¶ Intro / Opening
Fatebusters with Polish Radio.
¶ Russian Disinformation as a War Weapon
Hi everyone, I'm Adajani Shewska. Welcome in you to Fake Busters with Polish Radio, our special podcast focusing on disinformation and cybersecurity in the modern world. Throughout our show we will discuss how to debunk fake news, explore the history of media propaganda, and discover strategies to combat internet noise.
In this edition, we turn our focus to a critical and evolving front in the war in Ukraine, one that isn't just fought with tanks or missiles, but also with narratives, fake headlines, and manipulated truth. Since the beginning of the full scale invasion in two thousand twenty two, Russian disinformation has become a weapon of war deployed not just to mislead the global public, but to fracture alliances, erode trust in institutions, and confuse the battlefield itself.
How does this propaganda machine operate? We'll explore this question and more with Lithuanian Deputy Minister of Culture, Viktor Denisenko, discussing the multifaceted challenges posed by Russian disinformation and propaganda in Lithuania. Speaking with Polish radios Marianna Kriel in Vilnius, Danisenko elaborated on the evolving nature of these threats in light of Russia's full scale military operations in Ukraine.
Additionally, he highlighted the strategic initiatives being implemented to combat disinformation Ен аутлайнд компрегенсив плен імдад адресинг деспресинг іщу, пане міністре. Дуже дякую вам, що ви погодились на цю розмову. Mister Minister, it is very important for our listeners to understand the situation in Lithuania when it comes to propaganda and Jak to wygląda z informacją w tym społeczeństwie? Jak to wygląda na tle wojny w Ukrainie?
It's a really important question because in general this issue and challenge of disinformation and propaganda for Lithuania it's nothing new because I could mention that for example we faced some kind of information warfare from side of Russia in general a few decades ago or even after collapse of Soviet Union because we also have some accusation of violation of a right of so called Russian speaking community compatriots of Russia, etc. But of course this situation of open aggression.
of uh Russia against Ukraine because we are understanding what in general aggression begins ten years ago even more, eleven, science annexation of Crimea. But, of course, three years ago Russia started a conventional war against Ukraine.
So in Lithuania first of all it's changed uh our attention or our regard to this issue because you know before this beginning of with full scale invasion we try also to have kind of balance because you know it's quite often it's a question of freedom of speech and you look into some frontiers and could say what you know something is in grey area. But when war starts, we need to animate some decisions, for example, to finally to block some sources of Kremlin disinformation and Kremlin propaganda.
implement sanctions, including national sanctions against some actors and so on. In general, I could say that our attention to this challenge became even more aware compared to what we had before this beginning of full-scale invasion.
¶ Countering Propaganda Through Policy and Media
threat also became more clear and in which fields is this most evident I mean for example it could be cultural science Perhaps it uh also differs uh regionally in some way, and uh can you name some examples that you have managed to overcome in some way and which are still relevant today? А які ще є сьогодні актуальними? О в корс, яку цей ватпосибли бігес челендж возвез телевізіон ченелс в Росія Федераційн без.
you know s channels where transmitted in cable networks in Lithuania before full scale invasion, but after the beginning of full-scale invasion of Russia to Ukraine, Lithuania made decision just to turn out with mainly channels. from with cable networks, with Kremlin propaganda. Of course I could say that it's more still topical challenges we have because uh for example um social media today it's a perfect uh area for uh spread of disinformation because
As you know, social media have no frontiers. It's difficult to control it. It's quite often we could talk about responsibility of owners of social media because Например, мы можем поговорить с мета-корпорацией. possibilities to influence TikTok because it's from China. Another thing of course is continuous formation activities of Russian Federation and I could mention one example I think And, of course, it's like an old paradigm of all propagandistic cliché.
voluntary Lithuania during the Soviet Union and so on and so on. We know all these narratives but We could say that Russia tried to reproduct it continuously and for me quite interesting aspect that for a word for this book write the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Sergei Lavrov. So it's also showing well quite high attention of Russia In this field of disinformation and propaganda, quite high attention to Lithuania and to Baltic states in general.
Ви власне декілька місяців тому ще афью манс агою а уверсити професор and disinformation researcher and uh today you are also working at the Ministry of Culture to create as I understand it A mechanism that would uh counteract uh this in the cultural sphere. For example, when it comes to performance. Как это работает сегодня в Литве?
to regulate this area of public information. Ministry of culture in in Lithuania got ten years ago and it was like a reaction to events in Ukraine, to Crimea, annexation of Crimea and so on. Så det är det lituaniska politiska system som det är naturliga responsabilitet av minister av kulturen. När vi talar om de som vi försöker implementera idag, först av all, vi har en väldigt stor task.
according to the program of current government of Lithuania, Ministry of Culture, of course, working together with partners with other institutions and other ministries. should prepare a plan to fight disinformation and manipulations, a national plan. So today we are on the first stage, on the stage of preparation.
this plan it's still hard to present a lot like a concrete things about this plan because it's a work in progress but in general our goal is how to improve resilience of society, to disinformation propaganda, improve media literacy. First of all, like provide more possibilities for real, for quality media to work and also to support democracy and all political, democratic political system.
