Welcome to the Bloomberg Surveillance Podcast. I'm Tom Keane. Daily we bring you insight from the best in economics, finance, investment, and international relations. Find Bloomberg Surveillance on Apple Podcasts, SoundCloud, Bloomberg dot Com, and of course on the Bloomberg Right now, a woman who knows that all of this market chit chat folds right into the guestimate on the American economy.
Francis Donald is at Manual Life and does wonderful short brief uh messages and research reports on the concept at hand. She's never written on anything like this Friday's Jobless report. Francis, how do you approach the complete mystery of this Friday's report. Well, I'm not trying to get a sense of what that headline is going to look for. I'm looking for a
lot of the underlying details. And what I suspect are going to see is that more people are unemployed on a permanent basis as opposed to temporary and the duration of unemployment is going to start looking much worse and worse. So while you might see headlines seeing we have some moderate improvement, ultimately the underlying foundation of the market is just getting worse and work. There are three unemployment rates,
the visible one which everybody is glib about, etcetera. Chairman Greenspan's lovely augmented unemployment rate, and then the all in use six rate, a much higher statistic, which one matters the most, all encompassing. And this is what's been so challenging about COVID nineteen minutes ensuing obsession, is that the pain on the economy has been so much more sinister than what we speak even in headline GDP numbers. We're
talking about wage losses. We're talking about larger levels of income and racial disparities that flow as a result of it. As an economist, for us looking at traditional economic data and telling you what happens next, but there's so much more happening under the service here. It's more concerning. And most of all, when we look at the underlying picture, we still have fourteen million Americans that have to be
hired just to get us basketball February. It's very difficult for us to look at this number and say, even if we see you know, another one point five million people quote unquote rehired, we're still in one of the worst It's a the worst labor market we've ever seen, and yet here we are. We're going to probably hear a lot of headlines talking about how there's been improvements
on Friday. Just doesn't sit right for insis The challenge for you is you've got to take the data, understand how it's changing, then try and understand how investor attitudes to that data are changing as well. If we've got a negative print in the pay Rose report this coming Friday, how do you think investors would respond to that? I think they probably view it as a call to action for policy, and likely some implication that we're going to see a faster move on fiscal stimulus and maybe some
additional moves from Powell. You know, for the last month or so been claiming or trying to highlight that the high frequency data that told us bid April was a key positive inflection point is now turning in the other direction. But the key here is not to say the economy is going to worsen and therefore stocks are going to do badly. No, the key here is to say the economy is going to worsen and this is going to engender an important policy response. The game here is no
longer than econ data. The game is figuring out how Powell and how we're going to see Congress respond to it. The dominant policy response when it comes to markets has been that of the Federal Reserve monetary policy. And I wonder from a job's perspective, how much the low, low, low interest rate policy that the Fed has the backstop to the markets is actually creating jobs, stabilizing jobs, keeping
companies from firing people. Can you draw any connection to the feds policies to employment in the United States right now over the long run. Yes. In the near term, their essential function is to ensure we don't see a credit crisis. That that is their main issue at the current um element. They're doing a very good job of that, and that's why the entire focus of the macros here
has really shifted away from monetary policy. Of course, hugely important to the way we're treating and you think from late goal the whole variety of asset classes, but towards fiscal when we look at the city, surprising that and we see, you know, the largest spread between where data came in and economists expectations. I like to sell this, how wrong economists are. They've been the most wrong they've
ever been for this particular measure. What we know, and what's my personal senior is that the thing we missed was just how sizeable fiscal stimulus was going to be, how big the numbers were going to be, How he's going to see two thirds of Americans would be making more than they did pre COVID. You know, personal income up double digits on an annualized basis relatives last year. If we lose that main pillar of this rebound, then
the econdia starts to worsen pretty substantially. And my concern is that as much as we missed how powerful it would be on the upside, we may miss just how painful it will be on the downside. Francis, I've got to say I like that some do you like that that we renamed the surprise indexes the economist success right or failure right? Basically just judge in them real time. And this has been brutal. This is I have no
idea Friday, folks, what we're going to see. I don't know how I make a three month forecast, let in a six month forecast. It's really no different than the companies. But Francis, the heart of the matter here is what you people do, which is count countable things. Can you count the stress in the American economy. You can count a lot of stresses. But we're not using the same measure as we did before. And this is why, honestly, I'm more focused on initial jobless claims this week than
i am on it's accountable. It's too stale for us. This crisis moved so quickly. So all those alternative data points that we're now all talking about every day, the Google mobility, the t s A passengers, you know, how many people are going to restaurant data is so much more important and what we witnessed in the past. It's about April is that movement and the ultra high frequency
daily and weekly indicators are what gets markets attention. So nonfirm parils, of course, should be the most important number of the week or the month, but it's not going to be. It's going to be all that mobility data. It held us. Are people still moving around and increasingly tom not just our people moving around and our stores open, but what is their confidence level? Are we reopening economies and people feel confident using them? The demand side of
the picture. That's also much more difficult to count, so we aly we have to move away from those traditional data points and look at new ones. Is very uncomfortable for economists, and maybe you have to change our models and are forecasting process. But this is COVID nineteen. We have to do economics differently. Francis. I can hear the concern in your voice. It's palpable. Can you walk me through the scarring and the structural changes, the structural damage.
