First as the war between Hamas and Israel rages on. Russian President Vladimir Putin is in China today, meeting with President Shijin Ping in an international forum. It's Putin's first major international trip since the International Criminal Court indicted him for war crimes in Ukraine, and.
Just a few hours ago, the Russian President arrived in Beijing to meet with his dear friend Shijin Ping. Officially, Putin is there for the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, but the visit is also seen as a showcase of the leaders no limits partnership amid rising tensions in the Middle East.
When China's President Shijinping welcomed Russia's President Vladimir Putin in Beijing this week, the two leaders hope to show the world a picture of unshakable unity and strength against their Western adversaries, especially the US. They've pledged a no limits friendship and forged a close trading relationship that's been critical to each of their economies. Bloomberg's Rebecca Chung Wilkins reports this partnership between Russia and China is increasingly complicated by
Russia's costly war in Ukraine. China's broader global ambitions and now by the escalating conflict in Israel and Gaza.
This nature of the China Russia rationis ship has often been described as sort of the sibling rivalry. But this idea of the older brother and the younger brother. And you know, when Mao first went to the Soviet Union, it was clear that the US star was the older brother and China was the younger. That partnership has completely switched, and that really is because of that economic dependency.
I'm Weskasova today on the big take Hijin Ping and Vladimir Putin test the limits of their limitless friendship. Rebecca, welcome back, good to see you.
Thank you very much for having me. It's pleasure to be You.
Have been very busy in the past week trying to pull apart the different threads of the meeting between Xijinping and Vladimir Putin. And there's a lot to talk about here. I want to dig into all of it, but as with everything these days, it's being overshadowed by what's happening in Israel and Gaza, and that too has become part of the China Russia relationship. Can you just talk a bit about what's at stake for Ji and Putin there.
Well, I think for China in a way, the role that China can play as a peacemaker and its own desire to sort of be seen as a neutral mediator, as a responsible statesman on the world stage has really come to define the sort of modern relationship between Putin and Si dimping. And we see that again with the Israel Hamas conflict, and we have seen a chorus of voices from Palestinian Envoi to Beijing, from the Israeli envoy to Beijing, Anty Blincoln, all saying that China should step
up and do more. And Blinken's sort of specific request here is that China use some of the leverage that it has with Iran to prevent the crisis from escalating. And the sort of worry from the US point of view is that the militant group has blow may also be drawn into this war. And so we see this pressure on China globally to take on a bigger role. There is this question of just how much influenced China
has really in this part of the world. It has sought to build out its influence in the Middle East and to try and challenge some of the US dominance and the US relationships in the Middle East in recent years. And China did preside over this diplomatic deal to resume ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran. It was a really important deal. But we have seen she's trying to take up more of that role, and so that is the sort of question mark when it comes to the Israel
Hamas conflict. The other element here, which I'm sure we'll get into, is whether or not China wants to wade into a geopolitical conflict that is just so complex. Its strategic ties and its partnership with Russia, in a way comparatively are much clearer. The Middle East conflict is infinitely more complex, and.
For Vladimir Putin the calculation is somewhat different. I imagine you write that in one way this benefits Putin because the world's attention is now drawn away from his war in Ukraine and toward the Middle East once again, and questions about where Western aid, military and humanitarian will go. Yeah.
I think there's two sort of big points. The first is, as you mentioned, the Israel Hamas conflict, there's a distraction away from what he is trying to engineer in Ukraine, and I'm sure the Ukrainian leader Zelenski is concerned that the world sort of spotlight has shifted away from the
very real conflict that he is engaging in. The other element here, I think, is this sort of increasing concern over geopolitical tensions, over commodities and over disruption to markets and so on as well, which in some way sort of highlights the vulnerability of many Western nations really, after having sort of turned away from relying on Russia and turning to other sources, now finding themselves in another sort
of geopolitically precarious situation. And there is this element too of what it means to be in, you know, the sort of so called alternative world order, what it means to be part of the shifting balance of power away from US led and US dominated forums and groupings that Russia of course is really important player.
