I'm Daniel James, and you're listening to seven AM. In Russia, the rules of power are being rewritten. For decades, Vladimir Putin govern through a network of loyal elites, oligarchs, bureaucrats, security chiefs, each free warded for their obedience and connections. But since the invasion of Ukraine, that system has begun to fracture. The old elite are being sidelined and a new caste is emerging, relatives, ideologues, and battlefield loyalists who
tie their futures to the war. Moscow based journalist Cape Depuri has covered Putin's Russia for Reuters and more recently as the Bureau Chief or Associated Press. Today, she tells us how the war is reshaping the Russian willing class and what it reveals about where Putin's Russia is headed. It's Monday, November twenty four. Kate, thanks so much for joining us. You are one of the very few Western journalists still reporting from Russia. What's it like for you
to do your job there? What challenges do you face?
It's true there are very few Western journalists still reporting out of Russia. We are now roughly I would say, about twenty journalists. It's highly restricted now in terms of what we can do. The Special military Operation, which is what the Russians called the war in Ukraine, has brought extreme restrictions for all media. There's a whole slew of new Internet restrictions. So it's now a criminal offense to
search for any banned websites. That means independent news in Russian, So the Internet search is a criminal offense in itself. Platforms like WhatsApp and Telegram are now blocked. They're not fully blocked. They're still operational, but they will be fully blocked as the government tries to roll out its new platform called max.
Max is interesting.
It's a platform that has been developed by the Digital Ministry and it will be installed on every smartphone sold in Russia. It will be the platform used in all official business and it has been developed as a state tool, so most people expect it will be used for surveillance.
Does all this make it frightening for you to do your job? I mean this sort of surveillance pressure. Not only does it make it difficult for you to do your job, let'n't make it scary to do your job.
Yes, it's less scary for a Western correspondent than it is for Russian journalists. They have to be even more careful than Western journalists. And part of my job is to make sure that I fulfill the duty of care towards the Russian journalists that I work with. It's also scary for anybody that talks to a Western journalist, So in terms of sources, it's now very restricted. People are quite frightened to meet you, and they're certainly really careful about whatever they say to you.
Can you take us back to a time before the war? What kind of power structures existed under Putin and how stable was it?
The elite around Putin up until the war was pretty stable. It was composed of the people that he had known in Saint Petersburg when he was coming up through the bureaucracy in that city, and they're probably his closest circle. It was also composed of people that he could trust from the justice and security agencies, and also the Sillaviki,
who are the FSB and the security services. There's one really other important group to mention, and that is the technocrats, and they've also been at his side for a long time, and they're possibly the most interesting group in some ways of the old structures because they are people of diverse views and political conviction. They're extremely talented technical crats who basically have kept the government going.
So the elite is a mixed bag.
It's a kind of honeycomb of people that he has developed and he trusts.
Most of the elite.
Apart from the technocrats, have been allowed to develop positions of great wealth and status as long as they stayed out of politics. And put In allowed the access, and he decided who got to play political roles.
And since the invasion would have been the biggest shifts in how political or business power is distributed.
Well, it's now all about winning the war.
And key to the prosecution of the war has been this group of technocrats. Put In values above all else, the ability of those.
In his circle to help him win the war.
He did put the old elite or notice in early twenty twenty four when he made a speech to the Federal Assembly. It's like his address to the nation, and he said, the real elite is those who serve Russia workers and warriors, people who've proven their loyalty to Russia in action.
What they are definitely not an elite. I repeat the true real elite are all those who serve Russia, the workers and the warriors, the reliable ones, the ones proven their loyalty to Russia. They are worthy people.
So top politicians and business bosses know that they need to be involved in some kind of patriotic support for the war now.
And so that's saying a whole bunch of other characters rise through the ranks and in uadically highlight and Civilova. What does her rise tell us about the kind of people Putin is now elevating?
Well, Annatsivilyova is a very interesting and significant character.
Misinski.
It's important to say that the Kremlin has not acknowledged this officially, but she is widely reported to be a second cousin of Putin's. He doesn't acknowledge family members publicly, but Western intelligence and independent Russian reporting suggests that she is his second cousin. She has been given a job as the deputy Defense Minister. There are several of them,
but she is possibly the most visible. She has a very active social media presence, and she's like the human face of port given to military veterans and their families. Her telegram channel and now her Max channel is full of pictures of her meeting and greeting veterans officiating at Paralympic sporting events. She is extremely empathetic but also pretty tough, and she does a very good job for Putin in giving a human face to this war effort.
Is this a trend caat of Putin picking family members to take on important roles, and if so, what does that say about how Putin is holding on Suwey's group on power.
Independent observers say that putin His inner circle is smaller now.
