New Scotus Term: From Abortion Rights to State Secrets

Boston marathon bomber Joe Harsar Naive. That decision will now be at the center of one of the biggest cases the Supreme Court will hear when it returns in October. My guest is constitutional law professor Harold Crent of the Chicago Kent College of Law. How what issues will the Supreme Court be considering in deciding whether to reinstate the death penalty forced Our naive case rises out of the awful Boston marathon bombing, and of course was caught red handed.

He was sentenced to death, and two challenges in this case that the first circuit to overturn not the conviction but the imposition of the death penalty. The two grounds were first that the defense attorney was not permitted to question the jurors about the extent to which they had read about the bombing prior to being seated as jurors.

And second, at the capital phase of the mitigation phase, Tarnaye argued principally that he was under the spell and influence of his older brother, who had been killed in the shootout with the police, and that he had tried to introduce evidence of a grizzly set of murders that the older brother had committed previously, including dominating a friend and trying to get the friend to help him commit these murders, and the court had rejected the defense's effort

to introduce this information. So those are the two issues raised to the Supreme Court. Why take this case? Because the context has changed since Attorney General Merrick Garland has stopped all federal executions. I think that the Supreme Court might be taking this case not just because of this notoriety, but to investigate the use of harmless error in death penalty cases. And indeed, the Supreme Court took another case

where the harmless air doctrine may arise. That case arose from when a defendant was shackled in the jury, just as we saw in the Chicago seventh movie recently, and the Sixth Circuit reversed the conviction on the ground that the shackling of a defendant could never be innocent, and I think the court took that as well to look at the harmless air doctrine. Obviously, the evidence was overwhelming with respect to Turnaye, and that may have influenced the

Supreme Court to take the case. Politically, this is fascinating because President Biden has said that he's an opponent of the death penalty, but he is acquiesced into allowing the Supreme Court to hear this case. Somewhat of a head scratcher in terms of why he is allowing the case to go forward. The Biden administration could have easily gotten rid this case by just saying that they would never

enforce the death penalty. And but obviously he's willing to allow the Court to make these kinds of decisions even if he won't use the death penalty during his term. So let's turn out to a case that's destined to be one of the most watched and perhaps controversial of next term, centering on a Mississippi law that would ban abortions in almost all cases after fifteen weeks of pregnancy.

What is Mississippi asking here? This case isn't petic because it directly challenges the viability test that the Supreme Court has now upheld in the versus Raid and in Planned Parenthood versus Casey. Under that scheme, the state had insufficient reason or insubition justifications to regulate the women's right to

choose prior to viability. Under this Mississippi statute or the Gestational Age Act, the line that's drawn is really rather one of fifteen months, So the point would have to jettisone or get rid of the Row framework in order to oppose the law here, and it may well do that. So this is an incredibly significant decision, and what the Court would be replace it with is unclear, except perhaps to give the green like the states to ban abortion, as many did prior to Roversus Weight. So Mississippi is

asking for a sweeping ruling here. But can the Justices decide this case without overturning Row or Casey. I don't think so. That's what's so telling about this case, and that they chose to take this case is because there's no way that I can see for them to uphold the gestational Age Act and still be consistent with the framework of Rovers's way. They might adopt a different framework, but it would not be the one that focuses on viability.

As their precedents dictate. The issue in this case hadn't divided the lower court, so they could easily have not taken this case right. What's amazing is that that took the case because this is not a case as with others chipping away the abortion right. It is absolutely a frontal attack, at least a frontal attack on the framework set out in Rovers's way in in Casey, the Supreme Court is going to consider making it easier for people to walk around with a gun. I mean, that's just

backwards and dangerous. So I heard that news in my heart sank. Like New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio, the hearts of gun control advocates across the country sank when the Supreme Court announced it would discide whether to allow most people to carry a handgun in public. I've been talking to Professor Harold Crent of the Chicago Kent College of Law, so how this will be the first time in more than a decade that the Supreme Court takes up a major second Amendment case. What's at stake here?

