Navigating Israel-Iran Ceasefire Uncertainties

I really think it's important to see the Israeli and Iranian positions. These are two states that are extremely isolated. They are in a war footing, in crisis mode. I think we will see certainly changes in Iran. That doesn't mean democratization or regime collapse, but a regime that will probably in the short term tighten its mechanisms of control and repression. And Israel isn't thinking...

Two years from now, how does it maintain good relationships with the neighborhood? That is not on the agenda. Just two days after President Trump deployed America's military to attack Iranian nuclear development sites, a shaky ceasefire between Israel and Iran brokered by President Trump emerged.

So far, this deal appears to be holding, but there's no formal agreement in place. At least not yet. It's clear that Iran's nuclear infrastructure has suffered significant damage. But it is not yet clear just how extensive that damage really is. to Iran's nuclear weapons development program. That uncertainty leaves a lot of unanswered questions about where things go from here. Will there be a formal ceasefire in the coming days? How did energy markets react to the rapid de-escalation?

Is this conflict really over? This is a special episode of Columbia Energy Exchange, a weekly podcast from the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University. I'm Jason Bordoff. In response to recent developments in the conflict, I brought leading experts here at the center together to discuss what we know so far about the ceasefire between Israel and Iran, how the oil markets reacted, and the status of American sanctions on Iran.

Today on the show, we have Richard Nephew, Karen Young, and Daniel Sternhoff. Richard's a senior research scholar here at the Center on Global Energy Policy. He formerly served as U.S. Deputy Special Envoy for Iran under the Biden administration.

where he played a key role in negotiations over the Iran nuclear deal. Karen is a senior research scholar here at the Center on Global Energy Policy and a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, where she focuses on the political economy of the Gulf states and energy policy. And Daniel is a non-resident fellow here at the Center on Global Energy Policy. He is also the head of Energy Aspects Executive Briefing Service.

Richard, Karen, and Daniel join me on the afternoon of June 25th, that's Wednesday, to unpack the conflict between Iran and Israel. We discuss the current state of Iran's nuclear program. the broader geopolitical and energy market implications of this unfolding crisis, and where it all goes from here. Want to welcome my great colleagues, Richard Nephew, Karen Young, Daniel Sternhoff, yet another in our series of regular check-ins as...

Conflict has escalated in the Middle East. We're just lucky to have such tremendous experts here and turn to you regularly for insight to help myself and all of our listeners understand what's going on. As we usually do in these rapid response episodes of Columbia Energy Exchange, I just want to level set for everyone listening. And we are recording Wednesday afternoon.

Where we are today, obviously the U.S. had this massive strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, particularly Fordow, the most protected one. And then Iran struck back in ways that were perceived, I think it's fair to say, as face-saving. symbolic, not really trying to escalate, but on the contrary, trying to de-escalate. At least that's how oil markets responded. But Richard, let me...

start with you and just if you can explain where we are today and if that rough summary is correct and what are the things you're watching most closely right now. Yeah, I would say that summary is correct. Maybe add a couple bits to it. So we had the long pattern of Israeli strikes. We had the U.S. strike. Iran responded with the missile attack on Ayyuddin base in Qatar, but the attack was intercepted by Qataris. So at this point...

You know, the Iranians were in a position to say that they had attacked back, but there hadn't been any damage at all. At that point, the president then pushed for a ceasefire between the United States, Israel and Iran. candidly, it doesn't seem that the Israelis or the Iranians had fully received the memo by the time the ceasefire was announced by the president. There was no confirmation from either the Iranians or the Israelis for quite some time.

And the Israelis stepped up significant attacks on Iran. At some point, the Israeli attacks ceased. The Iranians fired another round of missiles at Israel. The Israelis were pressured not to respond significantly back against Iran, attacking one symbolic radar station. And a ceasefire has essentially been in effect now for, I don't know, you know, give it 36 hours, something like that. Now the big questions are around, you know, what happens?

whether or not there is going to be some sort of negotiated ceasefire. Right now, all we have is, frankly, an informal one where both sides have literally ceased firing. But there's no details as to what that means. There's no details as to what the incentives are. There are some tweets.

And there are some messages about potential for sanctions relief and the risks of reconstituting the nuclear program. But a lot of the debate now is focused on how effective the strikes were. What's the lasting damage to Iran's nuclear ambitions and whether or not. some kind of deal can come out of this, even as the Iranians are gearing up to respond diplomatically, including by reducing their cooperation with international inspectors.

