¶ Intro / Opening
🎵 Music
¶ MH370: Outside Actors and Motivation
Someone took MA 370. But who and why? In today's episode of Finding MH370, we're going to delve into the motivation and methodology of one potential culprit with someone who has a rare and compelling perspective. Recently retired CIA officer Sean Wisweser, who spent decades studying and applying the lessons of espionage and spy tradecraft. That's all coming up right now.
Hi everybody, Jeff Weiss back with you for another episode of Finding MH370, the podcast where we take a deep, detailed look at the full range of technical evidence. with the help of some of the world's leading subject matter experts in order to solve aviation's greatest mystery. Today I'm really excited to talk to someone whose expertise is unusually deep and unusually hard to get access to.
The Central Intelligence Agency is obviously a rather tight lipped organization as a rule, even if after the retired CIA officers are bound by strict rules about what they're allowed to say. So I feel really lucky to talk to Sean Wiswester, who has a new book out. He's concerned about what he sees as a dangerous lack of awareness about the threats facing the United States and the Democratic West. It's a concern that I share. He wants to speak out and try to raise awareness before it's too late.
Before we get into the meat of it, a little housekeeping. If you'd like to get a free newsletter that goes out with each episode, head over to the show page at finding mh370.com where you'll also find uh an archive of past shows. And if you want to support the show, you can sign up for a paid membership there. You can also contribute with a paid membership here on YouTube.
Going forward, I'm going to be adding exclusive content for members as a way to show my thanks and give something back to those whose support I'm so grateful for. So keep an eye out for that. Okay, back to Sean Wiswester. I wanna be clear up front, I'm not talking to Sean about what the CIA thinks happened to M H three seventy. That is not his bailiwick. Frankly, I don't think the US intelligence community has any idea what happened.
What we're going to talk about is the strategic environment in which the disappearance took place. That will help us understand the number one question that people always ask me when they know that I'm into the MH370. The thing they always ask is why? was the motive? Why was this plantation? That's a difficult question to answer no matter what your favorite theory about the disappearance might be. Frankly, it's not something that It's easy to say. We need to think about it carefully.
The default assumption, of course, has long been that the captain must have taken the plane. In the last three episodes, we saw how the three pillars underlying that main theory turned out to be Much more fragile than most people realize. And the implication is That the captain wasn't the culprit leaves us with only one plausible alternative explanation that the hijacking was carried out by an extremely ruthless and sophisticated outside actor, namely Russia.
Okay, why would Russia want to do such a thing? This is where Sean Westwester's expertise comes in. He has studied their motives, he has studied their mindset and their methodologies. He has gone toe to toe with Putin's Russia for decades. Let's hear what he has to say. Sean Wiswester, thank you for coming on the show. You have a new book out. It's entitled Tradecraft, Tactics and Dirty Tricks, Russian Intelligence and Putin's Secret War. Congratulations
Yep, thank you. Thank you. Yep. Honored uh honored to be with you, Jeff. Thanks for uh ag agreeing to talk about my book.
Absolutely. I've read it. I really enjoyed it. I It's it's a thing. It really says something to read a book beginning to end these days, honestly. Uh I really enjoyed it. You distill down some of the lessons that you learned as a a senior operations officer in the CIA. where you worked in covert operations, you were both running Russian assets namely our assets in Russia and countering Russian attempts to run agents against the US. Is am I getting that right?
Yeah, very well said, uh Jeff. Done a lot of podcasts and that's about as succinctly as I've heard anybody state it. Yes. Worked in Russian operations both Handling um our assets and that's correct terminology. You know, our assets, our agents. We we they of course call themselves operations officers or as yetchiki in Russia.
We call ourselves officers, but I was handling assets or agents that were helping us and then I was working with joint partners throughout my career countering their efforts to recruit Americans and our allies. So well said. Thank you.
Okay, great, great, great. I don't know to what extent I'm just gonna ask you questions. If you can't answer them, I understand you have like constraints being a intelligence guy. What are some of the places that you worked where you were still?
So uh constraints reminds me CIA always wants me to say a disclaimer. So um uh my views are mine alone, don't represent the views of CIA nor any other government agency. Uh they asked me to always state that as it is stated in the book. Um so I can say m broadly, CI doesn't like us to comment on specific countries. Started my career as a foreign service officer, did some postings with the State Department that entered my intelligence career, the the vast the bulk of my career. Um
of uh almost 28 years, was with CIA. Um I served 12 years overseas, uh tours in Central and Eastern Europe, Eurasia, um a lot of work in the former Soviet Union. Um and that's that's what they like me to leave it.