The Court has stayed away, as you mentioned, from Second Amendment cases for ten years, and the lower courts are split, and how to analyze cases when there are certain state regulations about background checks, state regulations about what kind of guns one can purchase, and state regulations as in this case about carrying a pistol concealed carry law which would allow someone to carry a pistol in public. And so they've divided both in terms of what kind of scrutiny

to apply as well as in results. Most courts have provided the universe into a core and non core gun ownership issue. Owning guns at home would be core, having an assault weapon would not be core. And the question then that's puzzled these courts is whether having a pistol in public is such a core right, which then could only be limited if there is a compelling governmental state interest. And you know, the courts are split and their history

is split. Some courts have relied upon history and said that there is no kind of ingraining history of waving around a pistol in public, or even keeping one concealed in public, as there is and having hunting rifles or and having guns at home. So the courts have been split on the historical pedigree of concealed carry as well

is on the standard of review to apply. So this has been your very telling case because the Court will have to give some kind of help to lower courts about how to analyze the many many Second Amendment cases on background checks on licensing that exists, or they may take a narrow view and say that in this case, New York has said you can only have a license if you have good cause, and that good cause is open to interpretation in a case by case basis. Do you have a fear for your life? Do you live

in a lousing neighborhood? You know what is the reason that you give? And they may decide that that kind of subjectivity has no place in the Second Amendment, and so they may take a narrow way out and not talk about the standard of review at all, but just say that states, if they limit a right to carry guns, have to do so and object of le verifiable way.

Looking at the court, you have Justice Brett Kavanagh, who joined an opinion with Justice Clarence Thomas, who is an avid defender of the Second Amendment that described gun caring restrictions as imposing an onerous burden on a fundamental right. Where do you see this conservative court on this issue. Do they want to move forward with less restrictions on the Second Amendment. It's a tough question to predict. In

terms of the court. I don't think the Court is going to go far as Justice Thomas wanted them to. He has said in public that this is just like the First Amendment, and we shouldn't allow any more kinds of restrictions on speech outside the home, and so we shouldn't allow restrictions on gun ownership outside the home either. On the other hand, the Court has varied Fourth Amendment rights whether someone's in the home or outside the home, and has done so even this past term. So I

think that the Court will still be divided. Though my guess is that they will strike down the concealed carry licensing system that New York has adopted. And I should note that Michael Bloomberg, the foundering majority owner of Bloomberg LP, the parent company of Bloomberg Radio, is a donor to groups that support gun control, including every Town for Gun Safety.

Now turning to a somewhat less controversial case involving religious rights, the Court will consider whether states can exclude religious schools from a student aid program because it's used to teach

religious education. Anybody predicting the outcome of this case would have to say that the court will overturn the first circuit here and say that the students have a choice about whether to use a voucher or funds from the state, and if they have the ability to use them in a private school, that it would be unconstitutional to prevent them from going to use them at a religious private school,

which in fact is what Maine have required. Maine, because it has such small school districts, often give money to the students that we don't have enough resources to have you go to public school here, so take it to a private school of your choice. But they had said you can't take it to a private religious school. And again, with this court, I'm very confident that they will recognize a broader free exercise right and decide that Maine has to permit their residents to use the state funds for

religious education. Well, even before Justice Ammy Coney Barrett got on the court, the justices have been ruling in favor of religious rights over just about any other rights, and this would follow up on the ruling in Espinosa. It's very similar to Espinosa. Esponosa was the Montana case, which had to do with tax credits, and in this case it's not tax credits, it's basically tuition dollars. And I think the court is going to follow Espinoza and expand it and don't have to expand it that much to

suggest that the main system is unconstitutional. As well. Last night I found this He's Detaining number twenty four. Well's your video. They water boarded him a hundred and eighty three times. Everything they got from him who was either a lie or something they already had. If it works, why do you need to do it a hundred and eighty three times? Because if what we did to him ever came out in the court of law, the case

is over. The movie, appropriately called The Report, is about the CIA's use of torture at black sides following the September eleventh attacks and the Senate Intelligence Committees report on the CIA's rendition, detention, and Interrogation program, commonly called the torture program. Now. The first detainee taken to the CIA's first black site, Abou Zu Beta, who was repeatedly tortured and water boarded at least eighty three times. Is taking

his case to the Supreme Court. I've been talking to Professor Harold Crant of the Chicago Kent College of Law. Zubaida is what's known as a forever prisoner, held without formal charges at Guantanamo Bay for fifteen years. What's he asking the court? After he was captured in Pakistan, he was taken to a CIA black site in Poland where he was interrogated and tortured for a great deal of

