely off base, although it was almost always you know, because it has imagined in a hilarious way, overly dramatized. And that certainly that the user operating systems were like nothing that we've ever seen. I know this UM, and I think we're sort of living in a similar

era for three D printing. Sure we don't know yet what we're worrying about too much and what we're not worrying about enough. Sure, well, especially for people who have had very limited experience with three D printers. They've heard about them but never had direct experience. Joe, as someone who has had direct experience with three D printers, would you say that the three D printer we have here in the office would be capable of printing anything that

someone should be worried about remotely. Are you worried about tangled masses of plastic hair? Yeah? See, here's the thing. It sounds like the plot of a Japanese horror movie actually if it's in front of the person's face. Uh So, we have printed stuff out with a three D printer here at the office. It's just it takes a lot of of paying attention, Like you can't just hit the print and walk away because the materials themselves in our case, I think we're using p L A plastic, but the

materials themselves are uh you know there. They need a certain temperature to operate at, and beyond that you're either not going to get the meltedness you need for extrusion, or it's going to be too warm and then the

stability of the build will be compromised. Or the build plate isn't leveled, or you haven't aligned everything correctly in your your pre planning phase, trying to print at a level below where the plate is or something, or your design has a key element missing some kind of structural

bit to it that just isn't quite there right. I recently had a mask three D printed for a costume and in that case, the mask was divided into three pieces, because if we had tried to print it as one full piece, it would have been very It would have been a miracle if it had come through with the

structural integrity intact and not folded in on itself. The point being that three D printing, at least on the consumer level, has come a long way, but it's it's still fairly primitive, and it's it's not like you can hit print and you get a gorgeous coffee mug at the end of it. You're gonna get something that's made

out of plastic. Depending upon the sophistication of your printer, it may be fairly there may be some fairly obvious edges, especially like just between the layers of the plastic that's been like a plastic plastic pixelation. Yeah, yeah, it's it's not like a smooth surface like you would get from something that was molded plastic. Well, I mean, certainly, to a certain degree, you're right, But also I mean, if you're willing to shell out a lot of money, there

are some really good printers out there. These show absolutely and in labs and research labs, there are extremely good

printers that can print with with metals and with glass even. Yeah, it's it's a little bit beyond even the pro summer level obviously, But the point being that, uh, some of the fears around three D printers might be a little premature, right, But but there are all kinds of fears people have because I mean, obviously it's not exactly analogous the Internet, because the Internet was a more ubiquitous kind of information technology.

You know what, anything that people could do to you socially in general life that didn't involve physical contact they could do over the Internet. Sure, but there's there's there are fears that some of which are are vaguely valid in the like like especially for the future about three D printers. Uh, you know it's not all the like Oh no, cats and dogs three D printing together. Uh,

copyright infringement. I suppose that the fair fear sort of the I mean, it's almost difficult to even call it copyright. It is certainly intellectual property. The idea of of let's say that you own a furniture store. Someone comes in, takes pictures of a table that you have designed, and then goes and uses additive manufacturing a three D printing process to essentially replicate that table. There's they're stealing your work. You could at least you could argue that this is

my plastic table now. Yeah, or or especially with art or something like if you really wanted a sculpture and you had an extremely good three D printer, then you know that sucks for the artist. Yeah. I thought it was funny back when everybody freaked out that somebody three D printed a gun, because I was like, you can buy guns a lot more easily than you could three D print one. Well, let's say you've got a criminal record,

but you also have a large bank account. You buy a three D printer and you can print as many guns as you would, But you can go into any you know, legitimate establishment and have difficulty buying guns. Not

great if you have a criminal background. You probably also, i mean, assuming it's a large amount of money, you probably can illegally obtain a gun with you know, a good ten dollars anyway, Right, But it's still one of those things that you know, you think, oh, well, this could suddenly put a not only could it put guns in the hands of people, and that's kind of scary,

you know, without any sort of regulations right. But also on the other side of it, beyond that scary thought is if the person is not careful with the materials they're using to build their gun, you could end up with something that maims the person who built it. Even if they are just like, Hey, look at this cool thing I built. I'm going to take it out to the shooting range and I'm going to shoot it there.