Okay. And you how uh okay, and then what year did you retire?
Uh twenty twenty three. Yep, end of twenty twenty three.
Okay, so you're fresh out you're fresh out of the service. So I think what you have to say
Still relatively.
¶ Putin's Undeclared Cold War
Okay. So your book subtitle refers to Putin's Secret War. I was hoping you could tell us what is this war? What are its objectives? Is it a continuation of the Cold War between the West and the Soviet?
Yeah, I think it is a continuation of Cold War. You know, um I was very fortunate our former DDO, uh Michael Sulik, one of the most respected deputy directors for operation. And certainly in my career in CIA, maybe ever for us. Uh you know, Mr. Sullick mentions in the foreword to the book that he he uh graciously wrote, um we fellow Cold Warriors, uh meaning his generation and mine, we we knew the Cold War didn't end.
Um and we also knew that when Vladimir Putin came to power in Russia, former KGB officer himself, former head of the FSB, we we knew who he was. You know, the like the saying they s in sports they talk about sports teams, oh they were who we thought we were. Well Putin is who we thought he was.
He's a Czechist. He's a believer in the mentality of the of the Czechist of which I'm sure you read in the book, uh Jeff. Um thank you for reading it. You know, I spent time earlier in the book talking about that mentality, that culture of Czechism.
dating back to the Chekha, the first uh security committee in the in the USSR. So um so the book is about how they've been leading this undeclared war on us, the West, and we haven't been paying attention. You know, one anecdote that I shared is that uh Russian intelligence officer I mentioned I was debriefing, you know, in the years after nine eleven and I never state exactly where, when, or how I wanna protect our assets to help the
But as a younger officer back then, you know, decades ago, I was asking him what okay, so why are you still calling us the Geph in Russian, Vlovnik, the main adversary? I thought it's about the global war on terror. You know, I was trying to understand I don't understand why Russia would focus on us with so much energy and resources. You're still focusing us on the main enemy, and this is again many, many years ago.
And that was an education for me because this uh Russian intelligence officer said, Hey, Billy yes buddy. You were the in main enemy right after World War Two. That's what they called the Germans, by the way. They called the Germans the Glaubn. United States became the main enemy. You were always the main enemy through the Cold War. You are the main enemy today. And he was very adamant with you. That's never changing, it won't. For us, the United States comes number one.
And so I realized because of officers like that working with me, you know, and then the many examples over the past decades, they um they just will never stop focusing on us as the main adversary. And they focus the vast bulk of their resources against targeting the United States. So that's the undeclared war, Jeff. That's the war that we're not noticing, not paying attention to. Declared war by them against us, their intelligence services against us, and there are many examples.
Uh you you also wrote um that uh Putin is engaged in a secret war. In this c in this particular context, you were talking about Europe, you wrote Putin is engaged in a secret war whether Europe chooses uh chose to recognize it or not.
Why would in this context Europe, which I think it's true more broadly, why does the West And I and I think it's I think it's true, maybe you would disagree, that the media and the the government, uh meaning both the opposition and the party in power Don't recognize, don't acknowledge, never talk about hardly the idea that we that this war is being waged on a kind of
So Jeff, a big part of it of course is nine nine eleven and the necessary and important war on terror. You know, I served in conflict zones like my entire generation of CIA officers. You know, we all did. And um so we were in an existential struggle with Al Qaeda and with terrorist organizations. We and our European allies.
Um we can talk about whether other wars were necessary or not. I tried not to get into policy in my book. Other experts have talked about that. But I do believe that we had no choice to go into Afghanistan and to take on Al Qaeda. Um, but that led to twenty years of war. You know, I don't think the United States n none of us saw that happening. Twenty years of nonstop war. And so we in the in Europe, our allies were engaged in um in in things that matter.
But we did take our eye off of Russia and China both. I I firmly believe and and um and many of my generation of CIA officers A lot are now retired as well, like me. We look back and we say, Yeah, you know what? We took our eyes off of our two main adversaries that have never stopped working against us, Russia and China.
