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Elizabeth Economy, the Hoover Institution at Stanford University changed our dialogue on China where their Michigan graduate school book The River Runs Black, and has done the rarest thing. She had a triumph in graduate school and then continued forward with book after book after a book. She's the only one who has read all of James Torregian on g as well. Doctor Economy, thank you so much for joining us.
Because of you, I am buried in a Nern book, Joel Wulfnow in Philip Saunders China's Quest for Military Supremacy, Elizabeth Economy, do you have any idea the makeup and the power of president She's China military force.
I mean, if you're reading the book, then you know that she didn't. Ping has made radical changes to Chime's military over the past thirteen years since he came into power. He's reorganized it. Certainly, he's reshuffled the top Chinese military. He's modeled it in many cases on the US sort of joint structure, and he's certainly increased and advanced Chinese military hardware capabilities. So he's transformed. He's been a transformative
military leader. That being said, of course, we've also watched these purges of the senior military leadership, most recently at the Fourth Plenum, and it's very unclear, you know, sort of the readiness of the Chinese military, certainly at the top, to take any kind of military action moving forward. So just the constant roiling of the senior Chinese military leadership, I think is a real challenge for the fsigent Ping and the party leadership.
Liz Paul Sweeten brought this up brilliantly this morning. The basic idea is we all have a perspective of Taiwan, and maybe it's Sean Kaishek and missus Shang Kaishek coming to Washington and then on to this and Nixon and Kissinger in all that, is this a full crom point where Taiwan is actually under threat.
Look, there's no doubt that Taiwan is under threat, and over the past several years, the rhetoric out of Beijing and the sort of the military activity around Taiwan, the air flights, the sort of crossings in the Taiwan straight over the Median Line have only increased. And I think what we saw, you know, just over the past few weeks was Prime Minister of Japan Takaichi when she said that if China were to take military action against Taiwan, Japan could be forced itself to take.
Some sort of military action.
That China came out very hot and said Japan acrossed the red line and that you know, it started, you know, the banning, you know, boycotting Japanese sea food, Japanese films, et cetera. And so I think there's no doubt, you know, Si Jinping has said he wants the Chinese military to be prepared to take action by twenty twenty seven. That doesn't mean that they're going to launch any kind of
military invasion in twenty twenty seven. He's just put that down as a marker for when he would want the military to be prepared to take Taiwan.
So I'll just say I was in tai in mainland China.
Just came back Saturday, and one of the things that our delegation heard was from a retired senior foreign policy official that China is not prepared to wait two hundred years and that it is prepared to take any form of military action. So I think, you know, the heat is, you know, it's only getting hotter for Taiwan at.
This point, Elizabeth, President Trump and President and She have been on again, off again having discussions on trade. What's the perception within China of President Trump, this administration and maybe the policy as a religiou to China.
I think, look that there's still a sense within China that President Trump can be very unpredictable. They see some openings with President Trump, and I think the recent phone call that was initiated by Sijin Ping is evidence that, you know, Cijin Ping wanted to send a message about Taiwan, certainly that Taiwan is part of China and doesn't want the United States to wade into this you know, Japan.
Mainland China bruhaha.
But I think he was also probing to see whether President Trump might be willing to do something on Taiwan, especially in the wake of this, you know, US Russia negotiation over Ukraine and that initial peace plan that they put forth.
You know, is there something.
That President Trump and President She could discuss on Taiwan when they meet in April. So I think, you know, the perception in China is that President Trump is a deal maker, that he's willing to put everything on the table and to trade things in and out, and so I think that's what they're looking to assess. Now, do you.
Believe from the US perspective that putting things on the table would include Taiwan? Do we have any indication in President Trump would consider that?
You know, I think there's always concern when it comes to President Trump's commitment to Taiwan. He's never come out and said that Taiwan is a very valuable partner for the United States.
You know, He's been.
Critical of Taiwan on some front. I think what we do know is that Secretary Rubio and Secretary Hegseth have been very strong in their support of Taiwan, very strong in their commitment to our Indo Pacific allies and partners and to sort of a continued US dominant presence in the Indo Pacific in the security space. So, you know, it's unclear. You know, I think we've seen a fracturing to some extent of this administration on the Russia issue.
It's not impossible that we'd have a similar fracturing on the China Taiwan China issue.
Elizabeth economy with US an extended conversation of course with the Hoover Institution in Stanford University. Mark you, Petel, Chris Whalen coming up, and later we'll be looking at the gambling across America, Doctor Economy, the world according to China your must read, you say, rewriting the rules of the game, myke China one oh one also learned at the altar
of Elizabeth Economy. Is it presidents have a four year window, an eight year window, China has a twenty thirty year x axis Rewriting the rules of the game one of your chapters here, does President g is he shortened the China exit or are they playing the long game each and every day?
