Hello, and welcome back to Drilled. I'm Ami Westervelt. This season, we are making our way through the book Climate Obstruction, a Global Survey. I'm getting ready to head to the annual UN Climate Summit, the COP or Conference of the Parties in November, and to prep for it, I am reading up on all of the research so far about
climate obstruction and how it works around the world. In today's episode, a really important topic, especially for this year's cop which is how climate obstruction works in the Global South and how some of these structures in place continue to privilege global North countries over global South countries when we're talking about climate negotiations, which then makes it that much harder to even talk about climate policy in the Global South without it seeming like something that is patent unfair.
Joining me to talk about this today are two leading experts on this question. They oversaw a chapter in this book that pulls together all the research that we have so far on it. Ruth McKee from de montfur University and Omar Faruke at Queen's University in Canada. Our conversation is coming up after this quick break. I'm going to ask you a really, really dumb, basic question and that is, please define global South for us. Let's set the context here.
That basic question is probably a very whole book. So I think for setting it out into the context of this chapter, we say the global South in its geopolitical sense, So it's a group of trees that have a history of colonialism, neo imperialism, and so that historical context of non Western nations that now sit within a very different economic and social structure to Western nations that really it's driven by political and economic marginalization, which then in turn
has implications, at least for us in our case, how it then stands with addressing climate the climate crisis. So we can't say the global seuth and global self countries as this one complete, same picture set of countries. Rather, it's a reflection of the geopolitical history in which we've distinguished between western Global North countries and then non Western
countries in the Global South. So I think that's the best way that we come to defying the global seuth and how we deploy it in this chapter.
Okay, so you talk about these five major considerations when we're looking at climate obstruction in the Global South, and I want to talk about all five of them but let's start with what you were just talking about, Ruth, that like these You know, there's a lot of very different countries in different regions of the world that are in this category of Global South. So that means that they have varying commitments, and there are varying commitments even
within the countries. Can you talk about those contrasts and how they play out both within the countries and sort of beyond them and between them.
Okay, so I'll pick this up.
So here we are referring to the variations in climate commitments among countries in the Global South. And we see that these countries, as mentioned, given the fact that we are looking at these countries from the advantage point of history of colonialism, new colonialism and imperialism and their positions in global political economic order, we see this country's experience shared experience in terms of disadvantages in terms of economic growth, development, prosperity,
and human development. So a common thing among all these countries that they are in a disadvantageous situation in terms of economic growth and development, and there shapes their commitment to climate action, their commitment to fulfilling their pledge, their commitment to the parish accord. So such disadvantages we see creating these variations in terms of commitment s. Take, for example, African countries. We can consider all those countries together in
one category. For them, climate action is not a priority. Decarbonizing the economy is not a priority for them. Is energy poverty, Addressing energy poverty, reaching electricity to its population. It's something that is their priority and certainly they will
consider any sort of options to fulfill that goal. So when energy poverty as a result of their advantageous situation in terms of economic growth, prosperity, and human development is a major concern, then climate action or commitment to climate pledge is something that takes a back seat. We can
also think about the case of India. India is a giant economy in current times, but it is still considers energy poverty human development associated with these as is primary concerned because millions of people, hundreds of millions of people in that country that do not have access to energy. So energy poverty, energy security, and disadvantageous economic situation is something that is causing varying commitments to climate actions in many countries in the global South.
It's been interesting to see the big oil majors really pick up on specifically energy poverty in Africa as like there you would think that they're all just charities trying to solve it. They talk about it all the time.
Yeah.
I'll just add one thing here. Carbon majors are expressing interest in many African countries to explore and to love their antebor resources by mentioning this issue of energy poverty energy security. But there is also another layer of it, and that is the interest of countries in the global North, especially European countries, which are now facing an existential trip
coming from cutting off gas from Russia. So they have to find out alternative sources and they have found with their with the assistance of their carbon majors, some some African countries as a source to fill that PoID.
Yeah.