I'm not playing on shooting anyone else. You're talking about using something that's you know, if you're not using the right plastic, the forces of a of a bullet being fired could be enough to shatter that and severely hurt the person who's actually using the gun. Oh. Absolutely, the type of plastic that Cody Wilson used in that demonstration, we were far beyond the grade of the usual p l A that's found in most commercial level three D printers. Yeah,

his gun was called the Liberator. Jonathan and I did an entire episode in which we mostly contained our snark about defense distributed Tody Wilson um back in it was called printing a gun that was over on tech stuff. So if you somehow missed that story, you've been living under a rock for a couple of years and or you'd like to go back and hear some details about it.

Go ahead and check that out. It is on the interwebs. Yeah, but like all of your security information, speaking of security, okay, Yes, that that seguates us into into a story about Yeah, it ends up getting us to a story about how three D printing could cause a threat to one element of security. In fact, has that. It's not could, it's it's happened. It's it's out there. It's going on right now. We're all do it's your keys, it's your key, specific

your luggage. It could be any key, but specifically, we're gonna start talking about the t s A approved locks that you would use on your luggage. Yeah, so I'm gonna tell a little story. On November, the Washington Post ran a story by Ashley Halsey the third titled the Secret Life of Baggage? Where does your luggage go at the airport? It sounds like it sounds like one of the movies they would watch on Best of the Worst Media.

It's so magical, like your luggage has a little magic gnome kingdom and you know, you know, I would have that plinky music that do do do do do do do do do do as you watch it go through anyway, Sorry you were saying no no. So it was an article looking into US Transportation Security Administration. So that's the t s A. You're probably familiar with it screening practices for checked bags, and it was telling the story of what happens to your stuff after you check it, and

I thought it was a pretty interesting article. Actually, it talked about the machinery and the procedures used to screen traveling containers. And the key part of the story that's relevant to this topic is that the author talks about how the t s A has a set of master keys that can open all t s A approved locks on luggage, which makes sense if your job is to to be certain that stuff going through the airport, going

onto airplanes doesn't contain dangerous materials. Right. The t s A started saying, well, we need to screen this luggage for important security purposes, but if people are putting locks on their luggage, then we might have to cut their locks off, which is, you know, a waste of that person's resources. So please buy these t s A approved locks that the t s A has master keys for, and then we can rifle through your personal belongings without destroying any of them on purpose, and you'll never know

because the lock will be back on them again. Yeah, But anyway, so people are people. If you want to lock your luggage to keep people out of it, but you don't use the t s A approved lock, and the t s A agent wants to check what's inside your bag, they'll just use bolt cutters, which I guess is is at least a little better than you know, damaging your bag directly to get at what's inside of it, right, knife in the side of the bag just barely better

than that. So the problem is that somebody published a version of this story that contained a very problematic picture. And I word it that way because I honestly can't tell if the image that I'm going to talk about originally ran with the story when it was published on the Washington Post page, or if it only appeared in a reprinting of the story on a site called Harold

dot net, which some sources refer to. Uh. The Washington Post version of the story does not have the offending image anymore, if it ever did, got you, but that offending image would be a picture of a hand holding a series of the master keys for the various types of T s A locks. Yeah, it's a close up image of all of the master keys that can get into all your bags. So in other words, if you take a look at this, you can see the shapes of each of those keys. Whoops, which you know all right.