But you're really worried about right now. What I see ahead is, you know, we we have to trade on our you know, three months six months basis as well, but we also have long term portfolios. And it's the long term portfolios that I spend a lot more time thinking about because even though we care about equities. In the next six months, we're in the midst of the largest fiscal spend outside of wartime. We are beginning to see the seeds of debt monetization. Look at really, they
are deeply negative and likely to stay there. This is a transition to a new system. What that's probably going to see super yield curve is going to uh, you know, probably create some misallocation of capital. It's probably gonna push more money into alternative and hard assets. This is the way that COVID nineteen actually has these more sinister long term impacts on the way our system is working. So yes, I could, you know, lay out why the economy will
weaken in the next six months. But what really keeps me up at night is how we need to think about the five contending horizon. That's what's changing very dramatically on a week to week basis here it's going so weickly, and yet it has such long term implications. That's that's where the concern you here in me, John comes from. Francis. One thing Tom has been focusing on for the past few days, and rightly so, is the negative real yield
in the United States. This increasing inflation expectation longer term despite the ultra low yields. Now, what's your sense of inflation going forward? So my sense is that we may actually hit a little bit of some concern about stactulation in the second half the year. Now I've got a raging inflation vole. Our models say we get to two and a half percent inflation, The markets think something a
little bit under two. But in the second half of the year, a lot of those based effects were going to draw out and inflation, and I'm sure I'm going to have portfolio managers asking me have we underappreciated how much inflation is in the system. I also think we need to move away from the idea that monetary policy is the source of inflation. And remember that deglobalization and huge fiscal spends which large with large fiscal multipliers, that
may be where inflation is coming from. So I do expect the market to raise them to places an expectations. I do expect real rates to continue to trend low, will remain negative for a long time, and that is of course going to push more money into search for yield opportunities. It is still bullish, yes all, Francis great to catch up with you. As always, my best to
you and yours, Francis Danner. There of many life asset management speaking Tom to the importance of claims this Thursday right now a synthesis and we can do that with Jeffrey, you of v and White Melon. He just does wonderful work, yes, in the foreign exchange space, but much wider than that. Jeffrey, you let me just start with the conundrum of these low interest rates is your attention on the nominal the
current rate. Are you focused on real yields? Absolutely real yields, you know, because that ties into financial conditions, and that is what central banks don't wants to tell you. But what they're actually doing with yield control is depressing nominal get inflation, not get in flacition to escape velocity, and depress real yield because that's the real thing pardon upon which helps corporates. So, Jeff, that's the objective right now
in the United States? Do you think yield curve control is happening, whether they formalize it and announce it or not. So in effect, I think that's what the market is pricing in. And and as you say, if the central bank doesn't announce it, but if you keep markets believing for long enough and such that it's effectively priced in, then the central banks in general, not just in the US but elsewhere in the UK here I think they'll just won't clap their hands and say job well done.
It's always about expectations. If they can get long, longer dated inflation expectations up, then it's a job done. But that's the missing piece of the puzzles right now, non not moving inflation even less. Do you think they can, Jeff, So, now this debate about whether they want to start to tew a target average inflation, you know, not just spot inflation, but inflation over a period. I don't think we're there yet.
They can, you know, when they start to say we really want inflation to fly over a five year horizon. If you're starting point is one, then for the sake of argument, it doesn't matter about your end point is four or five. As long as you average out to be two or three. You need something like that enshrined in a REMIT. So the FED Monetary Policy reviewers coming up the UK, they're reviewing this, you know, all the time. Once that is enshrined, then markets may begin to believe it.