Yeah.
I asked a fossil fuel executive recently if they were planning to invest in grid infrastructure in Mozambique to as part of their energy poverty plan, and they were like.
What because most of most of these are exported to will be exported to Yes, so Ghana, for example, it will export all major part of your newly developed fossil gas to Europe. So they are not in a position like carbon maages are not in a position or not to make any commitment to do anything locally.
So it is it's often said that, and obviously there's a lot of evidence to this effect as well, that you know, global salth countries contributed the least to climate change, but will face the impacts first and worst. Can you talk about how that plays into climate obstruction.
That's an interesting thing that we observed in our analysis of climate actions and climate delay or obstructure in the global South. But the issue of least responsibilities is something that is used most often than not by politicians, politically leaves, and even civil society groups environmentalists noted environmentalists to sort of justify climate delay, if not climate overstruction. In this case, we are very careful in choosing our work, and that
is also connected to the notion of climate justice. So it comes from that original nineteen ninety two un trible FC Climate agreement where this notion of differentiated common but
differentiated responsibilities came in. So the global North, they contributed overwhelmingly to historical carbon emissions, so they created this sort of mess or climate crisis is now up on their shoulder to take the major responsibility to clean it up, and that is by reducing their emissions as well as providing technical and financial support to Global South countries to first adapt to climate crisis and then also contributing to
sort of mitigation transitioning to where green energy all sorts of things. So the notion of least responsibility, historically, least responsibility is something that we find as a kind of justification for delaying climate actions or even undertaking board climate actions in many countries in the Global South, many big countries. India's name comes to our mind because India is in recent years in global even climate meetings.
India is kind of playing.
The role of a leader of the Global South in advocating for them using the framework of climate justice, climate fairness, all sorts of things. So we find such emphasis on least responsibility is a major factor contributing to sidelining climate actions or delaying climate actions in many countries in the Global South. And I will also add one particular point. The notion of least responsibilities is not just that sideline
commitment towards renownse gas mitigation, reducing their emission. It directs their attention to most of their time energy and attention to building resilience and developing adaptation measures. So their focused on least responsibility takes all energy and resources and attention towards adaptation and resilience. And we also see how that plays out during global climate negotiations. Global South countries call
for climate finance contribution equally for mitigation and adaptation and resilience. Currently, globalnot countries are interested in investing in mitigation, not much in terms of adaptation and resilience. So global health countries involve these notion of climate justice least responsibilities to intervene into that financial arrangements.
Equally divided between mitigation and adaptation.
And I think that goes to the problem that stands in the idea of fair share and differentiated responsibility that comes out under the Parish Agreement under Article for And I think this idea of equity and ensuring justice, it really feeds into the stalemate that then proceeds within conventions u N SAC conventions almost given the example of sort of the Indian negotiations, and it presents that another bigger question around well what do these global UNFCC convents do.
Are they there to push for strong climate action or are they there to do this slowly or even muddy the waters along this path, and it actually presents a problem for the probably bold action that needs to get taken to address the climate crisis. So I think this idea of fairness, which established within within article for the Parish agreements, fundamentally is saying, well, it's equity, it's striving for equity, and so the door start from the place.
But I don't think equity really means and connects with justice in and of itself, and I think that's something that underlines what these large UNFCC conference conferences do stand for with equity and increase in equity, but they can't necessarily represent justice and in this case climate justice, what we would like to see in terms of climate justice. So I think that might be one of the biggest I guess institutional problems of the unof they see in their role and how that plays out. Yeah.
Yeah. Relatedly, I want to have you define and talk a little bit about loss and damage because I feel like, you know, it's it gets talked about every unf Triple C conference and everyone's like, yeah, we should do it, and like we're going to do it, and then they
just don't do it. So yeah, I'm I'm curious what you've found on that and how particularly the persistent failure to actually come through on loss and damage promises has made it easier for global self countries to kind of be like, well, forget it, then we can't work on this stuff if you guys aren't going to be serious about helping to fund it.
