SCOTUS Doesn't Decide & New Delaware Law - podcast episode cover

SCOTUS Doesn't Decide & New Delaware Law

Feb 25, 202536 min
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Episode description

Constitutional law professor Harold Krent of the Chicago-Kent College of Law, discusses the Supreme Court neither affirming nor denying President Trump’s request to fire the head of the Office of Special Counsel immediately. Business law professor Eric Talley of Columbia Law School, discusses the changes in store for corporate law in Delaware. June Grasso hosts.

See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Transcript

Speaker 1

This is Bloomberg Law with June Brossel from Bloomberg Radio.

Speaker 2

President Donald Trump has started his second term with a torrent of executive orders designed to transform the government and assert sweeping presidential power. In the first of many legal fights expected to end up at the Supreme Court, the justices have decided not to decide. With a bare majority of five justices, the Court said in an unsigned order that Hampton Dellinger, head of the Office of Special Counsel, should remain in his job at least until Wednesday. That's

when a lower court order temporarily protecting him expires. So the Court neither granted nor rejected the administration's request to let Trump fire Dellinger, who heads the independent US agency that protects government whistleblowers. Joining me is constitutional law expert Harold Krant, a professor, Chicago Kent College of Law. How will you explain the issue around the firing of Dellinger?

Speaker 3

In creating offices, Congress often has protected the officeholder from the plenary removal of the president and limited the president's reasons for being able to remove the officer, usually to neglective duties or for cause. And the Office of Special Counsel, which is in charge of protecting whistleblowers against the government, is focused on trying to protect employees who complain about what's happening in their government job as government waste, et cetera.

So Congress decided in creating this special office to protect the head of it from at will removal and the independence Congress thought was necessary in order to protect the independence of the office, because oftentimes the office Special Council protects employees against their bosses.

Speaker 2

Was the question here a procedural question, really whether or not the tro issued by the lower court judge could be appealed.

Speaker 3

That was the narrow issue that the court decided, and the court decided better to wait until there was a more clearly a final order before they decided the case. The case is complicated for a number of reasons, and I think the press has missed at least one of them. I think the most obvious legal issue is the Trump administration's movement to be able to fire any individual worker or officer at will in order to maintain the unitary

executive ideal. But the other issue, which is connected is even if you can't remove someone for any reason at all, what's it like to reinstate someone against the president's will. So, in other words, there might be a claim for back pay, as there was in the famous Humphreys executive case several generations ago, which is the lead case uphold up the independence of agencies, But in that case the court never had to force an officer in that case and Federal

Trade Commissioner back into office. Here, this would be the first time, at least one of the first times that a court would actually reinstate someone and force the president to work with someone that the president doesn't want to work. So there's really two aspects of this case. You know, one is being pardon parcel, then of the president's ambition

to be able to fire anybody at will. But the second, which is connected, is can a court force the government not only to pay back pay, but to take somebody and keep them on their job against the president's wishes?

Speaker 2

Was the Trump administration trying to make this an issue beyond this one firing? In other words, they said that the order exemplifies a broader trend by lower courts with plaintiffs challenging Trump's initiatives and persuading district worts to issue tros that intrude on presidential Article two powers, So were they trying to make this a bigger issue.

Speaker 3

In powered But I think this is also more of the mosaic that one can see from the presidents removing one of the NLRB members' National Labor Relations Board members, one of the MSPB, which is the Merit System's Protection Board officers. And not only that, just last week the executive order basically declares war on independent agencies and says

that they really aren't going to be independent agencies. They all have to come for guidance from the President and from OMB from Office of Management Budget, and he's not going to respect the independence of any kind of agencies. And so the Solcier General wrote to Senator Durbin Judiciary Committee and said that the administration will no longer defend administrative agencies and indeed they're going to try to make them into what's called exact necative agencies or more dependent

upon presidential leadership. So I think that yes, there is an interest in the Trump administration to try to minimize the number of tierros that have been entered against his executive orders and DOGE activities. But at the same time, this is very important to the administration to try to again sort of conform to this unitary executive ideal, which says Congress can have no say in making an office independent. Every office has to be totally dependent upon presidential will.

Speaker 2

So the Court decided not to decide, and it was basically the middle of the court, the Chief Justice and Justices Elena Kagan, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett. But surprise, surprise, Clarence Thomas, one of the most conservative justices, join them to make the fifth vote.