Back in the day, it would have taken quite a lot of work to create a key to you know, use like a piece of metal and then grind it down just right based upon the way it looks in a picture. But that could have been done and we'll talk about that later. Yeah, well, certainly before computer run key creating machines. Words are apparently not in my head today it's terrific, and also before algorithms that can end up looking at a pattern and making a really close

estimation of what that pattern represents. Right, Because the resolution on these images is not so high that you could just zoom. You couldn't zoom and enhance over and over. So you've got a good picture, you need you need a computer that has some good guesswork with it too. But now we're in the era, the combined era of sophisticated object recognition image software and additive manufacturing that is

three D printing. Joe, Please tell me, please tell me that is impossible for someone to take the images that are here in front of us and turned that into an actual physical thing, thus manufacturing their own master keys for T. S A. Locks. Well, I don't know about this image, but it's definitely possible to do from a photo, and it has been done, and people have tried the keys and they work. So I'm going to tell the

story of that now. Apparently somebody tried to delete this photo after they had published it, But silly person, Nothing gets deleted off the Internet. What's the rule about the Internet? The Internet is forever Archive dot org, We salute you, and so on. Auguste Remember that original article was last year,

so it was out for a while. I don't know when the image got deleted, So I don't know exactly who was the first person to point out this problem, but several sources linked to an August one tweet by a guy who calls himself an independent journalist named Luke Rudkowski, and it shared the image of the master keys and said does at Washington Post and brilliant T s A. No, they just compromise their locking system by putting this out.

So ouch, yeah, some hackers got to work. So I'm going to try to explain what happened as far as as best I can understand it, because there was a kind of complicated series of events. But in early September, a group of lock pickers and security hobbyists published to get hub, a collection of CAD files based on the images of the t s A master keys that have become available on the internet. And it looks like it probably wasn't just the Washington Post image. And I'll say

more about that in a minute. But yeah, let's break down. Let's let's unpack a couple of terms for those of you who might not be familiar with get hub and cat images. Sure. So, get hub is essentially a repository. It's a place where you put open source code. Typically, so let's say that you create a program and you want to make it open source so other people can take your code, tweak it, change it, upload their own versions,

you know, do transformative work with it. Get hub is sort of the centralized place that you would go and store that so other people could get at the code you had created. Right, So, if you want to make something like a Google deep dream available to the public. You can put it up on geth hubs, so people can make their own apps to do things with it, right, Yeah, but then also their CAD files. The CAD just stands

for computer aided design. So if you want to put together a digital shape to make on your three D printer in three dimensions, you'll probably make it in a CAD program you can. You can think of a CAD program as a kind of MS paint for three D objects. Yeah. I remember I had a friend who did a lot of work with CAD programs back in high school. But that was specifically in design classes where you're trying to create a a three dimensional object, a plan for a

three dimensional object. It's also used a lot in architecture firms that kind of thing, right. So CAD is bigger than just three D print, but it's a way to get the file you want to you want to print in a three D printer. So apparently after these files went up on geth hub, it was literally only a few hours before somebody downloaded them and printed one of

these things and it worked. There are now images online of people using these three D printed keys based on these images to pop open their t s A approved luggage locks. Yeah, and you know, to be fair, some of the t s A locks feel like they could open if you sneezed on them. But maybe that's just my experience with t s A luggage locks. I've never used one I travel. I traveled just enough where I've used them a few times. Uh And and I often question why I go through the trouble, but I still

do it. Yeah. Well, some users report being able to open the locks with unmodified prints of keys using plain old p l A. So these are plastic keys. You don't need a print him in metal or anything. And p l A is not not the sturdiest plastic. I've got some little p l A trinkets on my desk that I made in our in our printer in the office. I read about one user in this Wired article that I'm currently referring to who had to modify the scale

of the key, but otherwise it worked. And this Wired article talked to a lockpicker and University of Pennsylvania compside professor named Matt Blaze about it, and he made some interesting points I thought. First of all, he pointed out that, uh, not that it really changes the thrust of the story, but just for the record, he thinks the image in question leaked somewhere before the Washington Post story, so they might not don't line up with your pitchforks only there.