I think again it goes to this stalemate and connects with what we've talked about. So this idea of loss and damage, so we mentioned this in the book, it's abound the third pillar of global climate governance. So I think it helps shift from the even the mitigating mitigation adaptation to an actual, more formal financial role of providing the finances to cover the harmful impacts, particularly in the
global South. And it's based on the the unavoidable reality that climate change has and will impact on these countries more so than other countries. And that goes back to the history. Think back to those that geopolitical context and the historic colonial history, the nerperial neo imperial history that surrounds these current relations where loss and damage is there to say, well, we are going to support you and
provide you resources to deal with these impacts. But fundamentally that means that Global North countries are now under I guess or seeking financial obligations. And when you've got that financial those financial obligations to contribute to that loss and damage pillar, it's giving the Again. It goes back to that contentious to your political environment with political interest, financial interest,
economic stability. The conversations then go, well, how do we how can we sort of give away so much of this money to support loss and damage for the impacts that we've The Global North taken responsibility for its actions, to put plainly, but I guess that also comes and this I don't necessarily think it comes across in the chapter, but it's also reminds me of an acceptance of responsibility
that the Global North is failing to achieve. More so than just not wanting to spend money, It then means that there is that responsibility in that ownership that needs to then be accepted. And I still think when it comes to the Global Norse actions Western Europe, the US keeping responsibility for that history, admitting that that's happened is what then stalls the negotiations. So we talk about word perfect policy, but an off the comment would be sort
of is that a confession? Do you admit guiltyre And for me, that's the sense that that ongoing stalling, that word perfect policy idea is the attempt of cause and prevent responsibility then being ironed out into this financial support, which then again creates that stillmate, well if they're not going to do it, well we're not going to do it, and the back and forth in the back and both
continues to happen. So I think loss and damage is that necessary step that needs to be taken, that financial support to deal with those consequences by the Global North. But in reality that does mean accepting more responsibility, for which many countries in the Global North, fundamentally in there are not willing to do given the complex social, political, and economic context that each country has in and of themselves.
So I think loss and damage is central is But I think at the same time that's going that is stalled because it takes too much to add responsibility and thus the consequences that come with that.
Yeah, I'll just add one particular point here. Even though the loss and damage, that third pillar which emerged in recent years within the human cops system, the global not country is powerful countries, particularly the European Union and the United States. They made sure that there is no such thing there within, within within decision making process as something that will point towards their legally mandatory obligation or something.
So they then they make sure that such arrangements loss and damage will not really bind them towards any sort of legal obligations.
So even though.
That that that was removed this processes in the past several years, it is only about financial support. Is not compensation or reparation those words and not. There is is simply financial support for Global South countries, and we see very little in terms of financial contribution to that fund as of now.
Very little.
This has come up already a little bit the structural issues in geopolitical shifts in climate politics, which are very very complicated. So can I have you talk about the traditional approach to development and especially you know, development and growth and how that kind of often gets pitted against climate action.
Yeah, so this is something that we discussed at length, not just in this chapter, but also while preparing APOL
brief and eventually this chapter. This traditional approach to development, shaped by the ironclad belief in a new classical economic system emphasizing growth, development, prosperity, improved human development through market driven processes is something that is that has historically shaped development approaches around the world, not just in the global South, around the world, in global North as well.
The main focus is that, okay, if we focus.
On economic growth, market driven economic growth, it will increase not just economic share of these countries, but also increase competitiveness. And in that process of achieving growth, prosperity and improved human development, suddenly greenhouse gas.
Emission will will shoot up.
And the logic is that countries will be able to address high greenhouse gas emissions at some point in their development trajectory by using resources that they accumulated through this path of economic growth and prosperity through their actions in this process.
So is the market driven approach.