Uh in the case of Europe, um I believe firmly in the alliance. So NATO and with our European partners, we have to work together. You know, Jeff, the the largest uh chapter in the book is on Ukraine, the Ukraine war and the Russian intelligence service. How they did it, how they promulgated it, uh their false prognostications of success.
And uh I believe very strongly, as I stated in the book, that we have to support Ukraine. Um but I think that, you know, there's enough mistakes sort of both in Europe and in the United States, looking back on twenty or thirty years of policy with Russia, um, that we weren't focused enough on the threat.
🔇 Silence
But it seems that even after the threat became clear and I mean it it it things have really heated up in Russia. I mean sorry in in w in Western Europe, especially the Baltics, but also Germany. I mean, I think the Germans are much more attuned to what's happening. But but there's still I mean well let me let me move on to this question. In I I want to talk about Gorasimov. Now in tw in twenty thirteen a ru a Russian general uh named Villery Gorasimov he wrote a
¶ Russia's Hybrid Warfare Doctrine
He he gave a speech that was very influential and he one of the things he talked about was this concept w in Russian it's called Gibridnya voina, hybrid warfare. And th this idea of something called the Gorasimov doctrine became very contentious. Um but I think the point is pretty incontestable. Um Russia w was about to embark at that time on a really widespread series of unconventional attacks against the West.
cutting undersea cables and pipelines, random acts of arson and sabotage. Um more recently they attempted to place incendiary devices on air cargo freighters. um all kinds of widespread and sophisticated computer hacking attacks, interfering with elections. I mean the list really goes on and on and on.
If you pointed to any of them in isolation, you would say, What's the motivation for this attack? Why put incendiary devices on cargo planes? It doesn't it doesn't seem to serve any particular purpose. What And and people might tend to think, well, if there's no motivation then that they they probably didn't do it. But when you take these singularly right random acts together, a pattern starts to emerge. Do you see a pattern?
Yeah, of course. So um spent a lot of lot of time in the book as you know. Chapter uh uh eight is on sabotage and special operations and then tying in again with chapter ten talking about hybrid war and it's developed. So you said quite rightly, Jeff, uh they do they do use the term Gibridna Vajna, but of course that's a cognate from English. I prefer the term in Russia, they say Geskontachnaya Vajna, non contact warfare. Or they also told it called it uh Vaina Novova Pokaleni.
Wars of the next generation, the new generation. So as I discuss in the book and I've also uh been published in two other books, I've had chapters on on these topics on hybrid war. Uh you know, I look at the Russian writings and the Russian doctrine. How do they articulate it?
Garazimov as chief of the general staff, you're quite right. He gave a famous talk in uh twenty thirteen and then he had a a uh in a uh article from the talk that was in a military courier magazine, I believe it was called, uh for the Russian military.
But what Gorazimov was articulating and what that writer you mentioned one writer called it the Grazimov Doctrine. He later said he regretted using that term because in Russia nobody refers to it that way. They refer to it as Yes, contact weina, non contact warfare, or they talk call it warfare of the next generation or new generation warfare.
Um they're hearkening back to a debate going back thirty years, Jeff. It's kind of like often happens. We in the United States, we in Europe, we're we're way behind the curve. The Russians have been talking about this for thirty years. And what first uh what it first came out of was when the Russian army after the Soviet Union collapse was in decline and they watched what the United States pulled off with air power in the Gulf War in nineteen ninety one.
The Soviet then Russian generals, they weren't stupid. They realized that this new uh revolution in military affairs or the reconnaissance strike complex it's called in military doctrine. meant that the United States was destroying armies entirely from the air. We took out Saddam's army entirely from the air. So for the Russians they realized, you know what?
We're in big trouble. Our plans that we could take Germany through the Folder Gap in a conventional war, the United States might have enough and the best air power in the world with its NATO allies that they could destroy our entire army before we'd ever get through the Folder Gap. And they knew too they were suffering from not keeping up funding and maintenance and tactics uh techniques, procedures, TTPs as they're called.
So Jeff, that's an important doctrinal basis of writers that like uh like I quote in the book, uh writers like Mahmoud Goreev and Slichenko, these are famous Russian generals before before Gorazimov, they were talking about these concepts. What's it all boiled down to? The important point is Karazimov articulated in twenty thirteen an idea of continual warfare against against their adversaries, Russia's adversaries. He didn't name them, but he just said, you know what?
