Now CNA 938 rewind. Our top story today takes our focus to the war in Ukraine. You might have seen over the weekend that public row at the White House between US President Donald Trump and his VP JD Vance and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. It's apparent that the rift between the US and Ukraine is growing, fueling uncertainty about American support for the war-torn country. Yet in spite of all that, Mr. Trump has played down reports that he would cut aid to Ukraine.
He also said that the possibility of a minerals deal was not dead yet. At the same time, Mr. Zelinsky now appears to be ramping up pressure on his European allies. European leaders seem to agree that the war should end soon. But can't seem to guarantee peace without Washington's help. They're also divided on how to end the war. So where could all this see Ukraine and Russia head to? Let's ask Graham Gale. He is professor emeritus for government and international relations.
at the University of Sydney. Good to have you back, Professor Gill. Now, US President Donald Trump is suggesting that his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky, quote, won't be around very long if he does not agree to a deal with Russia. Is this really an existential crisis for President Zelensky? Does the Ukrainian leader have any leverage in negotiations at all?
Well, he doesn't have a great deal of leverage because Ukraine is overwhelmingly dependent upon support by the West for its uh for its continuation of the war effort. And Zelensky's problem domestically is that he's associated with this idea of war to a victorious end. If you look at at what Zelensky has been saying over the last 3 years, it's actually changed fundamentally, uh, over the last
6 months or so. Initially he was saying war to a victorious end, which means getting back all of the territories that existed as part of Ukraine prior to 2014.
Now he's talking about the need to establish Ukraine with a strong position to negotiate with Russia, so that he actually accepts what the Europeans publicly don't seem to accept but which Donald Trump does accept, and that is that if the trajectory of the war goes on the way it is, and it's likely to, Russia has won and Ukraine has lost, and that means that that, Zelensky realizes that negotiations are coming up, but what he wants is strong support on his side, preferably by the
Americans and certainly by the, by the Europeans. So, so Zelensky's really got very little, little, uh, wiggle room here at all, I think.
Professor, we can see that Mr. Trump's priority is to end the war at any cost, uh, and he wants it done now, doesn't want to prolong it for years, but what is complicated. What is Mr. Trump not appreciating about this?
Well, I think he doesn't appreciate that if there's going to be a uh an effective and long-term peace, it's got to be negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. Not between Russia and America, not between Europe and and uh Ukraine, which is what the Europeans seem to think it's all about, but it's got to be between Russia and Ukraine, and only those two countries can, Make agreements which they will both hopefully then uh abide
by into the future. Any agreements that are made between Russia and America, for example, or Russia and Europe, why should Ukraine, uh, agree to go along with them? Why should it abide by them in the future? I mean, it's really got to be resolved between the two countries. And it really doesn't matter what Trump says in terms of uh of minerals or troops or or or anything else,
in a sense it doesn't change that basic issue. It's agreement between Kiev and Moscow that's crucial, not between Moscow and Washington.
Well, uh, the two sides didn't sign that minerals deal, uh, that was really played up by Donald Trump during the White House meeting. Uh, rather tense meeting, I should say. Now, Mr. Trump insists it's not off the table though, Professor. What might compel Mr. Zelensky now to sign this agreement, especially after those theatrics at the White House we saw last weekend.
Well, I mean, Zelensky must see that there's some advantage to Ukraine in in this. I'm not sure what the advantage is, and I'm not sure what the advantage to the US is either, because, I mean, Ukraine does not possess the, the critical minerals that are that that that the Americans were talking about originally, and their minerals economy or the mineral sector of the economy is is is relatively small. So, Why America is is talking about going in there is
a bit sort of unclear to me. Why Zelensky would see it as being important is that he believes that it would then commit the US to defend Ukraine. And in some ways that might actually happen. But let's be clear, no, no American company is going to invest in Ukraine until they're certain that the war is over and B not gonna start again. So the whole minerals issue is really a second order one.
You've got to get the, you've gotta get the war finished first before the minerals can actually come into play at all.