Yeah uh. He also says that a good lockpicker, you know, could probably pick the locks in less time and was with less trouble than it would take to print the keys, since he says, and I quote, I find it's actually quicker to pick the t s A locks than to look for my key sometimes. Yeah. Now, these are not terribly sophisticated locks. They're not meant to be. They're just

meant to be a deterrent. And the other point he makes is that the parties in questions should have known better than allowing people to photograph the keys, because photo security and physical keys is a known issue, and we'll get to more about that in a minute. But there

have been more developments since then. According to a timeline that I read, which was created by a lockpicker involved with the T s A Key story, which I found linked in another article for The Intercept by Jenna McLaughlin, boy, the trail of of sights here is is impressive. Well,

I'm just trying to lead you through my thoughts. But anyway, the printed keys were actually based on additional imagery dug up by the hackers, So it wasn't just the Washington Post image that leaked, but it was sort of inspired by the Washington Post league that hackers said, I wonder if we can find any more images of these keys, and they went out and looked for him, and they did.

They found, whether by legitimate or illegitimate means. I'm not sure, photos contained in a document called Guide to Travel Century pass Keys, which was created by a group called Travel Century, which they have a kind of complicated relationship with the t s A and the lockmakers. They are not lock manufacturers and they are not the t s A. But I understand that there's some sort of liaison organization. I

got a third party kind of that. Yeah, like they according to this article, they generate and enforced security guidelines for T s A approved locks, whatever that means. Huh okay. So so in the face of this mishap, the t s A responded, Yeah, and this is one of the most troubling parts that that piece in the intercept I talked about got a t s A official to talk about the late the leak and the three D printed master keys, and I just thought i'd read a select

quote this was pretty interesting. Okay, sure. The t s A spokesperson Mike England sent in an email to the Intercept the reported ability to create keys for t s A approved suitcase locks from a digital image does not create a threat to aviation security. These consumer products are peace of mind devices, not part of t s AS aviation security regime. And also, and the same guy said, carried in check bags are subject to the t s

AS electronics screening and manual inspection. In addition, the reported availability of keys to unauthorized persons causes no loss of physical security to bags while they are under t s A control. In fact, the vast majority of bags are not locked when checked in prior to flight. So what they're saying is that, well, we're concerned with national security, not your luggage is security. So it's not really our problem. Yeah,

not our problem. No, it's yeah, essentially don't matter. The t s A. The t s AS purpose is not to make certain that the bag you packed has the same stuff in it when you get to where you're going as when you left. It's just to make sure that you're not going to hurt the airplane or anybody on it, which I should put in is a is

a valid thing to want. Yeah, this perhaps was maybe not the best way to communicate it, since it seems like it's by by this way, I mean, this quote almost seems like they are flipping me the bird and saying saying, don't worry your stuff doesn't matter. They might as well say, don't put a lock on it, you know, because here they're saying, well, you know, it's it's going to be within our care the whole time. I mean, no one else is going to have access to it.

And I'm thinking the people that are handling the luggage all along the pathway from the point where I handed off to the point where I pick it up aren't

all necessarily upstanding citizens. I say that because I know there have been incidents where people have found stuff missing from their I mean, there's there's also just the mere fact that if you're if you are distrustful of human people, and you perhaps don't make it to the baggage carousel exactly at the moment when your suitcase comes out, then you know, a dishonest human person could walk up and just kind of rummage through your stuff. It takes some

of it out. Yeah, well, yeah, especially if it's one of those things where you ended up getting bumped on a flight. You're delayed, but your luggage got on the flight that you were supposed to be on, and then it's going to be waiting for you for hours at an airport. You know, there are a lot of reasons why this, to me is not exactly comforting. Yeah. Yeah, so perhaps not the most pc response from the t s A. However, this does speak to a larger issue

with with three D printing and security. Yeah, because this thing that just happened, this t s A keys event, was not not a totally unique situation. I mean there are other ways that photo analysis or three D printing and things like that can affect physical security. I mean, there are these ideas of three D printed bump keys. I think you looked into this, Jonathan. Yeah, bump keys are, um, they're interesting. So the really weird thing about bump keys is you don't need a picture of the key to

create a bump key. You need a picture of the lock. You need to see how the lock is shaped. From there, you can create sort of a generic key that has sort of generic little peaks and troughs in it, so they don't have to match the way the actual key fits. It just has to be low enough so it can slide into the depth of the lock, all right. They're called bump keys because you put the key in the lock and you hammer it with a mallet, which jolts