Speaker 3

So I'm very surprised about Justice Thomas because Justice Thomas has been on record as expressing skepticism about the independent agencies in the past. So I don't know what accounts for his Maybe he also believes and it's important to have final court action before any kind of appeal to the Supreme Court. That may be the basis of his

agreement to join the middle in this particular issue. But it's a very narrow decision on all of saying is let's wait until there's a final decision that may come as soon as this week, and so the issue may yet again return to the Supreme Court in due course.

Speaker 2

You had the two most liberal justices Sonya Sotomayor and Katanji Brown Jackson, saying that they would have turned the president down. And then you had two justices Neil Gorsitch and Samuel Alito, considered two of the most conservative, saying they would have granted Trump's request. Gorstch wrote a dissent, did it support the unitary executive theory.

Speaker 3

It's a signal that he would support that, and that would be consistent with I think his ideology as well as that of Justice Alito. And it's no surprise given the recent decisions by the Supreme Court in both the cell law case and an accounts case, that the writing had been on the wall with respect to the ability of independent agencies to continue. So I think their views

are not surprising, but it's not clear yet. If I had a bet, I would bet that the Court was leaning towards over ruling Humphrey's executor and getting rid of so called independent agencies. But that's not a for sure thing, and it may be that some of the conservative justices are taking a deep breath and saying, maybe we should hold the line because they are looking around them and concerned about what the unitary executive might bring to the country.

Speaker 2

In his papers, Dellinger did warn that you're going to be overwhelmed by Trump filings and a rocket ducket straight to the court. And in his first administration he sometimes skipped over the appellate courts and went straight to the Supreme Court. So could this set a precedent?

Speaker 3

Sure if the Court decides to hear this next week without having a full appellate process, then this would be a signal that the Court is willing to bend its rules and to take cases quickly in order to figure out whether or not to uphold President Trump's agenda. I don't think the Court would like that. I think the Court usually wants to benefit from percolation and from getting the benefit of individual judge's opinions below. And this isn't

like a huge national security case. It has to do just with again a narrow question of presidential removal authority. But who knows. Maybe they want to take this case, and maybe they will and try to expedite the case on the docket.

Speaker 2

Recent Supreme Court decisions don't they suggest that Congress can interfere with the president's power to remove subordinates? I mean, didn't we see that in the CFPB case.

Speaker 3

And what was very striking was in Chief Justice Roberts opinion in the Community case, he talked about the removal of power is one of these core executive powers that Congress could not interfere with, suggesting that for cause protections might be unconstitutional, as indeed he ruled in the CFPB case that you mentioned, it's possible, you know, it's possible

that they believe it. And what is striking is they've never really articulated why Congress can't have any kind of say in creating an office, whether that office should be somewhat independent, as in the Special Council case, because the Special Council is protecting whistleblowers and when there is this perceived conflict of interest within an executive branch, isn't independence an option that Congress can try to establish if it

thinks it's appropriate for the country. And the Court just blinks at that and says Article two Executive power, Article two executive power, and they've given no credit to Congress is interest in this case.

Speaker 2

I'm wondering if they're going to try to walk that immunity decision back a bit. It was hastily written and as I believe you. Certainly other people have said it was not the most reasoned decision.

Speaker 3

It was not the most reason decision. I think it's not directly relevant to the question of removal forty, but certainly there are seeds of the fact that you need to have protect the president when the president wants to fire someone. In that decision, and again, it's all possible. No one sucussed the yet that that court. We try to split it by saying we won't reinstate because that

is what trench upon presidential progatives. But we will say it's an unconstitutional action and back pay has to be awarded. And so that's at least a signal that if the compadministration wants to fire all these people, they're going to have to come up with the money somehow because they violated the congressional restriction.

Speaker 2

When the case is of all the federal employees being fired and the agencies being shuddered except in name only get to the court, how do you think they'll rule.

Speaker 3

It's clear that President Trump believes the Civil Service Act is unconstitutional. So I do think that that a case or a variance of it will get to the Supreme Court. And I think the Supreme Court is going to have a hard time saying, given all that Penalton Act and all the history of one hundred and twenty five years of the civil Service, that that's just going to go up in smoke. I think they'll say that president has

to have some control over policymakers. And I think that's a line that's at least far more defensible, depending on how you interpret it, than the idea that the entire civil service is unconstitutional. But that's just my prediction. One can never judge.

