¶ Introduction to Automotive Software Security
Welcome to Cars, Hackers, and Cybersecurity. Here, we break down the latest in automotive cybersecurity, helping you stay ahead in building secure connected vehicles.
Today, we're diving deep into an evolving threat that affects, well, pretty much every car on the road or about to be. The hidden risks lurking within automotive software supply chains.
¶ The Evolving Automotive Software Landscape
Yeah. Then this isn't just, you know, theoretical stuff. We're talking about real world vulnerabilities. They've really gone from these localized, almost surgical strikes to threats that can scale globally. I mean, imagine a car being stolen in thirty seconds or less just by someone physically getting it a wire through the bumper.
Or maybe even more concerning, a vehicle being controlled remotely just using its VIN number. These aren't hypotheticals. These are the kinds of things being found in cars driving around today.
Right. And that's where it gets really interesting, doesn't it? So our mission today is to kind of unpack how these risks have changed, you know, from those physical hacks to remote exploits, and why that shift poses such an exponential threat to safety and privacy, and also what the industry is doing, and maybe more importantly, what it needs to do to keep vehicles and, well, us safe. We'll dig into the regulations pushing for change, the big shift in how security is managed, and even how new roles, some geopolitical, are shaping the future of making cars. Okay.
¶ Key Regulatory Standards: UN R155 and ISO 21434
So to really get a handle on the scale of today's threats, maybe we first need to understand how things have changed fundamentally. Wasn't it true for a long time that car hacks almost always needed someone to be physically there?
Precisely. Yeah. For quite a while, the vulnerabilities making headlines, they generally required physical access to the vehicle's network. You might think about, say, the diagnostic port, the OBD two port, or maybe more dramatically, like I mentioned, someone pulling off a bumper to reach a headlight wire that's connected to the CAN bus. That's the controller area network, basically, the car's communication backbone.
And with that access, yeah, they could disable the immobilizer and steal the car in, well, thirty seconds or less.
Thirty seconds? Wow. That's incredibly fast. So these were really specialized targeted attacks back then. I mean, terrifying for the person whose car it was, but not easily scalable to thousands or millions of vehicles.
You've absolutely hit the key point there. That's exactly why the recent shift is, well, it's a whole new ballgame. As cars get more and more connected, you know, through mobile apps, cloud services, all that we're seeing vulnerabilities pop up that allow for truly remote access
Yeah.
A hacker could literally be anywhere in the world with just a laptop. And in some documented cases, all they needed was the VIN number of a vehicle to gain control.
Wow. So if you can get that kind of control with just a VIN from maybe across the globe, the risk and the potential impact, they don't just increase, they kind of explode exponentially. But what are the real world implications of that jump? Are we talking mass data breaches or could it be, I don't know, far more disruptive?
Oh, the scale of impact shifts dramatically. Yes. It means a single undiscovered flaw in just one connected car could potentially be weaponized against an entire fleet. Think about disrupting essential services, compromising national security, or even, worst case scenario, being used for large scale coordinated attacks. We're definitely not just talking about individual inconvenience anymore.
It's really about systemic risk. And believe me, regulators have absolutely taken notice. In recent years, automotive cybersecurity regulation has really sprung up in various regions. You got UNR one fifty five, which is part of the UNESE organization covering Europe, Japan, Korea, and others. That's probably the most mature one. We're also seeing similar rules emerging in places like China and India.
Right. And I understand there's also the ISO two one four three four standard. It's not technically a regulation itself, but it gets referenced everywhere, making it pretty much a requirement. Correct? What specifically does ISO two one four three four push for regarding these vulnerabilities?
¶ Challenges in Automotive Software Compliance
That's exactly right. It's become essentially mandatory through reference. And for our discussion today, clause 10.1 through of ISO two one four three four, it recommends performing testing, including vulnerability scanning, to minimize those unidentified vulnerabilities. Now while that's a recommendation, clause ten four three is actually a strict requirement. It says if you don't do those tests, you absolutely must provide a detailed rationale.