the key into the lock, pushing the pins. The pins are what keep the lock from being able to turn. Pushes the pins up. It's like it's it's like you just gave it a quick shove, so the pins bounce up, and at that moment you have to turn the key. And as you start turning the key, it's as if you're using the actual key built for that lock, and it will unlock the lock in question. So you would three D print this kind of generic key and then just use that hammer to go quick a quick uh

bump and then a turn. And apparently it takes a little practice, takes some some finesse to get the timing just right. Um, but it works. You can totally make keys that will unlock locks this way. Yeah. And of course there's just plain old lock picking, sure, yeah, which requires a little bit more. Uh, practice and access to lock picking tools, which are not hard to get, but the practice takes time. Like it's it's a learned skill. Yeah,

it's not. As it's not as simple as as you might think, but it's not, you know, impossible to learn. There are plenty of lock picking groups out there, copy

groups that U do this stuff all the time. Hopefully airport security people should be able to look at someone and determine that they're sitting there trying to pick a lock, sticking a lock pick gun into a lock, or or they they see a person just like I would like kneel down in front of a piece of luggage and then unfold my lock picks in front of me and picturing you like sitting on a skateboard and like and like rolling along next to baggage carousel, like with your

with your little kit laid out on your knees. Yes, that would be a little bit obvious. But also way before three D printing, this was an issue too. Yeah.

I mean, well, I mean people have been talking about various ways to reproduce keys from photos for years, right yeah, yeah, So for example, at the a c M Conference on Computer and Communication Security, a way back into the eight there were a trio of security experts who presented a product they called Sneaky as an E A K E Y why because we love you A system for duplicating a key that's not in your possession, so specifically by taking a picture of a key being able to create

a copy of it. Uh. Here's here's a quote from there. The abstract of their presentation, the access control provided by a physical lock is based on the assumption that the information content of the corresponding key is private, that duplication should require either possession of the key or a priori knowledge of how it was cut. However, the ever increasing capabilities and prevalence of digital imaging technologies present a fundamental

challenge to this privacy assumption. Using modest imaging equipment and standard computer vision algorithms, we demonstrate the effectiveness of physical key tele duplication extracting the key's complete and precise bidding code at a distance via optical decoding, and then cutting precise duplicates. We describe our prototype system Sneaky and evaluate

its effectiveness in both laboratory and real world settings. Using the most popular residential key types in the United States, which is basically saying that if anyone has ever taken a photograph of a key that you have, there's the potential out there, even without three D printers, to produce a copy of it. That's right. So all you kids who wear your keys on your hips, yeah, start putting those in pockets. They can keep the chain on them,

but put them in a pocket deep in those Jinko pockets. Yeah. So hey, I like my chinkoes. So one of the other things that that you want to talk about, Joe, was how this goes beyond the t s A goes beyond even physical locks and keys. Actually, oh sure, I mean, and of course it applies to physical locks and keys, but it's a broader security question because in in response to this incident, I've seen many writers and security analysts pointing out how that this is essentially a problem that's

inherent with backdoor systems. We often think of backdoors in terms of software exploits, but the master key is a physical form of a security back door, right, So what's the idea of a backdoor. It's essentially that there is a there is a secret way around known only to supposedly legitimate authorities that can always get in through your

security measures. Yeah, I um. I was on an episode of Daily Tech News show where we were talking about backdoors, were specifically talking about the n S A and and backdoors. Various law and law enforcement agencies often lobby to have

backdoors inserted into popular types of software. Uh, the argument being that this would increase safety if they were able to get access to these things quickly and stop actors who would be who are who are trying to plan out something that's going to be harmful to others, often in the form of terrorist plans like sure so so the ability to kind of peek in on telephone communications

along those lines exactly. And the point I made, and it's something I still believe in today, is that you do not increase security by introducing vulnerabilities into your system. And a backdoor is by its nature of vulnerability. Yeah. And frankly, they don't care about increasing security. I mean that's not the goal is to increase your privacy or

