Pressure Mounts On Iran–From Inside And Out

the thousands. Widespread demonstrations erupted in September over the death in police custody of Massa Amini. She was a twenty two year old woman, and she was arrested by so called morality police for allegedly disobeying around strict dress code for women. The protesters demanded, among other things, an end to religious laws that require women to cover their heads and that deny them some basic rights. The unrest has since broadened into a widespread rebuke of the government and

its leaders. Some protests have called for the dismantling of the Islamic nature of the state. The government has responded with force. Thousands of protesters have been arrested and some have been put to death, and yet even with international economic pressure and rising internal discontent, there are a few

signs that the government is weakening. Bloomberg Senior international affairs correspondent Mark Champion joins me from London to explain what to make of the turmoil happening now in Iran and how long and unpopular regime can remain in power. Mark, There's been so much happening inside around divisions within Irammian society, the government and especially the leader, like trying to keep control of unrest by students, especially young women, who are

really pushing up against these very strict laws. Can you give us a sense of what's happening now in the wake of all of these protests, arrests, and prosecutions where people are being put to death. I started going to Iranovo twenty years ago. It's different from all the iterations of upset. Before you know, you can say that he has reached a tipping point. There are reports Iranian forces are using bullets and tear gas on anti government protesters around.

The president has said chaos will not be tolerated. Brave Iranians of all ages and walks of life, have been taking to the streets calling for freedom, equality and the end of Islamic rule. The revolution is more than forty years old. It's a spent force now. The people who were leading the country there in their eighties. For them, the revolution was enormously exciting and they were completely committed,

and they still recall it in those terms. But the vast majority of the population was born long after and they don't have nothing connecting them to the revolution really,

and they've come to really hate the regime. There was some sort of cohabitation going on, which was kind of mechanized by these very managed elections, but they were offered acceptable, moderate to conservative candidates that they could vote for who offered some sort of improvement from very hardline views on things like, you know, wearing a hitch ab and so on. And that's gone. With the last election, all choice was removed. The turnout was absolutely minimal, So all pretense having some

sorts of connection with the population is has gone. And I think that really is a tipping point. Now that's a completely separate question as to whether that means that the regime's days are numbered, and that is you know,

much much less clear that that's the case. I've spoken to a few different sort of diplomats and officials about this and sort of just asking them here, so what would it take for there to be a collapse of the regime, and general view seems to be and I think it's probably right that a big mistake made by the security forces, where in one instance they kill large numbers of people, so a big mistake that's simply the lid just kind of comes off, and they seem to

have avoided doing that, and the protests have subsided. They've kind of gone more online, more into sort of daily life, which again is very dangerous for the regime because it just says that their idea of how we ran should be is just completely separate from how people want to live their lives. But it's safer in terms of the regime's immediate survive And the other possibility is, you know, it's a dangerous moment for the regime when the Supreme

Leader passes away. He's an older man and you know he won't live forever. There is no obvious candidate who would be acceptable for the vast majority of the population, and a lot of the legitimacy of the revolution and the regime is embedded in the supreme leader. So it's a dangerous moment for them when that happens and how they handle it. If they can handle that, if they can avoid the big mistakes, this could go on for

some time, and it's just a tragic reality. This has been true for quite some time, this disconnect, and we've seen over the years the strict enforcement ebb and flow where it would be relaxed for a while and then suddenly cracked down. What made the government become so forceful in its enforcement of these rules? I think really the best answer is hubris the it they had finally got

rid of President Ruhani and his team. They were those kind of conservative moderates that had been elected some time before, and they had kept the lid on some of the proclivities of the real heartliners. With them swept away, you then have you know a new president I see who is you know a true heartliner. Over the years, he's played this game in order to keep people on board and give them a little bit of what they want.