And frankly, it's getting pretty difficult, maybe impossible, to argue against needing comprehensive vulnerability scanning today. So, yeah, it effectively mandates it.
Okay. So this all points to a massive need for, well, constant vigilance. Given this escalating threat and all the regulatory pressure, how is the industry responding, particularly when it comes to actually finding and fixing these vulnerabilities? We often hear about the v model in automotive software development and this idea of shifting left. What do those terms actually mean here?
Okay. Yeah. Let's unpack that. The v model, it visually represents the software development life cycle. Think of a v shape.
Planning and design happen on the downslope, the left side. Implementation is kind of the bottom point of the v, and then testing and maintenance happen on the upslope, the right side. Now traditionally, things like TERA, that's threat analysis and risk assessment, they happen early in design on the left. But surprisingly, vulnerability testing often happened quite late way over on the right side during system and acceptance testing.
And I can imagine finding things that late must have some serious downsides. I mean beyond just the cost, does it also slow things down? Maybe stifle innovation or delay getting new features out?
It absolutely does on all counts. Yes. So this concept of shifting left is all about moving that security testing much earlier in the timeline over to the left side of the v. There's actually applied software measurement that shows the cost of fixing software defects or vulnerabilities in this case. It grows exponentially the later you find them. Think of it like building a house. Right? Fixing a faulty wire when the walls are still open. Simple. Cheap.
But discovering that same faulty wire after the drywall's up, the paint is dry, the furniture's moved in
Yeah. That's a huge mess.
Exactly. It's a complete teardown sometimes. The cost just explodes. Finding a problem during coding versus finding it just before the product release, it can be hundreds, maybe even thousands of times more expensive to fix, and that leads to costly product recalls, severe brand damage. So it's just far more effective and frankly cost efficient to catch these things as early as you possibly can.
Right. Makes total sense. Find them when the code is being written, not when the car is practically rolling off the assembly line or worse already on the road with customers. So what are the key challenges in doing that effectively, especially in the early implementation phase when developers are actually writing the code?
¶ Vulnerabilities in Modern Vehicle Software Systems
Well, one of the main challenges is getting an accurate software bill of materials, you know, an SBOM at every phase. With so many different pieces of code being written and pulled in, getting clear visibility into a precise SBOM, it can be a really manual time consuming process. And we don't want developers spending all their valuable time on that kind of overhead. We want them focused on creating great software. Another challenge, as we just discussed, is that exponential cost of finding things late which directly hits the time to market for, well, everything.
Individual components like ECUs, electronic control units, and the whole vehicle itself.
Right. Delays are absolutely killers in this industry. Okay. What about later in the process then, the acceptance phase? Maybe when you're getting components from a supplier and you might not even have the original source code. That sounds like a different set of problems.
You're right. Totally different challenges pop up there.
Mhmm.
First, context becomes incredibly important. Think about it. A critical vulnerability found in an ADS system, system, your advanced driver assistance systems like automated braking or lane keeping, that's far more sensitive than the exact same vulnerability found in say the ambient lighting system or the window controls. So prioritization has to consider the specific function of that component. What does it actually do?
Then there's the SBOM challenge again but this time often for binaries for the compiled code. When you get these compiled binaries from suppliers visibility into their respond form isn't always straightforward. You can make it tough to be sure you have the most accurate data for scanning. And finally there's the need for formal verification proving you meet compliance requirements which usually involves providing comprehensive reports to regulators.
Yeah. Okay. So the big goal is shifting left to save time, money, avoid those huge headaches. What specific security insights can you actually gain by scanning the source code itself early on right when it's being written?
Yeah. Scanning the source code directly gives you a lot. Mhmm. You can instantly find direct vulnerabilities coded in. You can identify all the open source licenses being used, which is crucial because some licenses can cause major legal headaches in commercial products. And you can detect guideline violations, like maybe not following specific secure coding standards or even spotting things like unencrypted keys or internal developer comments that might accidentally slip into the final product.