Speaker 2

We try to, Thanks hal. That's Professor Harold crant To the Chicago Kent College of Law. Coming up next. Changes ahead in Delaware law. This is Bloomberg Elon Musk went to war with Delaware after a judge there shot down his massive Tesla pay package, and he moved his companies

to Texas. Delaware is the corporate home to more than two million businesses, including more than sixty percent of Fortune five hundred companies in corporation fees generate more than a fourth of the state's annual budget, so state legislators are proposing drastic changes to Delaware's business statutes following recent defections by companies moving their in corporation to Texas or Nevada in search of friendli er legal treatment. Joining me is

business law professor Eric Talley of Columbia Law School. I mean, have there been that many defections of companies to Texas and Nevada that it's a real cause of concern in Delaware.

Speaker 1

Well, thus far, the rate of defections has not been that much bigger than it has been in prior years, and in fact, there have been importations as well to Delaware that have been going on. At the same time, there are larger companies, right that are more notable, particularly Tesla that defected, and so that some ways that has cast a huge shadow over this debate. The numbers thus far, though, seem relatively modest compared to you know, at least by measurement against historical trends.

Speaker 2

Is this all about Elon Musk?

Speaker 1

Well, I think probably Elon Musk plays a big role in this story, right that he is definitely, after having lost at least at the trial level, his compensation case, he's been kind of on the warpath against Delaware, and I think in some ways that has probably you know, caused.

Speaker 3

A little bit of celebrity around the.

Speaker 1

Question of, you know, where's the best state to incorporate. That doesn't necessarily mean that when you start looking around, you're going to find choices that are, you know, substantially better or easier to predict, but that probably did get this conversation started, because a lot of what is being put behind the new proposed regulations is sort of a sense of there's an exigency that we really have to take care of right away, but thus far the numbers

don't really quite back that up at least yet. That doesn't mean that it's not a cause of concern, because you know, absolutely, you know, Tesla is a big company, Mister Musk is a very influential person, and so you know it no doubt helps get some of the ball rolling, which probably on some level explains both the breadth of these new proposed changes and the fact that they didn't really take the usual course that various types of statutory reforms take in Delaware.

Speaker 2

Looking at it as a whole, what's the most important or most significant change.

Speaker 1

Well, they come from a bunch of different directions, but one of the things that probably unifies all of them is that these changes do not necessarily just sort of pick off one or two Delaware precedents. I was trying to count them up myself, and it's easy lee into the thirties, if not the forties in terms of the number of Delaware Supreme Court opinions that these changes would

substantially roll back. Now, they are fairly sweeping, but probably the core of them relates to a provision in the Delaware Code that concerns conflicts of interest right situations where there's a decision or a transaction made by a company that benefits either a corporate fiduciary or a big shareholder of the company. And there there have been probably five

or six sweeping changes. Probably the most important one over the last couple of years is to lighten the pressure on controlling stockholders, who really have gotten most of the scrutiny in recent years in Delaware, including in mister Musk's

compensation case. And that change would essentially basically say, for most types of transactions, we're not going to make it as hard for you to get essentially a hall pass and not be subject to liability for conflicts of interests types of transactions involving a controller.

Speaker 2

So then it basically alters the balance of power between minority shareholders and corporate leaders.

Speaker 1

That seems to be the intended effect here, and you know, one can definitely debate about where that balance of power should be. And in fact, that's part of the discussion about you know, competition between states, right. You know, they're essentially trying to turn up or turn down that dial on how much scrutiny they give officers and directors and

so forth. And Delaware had, you know, had provided ways that even a controlling shareholder could escape scrutiny, but you kind of had to do it in the right way, and you had to get the appropriate votes and permissions, and it had to be set up from the very beginning. And the new statutory proposal makes it less necessary to set something up from the beginning and doesn't really require

as many hoops to jump through. But the other thing that's kind of interesting, and you know, I think when you talk to most practitioners and professors and judges, one of the things that has made Delaware specials that it's got a relatively you know, large amount of case law and expert judges that you can make you pretty good predictions on how various cases are going to come out.