But now he's swung back to the hardline side. You know he did with Ahmadinijad before Honey, and now he swung back again. We see a lot of young people who are risking a lot by going out into the streets to protest. But is that true also of the vast majority of the population. You describe most people as having little connection to the old revolution and that spirit, and yet most of the population doesn't seem to be

rising up, even if they're sympathetic to a cause. That's the key, right that, so long as the government avoids some really massive mistake and then really large bloodshed that ignites the necessary level of outrage to get ordinary people out into the street, ordinary people who wouldn't normally take that risk, And that's what would be a desperate threat to the regime and what they've tried and so far succeeded to avoid. But you're right, much of the population

is not willing to come out. That the risks are extremely high, and that is why the regime can survive. One way to kind of understand how the regime has bought this very fine line in order to impose their view of the revolution and the Islamic state while keeping

people from sort of boiling over. The first time I went to run, I was left like ten days, and I went to various cities and there was something that really just sort of niggled, and I couldn't figure out what it was until the day I left, And it was that in all those ten days that didn't hear the call to prayer. Anytime you're in the Middle East, you know, you could Istanbul and it's so overwhelming, right

you just you'll never miss it. And it certainly struck me that I hadn't heard it in all that time. I went back the next time and I tried to,

you know, find out why that was. And the reason was that as people sort of became disenchanted with the regime, they kind of you know, identified that with the call to prayer and the molsons on and they complain, and eventually the Ministry for Religion issued a funk while saying that accepting certain very holy sites like in the very center of Terran and so on, they were not allowed

to amplify the call to prayer. It's so striking because it gives you this idea of how, you know, long this disenchantment has been going on, They've managed to secularize society in Iran in a way that isn't true in

most other Middle Eastern countries. I suppose One reason why most people in run have not risen up despite their own dissatisfaction is that the security forces are so efficient at enforcing these laws, and the regime makes very public the way in which they punish people, torture and other forms of brutal punishment. What role does that play in both the ability of the regime to hang on despite discontent and the unwillingness of people to rise up despite discontent.

It plays a huge role. It becomes at a certain point very very dangerous to go out and protest. You're likely to be imprisoned, and at the same time you can't really see how you're going to achieve your goal, so it becomes quite quickly dispiriting. We should really remember that these kinds of regimes, they tend to be able to survive long long after they've lost popularity and legitimacy, and they conduce for as long as the security forces

around them are willing to use violence to suppress. When you say one circumstance under which the government might fall would be that they make a mistake on a scale so large that many more people rise up, is that a case of them being able to overwhelm the security forces exactly what does it look like to overthrow that government. Well, at a certain point and the security force has just

done enough because the crowds are just so large. Each country has its that that limit will be in a different place, but you know, we haven't seen that reached in Iran. Yet another pressure on the government that is being felt by the people are the international sanctions against Iran, which has isolated the country even more than it was

before and has really squeezed its economy. Do you think that those sanctions are having an effect or has they just hardened people against the West despite not liking their own government. They have an effect in the sense that they make the country much poorer and therefore the government has less money, et cetera. But the government will follow,

you know, prioritize what it feels necessary. And for this regime, the top priority is going to be the security forces, their foreign policy, and all those things will come before what normal Western politicians might prioritize in terms of healthcare

or whatever. They will retain the money to carry on. Weirdly, the isolation of the economy has forced more and more of the economy into the hands of the I r g C. The Iranian Revolutionary God Corps has more control over the economy now than it did before the sanctions. The sanctions of work in the sense that damage the economy, but they don't necessarily work in terms of disempowering the regime. You won't find the sanctions popular, so people don't say

bring it on. But you are seeing a lot of unrest, and some of that unrest not in these particular protests, but previous ones. They were clearly about the economy, and they were held by in smaller towns and cities, poorer people. Quite different from these are the ones in in two thousand nine. You have seen a lot of unrest. Now, whether you can say that's because of the sanctions, it's

it's almost impossible to draw that line. Nobody's protesting against the government because they have followed policies that induce sanctions. That's not what happens. What happens is they go out when they're unhappy. If the sanctions create an environment in which they are unhappy, then you could argue that they've contributed, But it's extremely difficult to draw lines. Mark, please stay

