A "Green Transition"? If Only It Were That Simple

This time Adam spoke with Jean Baptiste Frasso, who's the author of More and More and More and All Consuming History of Energy. This book is great. It looks at how green innovation and decarbonization are not necessarily the same thing. In fact, Frasseau points out that it is perfectly readable and more importantly accurate to assume that the consumption of oil, gas, coal, and even wood will continue to increase right alongside clean energy. I've written about this a bunch lots of other people

have as well. If we only tackle the energy source and we don't tackle our behavior or our attitudes towards consumption, then yeah, we're going to end up using too many critical earth minerals or creating a bunch of environmental problems getting lithium or building a bunch of electric SUVs that nobody needs. Friseau shows this is the real story of humanity's development and consumption of energy. We keep using more

and more and more of all kinds of it. And while the popular narrative is one of substitution oil replacing coal, for example, the real is symbiosis. New energy sources do not supplant their predecessors, but rather supplement them. If that sounds like a radical argument, it's only because the notion

of energy transition has become so deeply entrenched. In a conversation recorded in September, Adam and Freiso discussed how the premise of energy transition became widely accepted as true and inevitable, why clean energy innovation is not the same thing as decarbonization, how the fossil fuel industry helped launder pipe dreams of non existent technologies like carbon capture and storage into mainstream climate solutions, and much more and more and more. It's

a really fascinating conversation. I hope you enjoy it as much as I did. That interview is coming up right after this quick break.

fight for fighting this debate. It's rather a book which helped us to understand what it takes to really get carbon neutral, right. So, I mean, that's the big difference I think that I noticed between the US and Europe from what I hear from people working in finance or insurance industry. Basically they say that trump reelection is a backlash.

Also in European finance, for instance, there were a lot of commitment of companies going and net zero, having net zero strategies and all this now is being reduced and you know, so it has effect and bad effects and terrible effects on the rest of the world as well. But right, we should not be obsessed with the US. I think the US now is just like thirteen or

fourteen percent of theater emissions. What did I say, is what's happening in China basically and in Asia in general, and there, I mean, there are some good news about the development of solar energy, but there are also bad news about deployment of new called power plant at the same time. And so my book helps usertand why these two phenomena can happen at the same time, Why coal and sorrow energy are not necessarily in competition. Why we have a far too simplistic vision of energy dynamics where

new energy replace the old ones. But in fact energies are in competition, but they're also in symbiosis. So that's really what the book explore, the simbiostic relationship between the between energies.

into it to make sure it's clear for folks. So the question I want to start with on that front is why humanity is still burning so much wood, Because the story we've been told is that there was wood, and then there was coal, and then there was oil and natural gas, and now we're in the midst of a transition to green energy. But one of the most transformational parts of the book for me is A, that's not the case, and B we're still consuming more than ever.

which is probably more surprising. But for instance, wood energy is very important for the paper industry, and the paper industry is a huge industrial consumer of energy. The forced the fourth largest consumer of energy after I mean, the first is steel, the second is cement, the third is chemical industry, and the fourth is the paper industry. And paper industry is using more and more wood just to

power its production process. And right now the wood energy consuming the paper industry in Europe, for instance, it's more or less the same as the solar electricity in Europe. So we're talking about, you know, a seriouse amount of wood energy here. But in a more general way, I think it's important to notice that the more you got oil, and once you've got oil, wood is becoming cheaper and cheaper because with all you've got chainsaws, lumber trucks, all

sorts of machines which make wood much cheaper. So you can burn more wood because you've got access to more wood. And another thing is thanks to oil and gas you can produce and pesticide and fertilizer, you can produce much much more wood on a certain area. I mean the yields, the productivity per acres of plantations of forest plantations has increased a lot since the nineteen sixties, especially with the production of cucalyptus, which is like a kind of a

miracle tree. Just to give you an example, in Brazil eucalyptus plantation they can reach like forty cubic meter per year and actar a forest in Europe would be like two or three cubic meter per year per rectar. In the early twentieth century, so that there is a radical transformation of the production of wood, and that makes that food energy has increased. For all these reasons, wood energy has increased lots in the nineteen in the twentieth century.

give you an example about oil and coal. To produce a car in the nineteen thirties, Ford Company, we need like seven tons of coal to build an automobile because they I mean Ford produced its own steel, it produced its own electricity, and seven tons of coal. It means that at that time, and automobile is just as much a coal technology as an oil technology, because at that time the tea would burn more or less seven tons

of oil during its lifetime. And it's even more than that because to use an automobile you need roads obviously, and to make road you need cement and steel, and these two materials are also called dependent. Right. So that's why despite the advance of oil, actually you burn more and more coal. I mean, there is no opposition at all. And then to extract oil you need a lot of steel tubes. When I say a lot, it's really tremendous amount.