That sounds really powerful. But how do you actually integrate this smoothly into a developer's daily workflow, you know, without slowing them down or cramping their style? Because that's often the pushback, isn't it?
¶ Practical Strategies for Compliance and Security
That is the critical question. Absolutely. It's all about seamless integration into the SDLC, the software development lifecycle. Security testing needs to feel like a consistent part of the workflow, not some big roadblock. So by integrating vulnerability management tools directly into the CSED pipeline that's continuous integration, continuous deployment, you can automate a lot.
Things like generating the SBOM from the source code, detecting security flaws, then handling the assessment and response. This means you can prioritize vulnerabilities based on risk and automatically push action items into ticketing systems developers already use, like Jira. It ensures developers know exactly what needs fixing next, almost like security is just another automated quality check they run.
That sounds like a really significant leap in efficiency. Can you give us maybe a real world example of how this works? How it might look for a developer day to day?
Sure. Let's imagine a GitHub repository, maybe called Auto Universe, focused on automotive code using languages like c plus plus and Python. By integrating security tools directly into this repository, every time a developer submits a new pull request or commits code, it could be automatically scanned. And you can set rules, like if a new pull request introduces a high or critical vulnerability, you can automatically reject it.
Right.
Right there. It gives immediate actionable feedback to the developer saying, hey, you need to fix this before this code even gets merged. Yeah. They get a deep dive into the vulnerabilities found, any license risks, guideline violations, all within their familiar development environment.
That's fantastic for catching problems right as they happen. Okay. Okay. Now shifting over to the right side of that v model again. How do you handle security for components and binaries you get from that huge supply chain? Especially since, like you said, you might not have the source code.
Right. So here the the benefits are really about ensuring regulatory compliance for the final product, the whole vehicle, and mitigating the inherent security risks that every single vendor in your often very complex supply chain can introduce.
Mhmm.
To effectively scan these binaries, it really boils down to three main things. First, you need robust asset management. Automatically creating an SBOM for what you receive and mapping it precisely to your specific automotive assets, hardware, software, firmware, everything.
Okay. So really understanding not just what's in the component, but where it came from and what it does within the car's overall architecture.
Exactly that. Second, continuous vulnerability correlation. This means constantly scanning these assets against known vulnerabilities from public databases, like NVD or CVE, but also crucially private databases. For instance, AutoSAR, that global partnership defining a common software architecture for car ECUs, it's super widely used in automotive but it doesn't typically publicize its vulnerabilities. Those are often found through specific penetration testing or maybe directly from vendors.
You need a system that can scan for both public and these private or non public vulnerabilities. And third, assessment and response, but with correct prioritization that considers the automotive context. Like we said, a vulnerability might be rated critical on its own, but maybe its actual exploitability in your specific vehicle architecture is very low, or perhaps it's in a less critical system, reducing its overall impact.
Got it. So it's not just is there a vulnerability, but is it actually exploitable in my system, and how critical is that system to the car's function and safety? Mhmm. Does that asset management system also give you a clear, maybe layered view of the whole vehicle?
It absolutely should. Yes. The asset management needs to be non flat, meaning you need a clear hierarchical view showing which vulnerabilities affect which specific components. Doesn't matter if you're the OEM looking at the whole car or a tier two supplier just developing firmware for one small part for that OEM. The process usually starts when you receive an SBOM or maybe just a binary file from your supply chain.
From that, you perform SBOM extraction to figure out what's inside. Then you connect that information to your asset management system. After that, it's continuous vulnerability detection using both those public and private sources we talked about. Finally, you prioritize based on exploitability and your asset specific configuration, and then you follow-up. That might mean creating tickets for internal developers, or maybe sending alerts to an XDR system that's extended detection and response for vehicles already out on the road to manage ongoing threats.
This really sounds like a continuous, constantly evolving process, not just a static, one time security check. Which brings us back to TARA, that threat analysis and risk assessment you mentioned earlier. How do all these newly discovered vulnerabilities feed back into that? Does the TARA evolve too?
