This is Bloomberg Law, with June Brusso from Bloomberg Radio.
A Texas judge struck down the FTC's ban on non compete agreements before the ban even went into effect, blocking the agency's effort to make labor markets more competitive. Non Compete agreements have become increasingly common, with an estimated twenty percent of workers that's about thirty million Americans subject to them.
Last January, President Joe Biden touted the FTC's overhaul of the rules, saying non compete clauses are overused and often make it unnecessarily difficult for average working Americans to get better jobs.
That's another thing to say you're working for a subway and you can't walk across the street and go to Jimmy Johns and get a twenty cent raise. What tells that all about others and keeping wages down?
But Texas Judge Ada Brown, a Trump appointee, said the FTC lacked the authority to enact the non compete ban and tossed it out. Joining me is William Kavasik, a professor at GW Law School and the former chair of the FTC.
The judge said.
In her twenty seven page ruling that the FTC's proposed rule was arbitrary and capricious and would cause irreparable harm.
Can you tell us more about her decision?
Judge Brown had two grounds for suspending the implementation of the rule vacating it. The first is the one you mentioned, which is that the FDC lacked an adequate basis to support the scope and the complete reach of the rule. That is, the rule applies to a very broad range of employment contracts. There are a couple of carbouts, but the judge concluded that you lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis to implement that rule, and therefore the rule itself as
arbitrary and caprecious. The second basis for rejecting the rule is her conclusion that the FDC lacks the legal authority to adopt rules involving competition policy. That is, substantive competition
rules are beyond the FDC's remit. This involved a fairly elaborate and technical analysis the FDC's authority going back to nineteen fourteen when Congress established the FDC Act and coming forward, but her review of the original framework and its subsequent evolution to the FTC simply lacks legal authority to adopt and apply such a rule, so that on that basis as well, the rule was suspended.
Do you agree with her reasoning.
On the second point. I do. It's always difficult to decide when you have a good fit between the substantive rule and the underlying basis. I think what's a matter of concern is that, first, it's an extraordinarily broad rule and unashamably it applies to the laws that have forty eight states that currently allowed various forms of noncompete. It involves, as the FTC emphasized, hundreds of billions of dollars of wages.
There are tremendous economic stakes here. This is very clearly a major extension of the FDC's oversight role in labor related agreements. You would think that for a measure of that art you would have to have a fairly extensive and careful review of the existing literature pro and con. I would say, in many ways, the SEC took shortcuts on that and tended to brush aside views that it
found to be incompatible with its policy preferences. And I think that did create a real vulnerability with respect to the arbitrary and capricious issue you argue about the FDC's authority is ambiguous. There are certainly plausible arguments that the
FDC has the authority. My intuition is that given the current direction of Supreme Court jurisprudence involving the grant of authority to administrative agencies and the effort that administrative agencies regulators to interpret their authority in a way to meet new conditions and to stretch in some sense the application of their authority, the current Supreme Court is skeptical about that.
The current Supreme Court says, if you want to do bold thing and to apply the law in a broad way, we want you to anchor that in a clear statement of congressional purpose. That Congress to allow you to do bold things has to say so. Clearly, the direction of travel of this doctrine runs against the philosophy the interpretation approach that the FDC is relying on. Here. Goodness knows how the Supreme Court would ultimately evaluate the rule. I haven't talked to them today, so I don't know exactly
what they'll do. But my inference from the current direction of their jurisprudence and the attitude that's embedded in that jurisprudence is that this rule would have a very difficult time surviving review as it goes up to the court, and that Judge Brown's ruling here is quite likely to be sustained.
If the rule had been narrower, let's say it just applied to low and middle income workers, I think that it would have passed.