And Karen, talk a little bit about what's happening in the region more broadly, what the response from different regional actors has been. Yeah, thank you, Jason. We've seen a communique from the GCC secretariat condemning... the Iranian attack on Al-Adaid peace outside of Doha in Qatar. And really sort of a show of unity, which for the GCC is not always the case. And certainly during the period, of course, between 2017 and 2021.

there was a blockade of Qatar from the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt. Today, the president of the UAE, Mohammed bin Zayed, just landed in Doha to show his support for the emir. And so this is, I think...

underscores the sense that they shared that risk together. Qatar really took the brunt and at first, I've said this before, I was surprised that Iran decided to retaliate on Al-Udeid, but then it's become very clear that that was the safest option to do so because they have the best relationship. between Iran and of the GCC states with Qatar. And there was obviously some agreement from Qatar that they would weather that and not respond.

But it doesn't change the fact that now the whole kind of outlook of the GCC states in terms of their efforts at economic transformation is certainly threatened. I mean, just those pictures and images of missiles falling into the skies in Doha. People don't really distinguish if that was a mall in Doha or a mall in Abu Dhabi or Riyadh. It's the Gulf.

And so that image is going to stay with us. Imagine if the World Cup was this summer. Of course Qatar would never have wanted images like that coming out or an experience like that. They wouldn't have agreed. And if I can just go a minute or two more, I really think it's important also to see the Israeli and Iranian positions within the region. These are two states that are extremely isolated, both of them.

They are in a war footing, in crisis mode. I think we will see certainly changes in Iran. That doesn't mean democratization or regime collapse, but a regime that will probably in the short term tighten its... It's mechanisms of control and its mechanisms of repression. And Israel maintaining this crisis mode. Israel isn't thinking... Two years from now, how does it maintain good relationships with the neighborhood? That is not on the agenda. And so there's really no force.

for mediation, for thinking about regional cooperation. And the U.S. approach is like, okay, war's over. And I think that reinforces the sense of the Gulf states that they always get the short end of the stick in terms of American attention. And we have to be really careful from US or US foreign policy perspective. of minimizing or having sort of a callous or lack of empathy effect for what this means for them.

Follow up on the first point you made, the kind of extraordinary social and economic reforms we've seen in several countries like Saudi Arabia, significant growth in foreign expat populations. opening of offices from all sorts of Western companies and investment firms. Do you think all of that sort of really takes a hit as a result of what we've seen in terms of risk in the region?

I do. I think it changes the calculation for probably many families right now. And this is the beginning of the summer holidays. People will probably leave with the kids and not come back in some cases. But, you know, people have different levels of risk tolerance. There are many people who live in the Gulf who are from the region and are escaping worse situations, people coming from Lebanon.

coming from financial crisis in Egypt, who have a higher risk tolerance. But I think for many Western expats and many corporates who have recently opened offices in the GCC, this certainly will be a burden for recruitment.

Daniel, I'm coming to you in a minute, but Richard, I just want to make sure people listening understand sort of the status of this ceasefire that Trump has twisted people's arms seemingly to commit to. Is that true? a real thing. And I guess, where does that leave us? We sort of had this.

Two weeks of conflict and escalation. Israel and the U.S., among others, are committed to making sure Iran does not have capability to build a nuclear weapon in that level of highly enriched uranium. Huge strike on Fordow. It's all over now and we go back to the way things were a month ago. Is that kind of where things are?

I think it's pretty implausible that we go back to the way things were. I think it's much more likely things get worse. There is an upside scenario here. The president announced a couple hours ago that... The United States and Iran are going to meet next week. Location unknown. The Orions haven't confirmed that yet. But at least that's a potential path to having a longer term, more durable deal, or at least further clarity on the ceasefire. But on the ceasefire itself, nothing's written down.

at least nothing that has been released publicly. So there are important terms here that really do need to be ironed out. You know, what does it mean if we see the Iranians take a bulldozer to the tunnels at Esfahan where Iran reportedly... is storing its highly enriched uranium. If they start to dig it out, what do we do?

What does Israel do? You know, if we see a bunch of trucks showing up and they load stuff into the back of those trucks, are the Israelis going to sit on their hands or not? Because this issue of reconstituting nuclear program, I think, is very, very real. The Iranians have given no indication. whatsoever that they're prepared to surrender the nuclear program. They've given no indication whatsoever they're prepared to surrender at all.