Like the US at the beginning of the twenty first century US more still to extract oil than the US than the whole US economy used in the early nineteen hundreds. Right, So there is really a synthetic expansion of both coal and oil, and the two go along very well together. Once you start to think energy like this, the idea of energy transition, of course, starts to become stranger and stranger. Right.

So the first part of the book is really an explanation of why coal, oil, woods and all energies actually are completely into twine and growing symbiotically and the second part of the book is how come that this idea of energy transition became so you know, natural, whereas it shouldn't be. It's a really weird, weird notion.

For so, they knew that coal would be necessary just to produce steel, for instance, like in the nineteen fifties American conservationists, you know, they were asking questions such as, will there be called in the twenty third or twenty fourth century, you know, we should you know, economize call because we will need call for a very very long period of time in the future. So they did not imagine energy system shifting suddenly to another another base. I mean,

it was not something they had in mind. And then there was a small group of scientists experts who started to talk about energy transition. Most of them were atomic scientists, US atomic scientists who had participated to the man Attan project, the creation of the first atomic So.

far away future. There is a an atomic scientist called Alvin Weinberg who was a participant of the to the Mandarin project, and then he became a very important character. He was the head of Oakridge National Laboratory after the war, and in his biography he explicitly explained, I mean he

said that I became obsessed with the Breeder reactor. It is a certain kind of nuclear reactor or fast nutrient reactor which basically opens up a kind of unlimited amount of energy or I mean energies for not decades of centuries, but for millennia. So it's really it really becomes a

kind of you know, providential technology. And of course when you start to think about energy, not indicate centric, but in terms of millennia, then you can imagine all sorts of things, and you especially imagine the end of fossil fuels. There will be an energy transition because fossil fuels are finite, there is a limited amount of them under the ground.

So there will be a future. There will be a time when we have exhausted fossil fuels and the world, the world will run on atomic energy and hydrogen because they know that you need, you know, like a liquid to power sheets or boats or or or cars and so on. Right, So that that that's that, that's what the vision was. But another important character in this respect is actually Mayanking Herbert that I don't know how famous

is in the US, but is really important. Theoretician of peak oil in the nineteen fifties.

Breeder reactor. He writes special reports that are read by John Figerald Kennedy about the Breeder reactor, and in his work he said that, I mean, we have to develop this technology because we need to make a transition from oil, coal and gas to nuclear energy. The person coined the word energy transition is called Harrison Brown, who is also an atomic scientist. And actually when he invents this world is recycling a technical term of nuclear physics and energy transition.

Nuclear physics is the change of an electron around its nucleus, and it recycles this world to talk about the future of energy, So really this is the beginning of energy transition as a kind of you know, expert knowledge. It comes from this small group of people. Several things to say. First of all, the energy transition seen by the atomic scientists of the nineteen fifties. You know, it's a very long,

dury process. It will take not decade the centuries. According to min King her Bed, the head of fossil fuel at a global level will be in three or four centuries. They know that there is still a lot of coal, and they also know that in the poor world at a make energy we take a lot of time to

develop obviously, right. What is problematic is that we recycle this idea of energy transition to reflect upon climate change, because now we have to do the energy transition not in three or four centuries, but in three or four decades, and we have to do it whereas fossil fuels are rather cheap, I mean, oil is not that expensive and

coal is cheap, so it's a completely different situation. But we recycle the same kind of you know, energy futurelogy, I think a very wrong energy futurology, which has played a detrimental role in our understanding of the enormity of the challenge of solving climate change.

nineteen fifties. Of course, with the atomic age in the nineteen sixties, I mean, futulogy becomes a kind of scientific discipline in the in the nineteen sixties, I would say, where there is a lot of drurnals that are call that are created about technological focusting, about how things technology evolve and so on. It is really studied at that period.

