All right, guys, we're very lucky to be joined this morning for instant analysis from doctor Tree to Parsi, who, of course is alongside a great front of the show. He is with the Quincy Institute for Responsible state Craft. So great to see you, sir, Good to be with you. So just your first reaction to the launching of this joint Israeli US regime change war against the Iranian government.
I mean, obviously, this is absolutely terrible. It's a violation of international law. It's a violation of US law that there's not been a vote, there's not been a debate. In fact, there's a vote schedule for Tuesday. It appears as if he almost wanted to start it before the vote, so instead of that war powers vote becoming a turrent, that became a deadline for him. But also I think it's you know, I have to admit that I was wrong.
I don't know if you remember. I wrote that piece in August of last year predicting that these Raelis would start the war again, and I thought that it would happen sometime before the end of December of last year. Of all the scenarios that I considered, the one that I found to be the least likely is one in which the United States would be fully on board. I was more worried that these Ralis would start something and drag the US into it or something along those ways.
But the fact that these radiers would be fully on board, the US would be fully on board and take the lead on it is something. I just thought that Trump would have enough of a care of the opinion in his own megabase to realize the political downside. It's not, as you know, talking about any type of a moral consideration on his end, obviously, but a political consideration. But even that seems to have been completely set aside in order for him to do this well.
In fairness to you, you know, when you look at the landscape, you see the political people have to realize this is a disaster. The military people realize it's a disaster. Our allies in the region outside of Israel did not want this war. Our allies in Europe, I mean, they're all, you know, put issuing supportive statements now, but they also were not eager for this war. So what was the piece that we were all missing in terms of looking
at this analysis in this landscape. I mean, I was obviously and I know you were too deeply concerned we would end up in this war with a run. But if you just look at it from a strategic perspective and all of these different pieces, there is something about it that seems to not add up.
I think that. I mean, it's a great question, and I want to say that, you know, I don't think I have the full answer in any wayship or form, but I think there's a couple of things we can
point to. First is the sugar High from Venezuela. The fact that that operation went as smoothly as it did, at least from a military standpoint, not a single American casualty, seems to really have cemented a view in Trump's mind that he is, you know, he's operating in a different dimension that everyone who's told him, you can't move the embassy to Jerusalem, you can't give Golan to the Israelis, you can't kill so lay MONI, you can't bomb for though, you can't do all of these things, that all of
them have always been wrong. That he has managed to do it and there has not been any real repercussions, which of course is not entirely true, and that as a result he's just gotten some sort of a superhuman view over himself in which he has again taken the advice by others about the dangers of this with a tremendous amount of assault and skepticism. Because what we have in this situation is not one in which there were a lot of people in the White House pushing for this.
The main person pushing for this was Trump, and the other people pushing for it were outside of the government, or at least of the administration. They were in the Senate, the pro Israeli crowd. It was the Israeli government, but it was not a lot of people inside the government that was doing this. All of these leaks that has come out almost on a daily basis in mainstream media, with military personnel declaring all the kind of challenges that they're faced with, this are all there to kind of
push him back or at least win more time. And I think it reflects again on the difficulty from their standpoint to actually do this in a successful way with a degree of expectation that Trump now seems to have based on a couple of operations that went much better than most people had expected. I think that's one element of it. The other element is and I mentioned this
on the show. Before the Israelis in the December twenty ninth meeting really managed to give Trump the impression that the Iranians are much weaker than they are and that he has this amazing, once in a lifetime opportunity to be able to get rid of this regime. We heard that in his speege talking about how this has been
going on for forty seven years. You know that he is the person who has this opportunity that has never been a better opportunity than this, And we saw that and the way that Witcoff declared that, you know, Trump was frustrated that the Iranis had not surrendered yet because he had the wrong expectation that they were so much weaker than they actually are, and that surrender was in
the cars. I think a fundamental misunder standing on Trump's end is that he thought the more aircraft carriers he brings to the Persian Gulf, for to the Indian Ocean, the scarier the Iranians will be and eventually they will cave, not understanding that what the Iranian theocracy fears far more than the aircraft carriers is capitulation and surrender they believe they can win, they can survive a war, and frankly, they may not be wrong about that, particularly if the
US is not going in with ground troops. There's a highlightode that they will survive this. But they cannot survive a capitulation or a surrender because their support based inside of the country has already shrunk. The people that are left supporting this theocracy are even more important to the theocracy at this point because they have lost so much other support. And the people who are left tend to be the most hard line and they will never forgive
a surrender. But they can definitely live with a war that is lost as long as it is fought. And this is that undamenttal psychological misunderstanding on Trump's side, in which he felt that he could just scare them into surrender.