In modern times, maybe what we need is continual warfare, especially accentuating what he called information means, what the Russians call active measure. So the idea was they're constantly going to have a second front undermining their adversaries so that if they do need to go to war, then their weak their adversaries will be weakened. So they practiced this in Georgia in two thousand eight.
And then again the big test of course was Ukraine in twenty fourteen, where to a large degree their information means they're they stalled the West, they stalled Europe into wondering, wait a second, what is going on here? Who are these little green men showing up in uniforms in Crimea? Of course they're Russian soldiers. But they had no markings on them. They were little green men as they were called.
So that's what Russian hybrid war non contact warfare is all about. It's compensating for their deficiencies in some of their military um and their air force in particular, the Russian aerospace forces, by using their intelligence services, information attacks. Hybrid war, cyber operations. That all falls on the case.
Right. I mean I think what's important to underline maybe is that Unlike conventional war, where you might use every tool in your toolkit to uh what they say kinetically uh uh attack your opponent and degrade specific assets like blowing up tanks and things like this. This kind of warfare there's just it's sort of like a
Through
at your enemy in a way that, I mean, importantly, does not rise to the level of triggering a shooting war. So it's like constant low level annoyance and irritation, but it can be things that Um, I mean, they could directly hurt your opponent by like cutting a communications cable or cutting a pipeline, but it might also be things that are just designed to sow confusion, annoyance, irritation. I mean I accurate in in thinking.
Yes, absolutely, Jeff. So you listed let me hit on a few things you've commented on. First of all, again, you mentioned the Ger the Bolts the Baltic countries and the Germans. You know, kudos to them for recognizing the threat and what is happening. You know, the German intelligence chief, uh, it was earlier this year, end of 2025. Intelligence chief in Germany stated on the record, I think it was in January, you know, we are at a state of war right now.
We're in a state of war, just shy of kinetic conflict with Russia. And he's correct, you know, the the the Russians, the GRU attempted to kill the CEO of Ryan Metal last year. The Germans have the GRU dead to right. They have all the evidence, they laid it out. There's been more cable cuts in the Baltic Sea in the past two years than anywhere else in the world. That doesn't happen by accident.
But you know, Jeff, one of the challenges is that NATO as an alliance, we haven't called every single one of these actions for what it is. Like the German intelligence chief said finally on the record, Hey, this is war. This is undeclared warfare by the Russian Federation against Europe. And so every one of these incidences that as you said, Jeff, sometimes the the various uh populaces in European countries want to sort of write it off and say, Wait a second, this isn't wait, is this war? No.
¶ West's Blind Spot to Russian Threat
On page one hundred and eighty one of your book, you wrote The Kremlin and the I RIS viewed the primary threat to Russia as the so called color revolutions that occurred in the former Soviet republics like Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Grasimov's vision essentially sought to turn the West's perceived strategies
exemplified by the color revolutions against it. Wha the perceived strategies uh again, this is what's referred to as the Grasimov doctrine or hybrid warfare, this idea of using a wide spectrum of sub uh you know, outright warfare techniques. And it's a really interesting idea that Russia's ultimate goal is to achieve regime change essentially in the West.
Yeah, of course. Yeah. Yeah, so they don't you know, Jeff, they don't the the the Czechist mentality of those services, they they don't fundamentally understand democracies. They don't believe that uh Georgia got tired of living under too much corruption under the yoke of, you know, Soviet oppressors. They don't believe that the Georgian people or the Ukrainian people or the Kyrgyz people in Kyrgyzstan, those color revolutions as they were called.
You know, the Russian intelligence services were absolutely convinced these have to be CIA and Western intelligence boards.
Yeah.
Because you can't have people choosing their governments democratically. You can't have leaders elected freely. That just doesn't make sense to them. And they'll never accept that. So um that's what I mean about Karazimov looked at the color revolutions and he says, you know what, we're gonna use their means against them.
didn't understand fundamentalis or democratically active governments. And by the way, let's look at the example of Ukraine, because the Russian picked leader, Yanukovych, was a complete fraud. This guy fled in disgrace, ran away like a coward to Russia after his corruption, the fact that Russia had literally paid him off as a leader. Um he fled.
So when we talk about whose legitimate leaders are not, Yanukovych didn't stay to fight democratically for, you know, his country and to say, Hey, I am the Democratic He fled like a coward. So um Garazimo's idea though is that oh we're gonna turn you know, we're gonna use information means in a constant state of a s of a second front against the West, because that's what Putin believed was happening in the former Soviet Union.