We characterize it as traditional approach in the sense actually the appropriate word would be the mainstream, dominant approach to development, focusing on market driven mechanisms. We call it mainstream or dominant because there are other approaches as well, focusing on sustainability, focusing on inclusion and other issues which involved include critique
of these traditional approaches. So the idea is that I'm summarizing this complex phenomenon, the idea is relying on market driven processes to develop resources to address economic concerns.
Along the way.
We will contribute to greenhouse gas emations, but we will be able to deal with that at some point in that trajectory by relying on resources accumulated from this process.
And I think it's important to add there as well, is that we think about marketing that market driven approach,
that dominant approach. And we don't necessarily touch on this in the chapter, but there's a lot of literature as well as scientific evidence that attributes and we have to acknowledge the tribute between these market driven, dominant approach neoclass economics that have expanded across the world over the past one hundred years and have had such a negative impact on the environment with the rise in greenhouse gas emissions. So I think it's fair to say. I'm not going
to say that capitalism is killing the climate. That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that there's certainly a relationship between how the market is structured and how and the impact that it has had on greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, when you have that very much tunnel vision that dominates the economy as well as dominates the political environment. You will then constantly feed into a developmental model that will pit the environment against economic growth and prosperity. So until
we you cannot divorce the two. So until you start to see an alternative to that development model, then trying to address this the climate crisis will, I guess, facilitate the opportunity for obstruction to happen. So we talk about in some of the outside literature, for instance, we create
new environments for say, crime to take place. So we talk about how in the case of carbon credit systems, so we've talked about fraud within carbon credit credit systems, you've created for an environment for a crime to take place. But that new environment is also based on climate chip, this neo classical approach that will negatively impact the environment. So you're opening doors to try and address the climate crisis, but within an environment which is not going to do so.
And I think that's an important point to show why actually approaches to development that dominate the that dominate society, that will dominate UNFCC negotiations, that dominate politics, will fundamentally store the progress required and become obstacles in and of themselves.
Have a hard this phrase in Canada de carganized oil.
Yes, we've heard it in the US too. Occidental Petroleum claims to have shipped the first barrel of net zero oil carbon negative oil. It's outrageous.
Yeah, it's beyond comprehensional. Like the fraud and all sorts of things are now so deeply greened in thought processes of our policy makers that they can say something decarbonized oil and that's how you reach you near zero goal.
It blows my mind that people are like, but it makes sense on the spreadsheet, though the atmosphere doesn't care about your spreadsheet. Actually, I want to ask you guys about how these two things that we've been talking about
kind of come together. Because there's the really complex unf triple C stuff happening, and then there's all of the market forces stuff, and I feel like it is creating this situation where a lot of global salt countries are getting into the oil business now and they're talking about using that money to pay for climate adaptation because there's such a failure on international climate negotiations to get money to deal with this problem that they're now dependent on
oil companies and the money from them to pay for it.
You mentioned that in you Know Not to us, citing particularly the case of Guyana right.
Yes, there.
I have watched many speeches by Guyana's president. Yeah, talks very eloquently and captivate audience.
They were a really early mover on carbon credits too, actually because.
Because they have intact forests and very rich biodiverse forest areas so that they can use that. But in terms of the issue of extractive industry logics to address climate action, Guyana is is such a fascinating case to see how they present their case, and it shows, as you rightly pointed out, the the failure of you and trible C
system to mobilize financial support for these countries Guyana. Most I guess vast area of that country is below the sea level and it will go underwater coming a few years, and it will require tones of resources and technical know how to address those concerns.
So who will pay for that?
They are like oil discovery is something that provided them with this opportunity. But I'm not quite sure whether I'm very pessimistic in this regard. I'm not quite sure whether even if you and trible FC system mobilizes trillions for Global South countries. It will persuade them to move away from extractive development pathway.
Yeah, because I have.
Seen from you reporting also about Guyana that there is a deep connections between carbon majors and politically leafs within Guyana.
Yeah.