And one of the problem is that most of the focusting actually was on technology, the evolution of technologies, and it is from this discipline that our understanding of what we should do for climate change emerged. The problem is that dynamics of technologies are not the same as dynamics of materials and energies. I mean, when you talk about technology,

technologies do become obsolete sometime. Landlines for instance, for telephones, you know they are absolute now, But materials are very obsolete. It's a very, very trivial thing. But I think it's very important to keep that in mind. Despite all the innovations, all the new technologies that we got in the twenty years and twenty first century, all raw materials have increased. That's why, I mean what you just said about how come that we burn so much food? Actually you can

ask the question for every material. It's not just that oil, gas and coal are expanding, is that every raw material is expanding. There are very few exceptions to this rule. One of them is asbestos, which is material which was prohibited. I think it's quite interesting to see that prohibition prohibition does work. If you want to do something about time change, you have to prohibit extraction or consumption. You have to really take a decision. You cannot rely on technological obsolescence

of Passifield. This is really a very it's a losing bad basically, it's a losing strategy. The only example of a room material that has decreased because of technological obserlizence. It is shipwule because it has been displaced by synthetic fibers. But it's not a good news Sutch environment, but it is one of the very very rare example of such a process of material transition. If you wish and chip wooll is still consumed, I mean, it does not disappear obviously.

So once again you cannot overestimate the enormity of what we have to do now. It is just I mean, we have no historical analogy to what we have to do now. We have never done energy transition in the past. We don't know how long it takes since we have never done an energy transition, and I think it's important for people to realize that this is extraordinarily ambitious. It's not just a matter of putting some solar panels and windmills. It's much deeper than that.

to trust the oil shock and the energy crisis. After nineteen seventy three, the phrase energy crisis became omnipresent, I mean was in every on every mouth, in every mouth, It was on talk shows on the New York Times, So it was really like an obsession, and energy transition actually became natural as a solution for the energy crisis. If there is one person that has been really important to really normalize this idea. It is a US president

called Jimmy Cutter. On the eighteenth of April nineteen seventy seven, it gave a very important talk on television where it says, I mean, in the part the US has done two energy transitions, one from good to cold, seven from coal to oil, and we have to do a third energy transition. It was a very astute way to sell to the US public the increase of the coal industry. I mean, Jimmy Carter is now remembered for having put some solar panels on the roof of the White House. He supported solar energy.

you got two branches in the Democratic Party. One was in favor of the energy policy plan of Jimmy Catur and then otherwise very critical. So climate change at the beginning was a of argument against this energy policy by the president. Anyway, So in nineteen seventy seven, Jimmy Cato use this idea of energy transition. It was to make future, to make call a peer futuristic. You know, we are not in coal mines, which are very poliutaying and so on.

We are doing an energy transition. That sounds much better, right, And actually because right after the speech on TV, the New York Times as an article saying that the US and the world at the beginning of a new energy transition or something like that, you know, So it was a PR move basically, that's trute way, and that's to a PR move. And shortly after this talk, energy transition was taken up by you and O. There was a conference on renewable energy in a will be a few

years later, and energy transition was over the place. It is then taken up by the ECD like in Paris and international organization, it becomes natural, Okay, everybody's talking about energy transition. Interestingly enough, the environmentalist movement, which never talked about energy transition before, after the President talked about it, started to say, we have to do an energy transition to solar energy. So really it's it's really this particular

time that really energy transition started to emerge. But really, once again, at that time, energy transition could mean anything like a pipeline in Alaska, it could be more call in the US, it could be lequal affection of anything that would increase energy sovereignty for the US again the

Middle East. That was really what the first out output of energy transition discourse was really in this context, then it was kind of forgotten in the I would say that in the nineteen eighty there is a really low point about discours around energy transition, and it re emerged with climate change. And here it's really an issue about the history of science. You got basically the same experts what worked on the energy crisis became the experts of

the climate issue. And that's really why we've recycled this wrong vision of energy dynamics from the nineteen seventies up to now. That's really because they are the same kind of economists, like energy economists fighting the energy crisis. A few years later there would be climate economists fighting climate change, and they would just recycle the same kind of theories. Will have not else. It's probably the most famous one

Noble in economics for twenty eighteen. It's very clear basically energy transition for him was a way to justify it was the delay in tactics. In nineteen seventy three, you write a paper on the energic crisis explaining that oil is becoming more expensive. Should we economize oil conserve oil? Not at all. On the contrary, we have to extract all right now while it is expensive, because with the breeder reactor oil might become obsolete at the end of

the twentieth century. This is the nineteen seventy three paid Two years later, right, he wrote the very first paper of climate economics, and he has the same reason. End there is an issue about greenhire the effect. Does it mean that we have to tighten our belt our energy belt?