time and actually did provide useful information. Zubaida, through his attorneys, try to challenge what happened in Poland and suggest that Poland was complicit in the CIA's torture campaign, and the European Human Rights agree with him, and that set off continuing inquiry in Poland. Now, during this Polish investigation, he asked for and Poland courts agreed for information from the United States which would then shed light on what happened

in Poland. And he sent a subpoena to two psychologists where contractors of the CIA for information about this black site in particular where he was held. And these CIA contractors had talked publicly about their role in the torture campaign, but had not disclosed details about what happened at this

particular site. And the lower court said that the CIA did not have to give up any kind of information because of the state secrets privilege, But the Ninth Circuit reversed, so the state secrets privilege protects information the government says would harm national security if exposed tell us the basis of the Ninth circuits reversal relatively controversial because the Ninth Circuit said that the lower court should have made a line by line determination about the testimony, what testimony would

be allowed that didn't reveal a state secret and should be permitted. And I think that they were influenced by the fact that the discussion of these prisons that were directed by the CIA is common knowledge, and so they thought that the government was pushing too much of this information under the rug and that they should not be allowed to make a blanket refusal to allow any kind

of information. So the Ninth Circuit said, you've got to make a line by line determination, and the government said state secret privilege, you get to dismiss the entire case. It's too dangerous to have the court segregate information that's permissible already in the public domain, or would not reveal a state secret from that, which is problematic. So we'll have to see. It's a very strange procedural posture. But nonetheless, at the heart of it is the question about state secrets.

Should we allow it the government or to have an immunity because state secrets and not have to respond to this request for information, or do we say, okay, it's like an evidentiary privilege. And obviously the government wouldn't have to disclose anything that's the state secret, but at the same time it does have a duty to disclose anything that's connected with it. It does not raise the kind of dangers that a state's secret would. Now, let's turn

from the CIA to the FBI. In a case originally brought by three Muslim men who claimed they were targets of an FBI dragnet surveillance program only because of their religion like a zoobay there's this case arises after nine eleven and some of the credible overreaction that our government took in terms of law enforcements in this case, they infiltrated Muslim community, including taping conversations in a mosque simply because the FBI wanted to get tabs on what was

going on to make sure there was no terantsort as a proactive measure. In this case, there were about eleven different claims that were brought Fourth Amendment, religion claims and so forth, and in this particular case, the Ninth Circuit overturned the District Court and held that some of the

claims could go forward. And as in Zooby, there one of the claims that the government had used as a defense was state secrets that they didn't want to disclose, methodology, names, and the means by which this illegal surveillance took place. And Ninth Circuit limited the state secrets as they did in zoo Beta, holding that the district court had to make a narrow decision about what was actually a state

secret and what was legal and what was not. And the Ninth Circuit, in doing this, adopted a view that the FISA Act, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, actually modified this common law state secrets privilege and narrowed it so that the result would not be dismissal of the case, but rather just in camera inspection by the lower court to determine what in fact had to be excised. So this is the Ninth Circuits suggesting that the state secrets

privilege goes too far. Considering this and Zoo beta is the Court taking an interest in state secrets? The Court is clearly taking an interest in state secrets that it has not returned to state secrets really since the Reynolds case during the Cold War. And they may use these two cases together to suggest the exact contours of the doctrine.

They don't have to use many other technical issues involved in the case, but the clear import the least at first glance, would be that the Court wants to say, this is a common law privilege, how far does it extend? How should it be applied attorney to immigration? The Supreme Court is going to consider whether federal courts can review decisions by immigration officials, and a question that both parties of the appeal asked the justices to take up. But

lower courts are split. So this is a case on the first glance has to do with just trying to reconcile a a split in the circuits, but it does have to do also with control of of administrative agencies. Here the Bureau of Immigration Appeals and the Court in a variety of cases, is suggesting that it is concerned by the unreviewable discretion and power that administrative agencies wield.

So it might be that the Court is taking this case just to vet the question about how much we want to re statutes to allow them to preclude judicial review. In this case, Um, it's actually a very narrow case.