I sort of hate to ask you about this because you're such a sophisticated and dignified person, But what about the Epstein files. You know, I mean, clearly, Trump, there are things in there that have been hidden from the American public. We know that they have not been forthcoming in following the law that Trump signed into law that requires the full sum release. We know he's moved Gallayne
Maxwell to this club fed prison. We know that very likely whatever is contained in those files, Israel, you know, likely has access to and does have full knowledge of. And of course we know that Donald Trump himself had a close personal friendship with Jeffrey Epstein over the course of many years. I mean, could that be a potential factor at play here as well?
It absolutely could be, because we don't have access to all of those filed and as you have reported on the show as well, a lot of the stuff that actually contains Trump's name was not released, so we don't know what exactly is in those files. So I think what we can say is that clearly there is some missing factors that would explain how we got to this point. Could Epstein be one of them? Absolutely, you cannot rule it out, and you cannot also assertively or conclusively say
that it was the factor. But to completely dismiss the idea that this has something to do with it, I think would be problematic because there's no evidence to exclude it. There's also no smoking gun evidence at this point that says this is the reason why this is happening.
Let me ask you about a few conflicting reports that we're getting, you know, understanding that as we're unfolds, there's all sorts of misinformation and lies and propaganda and things to sort through. So the Israelis are claiming that they believe they successfully assassinated Ietola company. He on the other hand, the Iranians are saying he's going to come out shortly
and make a speech. So first let's just talk about, you know, the possibility that he certainly was targeted, the possibility that he could have been assassinated, how significant do you believe that would be, and what would be some of the fallout from that targeting.
Undoubtedly would be tremendous significant if he were to be assassinated. What would follow, however, is actually a little bit more difficult to predict. First of all, there's a significant risk that the administration is well aware of that this will actually put a fire throughout the region because their Shia populations in Iraq, in Lebanon in Saudi and Bahrain in the UAE in Pakistan, who view Harmony as a religious figure and as a religious leader because he is a
grand Diatola or imagine, have needs. So this is something that I know in the summer they were very concerned about. Whether they have now completely dismissed that or not remains to be seen. The Israeli argument has been that it is necessary to kill him to essentially kill an era, an era of the Islamic Republic. It's symbolic in its value. Now what would follow? I would presume that the Iranias
already have decided the secession at this point. In fact, they've declared that they decided the secession for several key posts about five lines down, and that would be very odd if they were to do that. But not having done that with the Supreme Leader, could it erupt into protests on the streets in the sense that some people would think that this is an opportunity that absolutely also could happen. What we have seen so far, and I think this is an important point to keep in mind,
we've not seen any such product. I spoke to someone in Tehran just before this show. No scenes yet of people celebrating this in a large or any significant number at all. In fact, one thing that has happened that probably will make it more difficult for that type of sentiment to grow is that you had this bombing of the school girl of this girls school in Hoemos, girlan province in Iran, in which about fifty or so children were killed now in a war. Unfortunately, these things do
happen statistically. If this were to go on for a month, they would almost certainly have happened. The fact that it happened on the first day, I think is very significant. This is different if it had happened on one after a large number of leaders of the state apparatus had been assassinated, and then this happened, it would happen in a different context then. But this happened on the first day, before any of those other people of any significance had
been killed. And I think that also puts an impression in the minds of most Devarniys what this actually is, what the cost of this is, That this is not some of these romanticized views of war that is now being spewed by some exiled pretenders to a throne or pretenders to power, who are portraying this as if this would be some sort of an honorable war while they're
themselves sitting in Maryland and enjoying their daily lives. So I think that in themselves has had and will have a psychological impact on what the fallout will be if you start seeing that key people within the state apparatus are killed. The other thing that I think is also very important to keep in mind here is that by all accounts that I've spoken to, the Supreme Leader is