your personal security. It's it's about another goal, which is even if you take the authorities who want backdoors and everything at their word and say they're not going to abuse their power no matter what kind of system we're talking about if there's a third party with a key that all always works, there are ways that third party's key can slip into the hands of the bad actors. So even if you totally trust the government, which you know, we're not saying it's not the point of the show

right now, one way or another. But let's let's pretend you do totally trust the government and the authorities, it's still a bad idea to have these back doors because they always get out, and that that's exactly what what my point was was. The idea that a back door is is by its nature of vulnerability, it's it's a away other than the preferred way to access a system.

Doesn't matter if it's a door, or if it's an operating system, or if it's a piece of software, or if it's a telephone, does not matter what it is. It is another way that an actor can gain access to a system, uh and and potentially cause quite a bit of damage in the process. So I it is my belief that back doors are nearly always a bad idea. We all saw what kind of havoc they wreaked in Jurassic Park. Yes, yes, oh, you're talking about Nedriya Nedri

had a backdoor. Yeah, I don't know if that was for legitimate authorities, but that was for no. No, you didn't say the magic word related purposes. I'm extrapolating on the part. I mean, you know, did you create backdoors and suddenly dinosaurs can run them up? Well, that is a good part because it wasn't necessarily part of Nedri's plan to have a losci raptors eat everybody. It's just

an unfortunate consequence. Yea, this this brings us back to this is unix I know this, but anyway, I think it would be interesting to talk about some of the implications of this kind of event. Yeah, so, obviously we could reach the conclusion that physical locks and keys have had their day. We've already known that there were these potential vulnerabilities. We've talked about those, We've talked about lock picking, and we talked about the ability to replicate a key

simply from a picture. But this new story about three D printing, coupled with the rise of three D printing and popular culture, kind of drives at home yet again that the physical lock and key is not a beat all security measure, and that perhaps it's time to start looking at alternatives. We need retin a scanners on everything. Biometrics are part of it. But also this is not the only type of story, embarrassing story about a lock and a a way of getting access to that lock.

Did you guys ever hear about There was a story that broke around two thousand five about the Kryptonite bike locks. So I got a buddy. His name is Brian Brushwood, and he's a magician and a scam artist, that's what he calls himself. And so he did an episode of Scam School recently where he actually showed this particular vulnerability in action. So back in two thousand five, Kryptonite released a bike lock that had a tubular lock to it. So it uses a cylindrical key to activate the pens

and then you turn that it releases the lock. It's sort of like a like like whistle shaped almost, yeah, And so he showed that something that people had known for quite some time, that that particular style of luck could be defeated with a big pen casing. You take

the pen out of the pen and then plastic. Yeah, you just wiggle that onto the lock and if you wiggle it the right way, you can activate the lock, and you've you've opened up a Kryptonite These are expensive locks, by the way, Kryptonite bike lock, thus getting access to not just the bike lock, but also the bike that was locked to it. And uh. And so there were some people who were criticizing Brian because they were saying, hey,

why don't show people how to steal bikes? And I actually commented on his YouTube video and said, guys, he's not showing you how to pick locks. This is information that's been out there since two thousand five. What he's showing you is which lock you absolutely should not be using for your bicycle. All right, this is this is important consumer information, right. This is the it's the white hat hacker principle. Somebody shows you the vulnerabilities and your security.

Hopefully that should spur you to create better security. And Kryptonite did do that. In in full disclosure, Kryptonite went back, they redesigned their lock, they went with a disc shape rather than a tube shape, and they offered an exchange program. So they did their due diligence once once the vulnerability was known, they you know, it wasn't like they washed

their hands and backed away. This is their business. Yeah, so they went they did well, uh and uh and and held up their end of the bargain uh and and. Some other systems have certainly been created that are trying to move away from physical keys. You know, the little UH beepers on cars that will open your car door, having a numerical keypad on your on your house right right. A lot of them are things that are proximity based.