And this is one of the potential problems, or at least a risk factor with these new statutes is that a lot of that case law now is being overturned by statute. So it's kind of like, you know, stars that you were kind of guiding your ship by at night, you know a large portion of them now have basically disappeared, and we don't have any track record of interpreting this new broad sweeping statute. And in addition, it sets up much more kind of formulaic rules that leave less to

the discretion of the expert judiciary. So now one of the things that's going to be a little bit more complicated. It seems to me if these proposed reforms go through, is not just the question of how much, you know, where do you set the bal bals of preferences between minority shareholders and controlling shareholders, but the number of stars left to reckon by are much fewer, and the judge, if you want to liken that to the captain of the ship, it doesn't have as many places that they're

allowed to go. And so in some ways, you know, I guess I have, you know, some concerns that in you know, sort of trying to move really quickly to deal with this panic about Delaware exit that may or

may not even be going on. Some of the biggest benefits of being incorporated in Delaware, the expert judiciary, the large stock of case law to guide yourself by, are now also being weakened, and so some clear that even if you like the idea of giving you controlling stockholders more authority or more freedom than they have historically had or had in the last couple of years, it is necessarily going to be the best move to also say, well, you know, guess what, a lot of the precedents of

Delaware now no longer count. We're going to have to start building them up from the ground up, or at

least from you know, a lower level up. And you know that, quite frankly, could give states other than Delaware an end to say, hey, look, if you no longer are depending on your expert judges as much as you used to, and if you don't have as many precedents to guide you as you did before these reforms, maybe this is a real time where a state could step in and say, you know, we're going to start building up precedents ourselves, and I think you know a lot

of states, including Texas, including the VATA, and probably some other states as well, are starting to see this as a potential opening, even though the purported reason for it was to keep that from happening. And you know, I think you could make arguments in both directions, quite frankly, and.

Speaker 2

You wrote that this is a direct rebuke of the Delaware judiciary.

Speaker 1

It's really hard to read it as anything other than that. And in fact, even the proponents of it have basically said, yeah, we really really like Delaware law, but there's some opinions

where Delaware has strayed onto the wrong path. And so so you know, on some level, you know, I think everyone, even the drafters and the proponents of this legislation, you know, we're basically doing this as a way to I don't know, you know, box in a little bit at least some judges that had authored opinions that every certain people didn't agree with.

Speaker 2

You.

Speaker 1

One definitely can disagree from opinion to opinion. In fact I do regularly, But the question then becomes what's the best way to disagree with an opinion? In this case, this seems to be a fairly substantial reform to the Delaware Code that didn't even go through the proper channels. I'm not confident that it's actually going to accomplish what it's setting out to do.

Speaker 2

However, it just strikes me as odd that you don't like the way that some decisions have been coming out, what you said, like thirty and so the legislature makes a wholesale change in the law.

Speaker 1

Well, it definitely gives rise to a new form of instability that I think we're not used to.

Speaker 2

That.

Speaker 1

You know, there were always people who would disagree with various outcomes of cases, and there was an appeals process to do that. In fact, it turns out that even mister Musk's case has not been decided on appeal. But rather than wait for that appeal to occur, the Delaware legislature essentially has gotten kicked into action by proponents who

you know, obviously have their own goals in mind. But it's an odd way to respond to one or two cases by essentially, you know, obscuring or nullifying you know, nearly three dozen cases from the Delaware Supreme Court. And so you know, we'll see where that ends up going.

The other thing that's kind of interesting about this particular proposed reform June is that over the years, Delaware had sort of set up a system where it first consulted what's known as a council or a Delaware Corporate bar council that essentially is made up of practitioners in the field on both sides, defense side, planetoicides and they kind of, you know, try to hammer out some proposals that might make sense for the legislature to go after, and then those,

you know, the ones that kind of make the cut. They are often then get put into a bill that is introduced to the General Assembly. That's not how this one took shape, however, as far as I can tell, the council was minimally involved in deliberating these things. Essentially, they have now been asked to comment on the proposals that are already pre baked, but they don't have obvious, you know, rights to redraft them or to say this

is just a you know, a bad idea. I guess they could, but it's a kind of an odd inversion of the usual process that people are used to, and I think that's another you know, reason that people are kind of wondering whether this might give you know, maybe some short term satisfaction to people who would like to see a couple of precedents changed. But it is almost certainly going to have some collateral damage, the size of which we don't really know and.

Speaker 2

Who drafted this legislation, Were there any heavy hitters.

Speaker 1

The exact identity of the people has been not completely this goloes publicly. We do know that the law firm that has been representing mister Musk himself, who was doing a lot of the drafting, there are proposals inside it that certain former judges in Delaware had been advocating for unsuccessfully through case law, that ended up making it into the proposal, So one would presume that that there was

a role there as well. From what I know, the drafting was going sort of hot and heavy until the very last moment, and no one knew exactly what was going to be in these things until they were ultimately released, So it's not exactly clear who all the players were. Some have come out and said, yes, I played a role in this, but we don't know exactly who who was responsible for the drafting of specific provisions.