You know, the Baltic the Baltic countries are right behind Ukraine in terms of his list of grievances. Putin calling the collapse of the Soviet Union the quote greatest geopolitical disaster of the twentieth century. He doesn't accept that these countries had a right to choose their own path forward. Uh and Yeltsin for all of his rights or wrongs in Korobachev before him, they were fundamentally heroic leaders that said, you know what?
Rather than fighting and having a civil war, we're gonna let these independent these republics go independent and choose their fate and choose what they want to do. Uh Putin doesn't accept that.
So is i is would you say that there is a kind of civilizational struggle happening between rule of law, free market, democracy on the one hand, and kind of corrupt oligarchic, um, you know, Putin style governance on the other hand.
Yeah. And you know, I I believe I make the point in the book, I believe it's an existential threat, Jeff. The Russian intelligence services and not only them, their autocratic Chinese allies as well. This is an existential threat to the United States, no different than the global war on terror that we fought for twenty years. And how and why do I say that?
They they're they're fighting an an all all or nothing game. They believe, again, that democracies, fundamentally, they cannot tolerate democracies. It's not in Putin or Xi Jinping's world vision. And if you look at studies by the RAN Corporation and others over the past decades, unfortunately, Jeff, democracy is under threat. Democracy, unfortunately,
The concept of democracy, democratic rule in a lot of the developing world um has been under the gun, has been under fire. And so Putin's vision for his people I'm I'm a Russia expert, so I'm gonna stick to the things I know in Russia. Putin's vision he's articulated to the Russian people is say, hey, Give up your freedom.
It's okay, let me rule for you and my group of Siloviki, strongmen. Telling term by the way, when would the American people or any European power ever tolerate the cabinet of the of of important national security ministers being called strongmen. Jeff, we would never stand for that. We'd be like, what? Strongmen? That's what they call themselves? But his idea falls in line with an historic concept the Russians called wood.
It's the idea of a leader kind of like a con, a a very the German term would be Fjord. Okay, sorry, but that's about the closest concept. An all encompassing leader. The Russian concept of a vožhd is we're gonna give up our We're going to give up our freedoms so that we can live in security this guy's going to take care of us. That's fundamentally what what Putin's appealing to, whether he uses the term Vojd or not.
That's what he's appealing to, the autocracy, having an autocratic leader that decides everything for you. That's their vision. That's what Xi Jinping's doing in China, consolidating all all power to himself. And so they can't tolerate functioning democracies on their borders, uh Jeff. That's what the struggle is all about. They can't have the Baltic countries who chose their own path and who have succeeded dramatically. Look at how far the Baltics have come in thirty years versus Belarus.
Belarus is a disaster. I've been in Bel Belarus many times. Got to travel there as a student. They haven't progressed much at all from from nineteen ninety. Um the Baltics have tr tremendous progress. They've they're integrated into the EU, Europe, functioning democracies. Not perfect. Ukraine's not perfect either, but these are democracies. And they have c economies that work, market economies that work. For Putin, that's a problem.
¶ A One-Sided Geopolitical Struggle
You mentioned that from the Russian intelligence services perspective, they spend ninety percent of their time thinking about the United States. The United States has the war on terror to think about, they have China to think about, they have the whole world to think about. And it seems almost like what we're talking about is a kind of a one-sided war. Like one side one war is aggressively attacking the other and the other doesn't even realize that it's happening.
Absolutely. Jeff, I I tried to state the same as clearly and succinctly in my book. I hope that came across, but you just said it very well. You know, for the United States, most of my career in the intelligence community, Jeff, and at CIA, we could talk about a top ten ten list of national security concerns, and they're articulated in our national security strategies, the NSS.
Comes out with every presidential administration. Just came out this year with President Trump's second administration. And you look at that list, you've got a list of You know, proliferation concerns, China's certainly been on the list, a rising China, uh Russia's been on the list at one point or another over the past twenty twenty uh years plus. But where has Russia factored? I would argue unf unfortunately for me as a Russia expert,
And for my colleagues and I, as Michael Solik, our former DDO said, you know, it's Cold War veterans. He is a Cold War veteran. I coming into the service after the Cold War. We knew Russia never was off the map. They were always a national security threat. But if you looked at 2010, where was Russia?