Not at all. It would be so much easier to do the energy transition later when we have the Buder reactor, so it was really delaying tactics and energy transition was really also relying on very strong hope around new clientergy at the time.

or whatever. Right, So it's a very abstract vision of technology, very i mean, a deeply wrong vision of technological development. But it is still with us today and.

Jim Hansen, the very famous US climatologist. Edward David explained that, of course there is climate change, of course there was going Now the fact we all know that this is all science not interesting. The interesting question is what will confer the climate catastrophe or the energy transition. And it was very astute to present the issue like this because at that time cammatologists were actually very naive about the

energy transition. You can read article from the late nineteen seventies by climatologists US climatologists explain that climate change will have consequences, it would be sensible. I mean, you could feel climate change by two thousand, It would have economic consequences by twenty twenty, it would be catastrophic by twenty seventy. When you write twenty seventy in nineteen seventy, it's in

science fiction. And so the reasoning goes that, of course we have time to do an energy transition in the meantime, you know, as if we knew how long it takes. And this is not just particular climatologist. The Geneva Conference on Climate Change in nineteen seventy nine explicitly the opening quote of my book is from the conclusion of this conference. They say that climate change really have very serious effect by twenty fifty, but that leaves us time to redirect agriculture, industry,

in the whole economy. Basically, you know, there was a really very big yes nafety and trust in technology as well.

two or press through degrees. That's I mean, there would be, of course difficulties, but as not such a big deal in a way and too bad for the other. I mean, they're perfectly aware that from you know, Bengal or other countries that would be much more difficult. But the idea that you could sacrifice world economic growth for the survival or the safety of the poorest part of the world

population seemed ludicrous. So there was a very strong dose of cynicism, of realism in a way, but cynicism as well.

I mean, when you when you look at the the history of the I p c C, and especially the third group of the IPCC, which is really the one in charge of studying mitigation. UH in the archives you can see that for the US government that was really its role. The explicity states our our aim is not

to save the climate. It is to save the economy from the consequences of climate which is a different, different question and interestingly interestingly enough one I mean the first chair of IPCC Group three was called it was openly climate or skeptics, is Robert Weinstein. He works in the US and you know he doesn't believe in climate change.

And it takes his order from Johnson Nunu who with the chief of staff of George Bush father and basically George U Johnson new orders him to play the technology card. I mean, do not talk about, you know, the level of emission or economic growth or compensation to countries affected by climate change. Talk about technology. I mean, the US has to bet on technology. And that makes perfect sense.

I mean Robert Ronshein at this very moment we are talking about nineteen ninety one nineteen ninety two is also the US representative to the Radio Conference on Climate on the Environment in general, and for the US delegation makes perfect sense, you know, to talk about technology. The US at that time was the first dimeter was also the first technological power, so it makes sense to play the technology card. I mean, it's it's quite straightforward in a way.

developing future technologies to save us in the future. You distinguish it from climate denial because in a lot of ways, climate denial was an old ideology that stopped serving them well decades ago. A much more effective and insidious one is accepting that there is a problem and saying we're working on it in the future. And that becomes a delay tactic as you point out that they can deploy pretty much indefinitely all the way up to today's corporate sustainability, whatever you want to call it.

at the RIO Conference of nineteen ninety two. The General Secretary of the conference was a Canadian called Maurice Strong. He was also a US an old businessman story working for a Canadian old company, and he was a part of all sorts of influential investors and you know, important people. And basically his motto was, we need to integrate multinationals. Multinationals are the key because they're the one who can solve this. Who they create a problem, they will solve

the issue. And I think it had as it has had a significant consequence on the IPCC because when you look at the experts working for the IPC Group three, you can be struck that there are so many employees of all companies, of electrical companies, of automobile industry, there are you know, people from the industry. It was really what the IPCC was about. Once again, if you go back to US archives, the US government in nineteen eighty eight, when the IPCC is created, explicitly says that we need

to put the government into the loop. When the IPCC is created, there was already an international organization and climate change which had been set up by the World World Metorogical Organization and the UN Environmental Program. They had really very big ambitions like reducing bio quarters two emissions in twenty years or no even less in fifteen years, which seemed completely crazy to the US government, And they say, we need to create a new expert body. And the

important letter in IPCC is the eye. It's inter governmental and not international. So what the US and probably Britain wanted was to that the government would designate people from you know, not just environmental ministries or research ministry, but they also wanted people from the agricultural ministry, from the industry, from energy ministry and so and so force. And that's why we've got so much from I mean expertise coming

from the industry. And I mean you could say that it's kind of conspiracy theory, but when you look at the story of CCS, carbon capture. It is quite clear that you know, they actually succeeded. And how come there is so much about cabin capturing storage in the IPC groups through report. How come that carbon neutrality depends on so much negative emissions.