Speaker 2

Coming up next, I'll continue this conversation with Professor Eric Tally of Colle Law School, and we'll talk about whether there's been a backlash to this legislation and will it affect its passage. I've been talking to Columbia Law School professor Eric Tally about state legislators in Delaware proposing drastic changes to its business statutes following recent defections by Elon Musk companies and others moving their in corporation to Texas

or Nevada in search of friendlier legal treatment. Since this legislation was revealed, has there been a backlash so that perhaps it will not pass well?

Speaker 1

I think there has been a backlash in some ways. People who have long celebrated the idea that Delaware has become popular because it is predictable because of the fact that expert judges are allowed, you know, to use their discretion, and the statute is flexible to express some pretty profound worries about possibility that these reforms are actually pushed against

those long standing benefits of Delaware law. There's also some at least potential argument out there that this could have some constitutional limitations on it as well, because, after all, what we have in this situation is the Delaware Assembly passing a statute that constrains the equitable power of the

Delaware courts. Just like the Federal Constitution, the Delaware State Constitution has a separation of powers aspect to it, and in particular, the Delaware Court of Chancery's ability to exercise equity, at least by some arguments, is something that's guaranteed in

the Delaware Constitution. So should this go forward? I think there's not only going to be a continued debate about the process by which this bill came to the floor, but you might even see some constitutional challenges to whether it's even possible for the General Assembly to do what they're doing here without changing the Delaware Constitution.

Speaker 2

These changes. How much of the questions that come before Delaware courts? How much does this represent? Is it like fifty percent of the questions that come up twenty five.

Speaker 1

It's a good question. In recent years, it's been a fairly regular occurrence for cases involving controller conflicts of interest to be in front of the Delaware Court. Now that's in part because over the years, you know, it became a little easier to figure out how to set up a transaction that has a conflict of interests stay involving just an ordinary director and officer that would keep it out of court, and these were the ones that were always you know, the ones that got the most scrutiny,

and they'refore the most challengeable. So it's certainly the case if you look into our recent Delaware opinions, and there are not only you know, the Tesla opinion with mister Musk's compensation, but another case called the Molust case that involved the controlling stockholder, and the match Group case, which

was a Delaware Supreme Court opinion from last year. These have been you know, some of the big your opinions that are out there are recent case that just came out involving trip Advisor and its decision to reincorporate out of Delawares is also one of these controlling stockholder cases. So I think there is a real sense in which the controlling stockholder issue has definitely bubbled up in recent

years to occupy a lot of people's attention. The way that the courts have dealt with a lot of those cases, sometimes they came out against the controlling stockholders, sometimes they came out in favor of the controlling stockholder, but a lot of them basically said, look, Delaware loss still is flexible enough to allow you to you know, set up your own you know, if you do it from the beginning and disclose it in a way that people will

be able to understand and investors will be able to understand, you could set up a structure that gives a lot of control that's not very reviewable to a controller. So the big move that's being made here is that this statute is saying, first, you're not going to be required to do it's now going to do it for you. And second, the way that it's currently drafted, you've got no choice that there there is no ability to contractually

shape how much scrutiny you're controlling stockholder debts. Delaware is now making this a one size fits all type of legal test for evaluating those situations. And that's very peculiar because in a lot of other situations very recently as well, you know, Delaware has moved towards what people sometimes refer to as a more Contractarrian model, which is, here's the basic rules, but you can come up with your own tailored you can tailor your own system to get around

them if you want. And this, you know, sort of most recent episode effectively moves in the opposite direction. In terms of how much contractual freedom you have as well. So that's that's another reason to kind of, you know, scratch your head a little bit about the not just the content of the provisions, but the fact that they've been made, you know, seemingly immutable, seemingly they have to apply to every one as.

Speaker 2

Far as Texas and Nevada don't. They have a long way to go before they reach the point of matching the expertise that the Delaware chancery courts have.

Speaker 1

You know, everything looks great when you haven't really dug deep into what the althornatives are. But you know, the Texas business courts are you know, we really don't know what we're going to expect from about There are some things about the Texas business courts that people want a little bit of pauses if what you're worried about is, you know, litigation that is hard to predict and costly. So, for example, the Texas business courts have jury trials, whereas

the Delaware chancewer Court does not. So it's not really a matter of necessarily just convincing the judge. But you've got to sell your case to a bunch of lay people who may or may not be very fond of your controlling stockholder. There are interesting provisions in Texas law that value to actually order a deposition from someone before you use and file the lawsuit, which I find kind of an interesting thing as well. And then the judges, it's almost baked in. They have a two year tenure.