Jeff, they weren't even really on the list. They were barely top ten. We had global war on terror, we had Iraq, we had counter proliferation, we had concerns over Pakistan and what was happening with that we know Pakistan and proliferation. And so while Russia's been keeping its focus number one on the United States, the GEPA, the main enemy, main adversary, while China's been resurgent in the past twenty years, now the Chinese Navy has more ships than we do, Jeff, unfortunately.
Um their Air Force, unfortunately, wants to arrival the United States, I would argue they still can't because of the the the pride of the United States is our pilots. The pride of the United States is our airmen, our soldiers, our Navy has have way more experience doing it right, and we understand campaign. But the Chinese are going they're all out. They're trying to build more fire fighters, better missiles that can go further. Chinese Navy's outpaced us in terms of ship production.
So that's what they're out for. China and Russia, they're out for global domination. And the United States, what are we focused on? Jeff, we've got a lot of their concerns, you know, let's not not to mention the current war with Iran right now.
Um I just wrote a piece I hope to get published soon on the fact that we can't take our eyes off China and Russia because they may act opportunistically right now. That's what I believe is the greatest threat right now, opportunism by Russia and China, while unfortunately we're at war with Iran.
¶ Russian Deception and Election Interference
Uh y in order to do your job better, you learned Russian, you became fluent in it. Uh there's an interesting linguistic observation that you make in the book, which is that in Russian conspiracia does not have the negative connotation that does in English. It means something more like espionage tradecraft. And it actually would be a compliment to some
So so it's actually a compliment to say you have good conspiracy. Whereas in the English speaking world, like to to say that something is a conspiracy theory is basically to say that it's crazy, that it's not really happening, you're imagining things. We don't like to think of that there's conspiracies. And and so we have two visions of society that are at war with each other, one of which
takes pride in carrying out elaborate, nefarious conspiracies. Oh, yes. And the other that refuses to believe that conspiracies exist.
Absolutely Jeff, very you're a very astute reader, I have to compliment you because you've hit on key themes that I was trying to bring across to readers. My book is meant to educate. It's apolitical as you know. I don't mention any US president. Entire book. Okay. Uh don't talk about politics. You just hit on the the key point that I'm trying to make in the book. We have an entirely different mentality than the Russian security services and what they've
pressed on the Russian people for decades now. Um yeah, Russians use the term Pravla Conspiracia to talk about the rules the that's their closest equivalent to rules of conspiracy is their close closest equivalent to what we call trade craft, where I talk title my book Tradecraft. And they take great pride in what they also call Maskrovka. Maskrovka is what we would call denial and deception, Jeff, the idea that you know what?
We're gonna dupe you into doing our will, the Russians are, and you won't even know it. And this comes into the term you know I also talk about in chapter six of the book, the Palezni Dorak, the useful idiot. The Russian concept back to the days of Lenin. Lenin said, Hey, you know what? Let's take advantage of idealistic idiots in the West that believe in the communist revolution, and we'll take advantage of them for our purpose.
This has always been a part of Russian intelligence culture. And it's why, with their active measures, what they also call measures of support, they're supporting their malign policies. They're trying to get academics, journalists,
Diplomats, politicians in the West and in Europe to say, you know what, and there are some of them now, I'm not gonna name which countries, but one of'em has an election going on right now, where there's politicians that say, Hey, you know what? Russia can be our friend.
You know, we don't need to worry about the threat from Russia. I don't know how in the world a country that suffered revolution uh a a revolution that was put down by the Soviets in the fifties could possibly a leader of that country could possibly believe Russia's gonna be a friend to them under Vladimir Putin blows my mind.
But again, trying to stay apolitical, focused on them and their mentality. You hit the nail on the head, Jeff. You know, they um they just view the struggle entirely differently, the United States, you know? Um and and the other c the other thing that I'll mention is, you know, I watch a lot of Russia. I try to keep my language sharp. We're we're headlining their news every single night.
Jeff, every single night the United States is all over their news with a widely propagandized, bizarro version of the war in Ukraine, which is that the US is there fighting them. Supposedly, according to the Russian version of the news, it's US troops on the ground, NATO troops on the ground.
Nothing further from the truth the reality we know of, um but that's their version of the war. They're fighting fascism in Ukraine despite the fact that the Ukrainian president is Jewish himself. He had members of his family die in the Holocaust. So what's the news in the United States? We've got a lot else to focus on. We've got our economy, we've got the Iran War now, we've got the war on Terranera base.