In, and Rebecca this idea of an alternative world order that Russia, Chines and other nations in their orbit will form this alternative to the West's economic and political dominance really is at the heart of what we're talking about and at the heart of this meeting that she and Putin had what exactly did they want to accomplish at this meeting.
Yeah, I think you're totally right. That is at the heart of really where China and Russia see themselves as most aligned in the modern era. That is challenging the dominance of the US and this perception that the US and US led forums like NATO for example, are increasingly
encroaching and increasingly posing a risk. And it is worth saying that while President Sees in Ping and some in Beijing may not be fully behind what Russia is doing in Ukraine, and there are very serious reservations that you know, many in China have over the seizure of sovereign territory and so on. But the reason for Russia, the reasons that Russia has put forward are certainly reasons that China feels sympathy for because of this long history and long
distrust of NATO for example. And of course there's always this outstanding issue of Taiwan too, which China views as a renegade province. Now, in any potential invasion scenario, were China to seize Taiwan by force, no matter how unlikely that is, Russia would be a lifeline. They would be providing supplies, military supplies, food, and possibly diplomatic support too.
But there's also a cost because the more that people talk about the war in Ukraine, the more heightened these concerns are over a potential conflict scenario in Taiwan, which, frankly, I think before the invasion of Ukraine, it was hard for anyone really to believe that some thing so unlikely could happen. But that reality is now starting to be discussed in capitals everywhere, Beijing, Brussels, London. That worry is heightened, and that for Beijing is also a risk.
So the relationship between Russia and China has become even more complex than it was before, and a lot of it has to do with their economic positions. What does Putin want from gen now what does Russia need from China?
Well, Russia has become increasingly dependent on China economically for the last twenty months. The last time that Putin was in Beijing, it was around the time of the Olympics, and he walked away with that sort of so called no limits friendship. Less than a month later he invaded Ukraine. And so in the last twenty months, the dynamics of the relationship have really shifted. As Russia has become more isolated on the world stage, it's increasing relied on China.
So we see things like, for example, Chinese trade to Russia jumping more than fifty percent so far through this year, and we see the sort of rise of the use of the yurn in international payments. We see increasing exports of goods like mobile phones, cars and someone to make up for that shortfall as Western firms flee Russia.
Russia is now the biggest buyer of Chinese cars. Imports have jumped fivefold as foreign automakers exit the Russian market. And cars are just part of the picture. There's oil, gas, electronics, clothing, and plenty more besides.
So economically, that question of dependency, that's really the new dynamic that has emerged, and it is firmly establishing. I think Russia as the sort of junior partner in that relationship. And this nature of the China Russia relationship has often been described as sort of the sibling rivalry. But this idea of the older brother and the younger brother. And you know, when Mao first went to the Soviet Union, it was clear that the US star was the older
brother and China was the younger. That partnership has completely switched, and that really is because of that economic dependency. As I say, China really is jumping in to make up all these gaps that Russia is now finding itself as a result of sanctions, and also it was a result of Western firms fleeing. So the question of cars is
a really good example. We have seen this sort of huge jump in shipment of made in China vehicles, car parks, accessories jumped to about fourteen billion in the first eight months of this year, and it's because of things like example, only eight of Russia's fourteen passenger car plants in Russia are functioning at the moment, so it really is relying on China to funnel these types of goods to sort of keep society just up and running. That's sort of
the economic element. The other element, I think is sort of the diplomatic element. Putin wants to counter this impression that he is increasingly isolated on the world stage. He has barely left Russia since the invasion, mainly going to a handful of former Soviet states for these short visits, and that sort of isolation has increased since the Hague issued a warrant for his arrest for alleged war crimes.
And so the forums like the Belt and Road Initiative are really these opportunities for Putin to go and stand on the world stage with countries that are perhaps more sympathetic to this idea of an alternative world order. It is worth saying that the fact that Putin is there standing on the world stage is also likely a reason that we have seen fewer foreign leaders wanting to go
and in attendance at that Belt and Road forum. There is just the frank reality that there will of course be leaders who do not want to get on stage with Badamier Putin at a moment like this.