So you know, one of the things about the Delaware judges not only are they kind of recruited as experts, but they have much longer terms and are allowed to essentially develop a more expertise. You know, my guess is it's going to take a good year to year and a half for any judge to get up to speed on some of the key cases that are going to be heard. And then you know, their term is almost up and they got to hand the case to the next judge in and so a lot of these things.

If you you know, if you're under the impression that moving to Texas is going to be a nice, predictable, calm experience, it's not clear at all that that's the case. Nevada probably is further along than other states in at least developing a little bit of a jurisprudence, and they do have more permissive rules than Delaware. That's the way one of the ways that they have they have branded themselves.

But even Nevada now has just introduced a constitutional amendment creating strict business law courts, because while they had business law courts already, they were hearing other matters as well, and so so, you know, the other states that are attempting to compete with Delaware haven't necessarily put forth a set of alternatives that is hugely predictable. It might be attractive to some companies, but for other companies it's really, you know, very very early days and you're not going

to know. And then the question is do you want your company to be the canary and the coal mine right to try out some new state court or new state law outside of Delaware and see how it goes. You know, I certainly would like to see other companies

do that if I were making that decision. On the other hand, if in fact, you know, the import and the effect of these new statutes is to kind of tie the hands of the Delaware judges and not allow them to use their expertise as much as they have before, and also to you know, eliminate existing precedent from the books. So you have less to guide yourself by. Maybe this is really an opportune moment to start, you know, seriously trying to compete with Delaware.

Speaker 2

Is there anything wrong with a little competition among the states to get companies.

Speaker 1

To incorporate competition isn't all bad? You know, Delaware has definitely, you know, had kind of of a monopoly position here for a long time, and and you would think that they would want to take moves that that you know, you know, make that that position more durable, and they have generally, but you know, one can question whether these are going to do the do the trick or not.

If it's the case that we get a little bit more of an open, competitive free for all among states, then you could see a kind of an interesting environment shaking down where states themselves, you know, aren't trying to mimic each other, but are actually offering different points on the spectrum to sort of say, here's the kind of companies that we specialize in, or here's the balance that we strike here, and we're going to develop precedence around it.

And then you might see companies sorting in a much more in a much more varied way amongst these different jurisdictions. And you know, in some ways that type of competition is probably going to be helpful for you know, trying to find the right law to fit you. But it's also a painful growth process because we don't have a lot of existing precedents to make any predictions about these other states. Yet that's going to take some time. Delaware, at least up to now, has been a more predictable place.

And then I'll just add one other thing June that you know, I probably am personally responsible for, you know, cranking out maybe twelve thousand corporate lawyers who are practicing today, and they all specialize in Delaware law. They don't really know much more than Delaware law because that's mainly what we teach them in law school. So you know, my job is going to change as well, and then I'm going to have to start teaching more of a of

a general type of law. And I think if you are practicing attorney in this area, if you're brand new, this is not a bad moment because you're going to know pretty much just as much as a senior partner does about you know, Tennessee law or Texas law or North Dakota law. If you're a seasoned partner who's been you know, who's who's you know, whose stock in trade is?

I am your person who knows everything Delaware. This is going to be a more challenging moment that you're going to have to, you know, in some ways, you know, go back to school to try to learn some of these other other areas of law, and you know, hope that the precedence evolved in a way that makes it

at least somewhat predictable. So it will be an interesting moment in time, not just for controllers or for companies, but also for lawyers themselves, who have you know, buy and large predominantly developed expertise in Delaware law and our own courts over the over the years, is you know, even cited. Delaware precedence is kind of the bellweather of of how to how to treat other states law, and if that changes, then that whole ecosystem is going to have to adapt as well.

Speaker 2

Veteran corporate lawyers will have to go back to the books. Thanks so much, Eric, Best, Professor Eric Talley of Columbia Law School. And that's it for this edition of the Bloomberg Law Show. Remember you can always get the latest legal news on our Bloomberg Law Podcast. You can find them on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and at www dot bloomberg dot com, slash podcast, slash Law, and remember to tune into The Bloomberg Law Show every weeknight at ten pm

Wall Street Time. I'm June Grosso and you're listening to Bloomberg

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