So we're not there yet, Jeff. I want to talk about the reaction function from the Federal Reserve monetary policies setting going to purchase some of these longer dated bonds as the US Treasury announces in near one trillion dollar borrowing plan in the next three months. Is this basically
plunge protection control? Is this basically the FED that's going to prop up asset prices indefinitely until you get some rip roaring inflation, which isn't on the horizon, and it's not a matter of any kind of bleed through to the underlying economy at this point. Well, I don't think any central bank will actively admit that, and that they do know. If you do get the market sell off, if you do get bond sell off, equality selling off,
that is a tightening and financial conditions. Now in reality, you know, the economy, if it's growing fast enough, might be able to withstand that hit. But no central bank, you know, wants to take the chance right now, so they will just keep going until we get to escape velocity. That the r B a decided own night. I know they once said, so they're in your curve control already,
as are the Japanese. They might start to say, we're controlling a part of the curve we're comfortable with, but at the very long end that starts to steepen due to inflation being priced in, they're okay with that. But they have a set target right now and the absolutely going to stick to it with asset purchases. Right now, the real rates an tenier is a negative at one point all five percent. What's the breaking point here? So the breaking point again is when there are two ways
to think about this. One is it a breaking point to the downside and whereby you fall into into a Japan like scenario where no matter how low you depressed real rate um, it's just not going to work due to demographics, due to productivity. Then the markets just say we might as well go home, get out of equities, just stay in cash. There's no difference, or there's going to be a lot of control, a lot of credibility upside inflation risk. But I think right now central banks
are more worried about downside disinflation deflation. That word is still forbidden for them. Yeah, but the Tolsa's brilliant question, Jeff, you were doing yield curve control sort of kind of like and that you just correctly stated they're worried about disinflation in downside moves. What do you see in the ten year tips When you see that, I see convexity in some form of gentle acceleration to a Japan like
very low real yield. Well, you know that is something about the central banks will just have to try to manage as a type as possible. What is their Tallengs threshold? You look at the five year break evens right now it's falling again. It's it's below you know, one, one fifty, So, um, do you want to contain that to make sure it doesn't just saw as a sign that central bank is doing that the central banks are being too effective? Or do you just want to keep it in arrange right now?
The trajectory matters. We've gone from effects of the zero in March down to one and a half. They're happy to keep that pace, even if it goes to two. They're happy with the pace. But if it's suddenly just expands exponentially, then that's the loss of control, lots of credibility we talked about. The risk is always you don't know you've lost control, lost credibility until you actually lose it. And I think that's a risk that all central banks
will have to take. Right now, Well, Jeff, let's get to what that means in the effects market, the relative story of a currency pair with the US dollar on the one side, how would you push this through? G turn right now? But so right now and G turn Irrespective of what the RBA said of night, I'm still very comfortable owning AUSSI. AUSSY is the best reflation play right now, they've got some China tail winds in terms of the iron are market, property is reflating there and
in terms of trades and are improving elsewhere. Euro were comfortable, you know, adding to euro loongs. Even if when we get a bit of a short term correction, I am a bit more concerned about the ECB being worried about disinflation due to a strong Euro. But overall it's more and more clients are being a asking about the dollar debasement narrative. Are we seeing a shift? Is China going to push for a second win for whom and b internationalization?
That as a structural story is going to be really really interesting to see now, urine or story really important. If someone says to me they're like the r C, they're like the Euro, I'm thinking they think we're going to get a pick up in cyclical growth to return to risk appetite. But when they say we're talking to clients about dollar debasement, there's something has happening there. Which
one is it, Jeff? One is the short term cyclical uptick of Europe and Australia get their COVID reaction functions right with government investment and you're seeing that in Europe and Australia, and then that's a cyclical upturn for the dollar story and it's also and then be a euro a What is the future for reserve currencies? What is
the future for currencies? Full stop? And this new quality paradigm that we have, then will the dollars relationships to risk, to cash to everything else, will that start to change? You've got the one year story versus the ten twenty year story on this. Did you ever think that we'd be talking about the loss of currency status with the dollar index in the nineties. Um, so it's not about full lots of reserve staff. If it's lots of dominance.