Meanwhile, a remarkable show of mostly European unity on display in London, perhaps showing that Europe finally quote unquote woken up. How much of this scrambling can be attributed to Mr. Trump essentially headed for the exit from America's relationship with Europe?
Well, I'm not sure whether the uh whether the Europeans have said anything differently and done anything differently to what they've been doing over the last couple of years. I mean, we've had these meetings before, they've finished with uh with grand statements and very little has come, has come from it. What's. Different about this is that all of a sudden they've realized that NATO might not be the, the rock solid, secure alliance that they, that they thought that it was.
And therefore, what they're trying to do is to, in a sense, keep two balls in the air at once. One is to one is to continue to provide support for Ukraine. The other one is not to get offside with the US and it's not clear how those two things can be, can be um uh maintained continually. If Trump continues to take the attitude that he took to Ukraine that was evident in the Friday meeting.
Still, as Europe steps up, they want to keep the US involved. France and the UK proposed a monthlong truce and a peace plan. Now what's the possibility of the US and the EU actually finding common ground on their approach to Ukraine?
Well, they might find common ground, but uh uh it doesn't matter. I mean, what they've got to do is to get Russia to agree. It's all very well to say we're going to have, uh, we're going to put in a European force of peacekeepers when Russia has already said they're not going to accept the European force of peacekeepers. So what sort of world are the Europeans living in here? What they're, what they're assuming is that a peace can effectively be imposed by the US and Europe.
And Ukraine, and it just won't work that way, particularly if it's correct that Russia is winning the war, and therefore Ukraine is the weaker of the two parties. If you look at it historically, the side that wins the war is the one that determines the terms of the peace. It's not the allies of the defeated party. So the, the Europeans, I think, are, are really caught here.
I mean, I don't know whether they accept that uh that Ukraine is losing the war or has lost the war and they won't say it in public. Or whether they're so blind that they don't see that things are going against Ukraine. Personally, I think it's the first one. They know that that Ukraine is losing, but they can't say that in public because they would then lose face and their policies over the last three years would be shown to be a shambles and to be
to be a failure. And so, I mean, I think the, the, the problem here for Ukraine is that not everybody is, On the Ukrainian side is working in the best interests of Ukraine. Best interests would be to stop the fighting now and to get some sort of a peace agreement, not to say we'll continue to give you more weapons to continue the fight.
Professor, we've got a question on Russia. We'll get to that in a moment, but for now we want to ask you, do you see the US getting behind Keir Starmer's four-step plan? He does stress Europe will do the heavy lifting. But the US must still ultimately provide that military backstop.
Well, he said he won't, uh, so we can't always believe what he says, that he can, he doesn't always continue through with what he, he says he's going to do, but he's said up until now that he's not going to provide that sort of, uh, that sort of backstop. And of course, again, you've got to ask about the Americans. I mean, they've said, you know, we can do this providing the Americans do what they say they're not going
to do. So how realistic and how genuine is the European offer, which it just doesn't seem to me to be uh, To be one that's uh that's, that's got any legs at all.
Professor, we're going to get to a couple more questions regarding uh Mr. Putin and of course China, but this has just come in from the news wires. President Trump has, uh, according to media reports in the US, paused all military aid to Ukraine. Uh, what does this mean now that they did clarify that this is not a permanent termination of aid, it's a pause. Is this part of the process here based on what we saw over the last weekend?
Well, I think, I think Trump is trying to put pressure on uh on Ukraine to uh to negotiate and. The quickest way of doing that is to hinder his the Ukraine's ability to continue fighting, and I think that's what Trump has been about virtually since he was elected, that he's, he, For one reason or another, he does want peace to, to, to come about in the region. Perhaps it's, it's for, for, for the right sort of reasons, perhaps it's because he wants the US to be able to get in economically
into Ukraine, who knows. But since he's come to power, he does seem to want peace in the region, and the quickest way to bring that peace is to bring the parties to the negotiating table. And one way of doing that is to, to, for Ukraine at least is to cut off support to Ukraine. I don't know whether that's what he's thinking, but that's, that seems to me to fit with the overall strategy of what he's been doing over the last, uh, last month or so.