And that the idea they may do a deal shouldn't be taken as confidence that they are about to do that. On top of that, the Iranians are moving forward with reducing their cooperation with the IEA. About an hour ago now, the Iranian parliament passed. a bill that essentially will block any IEA inspections. And that includes of these damaged sites. So now we're down to Intel to find out what happened and where material is and those sorts of things. And so all this adds up to...

A lot of damage was probably done to the Iranian nuclear program. I don't think anyone should really have any doubt about that. Their ability to break out, though, is still real because we don't have answers to questions about where their HEU is. We don't have answers to questions about their ability to actually develop a warhead.

And all that comes back to the need for either a diplomatic process that gets us these answers or continued military action. And that's directly contrary to the intent of the ceasefire. So I would just generally say to everybody, this is not over. There is more to come. It's possible that it results in something more positive and a deal similar, but it's just as possible that hostilities are back on in a couple days' time.

And what I hear you saying is there's a big difference between significantly damaged and obliterated or eliminated. And some of the language we've heard from the Trump administration officials, both in the near term. I mean, I guess as intelligence sources come in and if it is still the case that people think.

highly enriched uranium stocks are somewhere accessible, maybe with bulldozers or something else, that is a near-term risk, and presumably Israel at least would respond to that. And then there's this question of beginning a process. I don't know how long that takes. years, maybe shorter, to just build all the infrastructure and equipment again. Is that right?

Yeah, and I don't think we should assume the Iranians are going to rebuild it the same way they did last time, right? I think we should expect the Iranians are going to build their new enrichment facilities underground in hardened spaces because they saw the Israelis didn't have the ability to strike it.

United States had to be called in against Fordow. On top of all that, the Iranians may choose not to even bother with the pretense of a civil nuclear program. Again, we don't have time probably to go through all the history here, but I'll just say... Part of the reason why Natanz was built the way it was, was it was supposed to fuel a Bushir power reactor, not a bomb plant. You don't need so many centrifuges for a bomb plant. It's one of the...

the oddities of nuclear proliferation. So, you know, the Iranians, even if they don't say embrace, we will now be a weapon state, they can do things with their actions that make it a lot easier from the breakout in the future, especially if they don't. feel like they were, you know, forced into a surrendered territory. They're not obligated to give up their nuclear program and they have no intention of doing so.

Daniel, Richard's view that this is not over, if one were to try to gauge whether it's over just by looking at how oil markets are reacting, you would think it's over because things are kind of back to where they were before this all started. So talk about how oil markets responded to the last few days and where you think we are now.

No, absolutely. If you were trading oil two weeks ago and you took a vacation and came back, you wouldn't know what all happened because we had completely round trips. You know, we're at 66, 67, brand 64 WTI, which is about a dollar higher than we were two weeks ago. In the middle, we did have about a $14. premium at its peak that was baked into prices, you could argue that that was sort of a moderate risk premium given the states of what would have happened if our moves had been...

But nonetheless, it was real. What was amazing is what happened on Monday. We had the strikes by the U.S. over the weekend when markets were closed. I opened up Sunday night Asian trading. We traded higher and actually hit the peaks for prices during this crisis. And the market, the conversations that I was having with many.

traders around them was all about what will the Iranian response be from the spectrum of will they actually move against four moves and how or will they do something more token. And my view was that it probably would be more like the playbook after the Qasem Soleimani killing, which was a more symbolic strike against Earville. And that's basically how the market, as soon as it saw...

Really, right away, as soon as the first missiles hit Qatar and because it was clear that there had been advanced warning, the market knew immediately what to do. And even before we had a ceasefire, we sold off $10 in a matter of hours. So basically the entire... Screaming just melted away immediately because the oil markets know that Iran is deterred. They're a paper tiger. They're not going to, you know.

go nuclear here as the strategy is in oil market terms. And then as soon as the ceasefire came in, you know, then we sold about another, you know, three dollars or so. And that's how we ran a trip. I think there's some. lessons here that the oil market takes away from us. You know, the first is that we have just been through an incredible stress test with kinetic action involving the Americans, the Israelis, direct attacks inside of Iran.