tons per year. But when I'm saying that the IPCC Group three the net zero scenario relies really a lot on negative emissions, is because they expect ten gigatons of carbon capturing storage, not fifty million tones, ten gigatons, ten billion tones. You know, it's it's just a crazy number. It is completely meaningless in a way. And interestingly enough, when you look at the history of CC, I've done that in a recent article. It's not in the book

it's actually an article which just out. For a long period of time, CCS was considered as not very serious because, I mean, if you want to do electricity from coal with CCS, for every two power plants, you need to build a third power plant just to produce electricity to power the CCS unit. It's a complete waste of NFD of money of resort anyway, So it was considered as completely ridiculous even by the IPCC in the early two thousand and then the oil industry pushed CCS from nineteen

ninety to onward, saying that's really important technology. We publish a lot of papers, we even create journals on CCS, you know, like peer review journals. But actually they were reflecting the oil industry interest. And in two thousand and five the IPCC published a special report on CCS and that really changed the statues of the technology. From a very abuse technology, it became a central element for carbon neutrality.

And when you look at the reference of this report, most of the reference they come from the old industry, all the Fossiphius in general Russia. So I mean that's why I think that we have read to understand that the expertise on mitigation is co produced with different lobbies. It's not like abstract knowledge. It's not like the interested scientists. It's it's it's more problematic than that and more interesting

in a way. You've got groups of industries fighting to put their own technologies and they produce papers, which is completely natural. It's normal. It's not like a conspiracy. It is, you know, how science works in a way it is, of course, it depends on funding from companies, especially when it is applied science. All the science and hydrogen on CCS on kind of farfedge technologies or complex technologies. It is really applied science, and it's it's co produced with specific industries.

two lakes buried in the ocean or something. CCS is sitting alongside those, and then it comes through this laundering process and it comes out as basically the plan for humanity to save the planet.

ands on. But without THEATO. It's an impossible task. And of course they want to introduce these ridiculous technologies they have only I mean, the only way they can do that. But I mean, the problem is that you can read

it both ways. You can say that. And actually they explained that they did that around two thousand and five twenty ten, basically to push government to be ambitious, to show that carbon neutrality was possible, and in a way, the Paris Agreement of twenty fifteen to respect two degree warming was really made possible thanks to these scenarios. How even if they're absurd, they had this advantage. So but

that's one positive bready reading. The more negative reading would be that they introduce false hopes and a false sense of safety. I mean, it gives the impression that you got competent engineers that in the end will solve the problem. And this is really depoliticizing the issue. It's really like infantilizing the population because they are I mean, we have been sold you false promises in a way, and I think it's it prevented us to have a more political

discussion or on climate change. I think a more adult conversation would be that there will be ZEO two in the economy in twenty fifty because there are many sectors that we don't really know how to decabanize or not a scale. So the key question, the key discussion, democratic discussion that we need to have is, I mean, where do we put this year to, where do we invest it? What is the CEU two that is vital, that is necessary, and the CEO two that is about luxualy consumption for instance.

You know, it's it's really something we should be able to discuss without being treated as kind of a dangerous de grosser or whatever. No, it's just the only reasonable way to frame the issue.

of solar panels and turbines around the world. But as you point out, green innovation and decarbonization are not the same thing at all, and we misunderstand that at our peril.

but electricity production is just forty percent of emissions. Then you've got all the rest where renewable are not that interesting and not that usual. I mean, to produce cement, steel, plastic, fertilizer, food in general. You know you don't do that with sort panels, it's not true. Another way to put it is we can talk about a transition in the electricity sector,

but probably not in the rest of the economy. So there is a big difference between putting solar panels and windmills and decarbonizing the whole economy, which is much bigger

than the electricity sector. And one possibility, and probably the most probable, is that in the next decades there will be more and more so called green electricity that we power the world that will remain deeply entrenched in fossil fuels for all the rest beat the production of materials still is a good example, of course, but also the