So, and this president, the current president, he acknowledged several times the contract between Guyana and and and the oil company is one sided and his administration cannot really do much to address this disparity in the contract. Yeah, because they politically lease and carbon majors are on the same page in terms of exploiting resources as well as exploiting a poor country in the globalself.
Okay, I want to talk about how these doew political things show up with respect to then not just the approach to development, but the actual investments in development from the development banks. So I'll give another example from Guyana. There was this really interesting thing that happened in the course of them kind of building out their oil industry where at a certain point the Biden administration in the US said, that's it, inter America is development big. We're
not going to fund fossil fuel infrastructure anymore. And so the Vice president said, while then they should stop funding fossil fuel infrastructure in their own country. It was like, he's not wrong, he's got a point. But they just kind of went, okay, fine and went and got the money from China instead. So it's a good example of okay, so it shifts, but then it just kind of comes back around.
Yeah, I'm saying in terms of geopolitics, we emphasize one particular point, not just the role of New Development Bank led by Briggs, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, and recently they also added ten more countries.
So it breaks.
Plus will emphasize one particular, one peculiar thing in terms of this geopolitical shift, and that is the rise of
a new development mechanism known as self cooperation. So, for example, historically it is widely documented by scholars that global North countries, especially the US and European powers, they used two major international financial institutions, the War Bank and International Monetary Firm, to actually control first implement their preferred development and economic agendas in countries in the global South, as well as
as exerting control over over them. So with the rise of bricks and the financial mechanism that they created with the new banking systems like the New Development Bank Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. We see a new development mechanism is emerging.
So if Inter American Development Bank with as a result of the influence of the US administration, decides not to invest in in fossil fuel based development projects in Global South, they now have option to approach another funding mechanism, and that funding mechanism is quite different in terms of conditionally it is attached to those development projects. So traditionally World Bank and International Monetary Fund they attached many draconian conditions
to each and every of their loan agreements. And these new arrangements that we see now emerging, they do not approach development interventions in the same way attaching conditions predetermined conditions to loan programs. Rather, they consider national needs, economic needs of their member countries and how they characterize a
particular development projects and financial needs. And it is the job of these new development mechanisms New Development Bank or Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to finance those projects that will lead to economic growth, prosperity, etc. And again here comes the influence of these as Ruth mentioned earlier, these tunnel
vision of market driven development and climate action projects. So so we see these these South South cooperation along with these newly created development new new development banks are really shaping the trajectory in in in the in the global South. There are some critiques that it may lead to greenhouse gas emissions, and we see from evidence although we cannot quite clearly establish the correlation between the existence of the creation of these new development banks and the rising greenhouse
gas emissions in the global South countries. But suddenly there there are forceful critique of these South South mechanisms that are.
That are sort of not paying serious.
Attention to climate climate concerns arising out of their their actions. For example, I can I can take here one mentioned here one example very briefly, Bangladesh in South Asia is now developing many several huge coal power plants. Historically, word Bank and Asian Development Bank, these two financial institutions were the major provider of financial support for major infrastructure development
projects in Bangladesh and elsewhere. Since word Bank particularly decided some years ago not to finance in fossil ficial based development projects, particularly in several countries Bangladesh is one of them, then Bangladesh found another way to secure financial support, and they leveraged South South cooperation.
Mechanism brought China India to.
Support their fossil will based infrastructure development projects. So even though civil society groups environmentalists they vehemently opposed some of those projects, particularly one which is located near a unisqu heritage site, a fragile macro forest, they failed to persuade both Bangladeshi government as well as their southern partners China
India to relocate or even cancel the project. So South South mechanism, new development banks, new financing mechanisms is certainly shaking up the climate actions and policies in the Global South.
Okay, let's talk about how multinational corporations fall into this. They're so helpful. How do they show up in this complicated mix of thing. How we touched on this a little bit that they often have a relationship with political elites in Global South countries. But again with the caveat that this term incorporates a whole lot of different countries. How are multi national corporations getting involved here?