with me. Will continue our conversation after the break. Given how much of the unrest in the protests are being carried out by young people. Is it just a matter of time that we see a generational shift that causes a much different Iran to take shape? You mentioned the supreme leader is old and won't be around forever. What happens next? I think the answer, you know is yes,

but how much time? So I remember again first trip to Iran in two thousands three four, going to visit one of the embassies and getting a briefing there where they were making exactly this argument that the regime is it's days and numbered because the demography is just all against them. And they weren't wrong that the demography was working against the regime. It's just that twenty years later, they're still there, and it's difficult to say when it

becomes untenable and when the regime can't continue. True, the eight year old who conducted the revolution that they will be gone pretty soon. But the sixties seventy old too, we're also grew up in or join the revolution, and it's on it. They still have a connection. It's not black and white. Question is how long? And it's not really very easy to answer that, Mark Champion, thanks for

talking with me. Thank you. Let's take a closer look now at IRUN from a national and international security perspective. Olive Ayaz is here with me in Washington. He's the Iran project director for the International Crisis Group, but think tank that tracks global conflicts Alive. For many years, the US has tried every form of pressure to get around to change really to change the government in a run,

and nothing has worked. If you were to advise President Biden, what would you suggest an alternative path to what the US is doing now? There is a ticking bomb which is around nuclear program that is advancing very quickly, and at some stage there needs to be a solution. Now, that solution could be something less than the restoration of the two thousand and fifty nuclear agreement, under which the

regime will get wholesale sanctions relief. It could be a narrower deal, kind of a freeze agreement that would provide them with partial sanctions relief that it's easier to defend politically, but would diffuse this potential crisis because the last thing the West ones at a time that it's dealing with the crisis in Ukraine, with the potential crisis with China,

is a nuclear nonproliferation crisis in the Middle East. I think the Western general and the United States in particular would have to come to a point psychologically to call this regime an evil empire and yet do deals with them that would limit the greatest threats that they pose to Western interests and security. By that, I mean replicating the experience that the United States had with the Soviet Union.

You know, it was possible for the United States to stand up against human rights violations in the Soviet Union, to try to contain the Soviet unions problematic foreign policy and role in proxy conflicts around the world, but at

the same time sign onto arms control agreements. This is the point that the West should eventually get to with Iran as well, understanding that political change in Iran comes not because of what the West will do, but what because of what they running people would want and will do. As we saw in the recent experience, the political leadership in Iran is still cohesive, still has the will to fight and remain in power. That could potentially change down

the road. There might be cracks when the supreme leader is not there anymore, if there are more differences within the system that emerge, if their defections and at that point they running people might have a better chance of achieving a more open society. The question that I think is often overlooked in the West is what will this pressure policy that the West is entirely focused on due

to the Iranian people, They're already on the brink. Another five to ten years of pressure and isolation will weaken this society even further in a way that even if a tipping point is reached, it might not necessarily result in the kind of transition to a democratic system that

the West wishes to see. So although the West cannot, I think midwife a positive outcome necessarily in Iran, this is not South Africa that you know, the West had a lot of leverage against that could use, in which there was Nelson Mandela, that could lead the democratic transition, in which there was William f the clerk who was

willing to compromise and hand over the power. All I think the West can do is to try to get into the kind of arrangements that will image the threat around proses on the nuclear front, the threat around poses in the region, and all of those have different solutions, and eventually also trying to empower the Iranian people through allowing the kind of sanctions relief that would benefit them

the most. Just to use your analogy between the United States and the Soviet Union, one of the differences is that at the time the Soviet Union was a major nuclear power, as of course was the U. S. And so that was the basis of the relationship. Whereas Around is trying to become a nuclear power and the rest

of the world is trying to stop it. Do you think that ultimately Around will achieve its goal of gaining a nuclear weapon or the efforts by the West to stop it will succeed in keeping it from getting one. Any country historically that has been determined enough to go for a nuclear weapon has been able to achieve that objective, and I don't think Iran will be an exception to

that rule. But in the Irani in case, I don't think there is a scenario in which they can weaponize without going through a conflict first, because this is a program that is so deeply penetrated by Western and Israeli intelligence, as we have seen by repeated covert operations against Iran over the years. Iran has blamed Israel for what it called an active terrorism on its Naton's nuclear facility. According to State TV, Irani and Foreign Minister Mohammed Jabads a