The US dollar will always be a reserve currency. But will it always be sixty nine dominant terms of payments for of f X transactions those numbers they put out a long time ago. The only direction is probably lower. But is that a one year story or a tenure story? Let's look at the policy mix. Jeff, fantastic to catch up with you as always, Jeff, you of bn Y Mellon. Let's do this. Let's save our conversation of the day and the foundational theories of this economy, in this central bank.
There is no one across the Atlantic better qualified than Janet Writing his original work with Mr mal Pass at bear Stearns years ago, now at Breen Capital as their chief economic advisor. Mr Writing is public service to the Bank of England and the Feller Reserve System, and it's definitive on the underlying theories of the FED. John, what's
the theory of this Fed. Well, it's clearly shifting to do whatever and it's a shift that's been in process for a while, to do whatever it can to support the labor market, to support minority and underprivileged groups within the labor market that have suffered higher unemployment rates over the years, and paying less attention and increasing little less attention to price stability. I mean, the good news is
inflation is low, um. But but I think the bad news is it puts too much bonus on the FED, when, as we know from what happened in the second quarter, fiscal action and timely fiscal action is much more important for stabilizing the real side of the economy. What is the statistic that you have in your head over how much this stimulus should be right now? I mean, everyone says the Republicans are undershooting at one trillion, maybe the
Democrats are three chones. Do you have a number in your head over the next year where the fiscal stimulus is going. Could it be five trillion? Well, I don't have a number because I don't know how the virus is going to play out, and I don't know how the medical response is, particularly a vaccine in the timing of the vaccine is going to play out. But we need a fiscal bridge and a monetary bridge across the chasm in economic activity. Now, the economy has rebounded very
nicely in May and June. We'll find out later this week about how July began, but it looks like the pace of improvement is significantly flattened out. And you pointed out earlier in the show about my former center field when I was at the New York Fed hitman Harris Ethan Harris um and I agree with him the number could be a million, But we wouldn't be surprised by a negative printing in terms of some of the things
that we see. So if there's uncertain about what happened last month, given the data that we have on July, it's impossible to know how the next six to nine months are going to play out. My guess is that by the end of this year, we will still have a substantial amount of unemployment, perhaps an eight nine maybe higher unemployment rate, and that's a lot of people who
are unemployed through no fault of their own. I think the good news is in the short run, and something we've been pointing out that the income support was it was search that it more than replaced a lost wage income in total, So there is a savings cursion. And we estimate that savings cursion through the second quarter to be in additional savings of nine twenty five billion dollars.
So it's not a it's not a shock. It's a problem for many households, but in totally it's not going to be quite the shock that some people's calculations suggest. But I certainly think we need to extend some form of extended unemployment benefits. Here, John, forgive me, because these are serious issues. But did you really used to call Ethan Harris hit man Harris? I absolutely did. He was
a center fielder and cleanup. Did anyone else but to New York for the New York Well, I used to I coached and managed the New York fed Research softball team, and and Ethan was my center fielder and clean up hitter. And you've got a lot of hits, So yeah, I gave nicknames to everyone in the game writes ups, and Ethan was hit man Harris. I love this, just not a name I would ever give to Ethan Harris of Bank for America. John, Let's talk about the new era
for central banking. You touched on the price stability mandate. It came out of the nineteen eighties with Mr Volka, the obsession with price stability, the war against inflation. Then came the independence into the nineties, and I just wonder what this new era is, John, where this is going, and what it looks like, and whether it's the right move to leave behind the work of the last several decades.