It's another complex the story to tell, and it just dives into some of the things that we've covered previously. But I think a good way to do is illustrated. So when we discuss some of these this in the chapter, we look at the Brazilian type of business sector context, and it's important to realize that it's not just island
gas corporations. I think fundamentally there's a different and what we talked about, what we know already about climate obstruction previously, and what we hear a lot about in the news focus on island gas, sext On, Mobile, Wile Shell, all of those island gas actors which have had a significant impact on greenhouse gas emissions. But other sectors, like the agribusiness sector are growing and increasingly high high pollutant industries.
It's just they'll be concentrated in different locations, and one of those is basically in Brazil. The aga sector is now one of the biggest I guess exports that come
within the that come from the country. And one of the key things that we have to think about in the context of Brazil is the deep interrelation between the agribusiness sector and their influence on the political system and particularly what we call the ruralistic caucus that has and is able to exert a significant level of influence over Brazilian politics, and when you had Bolsonaro in power, and we could speak to Bolsonaro and his a certain alignment,
we say, the now president of the United States, but at the time alignment and that shift towards as far right, but beyond even Bolsceonaro's reign. In Brazil, the ruralistic caucus has a significant and has always had a significant presence within the National Congress, and I think as a result, those ties with corporate actors to the political system in that country in particular, has allowed, I guess, a natural alignment between the political priority that comes from generating and
expanding growth in Brazil. It's that national priority improves the welfare of the population. All of that, even though we know that that doesn't necessarily repeat and fall down and trickle down into improving the lives of millions of people. But nonetheless that those two priorities, the government priorities and corporate priorities, fundamentally are aligned. And it is those multinational corporations that are around different states that have power and
control within these different they've got the political alliances. I guess that they're then able to shape national level agendas for economic growth, which often relates to these carbon intensive industries and high profit making industries as well. And so these multinational they have that lobby capacity I guess, to really connect their ideas, their interests with political interests in
thus what is seemingly the public interest. And it's important to recognize that the public have their own opinions, can have their own ideas around climate action, can resist it. But the overarching impact is spoken through the media as well, and it's the narratives, the constant narratives that you will see, including those in right wing literature and Brazil, that feed in and continue Let's grow the economy, let's push this sector. Let's not worry too much about climate change just yet,
because we need to. We need to improve the conditions and lives of the public keep and there. So I think it's that I guess, political power that they're able to harness, but also their role in managing the media as well. And we've seen that with the history of exonomobile and the infiltration of stay. Oil and gas is something natural to society, it's so normalized within but behind naturalizing and normalizing oil and gas, it's normalizing the political economy,
continuing the neoclassical model of economics to continue that. And so I think that's one big way in which multinationals are able to capture state, but also how states can align with multinational interests. So I think it's a two it's a two waves, a very complex relationship that allows these large sectors to continue do what they're doing without the rape percussions afterwards. And it even plays out in sort of legislation stay for instance and changing land uses.
For instance, between sort of nineteen nineteen twenty eighteen and Brazil, there was this change in policy around land uses. So it's AFO LU so it's the agricultural forestry and other land uses. So that's how we refer to one way in which emissions are and the way emissions are come from the agriculture folcy or the land uses industry. But that also ties with the land grabbing that would then
be exerted in terms of environmental protection. So essentially it's actually during the bolscenario administration, environmental protection essentially decreased, so legislation was cre and it was adjusted to boost, for instance, agricultural production, so that in the agribusiness step there was able to have an influence over those policies, so they're able to essentially target the political system and influence policy development so that it becomes open to opportunities to continue
extracting resources, in this case making sure there's room for agricultural development. But that impact on say, land use in Brazil is the same type of impact on environmental protection policies that the fossil fuel industry is able to exert stay in the US. So I think there's a similar picture that appears that we've seen in the global South, that was seen in the global North, that then also appears in the global South that is facilitated by these
multinational corporations. So while there are distinctions to how multinational corporations and states interacting the global South and it's impact in climate obstruction, there are some commonalities and I guess common lawgus operendi that exist, and particularly around changing and
adapting policy for their interests. So there's evidence, I guess that there's a consistent pattern of multinational corporations working with states invested interests to exploit under the guise I guess of development, continuing this neo classic economic growth model and of all the consequences of that that come from environmental destruction, marginalization, moving people out of their communities, such as in the
case of the indigenous people in the Amazon rainforest. So I think it's a common you'll see common examples from multinational corporations and states in the Global South and how they operate to obstruct climb and action that we've seen in other in the Global North, like the US, although it's not necessarily one, which is of what you might be used to of open denial and just the purposeful dismantling of environmental protections that are most ideological anti sie
in space that we've seen maybees in some of the Global North countries. So the same partner emerges, is what I'm trying to say.