Mustard, I think June if it had been limited in that way. If it had been limited to say, low income workers who were engaged in applying skills that arguably don't involve the special training and conveying of know how that might take place in other settings. If it had been tailored to that specific concern, I think the rule would have had a better chance of sidestepping the arbitrarrian
capricious ruling that Judge Brown found here. It would still perhaps run into the concern about whether the FDC has the authority in the first place. That is, Judge Brown's conclusion that the FDC lacks authority would mean that even a narrower rule would not be permissible unless Congress would have come back and clearly give the authority to do it. But I think a narrower rule would have had a
stronger chance of surviving review in two respects. One is that it would be less likely to be found arbitrary and capricious, and the other is that there's another issue looking in the background, where the Supreme Court recently has said, if you purport to do path breaking economically significant things by rule making, you have to point to specific grant
of legislative authority to do that. In other words, as the Court is said, where your initiative raises major questions about the operation of the economy, for example, you have to be able to show more precisely that Congress intended for you to address those major questions and to adopt rules to treat them. That is the basis on which yet another court in Florida, Federal Court in Florida issued
a preliminary injunction concerning the application of the rule. So when we take all of these, I would say, skeptical streams of jurisprudence, the FTC is traveling into a very difficult storm, and that a narrower rule would have helped
avoid the arbitrary and capricious ruling. A narrower rule would be less likely to raise concerns under the major question doctrine, but even a narrower rule would run into the concern that Judge Brown showed that the Commission just doesn't have authority to issue any rules involving competition.
How about another agency doing this? The National Labor Relations Board's top lawyer is moving ahead with an enforcement strategy to make restrictive covenants illegal. General Counsel Jennifer Brusso says such packs deny workers the ability to quit or change jobs, which in turn interferes with exercising their organizing rights in their current positions for fear of being fired and not being able to obtain new employment. Do you think of rule by the NLRB would survive.
I'm less familiar tune with the specific grant of authority that the NLRB would be relying upon, certainly in the application of its adjudication function, that is, in the prosecution of individual cases, it would be less likely to run into the question whether it has rule making authority, which is the issue in the FTC proceeding. The question for
the NLRB would be in its law enforcement capacity. Has it appropriately interpreted the mandate the Congress gave it, and would reviewing courts conclude that its interpretation of its The law enforcement mission encompasses the concerns that the NLRB Solicitor General has raised about noncompete. So the NLRB might be in a position to challenge these I don't know if they mean to do it by rulemaking. And I would add that the FDC does have authority to challenge individual
non compete agreements using its law enforcement mandate. It has a law enforcement mandate to prohibit unfair deceptive acts or practices or unfair methods of competition that involves case by case adjudication to challenge specific arrangements. That authority is not endangered in the challenges that are present in the federal
courts now, the FDC can continue to do that. That has the disadvantage that you go step by step and you don't have the capacity necessarily to adopt a broad based prohibition that applies across the country and condemns all of the arrangements. It's a more laborious way to get to the final destination that you wish to achieve. That task is still open to the FDC. That kind of litigation I assume is open to the NRB. That case
by case litigation approach is available. The district judge decision, and the FDC case deals with the effort in a single rule to achieve what otherwise be attained through a collection of cases over time.
How big a.
Blow do you think this is to the FTC.
I think it's a significant blow. And when I look at the whole span of the FTC's program since the Biden administration began in twenty twenty one, I would characterize
this as the most significant initiative that they pursued. Most significant measured by its purported economic impact, it's anticipated economic impact, which is self described as being very broad, most significant in terms of it's effort to move the doctrinal framework of intervention outwards, the game acceptance through the idea that the FTC has power to issue these competition rules and
include powerful prohibitions in them. And Third, symbolically, it is held out as an example of the Biden FTC is willing to take more risks, to be far more ambitious than its predecessors are, and as such to bring a new attitude toward the application of federal power to control commerce. In all of these respects, I would say, in the entire fleet of FDC initiatives, this is the flagship, and if you are running a navy, you don't want your flagship to be sunk.
In a statement, FTC spokesperson Victoria Graham said the agency is seriously considering a potential appeal. Do you think they should appeal this because it's going to the Fifth Circuit, which is ultra conservative as a reputation for overturning Biden administration rules, and then likely to the Supreme Court, where you know, as you mentioned, I don't think they'll find a receptive court.
I think they should. If I was guiding the strategy, I would do it. One reason is that the FDC has had some surprising success over the past year in front of that very court. It was in the context of a merger challenge to an acquisition by a Lumina of the Grail Company. It was an appeal from an
FDC administrative decision, a law enforcement measure. The parties opposing the FDC roise four distinct constitutional and administrative law challenges to the FDC's authority in addition to challenging the FDC's decision on the merits. I think that they thought that had gone to exactly the forum that would be favorable
to them. They didn't quite get the panel that they hoped for, but the panel they did get basically brushed the side all of the administrative law and constitutional law challenges. It upheld the FDC's decision, and in a sense, it showed that EVE been in a very difficult litigation environment,
you can prevail, so it's not a hopeless pursuit. And another reason I'd bring the case is it I think it would demonstrate the conviction of the agency to take on hard, difficult matters notwithstanding the possibility of failure in the court. You're ultimately going to have to face a judiciary, perhaps ultimately the Supreme Court, that has raised issues with
this form of approach. My suggestion was have it out now, get the appellate decision, take it up to the Supreme Court and say we need a basic decision about the framework of FDC authority generally and about its application of its abserdive authority in this instance. Let's not wait for another case or another time. Let's bring it to a head now, and if the result is adverse, we go back to Congress and say, if you want us to be active in this area, give us a clearer mandate to do, so.