seen by many as an obstacle. Inside of you are for those who actually want to strike back much harder, who believe that the Irani has committed a mistake by responding so politely to previous attacks to Israeli attacks waited for too long in the strategy called strategic patients, they view up how many, as an obstacle for what they would want to have done, which is strike back harder
or even go for a nuclear weapon. And for those who wanted to have a much more aggressive diplomatic approach, we would have included direct negotiations with Trump himself, which I think could have made a difference in all of
this that it had been done earlier. They also see him as an obstacle because he's been too adamant about not taking that step if he is taken out and there's a different leader or taking power, or if it's a council, etc. He also means that some of those questions will be revisited, and Iran may go in a very different direction, one that perhaps is not at all to the liking of the United States.
I saw you engaging online with some potential reports that jailed dissidents, jailed dissident leaders in Iran had also been targeted. You know, what do you make of those potential reports and what can we say, you know, based on again early reporting about what has been hit and what was ultimately targeted, about what the goals of this war actually are from the US and Israeli perspective, based on where they are attempting to strike.
I really try to wrap my head around that. We do know, for instance, that they did try to target the house, the empty house of the former president amadinajad He was not there and they did not hit that house, to hit a house about two blocks or two houses
down the street. But they also appear to have tried to hit the house that the dissident politician mi Jose Musavi, who was the person who won the elections in two thousand and nine and would have been president, who was a reformist had it not been for the election fraud in which Amadinaja took power again. He's been in house arrest now since for about seventeen years. That house was
also targeted. It seems to be an effort to eliminate all elements of this system, whether they are dissidents, whether they're reformists, whether they're in power right now, And that would be more in line with what I think these Raelis would want, which is to have a complete power vacuum at the top, which makes it far more likely that you will have a civil war or that you would have essentially a complete not just regime collapse and implosion, but state collapse. I'm not so sure if that really
is what the administration wants. I certainly would believe that they would recognize that this is not in the interests of the United States to see that level of instability. And whether each and every target is coordinated between the two side I have no insight into, but I could definitely see if this was just an Israeli war, that they would do this. The US being involved in it raises some question marks in my head.
And what do we know so far about the Iranian counter attacks which have been widespread US basis throughout the region, and of course directly targeting Israel as well. Obviously they also control those straits of Hormus, which are incredibly key for shipping in general, but specifically for oil shipping. What do you make so far of what we know about the counter attacks and what Iranian capabilities may be.
What we see from the counter attacks is that they happen very fast, which is about two hours into it rather than twelve to eighteen hours last time. They were not taken by surprise. They're not at a very very robust level in terms of a large number. But it's also very important to understand the attacks so far by US and Israel is not at all at the same level as it was during the Israel War of June
of last year. Tonight we may see something much much more, But what we seem so far has not at all been at the same intensity as we saw during the summer, and given the fact that the firepower is far far greater right now, I think that in and of itself is interesting. Whether that is because they wanted to slow start slowly, whether they thought that perhaps the initial wave of attempt
a decapitation would be successful, it's difficult to tell. But the Iranian response has also in that sense been very widespread, very fast, but also not as robust as it was before. We're not seeing the same number of missiles being hit at Israel, for instance, but we are seeing that they're targeting almost all of the bases where at least almost all countries in the GCC Iraqi air bases operated by
the US have been attacked. We saw that there was an attack that appeared to have gone towards the base in Kuwait, but the missile was deflected because of the air defense system and landed at the airport in Kuwait, and of Kuwait is of course a very small country. We've seen attacks similar things seems to have happened in Dubai in which the Palm neighborhood in Dubai was hit, and we've seen attacks in Kutar. We've seen attack in Bahrain.