¶ Culture, Art, and Wartime Allegiance
in Lithuania and also this question of some kind of artist or singers who affiliated with Russia or Belarus. It's also quite topical in Lithuania because we have a lot of examples. uh people who in general supports aggression against Ukraine who or who have performance in Crimea after 2015, that means in occupation territory, also want to have some shows in Lithuania and earn some money.
I know in Lithuania we have no censorship. It's forbidden by law. But we are trying to find solution in this sphere of value. So our like uh position from this point of view uh we're saying that of course we Do not want. to see in Lithuania singers, artists who support war crimes, who support war, etc. And first of all, it's responsibility of organizers of events they should think.
And also I could say that implementing this like a valuable position helps reaction from society. Because first of all it's like a vox populi when people say it.
You know w why person who I don't know like Putin and saying that Putin is the greatest uh I don't know leader of Russia, why such kind of person will have concert or would have concert in Lithuania, but At the same time I could say what I think that our position should be clever because uh we have some uh artists and some singers who from Russia, for example, who not support war and who like a showing this position uh
I don't know, for example, rock band Nogos Velo, they have a very nice song, Ukraine, and even recorded it, first it was in Russian language, and they recorded it in Ukrainian later.
and also we have some антипутін сонцоро анти крі антикремлян сонц uh it's just example from my point of view it's uh nothing bad uh if they will have or they had performance in Lithuania but they uh uh think what uh it would be nothing uh wrong if it will be also more performance in future because in Lithuania we have audience for this kind of concerts or show entertainment events, so from my point of view it's better that local russian-speaking community goes to some kind of performances were
s artists uh clearly saying that you know we we are against war and we think that uh this aggression of Russia against Ukraine is totally mad
¶ Grassroots Efforts and Societal Strength
You mentioned this mechanism that the Ministry of Culture is working on. I wonder if there are any NGOs that also research and catch various. fakes in the Lithuanian information space, in the Lithuanian internet and for example Даже в школьной освещении есть такие примеры? In general, we have a lot of different initiatives in Lithuania. First of all, I think that we should mention some kind of media, mass media. In Lithuania we have Фі факт чекінг ініціатив бажаналіст. So and it's it's
They are working quite well. Also, when we are talking about non-governmental organization, in general in Lithuania, quite a lot of non-governmental organizations are working with file of media literacy. uh organizing some kind of trainings or public lectures or similar events But also we have few non governmental organizations which are fighting what means fighting of course first of all Finding, exploring, explaining. So quite well known organization. It's debunk.eu.
Because it's a Lithuanian initiative but now we are working globally and around the world in general, even not only in Europe. Another quite successful initiative is Civil Resilience Initiative of the Lithuanian Non-Governmental Organization. So really we have a lot of examples and of course it's helping to keep this awareness, society awareness about this real challenge of propaganda and disinformation.
Я просто приємно шоковано від того, що я бачу в Вільнюсі, скільки... buses with the words Vilnius love Ukraine it's very very nice and I wonder if against the backdrop in this enormous uh support uh at the beginning of the full scale war. There were also fakes disinformation from Russia that Lithuania was actually so supportive of Ukraine. В том, что Литва настолько поддерживает Украину.
because we totally understand what happens and for us it's no question where is the truth and because we know the nature of Russia and Unfortunately, I was even not surprised what happened. But of course, Russian propaganda and disinformation are trying to affect this support. Because, you know, it's different kind of narratives. But first of all, of course, narratives are against Ukrainian refugees. And, you know, it's quite traditional narratives. For example, Luke, refugees.
will stolen your jobs or look Lithuania spending a lot of money to support Ukrainians but what about local citizens what about I don't know pensioners and so on. It's uh you know this attempt to split society uh using this kind of narratives. Also maybe another narrative which I could remember it but Lithuania supports Ukraine också by sending some kind of weapons or money for weapons. Lithuania supports war. Lithuania pushing war forward. Но, в общем, я могу сказать, что это не работает.
Vilnius, men inte bara i Vilnius, utan även i Lithuania, utan i alla stora städer. You will find a lot of Ukrainian flags which are on official buildings, but not only on official buildings, just some citizens just demonstrating also. Ukrainian flags on the cars or on the balconies of buildings because they support Ukraine and they want to show that they and we in general support. Ukraine. Lithuanian Deputy Minister of Culture Viktor Denisenko spoke with Polish Radio Samarian Nakryel in Vilnius.
And that was all in this episode of Fake Busters with Polish Radio. I'm Adain Shevska. Thank you for tuning in. And if you are interested in the topics of misinformation, disinformation, or fake news. Be sure to check our special podcasts created in partnership with the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