Everybody observed a taboo around oil export infrastructure. The Iranians wouldn't touch Hormuz for their own reasons. They were obviously deterred and afraid this could open up a major war with the U.S. The biggest loser or one of the biggest losers in a Hormuz crisis is one of Iran's only friends, which is China. Iran itself would lose access to its revenues. And so, you know, the thing that they had been threatening for so long, they didn't want to touch.

And likewise, the Israelis, even though they have a lot of incentives to try to go after Iran's key source of revenues, also understood that they diplomatically will lose any scope. with the Americans, not to mention the rest of the world, if oil prices are exploding because they had chosen to take out Clark Island. So everyone understood that this is just the consequences here of going after the really big oil flows were too...

Great. And I think that the oil market is going to, on a semi-permanent basis, going to come away from this lesson and understand maybe we don't need to bake in as high a geopolitical risk premium in the future. You know, if we have real physical supply disruptions, then you will immediately respond. But you don't need to preemptively put in as high a premium over theoreticals when we have kind of understood.

that we can withstand a crisis of this magnitude and not impact supply volumes. So do I hear you that like oil geopolitical risk? is, if not a thing of the past, sharply diminished relative to the past. And that is, in your sense, how market participants are going to think about things moving forward? Well, as a geopolitical risk analyst for oil markets, I hope not. However, yes, I mean, I think that there is clearly a lot of understanding about it.

have to pay attention to it and obviously if you're a trader you have to hedge your exposures during this whole period so you can't just ignore it and there were very real impacts across the market down the curve, things that happened with inventories. China was building up a lot of inventory before this, and now that inventory buy will go away. We've created hedging opportunities for U.S. producers, I think, clearly.

global markets always will need to pay attention to geopolitics, but the degree of how much of a premium you need to permanently leave in matters. I think it's important to note also.

The fact that Saudi and OPEC-plus had begun unwinding their voluntary cuts at a much faster pace, you know, beginning from April and telegraph, and this will continue, was something that had... I, you know, whether there were quiet conversations between Trump and MBS to get more oil into the market sooner, which I'm not sure was the case, but in hindsight, it was a genius move by OPEC plus to have.

begun doing that because this is about an ideal position to have this kind of crisis because we did have oil coming into the market and prices were relatively modest. And you still expect that unwinding to continue at an accelerated pace, as you told us on our last... Little rapid response podcast? Yes. For right now, yes, because the oil inventories and oil product inventories are really low.

And if you look at the structure of the crude curve, we've got a very strong backwardation at the front of the curve, which is just saying that we have inventories are drawing and the market is telling you it needs barrels. you know, have room to keep doing that. I think they will, at least through the summer. What is in question is almost everyone in the market, part of the reason why the violence of the sell-off was so great.

is the whole market expects that by the fourth quarter, we're going to have a really substantial surplus in the market as a consequence of OPEC plus. And I will add that maybe this ties back to what might happen with sanctions on Iran. That is a meaningful factor. You know, if we were to move into a new agreement or talks over a new agreement between the U.S. and Iran, and that involves...

a backing off of enforcement of sanctions that could bring more Iranian oil into the market. And that would complicate. the surplus that OPEC Plus has to deal with and that you know is the kind of thing that Saudis have to think about you know at the end of summer or fall.

The broader observation, I think, is a really interesting one. And, of course, it follows, what was it, a run-up to something like $140 when Russia invaded Ukraine. And in the end, we didn't see a disruption in Russian supply. Richard may have thoughts about even the tool of sanctions and how people refrain from using it because in an integrated global market, it imposes a lot of pain on yourself, not just a pain on your target.

You know, I've written for a long time that for all the talk of energy independence. The big shift we've seen in the half century since the 1970s crises, the Arab oil embargoes, which kind of shaped how people thought about energy security for so many decades. The world's changed a lot. That was a time of like.

Oil sold between buyer and seller in long-term contracts. Oil wasn't a globally traded commodity. And the much more integrated global market we have today, in many ways, increases security, even though it means you're more vulnerable to... something happening halfway around the world. And I think, Daniel, I hear you sort of agreeing with that, the idea that it's a more difficult tool to use, supply disruption in oil.