There are noncompetes. At state level. Four states have banned nearly all non competes, and at least eleven more have thresholds protecting lower income, middle income, hourly workers, etc. Do you think we'll see more states trying to pass laws about non competes.
I think we'll see an amendment of the legal framework. And this is a respect in which the FDC's initiative, despite the risks that I've been describing in the Sensus, achieved real success. It has drawn broad attention within the United States. So the issue of non compete it's catalyzed reconsideration of the existing legal framework, which, with the exception of a handful of states such as California, does not prohibit these agreements or render them unenforceable. Most states allow
them to be evaluated by a reasonableness standard. The FDC's initiative has inspired a new debate about whether or not
these kinds of restrictions are appropriate. So I think we're going to see a rethink in many states that allow these arrangements or a reasonableness standard, to rethink that approach, perhaps to create presumptions against them, to apply prohibitions that exist now on certain noncompete more broadly, so we could see in the States a restoration of bolder enforcement and scrutiny regarding noncompete, notwithstanding the result that comes from the
federal litigation itself. And I think you point to a result that the FDC probably had in mind in taking a very bold approach here, which was to change the policy debate to bring about indirect effects, including in the state government. And I suspect if we were to give truth theorem to the leadership team at the FTC, the FDC might stay. That is an important measure of success by itself, and that made the entire effort worthwhile, even if our own specific initiative is not successful.
I've been reading and you know some articles say management is back in control. Now you know, this is a huge win from management.
Do you agree with that.
I'm afraid that's a bit like saying that the match is over when there are still many minutes left on the clock. So there's a temporary reprieve, but there are still, as Jimmy Cliff would say, many rivers to cross before you get confidence that the status quo which allows many of these arrangements stays in place. So it's way too early to speak so confidently about things, especially because of
the point that we just mentioned. There are some limitations on these agreements at the state level, and I think the FTC initiative, even if it fails in the court, it's set in motion a policy rethink that's going to spill over through a number of jurisdictions. So I wouldn't be comfortable in simply sitting back and the storm has passed, the status quo prevails. I think that is not a completely thoughtful understanding of what's taking place now.
As you say, a lot more to come. Thanks so much, Bill, I really appreciate your insights. That's Professor William Kavasik of GW Law School. A divided Supreme Court refused to bolster the Biden administration's ability to extend protections against discrimination in schools to transgender students nationwide in an unsigned order. The Justice has left enforced two lower court orders that are temporarily blocking a new Education Department rule in ten states.
Joining me is Chase Stradio, Deputy director for Transgender Justice at the American Civil Liberties Union, tell us first about the Education Department rule that's at issue here.
The federal law that prohibits tex discrimination in educational programs that receive federal funding, and Title nine has regulations that the Department of Education has promulgated over the years, and the Biden administration, over the course of the last several years, has been working on an extensive rule implementing provisions of Title nine that were subject to notice in common and we're set to go into effect on August first, and we're talking about fifteen hundred pages that cover a lot
of different areas of issues related to sex discrimination. The subject that has received the most attention that's been the centerpiece of litigation over these regulations concerns transgender students and protections for transgender students and educational settings. First at the sort of definitional threshold level, whether or not Title nine itself includes discrimination against people who are LGBTQ. And then specifically, there are sort of two central provisions that have been
the subject of litigation. One concerns the inclusion of transgender students in sex segregated spaces in most specifically restrooms, and then the other concerns the interpretation of basically what is a hostile environment harassment under titlemind and in particular, the context has been the subject of most of this conversation
has to do with pronouns for trench under students. So those are two, you know, very discrete areas that have been the subject of litigation in a rule that covers, you know, extensive areas of federal educational programming, including protections for pregnant and receiving students, and other areas of interpretation
under Title nine. So that is the overall context that we're dealing with when we're talking about the recents that of cases that ultimately made their way up to the Supreme Court shadow docket.