They had to do what they discretionary right to ask for discretionary relief from the agency to stay in this country, even though because of the fact that the individual here has a job and there's a what end you can if you have a good job, you can ask for discretionary relief, and the agency and the two to one vote had turned him down because he had either negligently or purposefully in the past check off a box that he was UM a U. S citizen when he was

applying for a driver's license, and they used that reason to say you can't apply for discretionary relief. And the courts said that they read the the the statute to preclude review over facts, allowing petitions for discretionary relief, but not for laws and any kind of legal challenge. So it's a very narrow case. In terms of whether you can have factual review. But it does go then sort of immunize the agency from any kind of judicial review,

at least with respect to factual determinations. And so again the court may take it just to clean up and make sure that the courts are all sort of uniform and interpreting this right to have a discretionary appeal, or they may also be looking at this because they are reluctant to allow a preclusion and review provision to um immunize a agency from any kind of judicial oversight. Let's

turn to another case involving agencies and medicare reimbarrassment. This involves the controversial Chevron doctrine, which basically says that courts have to defer to government agencies when a law's language is ambiguous. So in some ways the American hospital cases

are very um detailed. Question about medicare reimbursement at different rates, and the question is can the agency um change the rate of reimbursements that it had previously recognized And but the interesting issue that comes up is that the agency's power to change the rates of reimbursement um stem from language in the statute that allows them to calculate and adjust reimbursements as they find necessary. And that's what the

agency did. But it's very broad language adjustment power. And can this adjustment power be used by the agency to change the methodology with which they had imburst hospitals for drug purchases in the past. So the Chevron doctrine is implicated because if you defer to all reasonable agency constructions of the term of open ended terms like adjustment, in essence,

you're giving agencies incredible power. So this case may be used as a reason to once again limit deference to administrative agencies interpretations of statutes when they are so open ended, and we could give rise to expanded agency power. So just like a power to if the term in the statute is power to modify or power to adjust, Chevron jefference used in that way leads to a great expanse,

can lead to a great expanse of agency power. And so the court might limit Chevron in some other the means or as with you know, as justice course that should say he wants to get rid of all of

it all together. How many of the justices have expressed a desire just to get rid of the Chevron deference well, what's what's fascinating about We have no idea about Justice Barrett, by the way, but what's fascinating about Justice course, Justice Kavanaugh is they believe in expanded presidential power, even if

it's never been recognized in the past. But they believe in whigdling you down power of the very agencies below the president um and so we Justice so Leto would probably join in with him, maybe Justice Thomas as well, And so it might turn on what Justice Barrett thinks. And she really has not had the opportunity to weigh in. In terms of the determinants of Chevron doctrine, I would expect that this is not going to be the case

where they will dismantled Chevron altogether. That I could be wrong, but rather it does cry out for a limitation that many have argued for before, suggesting that when an agency can interpret a provision so as to expand its power, that's when the reasonableness deference should be discarded, because we need a check on an agency to make sure that they don't aggradize their own power at the expense of the regulated public. Thanks so much, how for giving us

that introduction to next term at the Supreme Court. That's Professor Harold Crent of the Chicago Camp College of Law coming up next. The Cleveland Indians are changing their name. But what about the other team named the Cleveland Guardians. This is Bloomberg. The DC Court of Appeals has ordered the release of a man accused of taking part in a pepper spray assault on police during the January six Capital Riot, a reversal of the order of the district court.

Judge joining me is former federal prosecutor Robert Mints, a partner Ma Carter in English. First of all, is it unusual for an appeals court to be reviewing decisions by district court judges about whether to release defendants on bail. It really is unusual for courts of appeal to be taking a look at those decisions, because they're typically left

up to the trial judge. The trial judge is the one who has the most information and here's the arguments from counsel, and usually makes that decision based upon two factors, whether the individuals a danger to themselves or a danger to others. And if the court makes a finding that either one of those facts exists, the court will detain an individual pre trial and they will have to stay

in custody until their trial begins. So now, the appeals Court on Monday ordered the release of George Tanio's He was accused of macing a police officer at the January six Capital riot and attacking officer Brian sick Nick, who died after the attack. So why did the appeals court decide that he should be released when the judge decided he should be detained in this case? The Court of Appeals took a look at the lower court ruling and decided that the judge had aired in detaining this defendant

pre trial. The Court of Appeals looked at the individual's past record and saw that he had no past felony convictions, he had no ties to any extremist organizations, and no post januarystics criminal behavior that would otherwise show that he posed the danger to the community. Another factor that has weighed in on these decisions is whether or not there's