Professor, we want to go back to Russia now, uh, as we mentioned. How do you think Russian President Vladimir Putin is watching all this? How might he capitalize on the growing tensions between Kiev and Washington?
Well, I think at the moment all he has to do is to sit quiet and do nothing because they seem to be, they seem to be, uh, be doing it all themselves. Um, he has, he has uh he has intimated that uh that Russia has the sort of minerals that the US is that the US wants, and it would be willing to enter into an agreement to uh to supply those um, Uh, those minerals. So that's, that's one way that he's seeking to sort of undercut, if you like, the, uh, uh,
the Ukrainian position. Um, but I think what he, what he, what he, what he'll do is, he won't say anything. He doesn't need to say anything. I think what will be interesting is what happens on the ground, and if we, if we now see a a major Russian push on the ground in eastern Ukraine.
Uh, what that will suggest is that he's trying to take advantage of this, this lapse in support for Ukraine and the weakness of Ukraine, because what Putin wants is, is recognition of Russian control over the five provinces of Ukraine. Now, they occupy only one of those totally, the other 4, they occupy part thereof. And ideally what you would like to see is Russian troops getting up to the borders of those provinces by the time negotiations open, I think.
Uh, another audience member watching from afar, Professor, is China. Uh, it's observing the US wanting to reduce its involvement in Europe effectively and the war as well, not to mention. Uh, very having very little involvement other than voicing up, uh, voicing out rather against what's happening in Ukraine. Now, the bigger question is what could China glean from all of this for its own objectives?
Well, who, who knows, it's very difficult to discern what China is going to do anyway, but I mean the, China, China, China will see that it's alliance or it's it's relationship with Russia is in part a function of the breakdown of the Russian relationship with the West. And so if there is any improvement in the Russian relationship with the West, and there could be with the US if not with Europe for some time.
Uh, that, that might then give some pause to the Chinese in terms of how, how, how firm they see their relationship with, with Russia being, um. But in contrast, they can, they can, they can read the, they can read the, uh, read the tea leaves as well. And clearly what uh, what the Americans are trying to do is to reduce their, their exposure in Europe, which will enable them to transfer more of their efforts to uh to Asia and therefore potentially to confronting China.
Uh, and that means that, uh, that while, while I think the Chinese would like to see peace between Russia and Ukraine, because both have traditionally been friends of China, um, they are, I think they probably would be worried about the geopolitical consequences of that in terms of the relationship with the US.
With the US reducing its exposure to Europe, as you say, Professor, could we also see China perhaps taking advantage of a potential reduced exposure on the part of the US to Taiwan, for example, uh, and the rest of Southeast Asia as well uh to influence its perhaps its own plans for the island.
Well, of course this is what's always been talked about that China will see Taiwan in terms of in terms of Ukraine and if If Putin is successful or the Russians are successful, then that might be seen as giving a sort of a green light to To takeover of Taiwan. Uh, I mean, the issue, of course, is that, uh, that,
that both sides can learn a lesson from this. I mean, if the, if the Chinese do, uh, do read the Ukraine situation as one which opens the door for them to, uh, for Taiwan, well, then the opponents of that move will also see the Ukraine, uh, situation as being one which, which dictates that there must be an even firmer line taken.
With China. So that what you might see is that places like Japan, Korea, and, you know, perhaps the US, but again, who knows with Trump, um, might become even more intent on supporting Taiwan and preventing any Chinese, uh, any Chinese takeover. I mean, I, I still think it's unlikely that the Chinese would uh would try militarily to take over Taiwan, but um. Yeah, I'm not a scholar.
That's a fair assessment, Professor. Uh, I think that that what the points that you've put across certainly have made their points, uh, to be sure. Uh, for now, we'll leave it here. Uh, it's been a really enlightening conversation, something that is constantly evolving, uh, in the news. So thank you very much for making the time for us this morning, Professor. I really appreciate it.
Thanks very much. Bye.
That's Graeme Gill. He's Professor emeritus for government and international relations at the University of Sydney.