Because it's so broad-based, it can't be targeted. It's going to hit friends as well as enemies, and it's going to spark retaliation. And so there's an element of security that comes from that integration. I think that's true, although I wouldn't necessarily say that we're out of the woods on this question, even from this crisis. So even though the oil market...

you know, says this war is done, I don't think the war is over, as Richard was saying. You can imagine, what if the Iranians don't have progress in working towards a new durable international agreement? The Iranians, we don't know what they're doing on the nuclear program. They're clearly moving to rebuild their ballistic missile program, and we don't see any change in the regime. Are the Israelis going to sit there and be happy that Iran is?

funding that reconstitution from the sales of a million and a half barrels per day of crude oil. They didn't touch economic assets during this round, but if they have just made the Islamic Republic really, really angry... And if the Islamic Republic doesn't have internal threats and it is determined to rebuild, will the Israelis continue to say, we don't want to touch this? Or will the Trump administration, if Iran doesn't want to come to the table?

do what they have threatened to do and haven't done this year, and that's to really impose maximum pressure oil sanctions and take those Iranian volumes out of the market. So those things are still there. you know, as proximate risks that I think need to be taken into account. I wouldn't say the tool of going after oil flows is off the table. It has high stakes, but it certainly is there.

You asked the question I was going to put toward Karen, which is how Israel is thinking right now, as it seemed to. be squeezed and pushed into agreeing to a ceasefire. But if what Richard said about the nuclear capability, either existing stocks of highly enriched uranium or the intention to reconstitute still remains, where do you think Israel goes from here? Yeah, I mean, I think this is a very important issue and question, and mostly because, you know, the...

The relationship and the negotiation that's under consideration is not including Israel. This is U.S.-Iran bilateral talks. And it just makes no sense to think that Israel wouldn't have a say or that... you know, they will be okay with whatever Trump negotiates. They certainly won't be. So this is still an imminent threat.

And depending on the direction that the Iranian government takes, particularly what the IRGC decides to do. So we're going to see some fragmentation, I think. And I think we've already seen some threats from military commanders, IRGC.

commanders that they want to avenge the assassination of some of their members. So, you know, there may be some going rogue happening, but in any case, if Israel sees evidence of certainly efforts to retain highly enriched uranium and start to weaponization or, you know, any other kind of threat of ballistic missiles or just movement against their assets.

I think they will, you know, the ceasefire is very fragile. They would respond. And they remain on that war footing. And that will be, I think, their approach for a very long time. So, yeah, we're not out of the woods at all.

Richard, comment on any of that. And also, I wanted to ask you an oil market-related question, which is sanctions on Iran, as far as I know, they still exist. Notwithstanding everything that has happened, of course, we've seen loose enforcement. So Iran's level of exports has risen substantially from the first Trump administration to today. And now Trump is on social media saying things like, China, you're free to buy.

Iran's oil now. Does that mean we shouldn't even think about Iranian oil being under sanction anymore? Yeah, that tweet... Caught a number of us by surprise. Just to answer that question very directly, there's been no legal follow-up on any of that. In fact, I think there was some comments that the president made during press availability in the Netherlands that implied...

that sanctions relief is not, in fact, on. So I think at this point, if you're a compliance official somewhere out in the oil and gas universe, there is no change to U.S. sanctions with respect to Iran oil purchases. to operationalize that tweet to China. They would need to either be a national security waiver, which he could do, a significant reduction exception. So that would need to be the Chinese reducing purchases. That's not terribly likely to happen, or they have to be congressional.

So I think for the moment, we should assume that sanctions are in place and will remain such. But where I wanted to come in on topic here, and I agree with everything she said, I want to kind of double down on this point about what... What potentially an agreement might look like, especially because just a few moments ago, the president was asked whether or not he's going to try and push the Iranians into signing a deal, something like the JCPOA or something like that.

And he just said, I don't actually think it's necessary to have a deal because I don't see the Iranians getting back involved in the nuclear business anymore. I think they've had it. It's those kinds of comments that I'm sure are sending shivers down the spines of. Israeli officials because

Even though there is not only a political incentive, but I think a real operational sense that the strikes did tremendous damage to Iran's nuclear program, I don't think the Israelis agree that Iran is out of this business altogether. And when you add to this... suspicion.

of the U.S. intelligence community as if it's trying to undermine the achievements of the strikes, has been alleged recently, or something similar. You know, you have a real risk of cognitive dissonance if we start to see the Iranians reconstitute and the president's not even terribly inclined.

to write down what Iran's commitments are or what kind of verification provisions would be in place or similar. I also think, too, just while we're at it, that this goes back to the sanctions relief point. The Iranians, if they do want to have some sort of deal with the United States, they're going to want sanctions.