After the break, what does China get from its alliance with Russia? Turning the camera now to the other side to China Energi Jinping. China also has a lot that it wants from the younger brother from Russia.
Yeah, that's true. I mean Russia is really China's major partner in this ambition to build a new world order. Russia is a sort of critical partner in that agenda, and Russia has been important in sort of establishing some of these China led alternatives to G twenty and G seven and so on, and so that question of the
diplomatic support is certainly important. And then there is this sort of curious element of the personal relationship between season Ping and Putin, you know, sometimes described as something of a romance, even though they actually communicate through a translator, which is interesting. They don't share a common language, but they have these sort of commonalities that they both had fathers who were involved in the Second World War and
fought in the Second World War. They're both leaders that are really interested in this idea of the national rejuvenation of their countries, and they're also have a very similar age. They've even sort of celebrated their various birthdays. I think Putin, for Sheetin Ping's birth in twenty nineteen, gave him a
box of ice cream popsicles, for example. So there is this sort of personal element to the relationship that in some ways has stabilized what has been actually quite a fraught relationship historically between China and Russia.
Rebecca, you talked about some of the things that Russia needs from China economically and China two benefits economically from Russia.
Yes, that's absolutely true, and one of the key ways really has been as a buyer of discounted commodities. China has become the biggest buyer of Russia's fossil f yours and coal imports, for example, from Russia to China have more than doubled since twenty twenty, and so Russia is certainly helping China fill that need for more and also for diversified energy sources. It is worth saying China is still embracing that policy of diversification, and it isn't necessarily
giving Russia everything at once. It's still holding out, for example, over power of Siberia too, which is the potential new massive gas pipeline. Now there's an interesting difference here in how Moscow and Beijing talk about this. Often Moscow talks about this imminent deal that is about to be proposed, whereas Beijing is often much more reticent. It hasn't really said much and there is no official contract so far.
And just as Russia's economy is suffering from sanctions and other fallout from the invasion of Ukraine, China's economy two has been going through a very difficult patch and Russia is helping to fill in some of those gaps.
Yeah, it's worth noting that Chinese exports to Russia have been a rare bright spot. So while overall outbound shipments from China are still sort of falling, the shipments from China into Russia have jumped more than fifty percent, as I mentioned, so far this year, so it is providing a little bit of reprieve. Still, it's a very asymmetric relationship.
So China makes up about a fifth of Russian trade, whereas Russia makes up about two to three percent of trade for China, So there is still that veryly obvious imbalance in the relationship.
Rebecca, earlier you talked about this unlimited friendship that the two leaders pledge for each other. But we see limits of all kinds, and one of them is over China's unwillingness to fully back Russia in its work against Ukraine.
Yes, I think that's right. The last twenty months, if anything, have showed that there are indeed limits to China's relationship
with Russia. And it's interesting. We spoke with one former Chinese diplomat, very influential academic in China, Huangi Wai, who pointed to these red lines in the relationship, and one of those is this issue of nuclear weapons, and China has been explicit to say and to sort of almost preemptively say that it condemns the use of nuclear weapons in the conflict, and that it condemns the attack of civilians as well. So it has sort of highlighted these
areas where clearly it would be uncomfortable. The interesting thing that Wangi Wa pointed to when he gave me that example was that China, he said, itself, has faced nuclear back mail at the hands of Russia. And he was talking about this border conflict back in nineteen sixty nine where China felt under threat that the USSR might use nuclear weapons as they had this dispute over parts of their shared border. And it does speak to this more
fraud or more complex history. There is still some distrust of Russia in circles in Beijing. There is not a full throttle support for Russia. And even for those who do support Russia, Wang says, he says it's really more about supporting Russia's push against Western hegemony. It's sort of resistance to the US and to the West, rather than any notion of supporting Russia's incursion into sovereign territory that for China is a very uncomfortable sticking point.
And another thing you write about that further complicates this relationship is that while the US and Russia really have no relationship now, China and the US are still very big trading partners, and there is a desire to reach some sort of working agreement between the two nations. In fact, Jijinping and Joe Biden are expected to meet in November.