Federal trial judges in Kentucky and Louisiana issued orders temporary blocking the rule in tense states.
So did they block the entire rule?
Yes, So there has been a number of different cases proceeding through the federal courts and the appeal of courts and the district courts. Coming out of three cases, one in Kentucky and two consolidated in Louisiana enjoined the entire higher Rule, not just the provisions related to the sex separated spaces and the hostile environment harassment language that were the actual subject of the litigation that was brought by the various states and in some instances localities.
Was the reasoning of the two courts the same or similar? Why did they issue this temporary injunction?
I think there's sort of two sets of questions about, you know, why did they issue the induction? The first is sort of on the merits. The argument as to the provisions that the litigations focused on were that the interpretation of the rules exceeded that the administration statutory authority under Title nine, and that was the main substantive merits argument.
In essence, the protections that the statute affords from discrimination based on sets did not include discrimination against transgender people, and in particular not in these discrete ways. So those were the merits questions, and courts held that they were likely to succeed that the administration exceeded its authority in
promulgating these rules. Now, as to why the injunctions threat so broadly, the argument there, I know it wasn't even really advanced by the states themselves in litigating these claims, was that the rest of the rule could not be severed from the injury that they complained of with respect
to the provisions related to transtudents. That is the argument, and that is the basis for the sweeping injunctions that reach across all of the areas in which this Title nine regulation covered, and like I said, including related to general protections from discrimination for pregnant and breastleading students. And so the vision from the court was that what they couldn't sever the various provisions, and.
The Solicitor General had only asked the Court to allow the other provisions to be enforced while the legal fight goes on.
Yes, that's correct.
So there had been a motion for partial stay that had been filed in the appeals courts in the sixth and fifth Circuits, and the motion for the partial stay was only seeking to stay the injunction with respect to the provisions that did not concern the single sex facilities in the hostile environment harassment, So in essence saying their complaining of injuries with respect to these two discreete things, we're not seeking to block the injunction with respect to those,
but it sleeps too broadly, and we are seeking relief from this incredibly broad injunction that prevents us from implement mening this critical rule protecting students and staff from sex discrimination and education. So that was the stay they thought
from the lower federal appeals courts. Those were denied at the appeals level, and then ultimately they went to the Supreme Court seeking the same stay with respect to the rest of the rule and not challenging the stay with respect to the to the two provisions that I was mentioning, the hostile environment and the single sex facilities. Now there is some complicated piece to all this, which is that it is in part complicated because of how the Supreme
Court ultimately does it. But there's a definitional provision at the center of all this as well, and the SU's office also thought a stay of the injunction with respect to the definitional provision, and that definitional provision, you know, in essence, the piece of the rule that defines what is sex discrimination for purposes of Title nine and explains that sex includes cender identity, sex, stereotyping, pregnancy status, and this broad understanding of what it means to discriminate because
of sex Undercidle nine. So this definitional provision was also
at the center of the litigation. Even though the states that brought the initial lawsuit never complained that they were injured by the definitional provision, and if you think about what that means in essence, the idea here would be well, certainly after Boss Stock, which held that under Title seven, sex discrimination includes a prohibsion on discrimination against LGBT people in educational settings, a school couldn't say deny someone the
ability to be a graduation speaker simply because they're transgender. There's general educational protections against discrimination for the community, and that is distinct from the injuries being complained of with
respect to you know, in particular bathrooms and pronouns. And so they did speak a stay with respect of the definitional provision, but again that was denied at the Intermediate appeals Court and then at the Supreme Court they thought the partial stay of the sweeping injunction with the exception of the two provisions that they did not seek of.
Stay coming up next. So what split the court five to four? This is Bloomberg. So it was five to four decision, but all nine members of the court agreed that the parts of the rules that include the protections for transgender students, you know, the definition of sex discrimination including gender identity, and the restrictions on same sex spaces shouldn't go into effect until the legal challenges are resolved.
But tell us why the majority the five in a very very short opinion agreed with the lower courts.
So this is where things get complicated and pretty unfortunate.