He has gathered around.
Him only those that he can completely trust, and amongst those are possibly family members, although not acknowledged, and the family members of those inside his inner circle that he trusts. The kind of changes and the new characters that we're seeing are very much part of the Kremlin narrative. These new wartime heroes are emerging, They're changing Russia. This is very much what we need to understand when we look at Russia.
Today coming up? Is this reshaping permanent and what does it mean for everyday Russians? Do you see this as a permanent reshaping of the el or just more of a wartime calculation.
I think that's a big question. I think it's really important for Putting that these new characters who've risen up are seen to the Russian people of the rewards that you can get if you support the war. But it's a big question as to whether the old elite in the long term will give up their positions of power and allow the new characters in. I think in terms of Annatsiviliova, there's not a question about that.
She is already in. She's there for the long term.
There is a scheme that Putin personally has initiated called Time of Heroes. That's a scheme for people who are war veterans. They can apply to be trained to join the government. I think we will see them emerge into positions of influence and power. For example, Putin has said that he wants one hundred war veterans to be elected in parliamentary elections next year, so he's obviously interested in bringing these new military faces into the public domain. How high they rise is another question.
Kate is Putin at all interested in ending the war or seeking peace or does perpetual war suit him and he's hold in.
Power given this whole year of on off negotiations with the American side and with Trump. It's now clear that Putin is in no hurry to end the war. There's been some additional momentum on the front in recent weeks, with Russian forces really probing hard at the u Ukrainian defenses. He feels he's got the momentum on his side on the battleground. He has an ideological commitment himself to pulling Ukraine back into a Russian orbit, and that's really strong.
It's a really strong motivator. And those around him also say that that this is the key factor, is Putin's own personal commitment to this ideological goal that he has.
At its height, the Soviet Empire stretched from laverv in eastern Europe all the way to the Pacific Ocean. But in the wake of the USSR collapse, Putin views the sizable communities of Russian speakers and ethnic Russians in many of these former Soviet states, especially Ukraine, as belonging to the Russian Federation.
And where does that commitment stem from in the first place, As.
A question, it must come to some extent from his Soviet heritage, from having grown up and flourished as a KGB officer.
Within the Soviet system.
So he has an emotional commitment to that to the greater Russian influence, and it's also for him as a strategist, really important to keep Ukraine within Russia's orbit as a buffer to Western States, to the NATO alliance.
And finally, Kate, what does this changing elite mean for ordinary Russians.
Russians watch what is going on at the top with great attention. They understand that their lives are affected by the decisions of one man, so they are the best Kremlin watchers. And anybody who tells you that Russians are not thinking about the war and the power structures are wrong, they're really attuned to it. It's another question whether they will say what they really think. If you do a vox pop in the street in Moscow, you can be pretty much guaranteed that if anyone will talk to you,
they're going to be pro putin. Russians are extremely adept at saying what's needed of them in order to survive. That's the reality of their history. But there are those who will say what they think. And as reporters, by the way, we have to be really careful because we have a duty of care. They can really get into trouble the up in jail for a moment of kind
of impulse and emotion. The other thing I think that's interesting in terms of what Russians, what ordinary Russians are thinking, is that they do feel the restrictions and this is a pressure point for them. They're feeling the Internet restrictions quite considerably. That's a point where they will open up and say enough, we need information. We can't live isolated.
And they, of course.
Like the Ukrainians, are really tired of the war. The economy is feeling the pressure, prices arising, business is suffering, and the Russians feel it. So they are very interested in the decisions being taken at the top.
Well, k we really appreciate your time, and we really appreciate you're reporting. Thanks so much for coming on seven am.
Thank you very much for invading me.
You can greet Kate the puries reporting in eighteen forty three magazine The Economist's long read publication. It's called How to Get Ahead in Wartime Russia and it's online now. Also in the news, Labour has offered a concession to the greens of native forest logging in a bid to get its environmental reforms through This week The offer, according to the ABC, would mean logging of native forests would need to comply with new environmental standards within three years.
Green Senator Sarah Hanson Young they said she needs to look at the details, but that she doesn't think a timeline of three years to protect native forests is acceptable. And the Bureau of Meteorology spent ninety six million dollars on its website redesign. The new bureau chief, Doctor Stewart Minchin, has confirmed the website has been criticized for being hard to navigate and making ready placed stains on the radar
map difficult to understand. The bomb has been under fire regularly since twenty twenty two, when it attempted to rebrand as the Bureau. Its new leader, Doctor Stewart Minchin, told nine newspapers it's important to be transparent about the things management at the Bureau of Meteorology has got wrong. I'm Daniel James. It's is seven am. Thanks for listening.