evidence of premeditation. So in certain cases where prosecutors have been able to show that the defendants planned to commit violent acts, that they brought pepper spray or other weapons to the January six riot and intended to use him on police, officers. Some of those defendants have also been detained pre trial as evidence that they pose a danger to the community and if released, would continue to pose

a danger to the community. What's interesting is that Tanios was seen in a video with Julian Cater, according to an FBI FI Davit quote, working to assault law enforcement officers with an unknown chemical substance by spraying officers directly in the face and eyes. Yet a panel of this same appeals court, at the DC Circuit Court of Appeals

affirmed a judge's order keeping Cater in custody. How do you reconcile those two Well, I think it shows how difficult these decisions are and that they are made on a case by case basis. Here you can have a situation where you have different panels of the Court of Appeals looking at the same case and coming up with

different decisions. One of the reasons you have these disparate rulings on facts that may seem somewhat similar goes to the fact that this was strict an unprecedented circumstance, the January six riots, or something that judges have really never dealt with before, and they're weighing the threat that these individuals may pose to the community against their individual rights.

And one of the most difficult questions that are faced by judges in making this decision is whether or not these defendants are likely to repeat any of the conduct that occurred on January six. Some judges have looked at the conduct of the defendants and decided they pose a

continuing danger to the community. Other judges will have looked at the very same fact and decided that the circumstances of January six were so unique that they will not pose a danger to repeat that conduct, and therefore should

not be held pre trial. The d C Circuit Court of Appeals in a July opinion written by Judge Robert Wilkins, that opinion has become the sort of framework for decisions on free trial detention, and Wilkins said that everyone who entered the capital on January six did not necessarily pose the same risk of danger, and the preventive detention statute should apply to the January six defendants the same as

it applies to everyone else. So is he saying that, you know, some people who committed violence that day can get out. I think it does. I think with the judge is saying that there are no automatic rule that would require someone to be detained pre trial or not. The judge in this case looked at one individual and said it was not obviously wrong to conclude that statements

as a whole posed danger to the community. In this particular case, Judge Wilkins was talking about a defendant who had to pass history of expressing biases against African Americans and Jews, and the judge viewed that this violent rhetoric, in connection with the events of January six, made him unsuitable for pre trial release. It seems that prosecutors are

not asking for detention of all the suspects. You are former federal prosecutor, what kind of a wighing process do you go through when you're deciding whether or not you want to hold someone in prison pending trial. That's a

great question, because it's a very difficult assessment to make. Obviously, denying somebody their freedom even before they get their day in court is a very serious issue, and typically individuals are released on bond so that they can prepare for trial, so they can meet with their counsel, and in fact, the situation where they have not yet been found guilty of committing any offense, and so it stands to reason that they should not be sitting in prison before their

trial even starts. But some cases are unique, and some cases create situations where an individual is a risk to the community, where there's a danger that the person could be released and perhaps commit another violent act, and those are the circumstances that prosecutors ask for pre trial detention

in order to protect the community. But the facts there have to be specific to the individual defendant, and prosecutors have the burden of establishing that this defendant is a potential danger to the community in order to ask for pre trial attention. So we haven't seen any charges that I know of of sedition or a treason. Why do you think they're not charging that, Well, there was talk

about charges of sedition right after the January Sticks riot. Tradition, as it generally understood, means inciting revolts against the government, and there was talk specifically about a group within the Department of Justice evaluating whether sedition charges would be brought against the Riders, And there was even an interview by the then acting U S Attorney Michael Sherwin for the District of Columbia, who said that prosecutors were mulling seditious

conspiracy charges against some of the riders, and he even went so far as to say to you that he believed the fact do support those charges, and he thinks that those charge I just will ultimately be be brought. But as you pointed out, those charges have not been brought, and nor have charges of treason been brought. Another charge that is very difficult to prove, and the reason for that is basically that these charges have rarely been brought.