production food. I mean, in the book, I haven't touched a panago culture, but it's actually a key, key topic, Like between twenty and thirty percent of green house gases come from agriculture, where the idea of transition and energy transition is probably not very well adapted, you know. So I mean we have to realize that. I think one important thing is to recognize that we don't know how

to do that. Nobody has the solution, and we need to discuss that in a very you know, clear minded way and in a also more political way, because the idea of energy transition is at the end of the book. I said, this is the ideology of capital in the twenty first century. It is obvious when you think about it. You know, thanks to energy transition, all big companies they are on the right side because they can invest, they can innovate and so on. It's it's really a powerful

tool to depoliticize the issue. And I think a big part of the of the KMIC discussion should be on about redistribution, the redistribution of the emissions, to whom to do what? That should be really a key aspect of the discussion, and it isn't. Even in the climate movement. It is not so much framed as a as a I mean it used to be framed like that actually

has an equity issue. When you when you look at philosophy papers or six papers of the nineteen nineties, I mean they will talk about that about luxury emissions and vital emissions and how to distinguish between them, and how climate change is released on a program of equity and and and how unjust it is and no more and more the discourse has shifted to a technology it's about when your boards are good for cyphils are bad, you know,

something like that. A very many key and visions of the material world, actually technologies are completely intertwined and materially connected.

any disruption the industry or anyone else. Can you just explain that a little bit more of that idea that we're what we have to do is unprecedented and if we are to look, if we are to figure it out, then the place to find out how to do that will not be what we've done before. Because it's another one of those points that I think sounds really simple but is actually quite profound and quite a shift for a lot of people, including me.

this is not the case at all. It's really what I want to emphasize. I mean, we have never done an energy transition. Just to give you an example. Most of the time, the Industrial Revolution, as it is told to students, and how John Carey must have remembered it is it is a shift from wood to call. But in fact wood energy is increasing in the nineteenth century,

and it's even worse than that. To extract cold you need a lot of fruit, to the point that Britain in the twentieth century used more wood in the form of simper mining than it had burned in the eighteenth century. So just forget about this idea of massive shift in the past. The history, the material history of humanity, is the history of expansion of everything, the symbiotic expansion of everything.

That's really what we have done. It doesn't mean that I mean technologies improved and were becoming more efficient obviously, and for instance, the carbon intensity of the economy from the nineteen eighties has been divided by two. So I mean there is technological progress, it's not the issue. But despite this increasing efficiency, the sew tre emissions keep rising. So I mean the thing is believing that with solar panels and windmills where on the threshold of a complete

material evolution is an illusion. And to give you another historical example, because I say that history is useless to understand what we have to do, but it is useful to understand the misunderstanding of what we have to do. For instance, in the nineteen twenties, thanks to electricity, industrially discarded the old steam engines and replace them with electric engines electric motors. Electric motors are extremely efficient compared to steam engine. When you do that to divide by ten

the carbon intensity of industrial force machines, it's an enormous progress. Right. That happened in the after World War One, basically in the US during World War one and after World War One. Today, when you replace a gas power plant with a solar panel complex, you divide by ten the carbon intensity of electricity. So we have been there before. I mean, solar panels and windmills are just part of the history of technological progress. They're not a massive shift in the history of the

material history of humanity. And it's even worse for electric cars. Of course they're better than Petroum car, but they're certainly not zero emission. This is of course a lie. So I mean, I think we have to really understand that what climatologists explained that we need to do is really unprecedented. I mean, even at a natural scale. It's very difficult to see countries really getting out of coal or gas or oil, I mean very often. I mean recently papers

explained that Britain has escaped calls as really exiited call. Actually, no, Britain is still using a lot of call for in its import the British way of love, or the French way of life, or the Norwegian way of life. Those countries that don't burn call anymore depends on call because we import so many goods and we you steal and so on. That depends on call. So once again, I mean we have to underline the fact that energy transition

is really based on a false history. It projects a false history onto a very shadowy future.

I mean, so you really need a very strong political decision to say we don't invest anymore in these in these sectors. So it's a kind of control of capital. It's not necessarily like the Bolshevik revolution, but it's really a very very serious and stringent control of you know

what that is authorized, what is accept acceptable. But when I say it's more difficult, because you know, you could I could easily imagine that and in a way, in a way, in many countries the energy sector is nationalized, like in France, df is a national company, a British call for a long time was a national company in Britain. Know it's it's quite common to have a kind of public energy providers, but it's very difficult to imagine not

using all guests anymore into the gates. That's something which as an historian, I really have difficulty to imagine, know it.

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