I don't think it look obviously. It's pandemic. Is unlike something that we have faced in the last hundred years. I mean, the last time the US faced a pandemic of this magnitude, the Federal Reserve system was four years or so old. Uh, And we had a very different view of the role of central banks back but back in those times. So I do understand that the here and now is focusing on the economy, focusing on an
employment and that's appropriate. But I think that this obsession that we have to raise the inflation rate to two percent when I can find no serious work that says, unless you have a collapse in price level like we had in the Great Depression, running an inflation rate that's half a percent or so lower on average than two percent is a bad thing, and that we have to elevate the inflation rate. I find that a curious and
somewhat misplaced obsession. And then John Net goes to the heart of your work over all these death is there any proof to the Central Bank and quote unquote catch
up with elevated inflation? Well, you know, I was chatting to Charles plus or uh obviously you know him, a former federal on the show the other day, on the show the other day, and I chatted to him after your show, Um, and he made the point, and it's a point that I agree with that if you haven't been able to hit an inflation target, and you keep on saying that that's what you want to accomplish, then you are in danger of undermining your credibility when it
perhaps comes to other important things. I think that's a tremendously tremendously important point, because if there's no economic damage being done by an inflation rate of one and a half percent, in fact, there may even be economic benefits. I don't know that any If you tap a personal on the street, socially distanced and wearing masks, awesome, Um, you know, is the inflation rate too low for you? I don't know many people would say, oh, yes, it's
too low. I'd like to have my the perch in power of the dollars in my pocket eroded more quickly. And I don't know anyone they would do that. And yet there is this is academic view at the FED that somehow the economy will perform better at a two percent inflation rate over time. That doesn't one or one
and a hot centiment. Hold on, hold on here, because the idea, especially as the United States adds more and more debt, and as companies add more and more debt, the whole theory is that we can inflate away these debt loads, that basically the rate of inflation will make money cheaper so it will be easier to pay back this debt. What are the consequences if that doesn't happen, how much do taxes have to go up, especially if we don't see growth pick up at a faster speed
than it is now. But you will not find that theory espoused at the FED. You will not find people of the FED who say, the reason we want to higher inflation rate is to inflate away the debt because over time, what do we get. We get the Fisher equation from irving fisher um, we get higher inflation expectations, and that will push up interest rates, and that's something the FED would resist. So the FED would then have to buy more and more debt through QUEWI, and that
has the potential to be a dangerous spiral. So not the FED thinks the economy work better if people believe the inflation rates going to be two percent. The funny thing is their studies of the show, and it's a very very comprehensive study. Twenty people responded to the study of them thought that the inflation rate was ten percent
or higher. The public in general don't really understand the nuances of inflation, and certainly not the measurement nuances between a one or one and a half percent inflation rates and the two percent one I got time for one more question, and we're seeing an unraveling in the real yield. The ten year tips just hit a new low negative one point zero six folks, the thirty year bond one
point one nine handle. Right now, do you have in your mind what the Fed does if we get a gamma, we get a convexity, we get an acceleration in the decline of the real yield. Well, I explained that in a note that we put out on Friday, which and it goes back to the Fisher equation, which is the Fed is trying to repress through zero interest rate policy in QUEWI the nominal yield, and it's doing that quite successful.
You report fifty two basis points. They they they're trying to get people to believe in a higher inflation rate. And people are believing a higher inflation rate, and so inflation expectations are moving up, inflation break evens are moving up, and the Fed can't repress that. They want that to go higher. So they're left with the real yield, which
is the residual, which has to be forced negative. So I don't believe the real yield of negative one percentag is somehow truly a growth reading for the outlook for the US over the next ten years. It is a residual from a combination of interest rate repression on the nominal yield and rising inflation expectations, which is also an active fed UH policy. What you just heard there from Mr. Writing is definitive writing. And this is so important, John, is the is the real yield the residual of the
function or does it initiate the function? John? That is the arch debate of modern economics. John riding bring capital. John has to catch up, he said, Craig mofit. Michael Nathanson always smart on streaming, on entertainment, on content and the distribution of that content, joining us now supposedly on Disney's earnings, although we're not going there is Michael Nathanson,
founding partner, Senior research analyst. Michael, you have a sidecar UH skill of looking at some of these new technologies like snap and the rest of them. Is TikTok a valid platform to raise revenues whomever buys it? Yep, morning, Tom, I think it is. You know, the engagement is there, Um, it's it's you know what we've see in traffic. This this this year has been incredible, right. The it's really
written in terms of time spent and usage. So I think I think it can monetize and that will change, you know, if it's my Microsoft is going to change the dynamic of this industry. Even when Instagram was taken out in folks, Sarah Fryar Bloomberg owns a high ground on this in her wonderful book Mr. Seistrom in Instagram. But Michael Nathanson, is this somewhat equivalent to Instagram? Where we all underestimated what Facebook would do with Instagram? Are