I don't know.
I feel like every time I'm looking at this, I just come to the conclusion that it's maybe slightly better hidden in some Global North countries. And that's about it. They've slapped a code of paint on it. But I just want to ask you guys this last question, if you have a minute about what can be done to fight climate instruction in the Global South and what has worked and what does that fight kind of look like.
I think maybe It's one of the things I want to start off with is actually to begin with the risks that people face. So I think it's fundamentally we have to be aware that a fight can take place and we can push forward for change. But I think actually navigating say if you're an academic or you're an environmental group working on local level mobilization, that's one of the key ways in which groups have already started to do this. But we have to think about the risks
that people are faced. So we've heard about things like environmental defenders and environmental defenders who have been targeted as they try to challenge the deforestation across the ants on and when you've got such a lock in between the extractive industries, state interests, political interests, corporate interests, it presents a risk that I think has to then be thought very carefully in terms of what actions can be taken.
So we know that we've got engagement from NGOs within UNFCC negotiations, but when you've got countries where NGOs are going in so countries from the Global South with their NGO representatives, there a fewer number who are able to access those platforms to engage in the negotiations process, so at a at an international level and capacity wise being able to influence those higher level decisions becomes harder and
harder and harder. And I think that also speaks to the problems of these big multi lateral agreements that don't and are not really they are doing something, but still
don't seem to take the bold steps. And so I think it's really important that we turn to local level but also be vitally aware of the complexities of within countries, what's going on, how political conditions are perceived, what you can take for instance, even in the global West, the global North, the approach to environmental protesters and terrorism child is stacked on to and I'm not so environmental groups, so that local level mobilization that has to come from
the people. But it's also to be fundamentally aware that this political and social context needs to be navigated very carefully, as there is this particularly a global shift to the political right as well, which we can see is being exerted across the world. So I wanted to get that hard conversation out there.
Oh, do you have anything, I'll just add one one particular issue to the local dimensions of environmental climate mobilization.
I'd also suggest that.
Legal mechanisms, legal venues, legal fight is something.
ICG thing is interesting. I just haven't.
Yeah, yeah, it's the new thing that happened, if just two days ago. So the local court mobilization is something that I see a fruitful way to really put pressure on political elids. In our writing we mentioned in a chapter we mentioned one case of Sri Lanka which in both Sri Lanka and Bangladesh vibrant environmental mobilization contested fossil
fuel energy infrastructure projects. Sri Lankan mobilization succeeded bangladesh Shi case failed because in the case of Sri Lanka environmental advocates, they engage their core system and.
That actually persuaded forced the Sri.
Lankan government to cancel the project and negotiate a renewable
energy projects with Indian, Indian and financiers. So local mobilization again, I will emphasize one particular thing that is being aware of local political contexts, particularly with this growing trend of criminalizing energy and climate politics in the home of liberal democratic principles in the global not we are now seeing activists are given jail sentences three four, five, six years for just protesting, participating in progress, So being aware of political, economic,
and legal context. But I'm pessimistic about transnational global thing. I'm more interested in locally rooted activism.
But again being aware of political maneuvering that is happening within their context.
That is something that gives us hope at least from different places around the world that you say