In Bahrain, and we saw some very strange images of Bahraini's cheering once they saw that the drone actually did hit the US base where the fifth Fleet is and what that was it was actually drowning. It was not a missileze one of the same rather slow moving drones that the Iranis have been selling the Russians that Russians have been using in Ukraine. And it's just very surprising that that drone would have been able to get through all the air defense systems at the US naval base
in Bahrain. Whether that is because the air defense systems were overwhelmed or something else, I don't know, but it was actually very surprising to see that a drome would would make its way into the otherwise very fortified American base there.
Yeah, I mean also remarkable to hear the celebration, as you said, from the Bahrainians who were filming that. You know, what did you make of that? And obviously all of the US allies in the region have already put out supportive statements. We've seen Western Europe, you know, once again embarrassingly coming along and almost across the board supporting these aggressive, illegal strikes from the US and Israel. Mark Karney, who just gave you know, great speech about how we're turning
the page blah blah blah. You know, he winds right up behind the US in this illegal war as well. But what is the sentiment among people in the region, do you suspect, you know, beyond the top leadership?
Let me ask her, But I do want to I can't resist to comment on Carney and what he just said, mindful of the fact that he gave a speech that was widely celebrated at Davos in which he famously said that we're taking the sign down, mentioned very clearly that we knew that international law was invariably implemented based on the identity of the attacker and the identity of the victim, and here we have a perfect case of that in which this is, as you pointed out, a clear violation
of international law. But Carney, the Finnish Prime Minister, who also wrote this article about values based realism, could not even get themselves to even get close to a condemnation or even actually using the term international law. So when Carne says that the rules based order essentially is overWe
we're taking down the side. Many of us, perhaps a bit of a wishful thinking, believe that perhaps this would mean that he's going to do a re embrace of international law rather than a rules based system, because law is much firmer. Instead, we're seeing that he's not even
using the word international law. At the first instance in which his new little thesis would have been tested, he utterly failed, and so did the vast majority of European leaders, save the exception of Ireland, Norway, Switzerland and Spain, the same group who incidentally also stood firmly on the side of international law when it came to the genocide in Gaza. Now when it comes to the regional states, this is part of the reason why they were so against this
in the first place. They knew that they would be victimizing this. They have to, of course, from their standpoint, come up with very very strong condemnations. These are, at the end of the day, attacks on their soil. And the Iranian response is, this is not meant to attack you. This is meant to attack bases that are being used
directly or indirectly to attack our soul. End result of all of this may very well end up being that rather than having American basis on your soul providing you with security, it actually may end up becoming the opposite, that the very principle is negated, that you're actually at a greater risk of being attacked precisely because you have these bases on your soul. And very importantly in this case as well as the case of the past summer, the United States have vacated all of those bases before
it attacked. Both the personnel have been moved out and most of the equipment have been moved out, which then raises the question, what's the point of these basis If they were supposed to defend these regions, these states against Iran, and now when you're having a war, you're actually vacating them, what's in it for these states?
Yeah? Well, well, finally, you know, it's hard to see what the off ramp could be for the US, given that Trump just came out and said, hey, we're aiming for regime change here, and anything short of that, you know, based on his own metric of success, would be would be a failure. However, there are again some reports out that they reached out, the US reached out to Iran
looking for already some sort of a negotiated seasfire. There are also reports that the Iranians have reached out and offered some sort of concessions in exchange for a ceasefire. I have no idea whether either of those reports are accurate at this point, But my question for you is, you know, do you see some potential near term off ramp that could you know, keep this it's already a regional war, but keep it from escalating into an even broader and lengthier disaster.