we doing the same thing here? Oh? Without a doubt, Tom, even a couple of years ago started uh, you know, bringing stories Instagram stories, and I myself, you know, had doubts whether or not they can monetize stories because it's just a different format, different consumption pattern. But they've done it really well. Right, So, um, where there's engaged, where there's engagement on mobile phones, there's monetization. That's just what we've learned. So yeah, I think that's right. It's a
really good analogy. Michael. How does Snapchat do it? Though? And actually who does snapchat take eyeballs away? From I mean with with TikTok No. So so our view is, you know, at this point, because we're such a strange time when everyone's people were at a school, people working from home, it looks like all boats have risen. But we think over time, logically, if TikTok sorry TikTok does
keeps doing well, it's gonna hurt Snap and Instagram. Right, It's it's a similar demo, and you would think over time is going to hurt them on consumption and and on on advertising, that there's gonna be a new competitor taking ad dollars away from those two bigger companies. Is this the deal of the lifetime for Microsoft or the deal of a decade? Uh? It depends on the price, right, depends on the price, as Tom Notre on Instagram. Uh, you know Facebook paid our little Instagram. Um, it depends
on the price. But you know what, it's interesting to me that they they want to get into this business, right because they really not show much interest in a consumer business like this. So it kind of us it really questions like where do they want to go with this and what do they see? So, you know what, it's a deal, the deal of the decade in terms of a change of strategy. I think Craig from Manhattan
emails and says, ask him a question about Disney. Let's go there, Michael on Walt on Walt Disney, it was trading at one ten streaming revenue, moons shot one fifty and down we go. It's what we call, folks, a red zone green zone chart, Michael Nathan's and does Disney have the ability to get up into the green zone? A hundred and fifty dollars per share? Tom, We dread
Disney back in early May. So my answer would be no, not for not for the near term, right, the just the headwinds in their legacy businesses and parks and movie the movies and live sports and cable networks. There's so much pressure pushing and pushing those businesses is the wrong way. Yes, they've got a great stream story at Disney plus that's
that's great news. But where they make money, where really, you know, drive cash flow, there's so many high winds, you know, So it's no we we thought it's gonna take some time. In fact, you know, I've been surprised how resilient Disney has been during this crisis because in previous downturns would have been hit much harder, you know,
and it hasn't been. Michael. I love when you were in that episode in season two A succession, James Murdoch walks away from news Corp. Mr Murdoch the son of Rupert, and there's the whole family tension and all that. Great. How does news Corp fair? Not so much without James Murdoch? But just as the generation passes on, what's your update on news Corp? Presidentity? Okay, so we don't cover news Corp.
Quite quite familiar with it. You know, there's there's this interesting day Namgant News Corp. They own the Wall Street Journal. If you look at where the New York Times has moved to terms of its enterprise value, you know, embedded in news Corps is the Wall Street Journal. And I would think that the company would start focusing on maybe
cleaning up. They have a lot of disparate assets there, and you know, given again what we're paying for the New York Times and that that narrative, I would think News Corps has to look at it it's as head base and start trying to figure out what can they do to Jesz and assets on not that relevant anymore, right, and it's it worked for Fox, right, So we would come on and talk about Fox for all those years.
And Fox started to work because Rupert decided to break the company up and sell it to Disney, and it doubled, doubled in a year. And I think you know, news Corps. The question for me is, you know, how motivated today to kind of clean up the asset base and focus in on the well Stree Journal and Dow Jones to get investors to pay more attention to it. Michael, if you were to, you know, put in a snapshot exactly what COVID nineteen does for a lot of media and telecoms.
Does it just accelerate a trend that was already there or does it make them change course? Yeah, it does both. You know what we've found we've written about is over our career, we've seen these types of crises really accelerate trends but also break patterns that you thought were wobbly.
So you know, this time around, quarter cutting is going to accelerate um the decline of linear and entertainment view and will accelerate advertising may not come back to you know, it's a legacy TV the way that we you know, it hasn't the past, so it's going to force It's made Netflix, you know, a king because of it. But they're gonna force all the companies to deal with that, right and many of them, unlike Disney, we're not ready for this transition. So you have to catch up and
spend more money. And I don't know if they have you know, the will to do it, because it's really expensive to compete in streaming. So to me, this this was this has been a terrible outcome for the legacy media industry, just terrible because you know, it just made Netflix and digital so much stronger so quickly that I'm really I'm really quite down on kind of the long term future a lot of our our companies here alright, Michael,
Thanks watch Michael Nathan's in there at Moffatt. Nathanson found it, founding partner on Senior Research Analysted. Thanks for listening to the Bloomberg Surveillance podcast. Subscribe and listen to interviews on Apple Podcasts, SoundCloud, or whichever podcast platform you prefer. I'm on Twitter at Tom Keane before the podcast, you can always catch us worldwide. I'm Bloomberg Radio,