Reef vowed revenge. So once the decision, the political decision to go for a weapon is made, I think you will probably see in a US led attack on Iran's nuclear program. But having said that, although there is a military option for setting back Irun's nuclear program, there's no military solution to prevent Iran in a sustainable fashion from achieving that objective. And that is why the diplomatic solution remains, in the perspective of the Biden administration, the best and

most sustainable solution for curbing Iran's nuclear ambitions. We'll be right back. Do you think that the risk of a military confrontation rather than diplomatic economic confrontation as we've seen between the West and Iran is high? Oh? Absolutely. The problem right now is that the head space for escalation on the Iranian side is shrinking by the day. You know, the US has basically maxed itself out of sanctions leverage. It has sanctioned almost everything that moves in Iran. It

can increase the pressure by enforcing the existing sanctions. But if the dial of sanctions is eight out of ten, it will go to nine out of ten, and that is probably not going to result in significant change in the Iranian economic situation. They have survived. There are obviously thriving, but I think from the Iranian perspective, the worst of

the sanctions is already behind them. Plus they now have these growing ties with China and Russia, and they have this club of sanctioned nations to try to circumvent US and Western sanctions, and so their perspective is that they can survive economically. But the problem is if there is a covert operation against the run zunclear facilities, which has not happened since the last time Prime Minister in Antony

who was in office, that's Israel's prime minister. The only thing that Iran can potentially due to respond is to enrich to which could potentially cross US and Israel's redlines. Iranians are of course also itching to retaliate against some of the covert operations Israel is conducting on their soil against their military facilities. That too could potentially push the two countries over into a conflict, whether it's inadvertent or deliberate, and so the risks are high. I would argue they've

never been higher. And there's also now a political motivation inside Iran for an embattled regime to try to get into some sort of a conflagration that could potentially serve as a distraction from troubles at home, that people would rally around the government even if they dislike it, simply because they're defending their country. Absolutely, And this happened in the nineteen eighties. The younger revolutionary system in Iran went into the Irani Rock War for eight years and instead

of undermining it, that consolidated it. So they've had this experience before. What would military conflict between the Western Iran look like. I don't think we're talking about Western troops

moving into Iran, but something different. Well, it would be certainly surgical strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities, and there is this view even within Iran that it could be something similar to the tit fitat that happened between Iran and the United States in January over the link of Irani in general, Gossam sole money and I Run's retaliation the form of shooting a barrage of holistic missiles into US bass in Iraq. It is true that that tip for

Tad remained contained. But of course wars always start on assumptions that they're quick, they could be contained, and they're predictable, and almost always those assumptions turn out to be wrong. A conflict over I runs unclear program is easy to start, but it's probably going to be difficult to finish. A year from now, five years from now, where do you expect will be when it comes to both Iruns government

and its relationship with the rest of the world. It's a very dangerous business to predict developments in the Middle East and especially in Iran, But I don't expect fundamental changes in the short run. What I think should be the focus in the immediate term should be on trying to put a band aid on this situation that could

easily battle out of control. We are really at the mercy of a single incident between Iran and Israel, or you know, some kind of a provocative decision by the Iranians to enrich the weapons grade for instance, that could potentially provoke a conflict, and that kind of conflict can counterintuitively add to the regime's shelf life because it would change the subject domestically. It would allow them to further

securitize and militarize the domestic sphere. So if in the short run the focus is on preventing a conflict and on trying to empower the Irani middle class, then I think there is hope that in the medium term, with the top of the political system starting to crack in the Islamic Republic, we might see transition to something better. Everybody is thanks so much for being here, great pleasure. You can read more reporting from Mark Champion at Bloomberg

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