That's a great point. What's fascinating here is that TARA, even though it's performed early in the V model it is absolutely not meant to be a static document filed away somewhere. No, it's designed to be used continuously throughout the entire life cycle of the asset, the component or the vehicle. The potential attack paths and the risks they constantly change as components get updated or as new vulnerabilities are discovered. So if a new critical vulnerability is found in a vehicle that's already driving around, the terror must be updated.
It guides the best way to address that new risk. It really is a living document that informs decisions and adapts over time.
That really does make the Terra a living document, constantly reflecting the current threat landscape. And speaking of constantly changing landscapes, what about regulations? We know they're always a bit of a moving target, especially in this tech space.
No pun intended. Yes. The automotive cybersecurity regulatory environment is definitely evolving and at a pretty rapid pace. A very recent example is a new rule from the US Department of Commerce that was just enacted earlier this year. Its stated objective is explicitly to safeguard US national security and protect the privacy of American car owners. Specifically, it actually bans certain vehicle components if they originate from countries deemed high risk, like China and Russia.
Wow. Okay. A direct ban based on country of origin. Which specific parts of the vehicle are targeted by this rule, and what's the timeline look like?
It focuses on two particularly sensitive areas. First, the vehicle connectivity system, basically where the car shares data with the OEM's cloud services. And second, the automated driving system or ADIES, you know, taking control of ADEs functions like steering or braking remotely could obviously have a huge impact.
Absolutely.
Now this ban applies to software assets starting with model year 2027 and hardware assets for model year 2030. So some of those deadlines are actually approaching quite rapidly for the global automotive industry.
Right. So even if you're not a US manufacturer, if you wanna sell cars in The US, you have to comply. And by extension, all the suppliers selling components to those manufacturers also have to comply. This must have a massive ripple effect through the whole supply chain, doesn't it?
It absolutely does. A huge ripple effect. And this really highlights the critical importance of having effective asset management that goes beyond just security scanning. You now need the capability to scan for the origin of specific components. Where did this software or hardware actually come from?
There's even a new annual reporting requirement to regulators where manufacturers have to confirm they don't have prohibited assets in these sensitive areas of the vehicle. So having a strong asset management system means you can get immediate alerts if, say, vendors from banned countries are identified as part of an ECU's supply chain. Or you could proactively generate reports to easily identify any components sourced from specific regions making that regulatory reporting much easier.
Okay. So wrapping this up then, what does this all mean for us, you know, the drivers, the consumers, but also for people working within the industry? We've covered a lot today. From that escalating sort of exponential threat of remote vehicle hacks to the shift left idea that catches vulnerabilities way earlier, potentially saving what? Thousands of times the cost?
¶ Implementing Continuous Monitoring and VSOCs
Potentially, yes.
And we also saw how critical that robust asset management is, not just for scanning for security flaws, but now also for navigating these really complex constantly changing regulations like that new US rule banning certain components based on where they came from.
Yeah. If we connect all these dots to the bigger picture, it just profoundly underscores that the security of our vehicles isn't static.
Mhmm.
It's an ongoing dynamic process. It's really not a one time check that happens when you buy the car. Mhmm. The continuous effort, it involves every single stage of the life cycle, right from the initial code development through all the components brought in from this vast global supply chain, and even beyond that to managing updates over the air once the car is sold.
Which I think raises a really important question. In a world where car software is constantly evolving, constantly subject to new regulations and new threats, how do we as consumers or even those inside the industry, how do we truly understand and manage the long term security of a vehicle we own or produce? So maybe consider this. When you acquire a car today, are you simply purchasing a static product like we used to? Or are you actually becoming part of an ever evolving digital ecosystem, one that requires constant vigilance and updates throughout its entire lifespan.
And if that's the case, what kind of ongoing transparency and responsibility does that demand from both the manufacturers and from us as owners in this completely new automotive landscape.
That's all for today's episode. Keep your engines running smooth and your cyber defenses sharp. Stay connected by subscribing and visiting placidityx.com. Until next time, stay safe on the road and in the cloud.