relief, they're probably going to want that written down too. So all this comes back to, we're a little bit in the murk right now of whether or not there's going to be another deal, whether the president thinks there needs to be another deal, what the terms are going to be, how dirt will be. I mean, these are the kinds of questions.

that you need to answer to have a successful dismount from the operations that were taking place. Daniel, I saw, I think, some article headline that at least one producer, I think it was Cotera, sort of had plans to...

idle some rigs and was keeping them. Do you think there's any impact on U.S. production outlook from all of this? I think miners, I saw that report. They're not alone. I mean, I think, again, the story was U.S. producers have been taking rigs down because we've basically been seeing a one-way. moved lower in WTI prices over the course of the year on the retreat in the 50s, in May, before this began.

The spike that we have, a number of producers, we definitely saw a lot of hedging volumes picking up during the last two weeks when there were opportunities to sell. to sell forward and lock in their prices. And so for some producers, that might mean that they won't take down rates as much as they might have felt they need to.

a month ago but i don't think anyone's going to bring anything back and what we're also hearing from producers it's far more likely that uh this was an opportunity for those producers that did manage to hedge higher prices, they'll just fortify their balance sheets into next year rather than turn around and say, great, let me go do that. I think if we see a sustained move higher in prices and we're in, you know, a 70 plus, 70, really you need to be.

you know, closer to 80 on a sustained WTI basis, I think, to get more interesting moves in production, given a bunch of issues of shale production in order to... In terms of where things go from here, Karen, we've talked about a number of countries in the region to watch, and the U.S., of course.

We haven't talked too much about China and Russia. How important is it to watch them? How involved do you think they will be in how this unfolds from here? And are you kind of surprised they didn't play a bigger role in the last two weeks? Well, I'm not surprised they didn't play more of a diplomatic or certainly even offering. military supply or support to either Russia or China offering to Iran. They haven't been able to do so and have been unwilling to do so. Take, for example, Russia's

support for the Assad regime in Syria. They basically let him fail. They gave him asylum, but nothing else. They kept their base and, you know, just kind of moved on. So I think that was a strong signal also to Iran, and they probably anticipated limited Russian support. For China, I think this is certainly going to make them...

think about energy security and oil, but especially in gas. And thinking about the timing of this, as Daniel was describing, like where oil markets are, we're very comfortable in terms of supply. OPEC Plus had just began this unwinding. But gas markets, it's a different story. So it's a little bit tighter now. We're expecting more onto markets in a year or two. So the tension point there, I think, for China is probably a little more interesting, a little more heightened.

But the movement of who can make change in this region, who can provide stability, we're at an impasse. And this is, I think, what is going to motivate. changes in behavior. Between the protagonist, Iran and Israel, but also particularly for the Gulf states, of really feeling like the U.S. security umbrella again after 2019, 2022, now 2025, is not 100% there for them or they don't feel comfortable.

enough with it? And who is going to act? And right now, Israel is the hegemon. Israel has the military power, has demonstrated its ability. But Israel is not the... organizer, the convener, the political mover of the region at all and doesn't really have a plan for the way it will communicate and integrate with the neighborhood. So that leaves us at an impasse, I think, and a very dangerous one.

And I don't think there's anyone really willing to step in right now. Well, it just seems like there's so much uncertainty and confusion, lack of clarity about where things go from here, but always benefit enormously. Karen, Daniel, Richard, for your insights and your analysis in general, but especially in the crisis we've seen in the last two weeks, just being able to talk with you.

on a regular basis to understand what's happening and help everyone listening understand as well. So thanks for making time to be with us today. We'll probably talk again before too long. Thanks so much. Thanks. Thank you, Jason.

Thank you again, Karen, Daniel, and Richard. And thanks to all of you for listening to this special episode of Columbia Energy Exchange. The show is brought to you by the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University. The show is hosted by me, Jason Bordoff, and by Bill Loveless. The show is produced by Mary Catherine O'Connor. Additional support from Caroline Pittman and Q Lee. Gregory Villafranc, engineer of the show.

For more information about the podcast or the Center on Global Energy Policy, please visit us online at energypolicy.columbia.edu or follow us on social media at Columbia U Energy. And please, if you feel inclined. Give us a rating on Apple Podcasts. It really helps us out. Thanks again for listening. We'll see you next week.