There've been only ten cases of treason in the history of the United States. And tradition is also a difficult charge to bring, and it is something that has rarely been successful when it has been charged. There was a recent case in which individuals in Michigan were charged a militia group that brought in uprising against the government. But even in that case, the judges throughout this sedition conspiracy charges, saying that the hateful diet tribes used by the defendants

were protected by the First Amendment. So the problem with the charge of tradition is that it brings into the prosecution the debate as to whether or not the defendants are truly urging a revolt against the government, or are they engaging in some form of protected political speech. That's something that makes the case much more difficult for prosecutors. But I think that's why we're seeing the obstruction charges that are being charged here, rather than prosecutors charging sedition

or treason. So, Bob, there have been many prosecutors that have been accused of overcharging so here. Why not just charge sedition along with lesser charges and see if you can prove it or not. Well, sometimes you do see prosecutors throwing a number of charges into a case and then ultimately letting the jury decide if the more serious charges apply. But it does also open the door to other defenses, and I think that's what prosecutors are worrying about.

There is a potential as a prosecutor when you bring charges, if it's perceived by the jury that you're overcharging the case, that you're trying to bring more serious charges than the evidence will sustain, that that can sometimes backs by and ultimately result in a jury rejecting your case entirely. And that's why I think prosecutors have backed away from the

addition charges. They think that it opens the door into questions about with the intent of these defendants, where they're really trying to overthrow the government, or whether they're simply exercising their political free speech, and they want to avoid those discussions and focus instead on their conduct rather than their speech. So prosecutors have charge obstruction of an official proceeding and at least two five defendants according to the

Washington Post. What does that signal to you that that's the charge that they're going with. Well, I think prosecutors are taking the safer route. They do not want to see a lot of acquittals in these cases, should these cases ultimately proceed to trial, and so they're focusing on the conduct of the defendants rather than getting involved in

a lot of the speech related charges. Here, they are looking at what the individual defendants did, how they stormed the Capitol, when they committed violent acts, and ultimately linking to that obstructing the official proceeding, which in this case was the Joint House and sended session on January sticks

certifying the electoral College vote. And in this way they can focus the prosecution on the individual acts by each of those defendants and argue that ultimately, individually and collectively it led to an obstructing of that proceeding, since lawmakers had to flee the chambers as the vote could not continue as a result of the writer's actions. A federal judge has recently warned that that charge could be unconstitutionally vague.

Explain what his concerns are. What the judge was talking about is the fact that the government could face the constitutional vagueness problem if it cannot articulate to the court or put individuals clearly unnoticed. How corruptly obstructing or influencing Congress differs from ordinary trespass, creating, or disorderly conduct in

the capital. It really comes down to the question of what corrupt obstruction means and whether or not that is something that could be viewed as an overcharge and something that really is nothing different than a disorderly person's defense.

The statute of prosecutors are using here is an expansion of the obstruction of justice statute that was adopted by Congress in two thousand and two as a result of Starbanes Oxley, and what it does is it adds language that says whoever corruptly obstructs, influences, or impedes any official

proceding is guilty of a criminal offense. But some defense lawyers have questioned whether it's this expansion really goes too far, whether Congress intended to only apply to financial fraud or to traditional obstruction of justice crimes took as prosecutors are

charging here. What the judge is essentially concerned about here is that these files may not take place for a couple of years at least, and if it ultimately turns out that the charge is constitutionally deficient, that this will create a huge problem, potentially even a double jeopardy problem for prosecutors. So the judge is really doing prosecutors a favor by raising this issue now and allowing prosecutors to make an argument that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague.

The one downside for prosecutors is that by raising this constitutional issue now, it throws a bit of a monkey rank into plea discussions. Looking at this case with the video evidence they have, and they have evidence after the fact, does it seem like these are going to be easy cases to prosecute? Well, these cases do have a lot of videotaped evidence, and all of the defendants who are charging these cases appear on some form of video, so

their conduct is really irrefut utible. What they did, what they were doing, what they said. A lot of that has been picked up on microphones, and so there's a lot of evidence that prosecutors have to work with here, and I do think ultimately we're gonna see a lot of these cases resolved in a guilty play rather than

going to trial because of that overwhelming evidence. But again, prosecutors have to be careful not to overcharge these cases, and at the same time, they also have to be careful not to treat different defendants with similar charges against them differently. So there has to be some kind of consistency and uniformity to how prosecutors ultimately treat these defendants

who are in similar situations. At the end of the day, each of these defendants will be treated individually based upon their individual conduct, and ultimately prosecutors have to ensure that they are treated fairly and in an even handed way that we don't have sentences for some defendants that wind up being much harsher than other defendants who did essentially the same criminal conduct. Thanks Bob. That's mcarter in English. Coming up next, the next Solicitor General. This is Bloomberg,