Like you have a smartphone that has a particular app on it, you may be uh, you may have to put in a pen in order to activate a lock and unlock something as you're walking up to your front door. I've seen some systems that are so proximity base that you don't even have to do that. If you have your phone on, you've paired it with the lock system,

and you get within range, it will automatically unlock. I don't know that I'm particularly in favor of that approach, but I do like the idea of using the pen system. It's not full proof. No security system is ever full proof, but it's an alternative to the physical key and lock. Now, a lot of these systems also have a physical key that you can use UM. So if that's if it's

not a double lock system. In other words, if the same like physical lock and the digital lock are the same, you might not be in any better shape, considering that we've already talked about the vulnerabilities of physical locks. Yeah,

and there's also vulnerabilities involved in inometric systems too. We've we've talked about that either here on tech stuff before and thinking Okay, but because it's it's at this current moment not all that difficult to fool a retina scanner or a thumb print scanner, right, Yeah, there there are certain ones that are are looking more promising, like the ones that trace the veins underneath the skin and check

for blood flowing. Yeah, making sure that someone hasn't just cut off your hand and used it to slap on your front door. Um, in which case you may not be worried so much about the burglary. There might be other things that are pressing issues on your mind, like bleeding. Yeah, that could be way up there. But yeah, this is this is one of the things. We don't meant say this nor to to cause fear, uncertainty and doubt, but

rather to raise awareness of security vulnerabilities. Maybe it's one of those things that just makes you think before you get a picture taken, like, oh, you know, I pres shouldn't have my keys out, or you know, anything along those lines where you want to practice good security measures. No, not necessarily to go out and like by the latest security system to outfit your your house. I mean, I just use a cave troll is what I've got right behind the front door. Very effective. But let's talk about

your puppy like that. He's a monster. Now, what if somebody, the person who bred those cave trolls actually all taught them, taught them all a secret password that only the company has until they leak internal documents, and now people know they can get past your troll by saying the magic word, which is yar olsburg. I was concerned with that, but it turns out that this particular cave troll only goes

into a grape vine if you say that. So apparently there was musical theater at that particular cave troll UH university. So I'm thankful for that. Uh. To be more serious, however, obviously it's it's good to think about these things whenever you're trying concerned about your security. When it comes to t s a locks, I mean I don't have any good advice for that at all right now. I don't even know if I'll be using them at this point. Oh yeah, well, I mean, you know, it's don't take

anything valuable on a plane. Yeah, that's that's that's pretty good. The part part is when you go someplace and you pick up stuff for people you love to bring back to give to them. Like if I go on a trip and I start buying souvenirs for people, then I have a concern about that, although I could always ship it. I guess stop having people that you love. It's slowly turning out that way. I'm just getting grouchier as they

get older. No, I don't know. I mean, you know, perhaps perhaps good advice if you have a few extra bucks on you is to buy a regular lock. But since even those aren't full proof. Yeah. I saw one comment or on one of the articles I read saying I always use zip ties. Interesting, is there cheap and if the t s A Needs to get in there, they'll just cut it off, Yeah, and then won't cause damage to the luggage. That's probably that's probably the best approach.

And thinking that well, if they don't need to see it, everything safe and if they do need to see it, well, there's nothing I can do to stop them anyway, because that's their job. They're they're trying to practice security for a much larger group than just my stuff. They verify that my cans of dog food are not actually something else. Yeah. Yeah, well, at any rate, this was this was an interesting topic to cover. Uh, we didn't get quite as angry as we all thought we would, which I guess is good.

I think I got about as angry as I was anticipating. I got about I think I got about three quarters as angry as I was anticipating. Yeah, yeah, I had. I had calm, dude, I'm calm. Alright, Well, I'm gonna abide by that. Guys, if you have any suggestions for future episodes of forward Thinking, I recommend you write to us and tell us what those are. The email addresses f W Thinking at how Stuffworks dot com. You can drop us a line on Facebook, Twitter, or Google Plus.

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