I could let me first say I think the most likely scenarios is either that Trump continues this until he gets some sort of a regime implosion and need the clearest victory, but also washes his hands or whatever follows. And this has been very clear in the internal conversations that no one wants to take responsibility for what happens to you afterwards. And that's this is the big difference
between regime change and regime collapse. In the regime change, you're actually actively trying to install a new government, and their track record becomes your track record. In regime collapse or implosion, all you're doing is getting rid of the existing one, and then you say that you have nothing
to do with whatever comes afterwards. So I can see that scenario in the sense that if this goes on for a time and if they managed to kill a lot of the different leaders of the current system, that there would be some sort of an implosion and then he would declare victory, even though you know you would have instability, potentially civil war and all of these different kinds of things. The other scenario is that the Iranians continue to strike back the last the outlast Trump. This
becomes very costly for the US. Casualty rates, inflation, global or markets are destabilized, all of these different things, and then the pressure on Trump internationally from the American public, from his own base starts to become so strong that he looks for an exit, and then he may actually take the deal that was on the tape, the deal that is way better than what Obama managed to secure and that Trump nevertheless rejected, and then he may take that,
and then suddenly they cleared out of victory and say that thanks to my bombing campaign, we achieved this, even though the Omani Foreign Minister made very clear that this is already on the table and you are rejecting it, you're going for a war of choice. There is that
other scenario as well. I don't find it to be as likely, but it's very difficult to put any numbers on it, which is that after a couple of rounds, both sides feel that they can go back to the negotiating table with their faces having been saved, and they may actually be able to go back to the same agreement as existed before, the same offer on the table, but both of them can say that, you know, now we got it because of this exchange. Trump can claim
that he bombed them, that he was very successful. Levonians can claim that they struck back, they were very successful, and then they come to some sort of agreement. The reason why I think that's going to be difficult, though, is that at this point we've always said that there's no trust between the US and Iran, but there's never
ever been less trust than there is now. And as a result, even if they were to come to some form of agreement, it does seem to me extremely difficult that the deal actually would be implemented, that it would endure, that it would be anything more than essentially a cease fire with a pretense of having a deal beyond that.
Yeah, well, because Israel is certainly not going to be satisfied with that either.
Absolutely. Yeah, very interesting. Is very different in all of this.
Yeah, And to your point on the trust, once again we see the US using diplomacy as a ruse. The reports Israelis are bragging about how this has been in the works for months, that the date was set weeks ago. You know, CNN is now reporting about some biblical justification reason related to Amelek that they chose the state in particular, so, you know, hard to trust a country when they're constantly using negotiations and diplomacy as a ruse to launch new wars.
If I said just one thing on that, yeah, I think they Israelis have an interest to really push that narrative that this was a ruse from the outset, that this will already plan because they do want to destroy America's credibility as a diplomatic force as a negotiator because they were against these negotiations in the first place. And the more you push the narrative that this was a lie from the outset, the more easily you can avoid any future negotiations. I'm not convinced that it really was.
I think there were elements. I think there was some sincerity, but ultimately Trump felt for the type of pressure that he has proven himself to be far too susceptible towards. That doesn't mean that this wasn't a ruse at some point. This doesn't mean that this is in any way, shape
or form forgivable, or that it is not illegal. But I think we have to recognize nothing would serve the Israeli interest more then to completely destroy America's credibility as a negotiating partner, because that would avoid all of these headaches that these Raelis have had that at at various points in the United States have actually looked for diplomatic exit wrops.
Yeah, well, Trump is certainly making it easy for them.
Too, certainly to make that case.
Yeah, no doubt about it. Well, doctor Parci, thank you so much for your analysis, and I hope we'll get to speak again with you in the future because there certainly will be a lot to talk about.
Thank you so much.