Yes, indeed, all signs are pointing to the fact that we are expecting to see this sit down between Susonping and President Joe Biden, and it does look like China is quite motivated to stabilize ties. I don't think there are expectations of any sort of concrete or major breakthroughs,
but it's significant that they are sitting down. And part of that need for Beijing's point of view, is to sort of show that it's still willing to work with the international world, that it's open for business for foreign businesses too, and it hasn't sort of become this hostile strategic competitor that it believes the West tries to paint it as. It is worth also mentioning here that as we see China trying to improve ties with the US.
This is one of those dynamics that historically has made Russia uncomfortable, and in fact, it was the pressure that Beijing felt from Russia that border conflict and of other issues that really compelled China to resume diplomatic ties with
the US back in the seventies. So this dynamic with the US hanging over this partnership between China and Russia, and this worry by both parties that either Russia or China would side with the US and leave a third party out in the cold, is a sort of prevailing dynamic, and the relationships really important to remember when.
We come back Wilshi Jinping's rise as a global power broker leave an isolated Vladimir Putin behind Rebecca. We started this conversation talking about how China and Russia are looking to form an alternative economic and political competitor to the West. Do you think moving forward that that becomes more durable, that that does happen.
I think that China has had some successes in pushing that agenda, and particularly with the so called global self, with developing nations and in fact with certain countries in the Middle East too, And although, for example, if you look at that twelve point position paper that China put forward for a cease fire in Ukraine, that was met with some level of skepticism in Europe and in the US, but it did have some credibility among emerging nations, including
countries like Brazil, for example. And so it is important that although there is some skepticism of China's neutrality, and certainly the criticism of its peace proposal has been that it very much favors Moscow, there aren't those same criticisms everywhere. And when we look at, for example, something like the
Belt and Road initiative. Even as there has been a recalibration of how that financial lending has been extended and there is a pull in the amount of activity that we're seeing, quite a significant pullback, in fact, China has still built successfully this diplomatic clout and these diplomatic ties with countries who are themselves much more skeptical about the US and the motivations of the US in their various parts of the world.
Rebecca, as you continue to report on this, what are you looking for as a sign of a further strengthening of the relationship between China and Russia, or perhaps signs of cracks in the friendship.
The element to watch, and particularly for Suzimping, is just how long this conflict goes on for, because the longer it runs, the more delicate the position for C.
Although c has failed to condemn the war explicitly, he has also said he supports Ukraine's sovereignty.
It's pretty clear that the war as it unfolded is not something that presidents see or the Chinese would have chosen, and it remains very interlinked with the global economy, and this war was mainly.
A problem for them.
The worry, I think for China is that if this perceived coziness between Putin and Sea prevails, and the assumption is that it will prevail for as long as this invasion continues, there is this closer perception that China equals to Russia and Russia equals to China, and that is really a position that Beijing does not want. Beijing does not want to be perceived as economically or diplomatically isolated or willing to put itself in that position of isolation.
And the other issue here for China is Taiwan seeing that invasion of Ukraine has really alerted nations, particularly China's Asian neighbors, to the risks of a Taiwan invasion. That's coupled with rising concerns over potential invasion of Taiwan by China and China's refusal to rule out taking the democratically run I learned by force, has heightened those fears in the US in particular. Now just to say it's a highly unlikely scenario, but the fact is, Russia's invasion of
Ukraine has meant that everyone is talking about this. It's precisely the situation that China doesn't want and that I think is sort of the prevailing worry, the longer term worry for policymakers in China.
Rebecca, I was great talking with you.
Pleasure is mine. Thank you.
Thanks for listening to us here at The Big Take. It's a daily podcast from Bloomberg and iHeartRadio. For more shows from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen, and we'd love to hear from you. Email us questions comments to Big Take at Bloomberg dot net. The supervising producer of The Big Take is Vicky Rgalina. Our Senior producer is Katherine Fink. This episode was produced by Sam Gebauer and Zenob Sidiki Kilde Garcia is our engineer.
Our original music was composed by Leo Sidrin. I'm West Kasova. We'll be back on Monday with another big take. Have a great weekend.