So yeah, um very different worldviews. And and fundamentally we can touch on this more if you like, but it's the Russian insecurity about the West which goes back hundreds of years.
I think it's really important. I think the gist of what you're trying to accomplish is not possible unless we engage in a somewhat delicate discourse about what is happening vis a vis Russia in the United States. And I and I'll I'll let you kind of you know, guide me in how you want to talk about this because I know you don't want to be political, but at the same time, there is a it is kind of a front of mind.
I'm t I'm um so I think it has been fairly well established. You have a chapter in your book about Russian interference in the twenty sixteen election. This US Senate uh found evidence of this as well. I think it's at this point not really debatable that Russia engage in active measures to subvert the twenty sixteen presidential election in the United States. Would you agree with that?
Absolutely. Oh absolutely. Listen, they Here's the fundamental point, uh Jeff, I believe with all of my experience and those by the way of most colleagues that I've come across in the intelligence community that looked at this issue. Let's look at what the DNI report said from twenty sixteen, the Director of National Intelligence Board and the Senate Select Committee report, which were both bipartisan, current Secretary of State.
Uh Rubio was part of that Senate report. He signed off on it too. What did it say? It said they meddled. It said they attempted to disrupt, disinform, misform, and sway the American public. But what what was the fundamental mission? It wasn't for any one or other candidate. Jeff, that was incidental to what the Russians were doing. The Russians were trying to undermine the very concept of democracy.
They're trying to get they were and they still are trying to get Americans not to trust our electoral system. It's back to what you and I just covered talking about this is a different views of civilization. It's about the Russian intelligence services saying, You know what, we can't have democracy. It's a mortal threat to this regime that they're trying to keep in power, Putin, and whoever follows him.
And so the disunion, the the the infighting that they created in the United States, you know, how do they do that? We can get into the nitty gritty if you like, but fundamental best proof I always point to is look at what those reports talk about. Look at what Facebook found in its own investigation about the unfortunately millions of likes that Russian trolls picked up on.
Jeff, they were arguing different sides of the same issues. They were picking the most emotional issues they could for the American electorate, and they were arguing both sides just to amp up the level of emotion and amp up the level of hostility.
And they continue to do that. And it's a lack of awareness among the American people I'm trying to change. That these guys are playing us for fools. The Russian intelligence services are making us fight one another. We should be focused on them. They're the mortal threat to our to our democracy.
Yeah. Um well Sean, I want to thank you again for taking the time to talk to me and sharing your expertise. The book again is Tradecraft. Uh, tactics and dirty tricks, Russian intelligence and Putin Secret War. I highly recommend it to anyone who's interested in this topic. Sean, thank you so much for joining me today.
Thank you, Jeff. Imp important issues we talked about. I appreciate you you gave it a deep read, I can tell, uh, and I appreciate the chance to talk about the threat of Russian intelligence. Uh book's out on 21 April, so please uh consider a pre-order and and and go get it from your favorite bookstore. Jeff, thanks for having me.
¶ The West's Conspiracy Blindness
Again, my deep gratitude to Sean Wiswester for coming on the show. I think for a lot of us, the CIA is a shadowy and kind of unknowable organization that has almost mystical abilities. It's really refreshing to get a human perspective on what the world looks like from inside it. What I'd like to draw a line under in particular from what Sean told us is the idea that the concept of conspiracy looks very different in Russia and the West.
Full disclosure, I have many times been described as a conspiracy theorist because I postulated that MH three hundred seventy might have been hijacked by sophisticated actors. That kind of framing, namely calling me a conspiracy theorist, it's intended to denigrate and minimize a point of view. Because here in the West we have a culture that treats the idea of conspiracy as inherently delusional and absurd.
But as Sean points out, in Russia, conspiracy is viewed as a real thing, as in fact an important tool, and it's even a compliment to say that someone has good conspiracy. So you can imagine if a culture that respects and admires conspiracy decides to use it as a tool against an adversary culture that sees, you know, acknowledging conspiracy as a sign of mental weakness. Well you can just imagine the mayhem that might ensue.
Or rather, you don't you don't have to imagine it, because we're living in the midst of it, and frankly, it isn't that pleasant. Okay, that's all I have for you today. Thanks for watching. I'll see you next time.
If you like the show, please take a moment to rate, review, and subscribe. It really does help the show to grow. Thank you for listening.
🔇 Silence