He's certainly playing a long game, as you say, each and every day. And you know, they continue to invest in all the resources and capabilities that they need to you know, win the game over to twenty thirty five to twenty forty nine. And you see this in all the targets and timetables that they put forth, for example, in you know, how they're going to achieve global technology dominance.
But it also plays out across you know, a range of areas, whether we're talking about the Arctic or space or deep sea bed mining or dedollarizing the global economy. They're constantly putting, you know, markers out for the future five years, ten years, fifteen years out. What do they want to achieve? How are they going to get there? They have a long term vision and a long term strategy to achieve that vision.
So this is the long game.
And you know, Sheidin Ping doesn't see himself exiting anytime soon. So I think we can count on at least another five year term beginning in twenty twenty seven for cigen Pin, and after that, I imagine he'll still want to, you know, at least be in the background, you know, guiding the next leaders of China.
So I Jijenping seems secure for the foreseeable future. How does the average Chinese person on the ground feel about the world. Are they comfortable with China becoming, I guess ever more ostracized from the West. Do they want to integrate with the West? What's the feeling on the ground.
I mean, I think, look, there are as many different opinions within China as there are, you know, in the United States, and I think there are people who continue to advocate and desire that China be more open politically, even more open economically these days to the West. There were people who said, you know, she Didn'tping made a mistake when he decided to align with Russia as opposed
to the West after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. And then there are people that are very comfortable with China's more sort of robust posture on the global stage. It's more
wolf Weyer diplomacy. So it's not one particular view I think within China, but I think we see how Sijinping, you know, his approach is is you know, the much more activist and expansionist and ambitious China and one that's not afraid to take on the West and to assert Chinese interest, Chinese values and Chinese priorities tetor economy.
And the time we've got left, I've got to go to what you led with, which is this new tension between a new government in Japan and with China and folks. I'm ignorant of this, Okay, I got it. We're doing Can we do some surveillance geography now? Yeah, Google, which is seared in the memory of all Americans, and you come down southwest, there's a Mia Kayama, Tarama Ishigaki, Taka Toni and Paul helped me. Here there's a little piece
of lends. Sweeny nailed this at Lawrence years ago Yonagooni and on a clear day from Yonaguni sometimes you can see Taiwan.
Can you, okay?
Japan is that close to China? Liz, what is our biggest ignorance about the modern Chinese Japanese relationship?
I mean, there are there continue to be tensions between China and Japan. There are important trading partners, but yeah, I think the distance between the closest point of Japan and China is only seventy miles. They continue they have their own territorial conflict that over the dah Use in Kacku Islands, which Japan administers but China claims, and China as assertive as it's been toward Taiwan militarily over the past few years, it's been equally assertive an aggressive militarily
toward Japan around this particular you know, dispute. So I think from the perspective of Japan, they're concern for Taiwan. Taiwan used to be a colony of Japan. Many people in Taiwan actually speak Japanese feel close to Japan, so they have their own concerns about Taiwan. They have concerns about you know, China dominating the you know, Taiwan straight and trade routes there that Japan depends on. But they're
also concerned about their own security. And if you know, China takes action against Taiwan is successful, you know, is Japan next.
So I think there are a number of issues.
Sitting back in the minds of the Japanese when it comes to Chinese military action against Taiwan.
That prompted Prime Minister Takaichi's.
Comment, Elizabeth, how do you think Japan and our other allies and that part of the world did they view the commitment from the United States these days? Are they as confident as maybe they have been in past years or is that wavering?
No? I think, you know that the commitment starts from the top, and you know, President Biden was very clear on a number of occasions he said that the United States would come to the defense of Taiwan if China were to, you know, attempt a blockade or a military you know, invasion. President Trump has not reiterated that commitment. He's gone back to the policy of strategic ambiguity. But I think more than that, there's a sense, you know that everything was under review at the outset of the
Trump administration. You know, were they going to continue to support the aufue right, the nuclear submarine deal between Australia, the UK and the US. There was a lot of uncertainty. Ultimately we did support it, but everything seems to be, you know, up for grabs. You know, with President Trump again, Secretary high Seth, Secretary Rubio have been very firm from the minute that the administration took office that there was going to be continuity in the US commitment to the
Indo Pacific. But with President Trump, you know, there there's a much higher degree of uncertainty about our commitment to our allies and partners than right, you know, not only Democrats, but but Republicans in the past.
Doctor Economy, thank you so much for the generous time this morning. Really really appreciated, Elizabeth Economy, therefolks from Hoover and from Stanford as well,