And that is you know, again, this is all happening on the shadow docket and the context of emergency relief, without the benefit of full briefing and without the benefit of oral argument in a procureum order that is, as you know, two and a half pages and two and a half pages addressing legal issues that are underlying hosts of cases in the lower courts over many years, and then a fifteen hundred page rule, and this cursory treatment just shows that the hazards of the shadow docket and
how unfortunately imprecise it is. And then what happens with critical pieces of federal administrative action, and then of course the rights and responsibilities of individuals across the country, because you have this two and a half page order which in essence doesn't really say anything and in fact misconstrues the United States's day application, in essence suggesting that they have not sought relief from the injunction against the definitional provision,
and so they sort of just ignore that. And then I think this is really important, and it is also unclear,
but that's how I'm interpreting it. And then the question is, in essence, are they likely to succeed on the merits meaning day of the United States, on the merits of the claim that you can set the provisions that this alleged injuries flow from from the rest of the rule, And in essence, the procureum order says, no, they are not likely to succeed on that claim, in essence that they're all interconnected, in part because this definitional provision is
sort of at this center. But they don't in any way contend with several of the arguments that the United States has raised, and you know, somewhat curiously, and I would say disingenuously, they suggest that the United States has not explained how you can sever those things, even though in their briefing they say, you know, so quite clearly that an injury related to trans people using the bathroom has no impact on the rest of the rule concerning
whether or not you could, for example, kick a breastfeeding student out of school. And I think intuitively, any person understands these to be discreet things, even when it comes to, you know, the overall authority of the government to promulgate these rules with respect to the meaning of Title nine. So the majority of two and a half page order, as far as I can tell, doesn't really take the
United States arguments at base value. It doesn't even seem to contend with them as they were presented, and an essence just suggests that these provisions rise and fall together.
Let's talk about the four in the minority or dissent, which was the three Liberals and Justice Gorsuch. And they at least wrote nine pages. What was their descent about?
Well, I mean, that's a great question. What was their dis about? They wrote more, you know, in terms of the number of pages, not much more, And they don't challenge, first and foremost, they don't challenge the majorities in misrepresentation of the United States position. So, in essence, we end up with this very hard to follow, very cursory, you know, order and dissent that does not to be responding to
what is actually presented before them. And so the descent leaves unchallenged this idea that the United States has an
essence conceded to leave the definitional provision in place. So that's a big problem because it sort of does not get at sort of the fundamental question of their stay application, which is that, you know, there's a huge amount of harm flowing from this, and in fact, these provisions can be severed from from one another, and here's how and why not to mention, there is within the United States stay application argument that the definitional provision is compelled by
boss stock. In other words, the Supreme Court has already held that, you know, at least in Title seven, which usually is interpreted to be the same with respect to whether or not something is because of or based on sex, has held that it is because of sex to discriminate against someone because they are transgender. This seemingly obviously flows
from that. But there's a lot of confusion here because it is not clear when the dissent says all nine members of the Court agree that the respondents were entitled to the underlying relief, what that refers to, and if in fact all nine members of the Court agree on anything, especially given the misrepresentation by the Perterium Order of what
the United States position actually was. And so I hesitate to say what this means or or says, because it seems unlikely that they meant the states were entitled to relief on the merits that somehow, you know, Title nines protections can't be interpreted into aclude LGBTQ students. I find that to be very unlikely interpretation of what this very
curious sentence in is referring to. That said, it is unclear and it is causing obviously a lot of confusion among people who are trying to decipher this short but impactful order. You know, my interpretation of it is in essence that you know, as to the provisions first that everyone has either agreed or has misrepresented that are not being challenged with respect to a stay. So, in other words, the provisions that the court has said, nobody is seeking
a stay of the injunction. As to those, my read is they're saying, everyone agrees that the alleged injuries allow them to receive injunctive relief as to those provisions, in other words, that was a proper scope of remedy, not necessarily that they were entitled to relief on the merrit.
Justice Corsetch wrote the boss Stock opinion, as you know, and he sided with the liberals here, is it surprising to you that the Chief Justice who joined in the boss Stock majority opinion sided with the other conservatives here, I mean, do you read anything into that?
Well, so again, I mean I'm not exactly sure, and I hesitate to guess what any of them are suggesting as to the underlying Merit's question, that is to say, you know, whether or not Title nine can or must be interpreted in such a way that includes prohibitions on discrimination against LGBTQ people, because I think, and again coming back to the extraordinary hazards of the shadow docket and these emergency orders, it's very possible that everyone is just
laying in to one degree another on what is the appropriate, you know, scope of the injunction visa the claimed injuries that the States alleged in their initial filing. I recognize that that is somewhat difficult to square with some aspects of the order and the descent, but I also don't think it's clear what everyone is referring to at various points.
