Former MI6 Head Talks China Security Risks, Trade War Fallout - podcast episode cover

Former MI6 Head Talks China Security Risks, Trade War Fallout

Apr 11, 202510 min
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Episode description

Former Head of the British Secret Intelligence Service Richard Dearlove discusses the security and intelligence risks China poses and how Britain and other nations should respond to the US-China trade war. He joined Stephen Carroll on Bloomberg Daybreak Europe.

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Transcript

Speaker 1

Yeah, of course, it's a story where we continue to bring you coverage of throughout the program this morning. A Bloomberg editorial published this week, though has a stark headline, a trade war with China could lead to real conflict. It warrants that although the cost of the US's trade war and the trillions of dollars, the cost of escalating with China could be much higher amidst all the tariff chaos.

Just to highlight some other stories on the security issues that we have seen this week, the Wall Street Journal reporting that Chinese officials applied to the US they were responsible for recent major cyber attacks, The UK's head of the military made the first trip to Beijing in ten years, and Ukraine's president VLAs Mayr Zelenski claims to have captured

Chinese nationals fighting for Russia. So, beyond the economics, how is the world shifting in response to the Trump administration's policies To discuss, we're joined by Richard Dilove, the former head of MI six in studio. Good morning, Thank you very much for being with us. Should we be more concerned about the trade war resulting in a real war?

Speaker 2

Well, that's taking a big leap. In my opinion, I think at the moment, the trade war doesn't imply let's say, strategic military conflict with China. I think China themselves are keen to avoid that sort of escalation. Okay, The elephant in the room in the background is how the Chinese will in the medium to long term behave over Taiwan. And we talk about a Taiwan crisis all the time, but I think the likelihood is if the Chinese want to pressure Taiwan, it's it's an issue of a blockade

rather than any more serious military initiative. And in recent weeks, the Chinese have been quite aggressive in terms of exercising off the Taiwanese coast, I mean, demonstrating the way that they could line up naval and other forces to blockade the country. So I don't, you know, I think that's you know, everybody is in the media making dire predictions about how this could escalate, and at the moment we're still in the world of optics rather than outcomes. We

really don't know where things are going to end. And I would expect myself people step back from the brink if we get into more deterioration. I mean, I would predict eventually a negotiation over tariffs with China.

Speaker 1

Where we at this moment in terms of international relations, they seem to be shifting. What's your big takeaway from that, Well.

Speaker 2

Of course they're shifting. I mean we've been we've been talking about the end of packs Americana for a very long time, and I guess the arrival of the Trump administration has finally blown up the last remains of that. So we have no structured international security set, which we have rested on very heavily in the past and has

given let's say, stability to global markets. But let's face it, since two thousand and eight, since the banking crisis, we have had a situation where political decision making has been more important than I mean, the political decision making has driven economic considerations, and I mean we've had that through the banking crisis, through COVID, and we've now certainly got it with the Trump administration. I mean, this isn't a

new phenomenon. It's a trend in international affairs which has been developing very significantly over a longish period of time. And I'm surprised that everybody is so surprised when we had pretty clear predictions that this is the direction things were going in.

Speaker 1

I appreciate your more measured tone perhaps on some of these headlines, but I wonder are you more pessimistic about the stable world order now than you were before January? How much has your view, given your experience at six shifted on how safe a world we're living in.

Speaker 2

I'm really in two minds as to how to answer that question, and I'm not going to give you a clear cut answer either way. I just don't think we yet know. Look, the big problem in international relations is really how to accommodate the relationship with China and the United States. That is the sort of existential question to which we don't have a clear answer.

Speaker 1

And that's for everyone. It's not just those two countries interacting with each other.

Speaker 2

No, No, this is about global security and it's not the Cold War because we have intertwined economies. I mean, our economic engagement with China is massive. But we've created a situation which I think Trump is reacting to, where we have treated China as a normal training partner, the terms on which they entered the WTA as such that

China has been treated very favorably. What the Trump administration, whether you like it or not, and he's doing it very aggressive, is to I think, trying to create a more level playing field, but to get from where we are to where many would like to be. I mean, I interestingly, if you go back to the first Trump administration, he created a new attitude, a new policy towards China. Biden didn't change that. He carried it on, and we

are now into a further escalation. And there's nothing particularly surprising about this. Okay, the tariffs have been massively disrupted, disruptive, they've been suspended for ninety days, but not with regard to China, and that I think shows you what the core of the as it were objectivists there is an objective is to try to change the nature for the relationship. I mean, Trump has achieved things that you have. I mean, he's made that the Europeans pay for their own defense,

which is a very positive step. And he's also you know, exploded the rather ineffective way that we've handled commercial relations with China. But I mean, I don't think any of us expected things to happen so fast and in such an extreme fashion as they're happening now. And you know, we're at this point of extremism, but we don't know what the outcome will be. Will there be a negotiation with China? Probably yes, in my opinion, because both sides at some point will need it.

Speaker 1

How does Britain insert itself into that global conversation because there you know, last week we were talking about Britain being spared the worst of Donald Trump's tariffs.

Speaker 2

Have this We're in a sort of in between situation, and we are quite fortunate because you know, we sit independently outside the EU now, so we can follow our own foreign policy decisions and we have still a privileged relationship with the United States. So maybe we have a constructive role to play, but it's a role of soft power. There's not much hard power that the UK can exercise in this crist.

Speaker 1

Do you see that relationship with the US demonstrably changing as so much as changing in terms of the US relations with the rest of the world.

Speaker 2

We don't know yet. I don't think yet it's degraded in the way that people are saying. I think we still have the special relationship intact, and the UK is treading very carefully at the moment, and I think is hopeful that it will do some sort of free trade deal with this administration, which it wasn't going to do with the Biden administration and wasn't going to do with the barmber either.

Speaker 1

What about the intelligence community and all of this as well? We've had revelations, we're talking about the you know, leaks from messaging apps technology, the risk of cyber attacks? Is the position more precarious now? And where are I suppose European readiness to deal with those sort of issues?

Speaker 2

Well, I would separate Europe. I mean I would separate the EU out of this at the moment. Are you talking to me about the intelligence relationship between the UK and the US, Because if you are putting the emphasis there,

you know, five eyes is fine. It's institutionally strong. It's been through many crises since the original agreement between the US and the UK and nineteen forty seven, you know, the UQSER agreement, which was basically a sick entreaty, and that still functions, it still works, and it's still very important. The issue of let's say, the intelligence relationship between UK, Europe, Europe, EU,

United States. These are quite complicated issues and this is a you know that you can't make generalizations, you know, which are sweeping about the quality of where this has got to. It just doesn't function like that because all sorts of issues that the professionals have to consider, like source security, what's shared you know, what classification you use in an intelligence exchange? I mean I I you know, I'd need half an hour to explain it all of you.

But five eyes is probably in better shape than people realize. Okay, you know, and I've got to read the article I write in The Spectator three weeks ago. It explains it in some detail further.

Speaker 1

Reading for our listeners. Thank you for Imutuated Journal, for joining us. Formerhead of m I six

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