So you know, in some sense, it is possible to me that you have a procureum order that reflects a subset of the justices saying two circuits have said these things, multiple district courts have enjoined it. We are, in this emergency posture going to let it stand. Do I think that's a consistent position with what they've done in other cases? No, But could that be what's happening here in a Friday
night order in August with very little reasoning. Maybe so, I would say in terms of whether or not it means that the Chief, you know, sort of has a limited interpretation of Bostock's reach with respect to other statutory and constitutional protections for trans people, I'm not willing to sort of hazard a guess on that justice yet, but I don't think either of these, the order or the descent,
are particularly encouraging endorsements of this Title nine rule. I think it is deeply upsetting in terms of what it means for people across the country, because we now have a regulation that is in effect in some parts of the country and not others, with some provisions you know, enjoined to varying degrees depending on the circuit, and obviously as an enforceability administrability matter, that is horrible for the federal government, but it's also horrible for the individuals who
are trying to protect their rights Title Mine, and it's also horrible for the entities that are, you know, trying to comply with their obligations under Title.
Nind next term, the Supreme Court is going to take up the issue of gender transition care in a Tennessee case.
Do you think that in that case.
The Court will actually decide the issue?
Well, so in scrimmati, which is the case that the Court is going to be hearing this term, which which comes from the United States petitions out of the prohibition
on medical care for transgender adolescence in Tennessee. You know, the question is whether or not these laws that categorically prohibit medical care for transgender minors violate the Constitution, And so they will be answering, you know, sort of one set of questions with respect to the ways in which transgender people and particularly transgender youth have had their rights attacked by state legislatures. And the question there is really
is it sex discrimination? Is it trans status discrimination? When the government draws these lines based on gender transition and categorically prohibits this medical treatment, this is a constitutional case. I think the main question is really what level of scrutiny is going to apply? And whether they resolve it in such a way that answers other questions, whether they don't, I think that is still very much up in the air.
I think whatever happens in Scrimmati, they're going to separately have to contend with the Title nine regulations, because at this point it seems that this is going to be percolating in the lower courts and likely to end up the Supreme Court. Of course, all of that is dependent on what happens in the election, because these are rules that are promulgated by the Biden administration's Department of Education.
If Trump wins the presidency, those rules will be rescinded or they will no longer enforce them, and then they will seek to promulgate new rules and probably have some sort of temporary rule of rescinding the old ones. So some of this all depends on what happens in the election. And then with respect to the constitutional challenges to the gender firming medical care bands for adolescents, the Supreme Court
is going to consider those. They are going to have to contend with what is the nature of discrimination against trans people and what is the reach of Bostock. And then also because the states have argued that these cases are governed by dobs. Also, what is the reach of dobs. So there's a lot that's already up at the court imminently, and I expect there will be more. And obviously trans people and their families are are just trying to live their lives.
Conservative states have passed a slew of laws aimed at transgender youth, including restricting treatments like puberty blocking drugs, hormone therapy, or surgeries for miners experiencing gender dysphoria, laws regulating bathroom use, and pronouns. Which laws affecting transgender youths are the most common in these states.
Just to give sort of temporal framework here, in twenty twenty, no states had any of these laws, and now we're in a situation where half the country, so about twenty four states bans both medical care for transcender adolescents related to gender transitions, as well as the inclusion of trans girls and sports.
Those are the main.
Central pieces of legislation that have been passed in the most Then, the bills that ban trans students from the bathroom are you know, increasing in number, and there's you know, sort of about ten or so states that ban or restrict the ability of trans students to use the restroom
that aligns with who they are. Then there's you know, a number of leather laws that aren't you know, increasing that we're seeing, including you know, sort of the don't say gay style laws, so restrictions on discussions of LGBTQ people and content in schools. There's restrictions on the ability of students and school staff to use pronouns that accord with their gender identities. So those are sort of percolating
and expanding. But I would say the primary legal frameworks or emphasism and states across the country over the last three years has been banning medical care and inclusion in sports.
Unbelievable number of laws in just about three years. Thanks so much for joining me today, Chase. That's Chase Strangio, Deputy director for Transgender Justice at the ACLU. And that's it for this edition of the Bloomberg Law Podcast. Remember you can always get the latest legal news by subscribing and listening to the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and at Bloomberg dot com slash podcast Slash Law.
I'm June Grosso and this is Bloomberg